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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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UNITED STATES
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FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
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WASHINGTON, D.C.
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IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
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BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN
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ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION
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OF TANGIBLE THINGS FROM
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[REDACTED]
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Docket Number: BR
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10-49
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|
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PRIMARY ORDER
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A verified application having been made by the Director of
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the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for an order pursuant
|
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to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (the Act),
|
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Title 50, United States Code (U.S.C.), § 1861, as amended,
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requiring the production to the National Security Agency (NSA)
|
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of the tangible things described below, and full consideration
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|
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
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Derived from: Pleadings in the above-captioned docket
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Declassify on: 6 August 2035
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
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having been given to the matters set forth therein, the Court
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finds as follows:
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1. There are reasonable grounds to believe that the
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tangible things sought are relevant to authorized investigations
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(other than threat assessments) being conducted by the FBI under
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guidelines approved by the Attorney General under Executive
|
||||
Order 12333 to protect against international terrorism, which
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||||
investigations are not being conducted solely upon the basis of
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activities protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution
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||||
of the United States. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1)]
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||||
|
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2. The tangible things sought could be obtained with a
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||||
subpoena duces tecum issued by a court of the United States in
|
||||
aid of a grand jury investigation or with any other order issued
|
||||
by a court of the United States directing the production of
|
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records or tangible things. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(2)(D)]
|
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|
||||
3. The application includes an enumeration of the
|
||||
minimization procedures the government proposes to follow with
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regard to the tangible things sought. Such procedures are
|
||||
similar to the minimization procedures approved and adopted as
|
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binding by the order of this Court in Docket Number BR 10-17 and
|
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its predecessors. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1)]
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|
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Accordingly, the Court finds that the application of the
|
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United States to obtain the tangible things, as described below,
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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2
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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satisfies the requirements of the Act and, therefore,
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|
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to the authority conferred
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on this Court by the Act, that the application is GRANTED, and
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it is
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FURTHER ORDERED, as follows:
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(1)Α. The Custodians of Records of [REDACTED] shall
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produce to NSA upon service of the appropriate secondary order,
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and continue production on an ongoing daily basis thereafter for
|
||||
the duration of this order, unless otherwise ordered by the
|
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Court, an electronic copy of the following tangible things: all
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call detail records or “telephony metadata"¹ created by [REDACTED]
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|
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B. The Custodian of Records of [REDACTED] shall produce to NSA upon service of the appropriate
|
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secondary order, and continue production on an ongoing daily
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¹ For purposes of this Order “telephony metadata" includes
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comprehensive communications routing information (e.g.,
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originating and terminating telephone number, International
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Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) number, International Mobile
|
||||
station Equipment Identity (IMEI) number, etc.), trunk
|
||||
identifier, telephone calling card numbers, and time and
|
||||
duration of call. Telephony metadata does not include the
|
||||
substantive content of any communication, as defined by 18
|
||||
U.S.C. § 2510(8), or the name, address, or financial information
|
||||
of a subscriber or customer.
|
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|
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
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3
|
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|
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
basis thereafter for the duration of this order, unless
|
||||
otherwise ordered by the Court, an electronic copy of the
|
||||
following tangible things: all call detail records or
|
||||
"telephony metadata" created by [REDACTED] for communications (i)
|
||||
between the United States and abroad; or (ii) wholly within the
|
||||
United States, including local telephone calls.
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
(2) With respect to any information the FBI receives as a
|
||||
result of this Order (information that disseminated to it by
|
||||
NSA), the FBI shall follow as minimization procedures the
|
||||
procedures set forth in The Attorney General's Guidelines for
|
||||
Domestic FBI Operations (September 29, 2008).
|
||||
|
||||
(3) With respect to the information that NSA receives as a
|
||||
result of this Order, NSA shall strictly adhere to the following
|
||||
minimization procedures:
|
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|
||||
A. The government is hereby prohibited from accessing
|
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business record metadata acquired pursuant to this Court's
|
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orders in the above-captioned docket and its predecessors ("BR
|
||||
metadata") for any purpose except as described herein.
|
||||
Notwithstanding the requirements set forth below, Executive
|
||||
Branch and Legislative Branch personnel may be permitted
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
4
|
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|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
appropriate access to the BR metadata and certain information
|
||||
derived therefrom in order to facilitate their lawful oversight
|
||||
functions, which include, but are not limited to, those set
|
||||
forth below.
