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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
UNITED STATES
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
WASHINGTON, D.C.
IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN
ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION
OF TANGIBLE THINGS FROM [REDACTED]
(TS)
Docket Number: BR:
09-06
PRIMARY ORDER
A verified application having been made by the Director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for an order pursuant
to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (the Act),
Title 50, United States Code (U.S.C.), § 1861, as amended,
requiring the production to the National Security Agency (NSA)
of the tangible things described below, and full consideration
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN-
Derived from: Pleadings in the above-captioned docket
Declassify on: 29 May 2034
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having been given to the matters set forth therein, the Court
finds as follows:
1. There are reasonable grounds to believe that the
tangible things sought are relevant to authorized investigations
(other than threat assessments) being conducted by the FBI under
guidelines approved by the Attorney General under Executive
Order 12333 to protect against international terrorism, which
investigations are not being conducted solely upon the basis of
activities protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1)]
2. The tangible things sought could be obtained with a
subpoena duces tecum issued by a court of the United States in
aid of a grand jury investigation or with any other order issued
by a court of the United States directing the production of
records or tangible things. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(2)(D)]
3. The application includes an enumeration of the
minimization procedures the government proposes to follow with
regard to the tangible things sought. Such procedures are
substantively the same as the minimization procedures approved
and adopted as binding by the order of this Court in Docket
Number BR 09-01. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1)]
Accordingly, the Court finds that the application of the
United States to obtain the tangible things, as described below,
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satisfies the requirements of the Act and, therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to the authority conferred
on this Court by the Act, that the application is GRANTED, and
it is
FURTHER ORDERED, as follows:
(1) (A) The Custodians of Records [REDACTED] shall
produce to NSA upon service of the appropriate secondary order,
and continue production on an ongoing daily basis thereafter for
the duration of this order, unless otherwise ordered by the
Court, an electronic copy of the following tangible things: all
call detail records or "telephony metadata"¹ created by [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
(B) The Custodian of Records of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
shall produce to NSA upon service of the appropriate
secondary order, and continue production on an ongoing daily
¹ For purposes of this Order "telephony metadata" includes
comprehensive communications routing information (e.g.,
originating or terminating telephone number, international
Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) number, International Mobile
station Equipment Identity (IMEI) number, etc.), trunk
identifier, telephone calling card numbers, and time and
duration of call. Telephony metadata does not include the
substantive content of any communication, as defined by 18
U.S.C. § 2510(8), or the name, address, or financial information
of a subscriber or customer.
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basis thereafter for the duration of this order, unless
otherwise ordered by the Court, an electronic copy of the
following tangible things: all call detail records or "telephony
metadata" created by [REDACTED] for communications (i) between the
United States and abroad; or (ii) wholly within the United
States, including local telephone calls.
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
(2) With respect to any information the FBI receives as a
result of this Order (information that is passed or "tipped" to
it by NSA), the FBI shall follow as minimization procedures the
procedures set forth in The Attorney General's Guidelines for
Domestic FBI Operations (September 29, 2008).
(3) With respect to the information that NSA receives as a
result of this Order, NSA shall strictly adhere to the following
minimization procedures:
A. The government is hereby prohibited from accessing
business record metadata acquired pursuant to this Court's
orders in the above-captioned docket and its predecessors (“BR
metadata") for any purpose except as described herein.
B. The BR metadata may be accessed for the purposes of
ensuring data integrity and developing and testing any
technological measures designed to enable the NSA to comply with
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the Court's orders. Access to the BR metadata for such purposes
shall be limited to the NSA Collection Managers, Data Integrity
Analysts, and System Administrators described in paragraphs 17-
19 of the Declaration of [REDACTED] Chief, Special FISA
Oversight and Processing, Oversight and Compliance, Signals
Intelligence Directorate, the National Security Agency, filed as
Exhibit A to the Application in the above-captioned docket
("[REDACTED] Declaration"). Additional individuals directly involved
in developing and testing any technological measures designed to
enable the NSA to comply with the Court's orders may be granted
access, provided such access is approved by NSA's Office of
General Counsel (OGC) on a case-by-case basis.
C. The government may request through a motion, permission
from the Court to use specific telephone identifiers² that
[REDACTED]
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satisfy the reasonable articulable suspicion standard³ to query
³ The reasonable articulable suspicion standard is met when,
based on the factual and practical considerations of everyday
life on which reasonable and prudent persons act, there are
facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that
the telephone identifier is associated with [REDACTED]
provided, however, that any
telephone identifier believed to be used by a U.S. person shall
not be regarded as associated with [REDACTED]
solely on the basis of activities that
are protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution.
