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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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UNITED STATES
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FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
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WASHINGTON, D. C.
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IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
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BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN
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ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION
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OF TANGIBLE THINGS FROM
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[REDACTED]
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Docket Number: BR
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11 - 07
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PRIMARY ORDER
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A verified application having been made by the Director of the Federal Bureau of
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Investigation (FBI) for an order pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
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1978 (the Act), Title 50, United States Code (U.S.C.), § 1861, as amended, requiring the
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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Derived from: Pleadings in the above-captioned docket
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Declassify on: 21 January 2036
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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production to the National Security Agency (NSA) of the tangible things described
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below, and full consideration having been given to the matters set forth therein, the
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Court finds as follows:
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1. There are reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things sought are
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relevant to authorized investigations (other than threat assessments) being conducted
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by the FBI under guidelines approved by the Attorney General under Executive Order
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12333 to protect against international terrorism, which investigations are not being
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conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment to the
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Constitution of the United States. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1)]
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2. The tangible things sought could be obtained with a subpoena duces tecum
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issued by a court of the United States in aid of a grand jury investigation or with any
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other order issued by a court of the United States directing the production of records or
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tangible things. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(2)(D)]
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3. The application includes an enumeration of the minimization procedures the
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government proposes to follow with regard to the tangible things sought. Such
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procedures are similar to the minimization procedures approved and adopted as
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binding by the order of this Court in Docket Number BR 10-70 and its predecessors. [50
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U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1)]
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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2
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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Accordingly, the Court finds that the application of the United States to obtain
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the tangible things, as described below, satisfies the requirements of the Act and,
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therefore,
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to the authority conferred on this Court by
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the Act, that the application is GRANTED, and it is
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FURTHER ORDERED, as follows:
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(1)A. The Custodians of Records of [REDACTED] shall produce to NSA
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upon service of the appropriate secondary order, and continue production on an
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ongoing daily basis thereafter for the duration of this order, unless otherwise ordered
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by the Court, an electronic copy of the following tangible things: all call detail records
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or “telephony metadata”1 created by [REDACTED]
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B. The Custodian of Records of [REDACTED] shall produce to NSA upon service of the
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appropriate secondary order, and continue production on an ongoing daily basis
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¹ For purposes of this Order “telephony metadata” includes comprehensive communications
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routing information (e.g., originating and terminating telephone number, International Mobile
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Subscriber Identity (IMSI) number, International Mobile station Equipment Identity (IMEI)
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number, etc.), trunk identifier, telephone calling card numbers, and time and duration of call.
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Telephony metadata does not include the substantive content of any communication, as defined
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by 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8), or the name, address, or financial information of a subscriber or
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customer.
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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3
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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thereafter for the duration of this order, unless otherwise ordered by the Court, an
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electronic copy of the following tangible things: all call detail records or “telephony
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metadata” created [REDACTED] for communications (i) between the United States and
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abroad; or (ii) wholly within the United States, including local telephone calls.
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[REDACTED]
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(2) With respect to any information the FBI receives as a result of this Order
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(information that is disseminated to it by NSA), the FBI shall follow as minimization
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procedures the procedures set forth in The Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI
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Operations (September 29, 2008).
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(3) With respect to the information that NSA receives as a result of this Order,
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NSA shall strictly adhere to the following minimization procedures:
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A. The government is hereby prohibited from accessing business record
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metadata acquired pursuant to this Court’s orders in the above-captioned docket and its
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predecessors (“BR metadata”) for any purpose except as described herein.
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B. NSA shall store and process the BR metadata in repositories within secure
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networks under NSA’s control.² The BR metadata shall carry unique markings such
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² The Court understands that NSA will maintain the BR metadata in recovery back-up systems
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for mission assurance and continuity of operations purposes. NSA will ensure that any access
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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4
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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that software and other controls (including user authentication services) can restrict
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access to it to authorized personnel who have received appropriate and adequate
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training with regard to this authority. NSA shall restrict access to the BR metadata to
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authorized personnel who have received appropriate and adequate training.³
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Appropriately trained and authorized technical personnel may access the BR metadata
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to perform those processes needed to make it usable for intelligence analysis. Technical
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personnel may query the BR metadata using identifiers⁴ that have not been RAS-
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approved (described below) for those purposes described above, and may share the
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results of those queries with other authorized personnel responsible for these purposes,
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but the results of any such queries will not be used for intelligence analysis purposes.
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An authorized technician may query the BR metadata with a non-RAS-approved
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identifier to determine whether that identifier is a high volume identifier. If so, the
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technician may share the results of that query, i.e., the identifier and the fact that it is a
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or use of the BR metadata in the event of any natural disaster, man-made emergency, attack, or
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other unforeseen event is in compliance with the Court’s Order.
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³ The Court understands that certain technical personnel, specifically the personnel responsible
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for NSA’s underlying corporate infrastructure and the transmission of the BR metadata from
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the specified persons to NSA, will not receive special training regarding the authority granted
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herein.
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[REDACTED]
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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5
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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high volume identifier, with authorized personnel (including those responsible for the
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identification and defeat of high volume and other unwanted BR metadata from any of
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NSA’s various metadata repositories), but may not share any other information from
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the results of that query for intelligence analysis purposes.