|
||||
|
||||
B. The BR metadata may be accessed for the purposes of
|
||||
ensuring data integrity and developing and testing any
|
||||
technological measures designed to enable the NSA to comply with
|
||||
the Court's orders. Access to the BR metadata for such purposes
|
||||
shall be limited to the NSA Collection Managers, Data Integrity
|
||||
Analysts, and System Administrators described in paragraph 16 of
|
||||
the Declaration of [REDACTED] of the Signals Intelligence
|
||||
Directorate, the National Security Agency, filed as Exhibit A to
|
||||
the Application in the above-captioned docket ([REDACTED] Declaration").
|
||||
Additional individuals directly involved in
|
||||
developing and testing technologies to be used with the BR
|
||||
metadata may be granted access to the BR metadata, provided such
|
||||
access is approved by NSA's Office of General Counsel (OGC) on a
|
||||
case-by-case basis. Persons who query the BR metadata pursuant
|
||||
to this paragraph may only share the results of any such query
|
||||
with other specially-cleared NSA technical personnel, unless:
|
||||
(i) sharing is permitted under paragraph 3(J); or (ii) a data
|
||||
integrity analyst conducted the query using a RAS-approved
|
||||
telephone identifier at the request of an analyst authorized to
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
5
|
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|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
query the BR metadata pursuant to paragraph 3 (C) below, or an
|
||||
analyst authorized to receive query results pursuant to
|
||||
paragraph 3(I) below.² Queries performed by the persons
|
||||
described in this paragraph shall not be subject to the approval
|
||||
process and standard set forth in paragraph (3)C below. To the
|
||||
extent NSA personnel make copies of the BR metadata for purposes
|
||||
of ensuring data integrity and developing and testing
|
||||
technological measures, such copies shall be destroyed upon the
|
||||
completion of their work.
|
||||
|
||||
C. Subject to the restrictions and procedures below,
|
||||
up to 125 NSA analysts may be authorized to access the BR
|
||||
metadata for purposes of obtaining foreign intelligence
|
||||
information through contact chaining ("queries”) using
|
||||
telephone identifiers, as described in the [REDACTED] Declaration at paragraphs 8-12.
|
||||
|
||||
(i) Except as provided in subparagraph (ii) below,
|
||||
all telephone identifiers to be used for queries shall be
|
||||
|
||||
² The Court understands that only Data Integrity Analysts who
|
||||
have received the training required for access under paragraph
|
||||
3(C) will be permitted to perform queries and share query
|
||||
results with analysts as described in (ii) above.
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
6
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
approved by one of the following designated approving
|
||||
officials: the Chief or Deputy Chief of the Homeland
|
||||
Security Analysis Center; or one of twenty specially-
|
||||
authorized Homeland Mission Coordinators in the Analysis
|
||||
and Production Directorate of the Signals Intelligence
|
||||
Directorate. Such approval shall be given only after the
|
||||
designated approving official has determined that based on
|
||||
the factual and practical considerations of everyday life
|
||||
on which reasonable and prudent persons act, there are
|
||||
facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion
|
||||
that the telephone identifier to be queried is associated
|
||||
with [REDACTED]
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
7
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
provided, however, that NSA's OGC shall first determine
|
||||
that any telephone identifier reasonably believed to be
|
||||
used by a United States (U.S.) person is not regarded as
|
||||
associated with [REDACTED] solely on the basis of activities
|
||||
that are protected by the First Amendment to the
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
8
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
Constitution.⁶
|
||||
|
||||
(ii) Telephone identifiers that are currently
|
||||
the subject of electronic surveillance authorized by
|
||||
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC)
|
||||
based on the FISC's finding of probable cause to
|
||||
believe that they are used by agents of [REDACTED]
|
||||
including those used by U.S. persons, may be deemed
|
||||
approved for querying for the period of FISC-
|
||||
authorized electronic surveillance without review and
|
||||
approval by a designated approving official. The
|
||||
preceding sentence shall not apply to telephone
|
||||
identifiers under surveillance pursuant to any
|
||||
|
||||
⁶ The Court understands that from time to time the information
|
||||
available to designated approving officials will indicate that a
|
||||
telephone identifier was, but may not presently be, or is, but
|
||||
was not formerly, associated with [REDACTED] In such a circumstance, so long as the
|
||||
designated approving official can determine that the reasonable,
|
||||
articulable suspicion standard can be met for a particular
|
||||
period of time with respect the telephone identifier, NSA may
|
||||
query the BR metadata using that telephone identifier. However,
|
||||
analysts conducting queries using such telephone identifiers
|
||||
must be made aware of the time period for which the telephone
|
||||
identifier has been associated with [REDACTED] in order that the analysis and
|
||||
minimization of the information retrieved from their queries may
|
||||
be informed by that fact.