For purposes of this Order, [REDACTED]
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the BR metadata for purposes of obtaining foreign intelligence
information through contact chaining [REDACTED]
as described in the [REDACTED] Declaration at 6-7, on a
case-by-case basis. In addition, if the government determines
that immediate querying of the BR metadata through contact
chaining [REDACTED] is necessary to protect against an
imminent threat to human life, the government may query the BR
metadata for such purpose. In any case falling into this latter
category, the government shall notify the Court of the access,
in writing, no later than 5:00 p.m., Eastern Time on the next
business day after such access. Any submission to the Court
under this paragraph shall, at a minimum, specify the telephone
identifier for which access is sought or was granted, provide
[REDACTED]
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the factual basis for the NSA's belief that the reasonable
articulable suspicion standard has been met with regard to that
identifier⁴ and, if such access has already taken place, a
statement of the immediate threat necessitating such access.
Only the Chief, Special FISA Oversight and Processing, Oversight
and Compliance, Signals Intelligence Directorate; the Chief or
Deputy Chief, Homeland Security Analysis Center; or one of the
twenty specially-authorized Homeland Mission Coordinators in the
Analysis and Production Directorate of the Signals Intelligence
Directorate shall be authorized to access the BR metadata for
purposes of implementing this sub-paragraph.
D. For the duration of the authorization granted by this
Order, the NSA may use certain telephone identifiers previously
approved by the Court in docket number BR 09-01, specifically,
only those [REDACTED] telephone identifiers described in Tab 1 to the
[REDACTED] Declaration, to conduct queries of the BR metadata for
purposes of obtaining foreign intelligence information through
⁴ For telephone identifiers that are currently subject to Court-
authorized electronic surveillance, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. §
1805, based on this Court's finding of probable cause to believe
that they are used by [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] including those used by U.S. persons,
the government's submission need only provide the target's name,
docket number, and date of expiration of this Court's most
recent authorization of electronic surveillance.
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contact chaining [REDACTED] in accordance with this
Order. If NSA has knowledge of the discontinued use of any such
identifier, its analysis and minimization of information
retrieved from the queries based on any such identifier should
be informed by the knowledge of discontinued use of the
identifier.
E. The Director of the NSA shall continue to maintain
mandatory procedures to strictly control access to and use of
the BR metadata, in accordance with this Court's orders.
F. The NSA shall obtain the BR metadata from [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] via dedicated secure lines, and shall store
and process the BR metadata on a secure internal network that
NSA exclusively will operate.
G. Any processing by technical personnel of the BR metadata
acquired pursuant to this order shall be conducted through the
NSA's secure internal network, which shall be accessible only to
cleared technical personnel, using accounts authorized by a user
authentication service, based on user login and password.
H. Access to the BR metadata shall be accomplished through
a software interface that will limit access to this data to
authorized personnel. NSA's Oversight and Compliance Office
shall monitor the designation of individuals with access to the
BR metadata. Access to the metadata shall be controlled by user
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name and password. When the metadata is accessed, the user's
login, Internet Protocol (IP) address, date and time, and
retrieval request shall be automatically logged for auditing
capability. NSA's OGC shall monitor the functioning of this
automatic logging capability. Persons authorized for access to
the BR metadata shall be briefed by NSA's OGC concerning the
authorization granted by this Order and the limited
circumstances in which queries to the metadata are permitted, as
well as other procedures and restrictions regarding the
retrieval, storage, and dissemination of the metadata.
I. Any dissemination of U.S. person information shall
follow the standard NSA minimization procedures found in USSID
18. Before information identifying a U.S. person may be
disseminated outside of NSA, a judgment must be made that the
identity of the U.S. person is necessary to understand the
foreign intelligence information or to assess its importance.
Prior to the dissemination of any U.S. person identifying
information, the Chief of Information Sharing Services in the
Signals Intelligence Directorate must determine that the
information identifying the U.S. person is in fact related to
counterterrorism information and that it is necessary to
understand the counterterrorism information or assess its
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importance.⁵ A record shall be made of every such determination.
J. At least once before the expiration of the authorities
granted herein, NSA's OGC shall conduct a random spot check,
consisting of an examination of a sample of call detail records
obtained, to ensure that NSA is receiving only data as
authorized by the Court and not receiving the substantive
content of communications.
K. The BR metadata collected under this Court's Orders may
be kept online (that is, accessible for queries) for five years
from the date of acquisition, at which time it shall be
destroyed.
L. The Chief, Special FISA Oversight and Processing,
Oversight and Compliance, Signals Intelligence Directorate;
Chief and Deputy Chief, Homeland Security Analysis Center; and
the Homeland Mission Coordinators shall maintain appropriate
management controls (e.g., records of all tasking decisions,
audit and review procedures) for access to the metadata and
shall use the USSID 18 to minimize the information reported
concerning U.S. persons.