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C. NSA shall access the BR metadata for purposes of obtaining foreign
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intelligence information only through contact chaining queries of the BR metadata
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using identifiers approved as “seeds” pursuant to the RAS approval process described
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below, as described in the [REDACTED] Declaration at paragraph 17. NSA shall ensure,
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through adequate and appropriate technical and management controls, that queries of
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the BR metadata for intelligence analysis purposes will be initiated using only an
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identifier that has been RAS-approved. Whenever the BR metadata is accessed for
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foreign intelligence analysis purposes or using foreign intelligence analysis query tools,
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an auditable record of the activity shall be generated.
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(i) Except as provided in subparagraph (ii) below, all identifiers to be
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used as “seeds” with which to query the BR metadata shall be approved by any
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of the following designated approving officials: the Chief or Deputy Chief,
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Homeland Security Analysis Center; or one of the twenty specially-authorized
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Homeland Mission Coordinators in the Analysis and Production Directorate of
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the Signals Intelligence Directorate. Such approval shall be given only after the
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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6
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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designated approving official has determined that based on the factual and
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practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent
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persons act, there are facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that
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the identifier to be queried is associated with [REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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7
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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provided, however, that NSA’s OGC shall first determine that any identifier
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reasonably believed to be used by a United States (U.S.) person is not regarded as
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associated with [REDACTED]
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[REDACTED] solely on the basis of
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activities that are protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution.⁷
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(ii) Identifiers that are currently the subject of electronic surveillance
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authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) based on the
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FISC’s finding of probable cause to believe that they are used by [REDACTED]
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[REDACTED] including those used by U.S. persons, may be
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[REDACTED]
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⁷ The Court understands that from time to time the information available to designated
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approving officials will indicate that an identifier is or was associated with a Foreign Power
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only for a specific and limited time frame. In such cases, a designated approving may
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determine that the reasonable, articulable suspicion standard is met, but for the time frame for
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which the identifier is or was associated with a Foreign Power will be specified so that analysts
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conducting queries using that identifier can properly minimize information that may be
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returned within query results that fall outside of that timeframe.
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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8
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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deemed approved for querying for the period of FISC-authorized electronic
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surveillance without review and approval by a designated approving official.
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The preceding sentence shall not apply to identifiers under surveillance pursuant
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to any certification of the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney
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General pursuant to Section 702 of FISA, as added by the FISA Amendments Act
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of 2008, or pursuant to an Order of the FISC issued under Section 703 or Section
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704 of FISA, as added by the FISA Amendments Act of 2008.
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(iii) A determination by a designated approving official that an identifier
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is associated with [REDACTED] shall be effective for:
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one hundred eighty days for U.S. identifiers and for any identifiers believed to be
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used by a U.S. person; one year for all other identifiers.⁸
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[REDACTED]
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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9
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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D. Results derived from any intelligence analysis queries of the BR metadata
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may be shared, prior to minimization, for intelligence analysis purposes among NSA
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analysts, subject to the requirement that all NSA personnel who receive query results in
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any form first receive appropriate and adequate training and guidance regarding the
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procedures and restrictions for the handling and dissemination of such information.⁹
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NSA shall apply the minimization and dissemination requirements and procedures of
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Section 7 of United States Signals Intelligence Directive SP0018 (USSID 18) to any
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results from queries of the BR metadata disseminated outside of NSA in any form.
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Additionally, prior to disseminating any U.S. person information outside NSA, the
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Director of NSA, the Deputy Director of NSA, or one of the officials listed in Section
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7.3(c) of USSID 18 (i.e., the Director of the Signals Intelligence Directorate (SID), the
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Deputy Director of the SID, the Chief of the Information Sharing Services (ISS) office,
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the Deputy Chief of the ISS office, and the Senior Operation Officer of the National
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Security Operations Center) must determine that the information identifying the U.S.
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person is in fact related to counterterrorism information and that it is necessary to
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understand the counterterrorism information or assess its importance.¹⁰
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⁹ In addition, the Court understands that NSA may apply the full range of SIGINT analytic
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tradecraft to the results of intelligence analysis queries of the collected BR metadata.
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¹⁰ In the event the Government encounters circumstances that it believes necessitate the
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alteration of these dissemination procedures, it may obtain prospectively-applicable
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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10
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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Notwithstanding the above requirements, NSA may share results derived from
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intelligence analysis queries of the BR metadata, including U.S. person identifying
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information, with Executive Branch personnel (1) in order to enable them to determine
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whether the information contains exculpatory or impeachment information or is
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otherwise discoverable in legal proceedings or (2) to facilitate their lawful oversight
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functions.
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E. BR metadata shall be destroyed no later than five years (60 months) after its
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initial collection.
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F. NSA and the National Security Division of the Department of Justice
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(NSD/DoJ) shall conduct oversight of NSA's activities under this authority as outlined
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below.