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
9
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
certification of the Director of National Intelligence
|
||||
and the Attorney General pursuant to Section 702 of
|
||||
FISA, as added by the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, or
|
||||
pursuant to an Order of the FISC issued under Section
|
||||
703 or Section 704 of FISA, as added by the FISA
|
||||
Amendments Act of 2008.
|
||||
|
||||
(iii) A determination by a designated approving
|
||||
official that a telephone identifier is associated
|
||||
with [REDACTED] shall be effective for: one hundred
|
||||
eighty days for U.S. telephone identifiers and for any
|
||||
identifiers believed to be used by a U.S. person; one
|
||||
year for all other telephone identifiers.⁷
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
10
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
D. The Director of the NSA shall continue to maintain
|
||||
mandatory procedures to strictly control access to and use of
|
||||
the BR metadata, in accordance with this Court's orders. NSA'S
|
||||
OGC shall continue to promptly provide NSD with copies of these
|
||||
mandatory procedures (and all replacements, supplements or
|
||||
revisions thereto in effect now or adopted in the future). The
|
||||
Chief and Deputy Chief of the Homeland Security Analysis Center
|
||||
and their Homeland Mission Coordinators shall maintain
|
||||
appropriate management controls (e.g., records of all tasking
|
||||
decisions, audit and review procedures) for access to the
|
||||
metadata.
|
||||
|
||||
Ε. The NSA shall obtain the BR metadata from [REDACTED] via secure lines, and shall store and process the BR
|
||||
metadata on a secure internal network that NSA exclusively will
|
||||
operate.
|
||||
|
||||
F. Any processing by technical personnel of the BR metadata
|
||||
acquired pursuant to this order shall be conducted through the
|
||||
NSA's secure internal network, which shall be accessible only to
|
||||
authorized personnel, using accounts authorized by a user
|
||||
authentication service, based on user login and password.
|
||||
|
||||
G. Access to the metadata shall be controlled by user name
|
||||
and password. NSA'S SID Oversight and Compliance Office shall
|
||||
monitor the designation of individuals with access to the BR
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
11
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
metadata. When the BR metadata is accessed through queries
|
||||
under paragraphs (3)B or (3)C above, a software interface shall
|
||||
limit access to the BR metadata to authorized personnel, and the
|
||||
user's login, Internet Protocol (IP) address, date and time, and
|
||||
retrieval request shall be automatically logged for auditing
|
||||
capability.⁸ When the BR metadata is accessed through any other
|
||||
means under paragraph (3) B above, the user's login, date and
|
||||
time shall be automatically logged for auditing capability.
|
||||
NSA'S SID Office of Oversight and Compliance shall monitor the
|
||||
functioning of this automatic logging capability. All persons
|
||||
authorized for access to the BR metadata and other NSA personnel
|
||||
who are authorized to receive query results shall receive
|
||||
appropriate and adequate training concerning the authorization
|
||||
granted by this Order, the limited circumstances in which the BR
|
||||
metadata may be accessed, and/or other procedures and
|
||||
restrictions regarding the retrieval, storage, and dissemination
|
||||
of the metadata. NSA'S OGC shall ensure that such training is
|
||||
provided.