M. The government shall implement the additional oversight
mechanisms to ensure compliance with this Order:
⁵ The Court understands that the Senior Operations Officer at
NSA's National Security Operation Center is the approving
authority for after-hours requests.
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(i) NSA's OGC shall consult with the Department of
Justice's National Security Division (NSD) on all
significant legal opinions that relate to the
interpretation, scope, and/or implementation of the
authorizations granted by the Court in this matter. When
operationally practicable, such consultation shall occur in
advance; otherwise, NSD shall be notified as soon as
practicable.
(ii) NSA's OGC shall promptly provide NSD with copies
of the mandatory procedures (and all replacements,
supplements or revisions thereto in effect now or adopted
in the future) the Director of NSA is required to maintain
to strictly control access to and use of the data acquired
pursuant to orders issued by the Court in this matter.
(iii) NSA's OGC shall promptly provide NSD with copies
of all formal briefing and/or training materials (including
all revisions thereto) currently in use or prepared and
used in the future to brief/train NSA personnel concerning
the authorizations granted by this Order.
(iv) At least once before the expiration of the
authorities granted herein, a meeting for the purpose of
assessing compliance with this Court's orders in this
matter shall be held with representatives from NSA'S OGC,
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NSD, and appropriate individuals from NSA'S SID. The
results of this meeting shall be reduced to writing and
submitted to the Court as part of any application to renew
or reinstate the authorities granted herein.
(v) At least once before the expiration of the
authorities granted herein, NSD shall meet with NSA's
Office of Inspector General (OIG) to discuss their
respective oversight responsibilities and assess NSA's
compliance with the Court's orders in this matter.
(vi) Prior to implementation, all proposed automated
query processes shall be reviewed and approved by NSA's
OGC, NSD, and the Court.
N. Any application to renew or reinstate the authority
granted herein shall include a report describing: (i) the
queries made since the end of the reporting period of the last
report filed with the Court; and (ii) any proposed changes in
the way in which the call detail records would be received from
the carriers.
O. Upon completion of the government's end-to-end system
engineering and process reviews, described in Memorandum of the
United States In Response to the Court's Order Dated January 28,
2009, Tab 1, Declaration of Lieutenant General Keith B.
Alexander, United States Army, Director of the NSA, filed
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February 17, 2009, at 21, the government shall file a report
with the Court, that shall, at a minimum, include:
(i) an affidavit by the Director of the FBI, and
affidavits by any other official responsible for national
security that the government deems appropriate, describing
the value of the BR metadata to the national security of
the United States and certifying that the tangible things
sought are relevant to an authorized investigation (other
than a threat assessment) to obtain foreign intelligence
information not concerning a U.S. person or to protect
against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence
activities, and that such investigation of a U.S. person is
not conducted solely on the basis of activities protected
by the First Amendment;
(ii) a description of the results of the NSA's end-to-
end system engineering and process reviews, including any
additional instances of non-compliance identified
therefrom;
(iii) a full discussion of the steps taken to remedy
any additional non-compliance as well as the incidents
described in the Court's Order of March 2, 2009 in docket
number BR 08-13, and an affidavit attesting that any
technological remedies have been tested and demonstrated to
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be successful; and
(iv) additional minimization and oversight procedures
the government proposes to employ should the Court decide
to authorize the government's resumption of regular access
to the BR metadata.
This authorization regarding [REDACTED]
and unknown persons in the United States
and abroad affiliated with [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
and unknown persons in the United States
and abroad affiliated with [REDACTED]
expires on 10th day of JULY 2009,
at 5:00 p.m., Eastern Time.
05-29-2009 11:43
Signed Eastern Time
Date Time
REGGIE B. WALTON
Judge, United States Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court
[REDACTED]
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{
"title": "FISC Order BR 09-06",
"type": "FOIA",
"collection": "foia",
"description": "Order of the FISC approving the Government. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
"long_description": "",
"tags": [],
"document": {
"creator": "FISC",
"date_created": "2009-05-29",
"classification": [
"TOP SECRET",
"COMINT"
],
"dissemination": [
"NOFORN"
],
"programs": [],
"countries": [],
"people": [
"Walton, Reggie B."
]
},
"publication": [
{
"publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
"date_published": "2014-01-17",
"link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/fisc-order-br-09-06",
"reporters": [],
"contributors": []
}
],
"pdf_sha256": "3f922408ff7e8848a4b080f9bb2afe60e9c95c8ffb721532113ff04185266c52",
"pages": 15
}