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(i) NSA's OGC and Office of the Director of Compliance (ODOC)
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shall ensure that personnel with access to the BR metadata receive appropriate
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and adequate training and guidance regarding the procedures and restrictions
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for collection, storage, analysis, dissemination, and retention of the BR metadata
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and the results of queries of the BR metadata. NSA's OGC and ODOC shall
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further ensure that all NSA personnel who receive query results in any form first
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receive appropriate and adequate training and guidance regarding the
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modifications to the procedures upon a determination by the Court that such modifications are
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appropriate under the circumstances and in light of the size and nature of this bulk collection.
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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11
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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procedures and restrictions for the handling and dissemination of such
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information. NSA shall maintain records of all such training.¹¹ OGC shall
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provide NSD/DoJ with copies of all formal briefing and/or training materials
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(including all revisions thereto) used to brief/train NSA personnel concerning
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this authority.
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(ii) NSA's ODOC shall monitor the implementation and use of the
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software and other controls (including user authentication services) and the
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logging of auditable information referenced above.
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(iii) NSA's OGC shall consult with NSD/DoJ on all
|
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significant legal opinions that relate to the interpretation, scope, and/or
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implementation of this authority. When operationally practicable, such
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consultation shall occur in advance; otherwise NSD shall be notified as soon as
|
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practicable.
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(iv) At least once during the authorization period, NSA's OGC,
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ODOC, NSD/DoJ, and any other appropriate NSA representatives shall meet for
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the purpose of assessing compliance with this Court's orders. Included in this
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meeting will be a review of a sample of the call detail records obtained to ensure
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¹¹ The nature of the training that is appropriate and adequate for a particular person will
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depend on the person's responsibilities and the circumstances of his access to the BR metadata
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or the information derived therefrom..
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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12
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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that only approved metadata is being acquired. The results of this meeting shall
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be reduced to writing and submitted to the Court as part of any application to
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||||
renew or reinstate the authority requested herein.
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(v) At least once during the authorization period, NSD/DoJ shall
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meet with NSA's Office of the Inspector General to discuss their respective
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oversight responsibilities and assess NSA's compliance with the Court's orders.
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(vi) At least once during the authorization period, NSA's OGC and
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NSD/DoJ shall review a sample of the justifications for RAS approvals for
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identifiers used to query the BR metadata.
|
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|
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(vii) Prior to implementation, all proposed automated query
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processes shall be reviewed and approved by NSA's OGC, NSD/DoJ, and the
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Court.
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G. Approximately every thirty days, NSA shall file with the Court a report that
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includes a discussion of the queries made since the last report and NSA's application of
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the RAS standard. In addition, should the United States seek renewal of the requested
|
||||
authority, NSA shall also include in its report a description of any significant changes
|
||||
proposed in the way in which the call detail records would be received from the
|
||||
Providers and any significant changes to the controls NSA has in place to receive, store,
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process, and disseminate the BR metadata.
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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13
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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Each report shall include a statement of the number of instances since the
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preceding report in which NSA has shared, in any form, information derived from the
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||||
BR metadata with anyone outside NSA. For each such instance in which United States
|
||||
person information has been shared, the report shall include NSA's attestation that one
|
||||
of the officials authorized to approve such disseminations determined, prior to
|
||||
dissemination, that the information was related to counterterrorism information and
|
||||
necessary to understand counterterrorism information or to assess its importance.
|
||||
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--- Remainder of page intentionally left blank. ---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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||||
14
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||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
This authorization regarding [REDACTED]
|
||||
and unknown persons in the United States and abroad affiliated with [REDACTED]
|
||||
[REDACTED] and unknown persons in the United States and abroad affiliated with
|
||||
[REDACTED] expires on the 15th day
|
||||
of April, 2011, at 5:00 p.m., Eastern Time.
|
||||
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||||
01-20-2011 P02:39
|
||||
Signed Eastern Time
|
||||
Date Time
|
||||
|
||||
JOHN D. BATES
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||||
Judge, United States Foreign
|
||||
Intelligence Surveillance Court
|
||||
|
||||
I, [REDACTED] Deputy Clerk,
|
||||
FISC, certify that this document
|
||||
is a true and correct copy of
|
||||
the original [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
15
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||||
35
data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_11-07/metadata.json
Normal file
35
data/FOIA/ACLU_-_FISC_Order_BR_11-07/metadata.json
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
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|||
{
|
||||
"title": "FISC Order BR 11-07",
|
||||
"type": "FOIA",
|
||||
"collection": "foia",
|
||||
"description": "Order of the FISC approving the Government. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.",
|
||||
"long_description": "",
|
||||
"tags": [],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "FISC",
|
||||
"date_created": "2011-01-20",
|
||||
"classification": [
|
||||
"TOP SECRET",
|
||||
"COMINT"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dissemination": [
|
||||
"NOFORN"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"programs": [],
|
||||
"countries": [],
|
||||
"people": [
|
||||
"Bates, John D."
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
|
||||
"date_published": "2014-01-17",
|
||||
"link": "https://www.aclu.org/documents/fisc-order-br-11-07",
|
||||
"reporters": [],
|
||||
"contributors": []
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "55eecd20795db070a218acda47b15cd38045a6c1662a20ed34467610fb2e8ee8",
|
||||
"pages": 15
|
||||
}
|
||||
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