|
||||
|
||||
⁸ In addition, the Court understands from the Declaration of
|
||||
Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander, Director of NSA (Ex. A to
|
||||
the Report of the United States filed in docket number BR 09-09
|
||||
on August 17, 2009) that NSA has made a number of technical
|
||||
modifications that will prohibit analysts: a) from inadvertently
|
||||
accessing the BR metadata in [REDACTED] b) from querying the BR
|
||||
metadata in [REDACTED] with non-RAS-approved identifiers; and c)
|
||||
from going beyond three "hops" from an identifier used to query
|
||||
the BR metadata in [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
12
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
H. NSA shall treat information from queries of the BR
|
||||
metadata in accordance with USSID 18 and shall apply USSID 18 to
|
||||
minimize and disseminate information concerning U.S. persons
|
||||
obtained from the records produced pursuant to the authorities
|
||||
granted herein. Additionally, before the NSA disseminates any
|
||||
U.S. person identifying information, the Chief of Information
|
||||
Sharing Services in the Signals Intelligence Directorate, the
|
||||
Senior Operations Officer at NSA's National Security Operations
|
||||
Center, the Signals Intelligence Directorate Director, the
|
||||
Deputy Director of the NSA, or the Director of the NSA must
|
||||
determine that the information identifying the U.S. person is in
|
||||
fact related to counterterrorism information and that it is
|
||||
necessary to understand the counterterrorism information or
|
||||
assess its importance. Notwithstanding the above requirements,
|
||||
NSA may share certain information, as appropriate, derived from
|
||||
the BR metadata, including U.S. person identifying information,
|
||||
with Executive Branch and Legislative Branch personnel in order
|
||||
to enable them to fulfill their lawful oversight functions, and,
|
||||
in the case of Executive Branch personnel, to enable them to
|
||||
determine whether the information contains exculpatory or
|
||||
impeachment information or is otherwise discoverable in legal
|
||||
proceedings. By 5:00p.m. each Friday following the
|
||||
authorization requested herein, the government shall file a
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
13
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
report listing each instance during the seven-day period ending
|
||||
the previous Friday in which NSA has shared, in any form,
|
||||
information obtained or derived from the BR metadata with anyone
|
||||
outside NSA. For each such instance, the government shall
|
||||
specify the date on which the information was shared, the
|
||||
recipient of the information, and the form in which the
|
||||
information was communicated (e.g., written report, e-mail, oral
|
||||
communication, etc.). For each such instance in which U.S.
|
||||
person information has been shared, except those involving
|
||||
Executive Branch personnel seeking to identify discoverable
|
||||
information, the Chief of Information Sharing Services in the
|
||||
Signals Intelligence Directorate shall certify that one of the
|
||||
authorized officials identified above determined, prior to
|
||||
dissemination, that the information was related to
|
||||
counterterrorism information and necessary to understand the
|
||||
counterterrorism information or to assess its importance. This
|
||||
paragraph's reporting requirement is not intended to apply to
|
||||
instances in which BR metadata and information derived therefrom
|
||||
is shared with Executive Branch or Legislative Branch personnel
|
||||
in order to facilitate their lawful oversight functions.
|
||||
|
||||
I. Personnel authorized to query the BR metadata in
|
||||
paragraph (3)C above may use and share the results of authorized
|
||||
queries of the BR metadata among themselves and with NSA
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
14
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
personnel, including those who are not authorized to access the
|
||||
BR metadata pursuant to paragraph (3)C, provided that all NSA
|
||||
personnel receiving such query results in any form (except for
|
||||
information properly disseminated outside NSA) shall first
|
||||
receive appropriate and adequate training and guidance regarding
|
||||
the rules and restrictions governing the use, storage, and
|
||||
dissemination of such information. NSA'S SID Oversight and
|
||||
Compliance Office shall monitor the designation of individuals
|
||||
who have received the training and guidance necessary to receive
|
||||
the results of queries of the BR metadata.
|
||||
|
||||
J. Authorized personnel also may use and share the identity
|
||||
of high-volume telephone identifiers [REDACTED] that they discover or have
|
||||
discovered as a result of access authorized under paragraphs
|
||||
(3)B and (3)C or as a result of technical personnel access under
|
||||
prior docket numbers in this matter, among themselves and with
|
||||
other NSA personnel, including those who are not authorized to
|
||||
access the BR metadata, for purposes of metadata reduction and
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
15
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
management. The training requirements set forth in paragraph
|
||||
(3) I above for NSA personnel receiving query results shall not
|
||||
apply to personnel receiving such identifiers, which may have
|
||||
been identified through queries, so long as they are received
|
||||
solely for purposes of metadata reduction and management.
|
||||
|
||||
Κ. The BR metadata collected under this Court's Orders may
|
||||
be kept online (that is, accessible for queries) for five years
|
||||
from the date of acquisition, at which time it shall be
|
||||
destroyed.
|
||||
|
||||
L. At least twice before the expiration of the authorities
|
||||
granted herein, NSA's OGC shall conduct a random spot check,
|
||||
consisting of an examination of a sample of call detail records
|
||||
obtained, to ensure that NSA is receiving only data as
|
||||
authorized by the Court and not receiving the substantive
|
||||
content of communications.
|
||||
|
||||
M. At least twice before the expiration of the authorities
|
||||
granted herein, the Department of Justice's National Security
|
||||
Division (NSD) will review NSA's access to the BR metadata under
|
||||
paragraph (3) C above. Such reviews shall include a sample of
|
||||
the justifications designated approving officials relied upon to
|
||||
approve telephone identifiers for querying the BR metadata, and
|
||||
a review of the queries conducted.
|
||||
|
||||
N. NSA'S OGC shall consult with NSD on all significant
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
16
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
legal opinions that relate to the interpretation, scope, and/or
|
||||
implementation of the authorizations granted by the Court in
|
||||
this matter. When operationally practicable, such consultation
|
||||
shall occur in advance; otherwise, NSD shall be notified as soon
|
||||
as practicable.
|
||||
|
||||
O. NSA'S OGC shall promptly provide NSD with copies of all
|
||||
formal briefing and/or training materials (including all
|
||||
revisions thereto) currently in use or prepared and used in the
|
||||
future to brief/train NSA personnel concerning the
|
||||
authorizations granted by this Order.
|
||||
|
||||
P. At least once before the expiration of the authorities
|
||||
granted herein, a meeting for the purpose of assessing
|
||||
compliance with this Court's orders in this matter shall be held
|
||||
with representatives from NSA'S OGC, NSD, and appropriate
|
||||
individuals from NSA's Signals Intelligence Directorate. The
|
||||
results of this meeting shall be reduced to writing and
|
||||
submitted to the Court as part of any application to renew or
|
||||
reinstate the authorities granted herein.
|
||||
|
||||
Q. At least once before the expiration of the authorities
|
||||
granted herein, NSD shall meet with NSA's Office of Inspector
|
||||
General (OIG) to discuss their respective oversight
|
||||
responsibilities and assess NSA's compliance with the Court's
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
17
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
orders in this matter.
|
||||
|
||||
R. Prior to implementation, all proposed automated query
|
||||
processes shall be reviewed and approved by NSA'S OGC, NSD, and
|
||||
the Court.
|
||||
|
||||
S. Within forty-five days of the issuance of this Order,
|
||||
NSA shall file a report with the Court describing the queries
|
||||
made since end of the reporting period of the last report filed
|
||||
pursuant to the Court's order in docket number BR 10-17.
|
||||
Additionally, any application to renew or reinstate the
|
||||
authority granted herein shall include a report describing: (i)
|
||||
the queries made since the end of the reporting period of the
|
||||
last report filed with the Court; (ii) the manner in which NSA
|
||||
applied the procedures set forth in paragraph (3) C above; and
|
||||
(iii) any proposed changes in the way in which the call detail
|
||||
records would be received from the carriers and any significant
|
||||
changes to the systems NSA uses to receive, store, process, and
|
||||
disseminate BR metadata.
|
||||
|
||||
-- Remainder of page left intentionally blank. --
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
18
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN-
|
||||
This authorization regarding [REDACTED] and unknown persons in the United States
|
||||
and abroad affiliated with [REDACTED] and unknown persons in the United States
|
||||
and abroad affiliated with [REDACTED] expires on the 29th day of October,
|
||||
2010, at 5:00 p.m., Eastern Time.
|
||||
|
||||
08-04-2010 P05:07
|
||||
Signed
|
||||
Date Time
|
||||
|
||||
REGGIE B. WALTON
|
||||
Judge, United States Foreign
|
||||
Intelligence Surveillance Court
|
||||
|
||||
I, [REDACTED] Deputy Clerk,
|
||||
FISC, certify that this document
|
||||
is a true and correct copy of
|
||||
the original.
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
19
|
||||
35
data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_10-49/metadata.json
Normal file
35
data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_10-49/metadata.json
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "FISC Order BR 10-49",
|
||||
"type": "FOIA",
|
||||
"collection": "foia",
|
||||
"description": "Order of the FISC approving the Government. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
|
||||
"long_description": "",
|
||||
"tags": [],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "FISC",
|
||||
"date_created": "2010-08-04",
|
||||
"classification": [
|
||||
"TOP SECRET",
|
||||
"COMINT"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dissemination": [
|
||||
"NOFORN"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"programs": [],
|
||||
"countries": [],
|
||||
"people": [
|
||||
"Walton, Reggie B."
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
|
||||
"date_published": "2014-01-17",
|
||||
"link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/fisc-order-br-10-49",
|
||||
"reporters": [],
|
||||
"contributors": []
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "4b28e3871bb25718482caa177434e17a853ef0c10da2b8d45f905e9865cde3ac",
|
||||
"pages": 19
|
||||
}
|
||||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue