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U.S. FOREIGN
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INTELLIGENCE
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SURVEILLANCE COURT
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UNITED STATES
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FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILANCE COURN13 NOV 22 PM4:01
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WASHINGTON, D.C.
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LEEANN FLYNN HALL
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CLERK OF COURT
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IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
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BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN
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ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION
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OF TANGIBLE THINGS
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Docket No. BR 13-158
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REPLY OF THE CENTER FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES IN
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SUPPORT OF MOTION TO ESTABLISH A PUBLIC BRIEFING SCHEDULE
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INCLUDING THE FILING OF BRIEFS BY AMICI CURIAE,
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FOR LEAVE TO FILE AN AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF, AND A SUGGESTION
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FOR HEARING EN BANC
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The Telephony Records Program ("Program"), the name used by the Solicitor
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General in the Supreme Court, is a program, periodically reauthorized by this Court for
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the last seven years, of compelled production to the National Security Agency of "all"
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call detail records not only for calls between the United States and abroad but for those
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"wholly within the United States, including local telephone calls" (Order in BR 13-158,
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October 11, 2013, at p. 4). That Program is without precedent in American history. And
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it is very questionable whether it is within the scope of what Congress intended to
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authorize in passing Section 501 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”),
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50 U.S.C. § 1861. Yet in the seven years the Program has operated, this Court has heard
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only from the Government, in secret, on that exceptionally important legal question.¹
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¹ On October 17, 2013, the Center for National Security Studies ("Center") moved this
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Court to establish procedures to ensure that the current or next reauthorization of bulk
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telephony metadata collection is given plenary consideration by the full Court that
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includes an opportunity for amici curiae to submit a brief or briefs detailing why that bulk
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collection is unlawful. This is the Center's Reply to the Government's Response.
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75451.5
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||||
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At the heart of the Center's Motion is the principle that the Court needs to hear
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from more than one side. Accordingly, the Center has moved this Court to direct the
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Government to file its legal justifications for the Program publicly, and to set a briefing
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schedule to allow amici curiae to respond to those justifications. That is the best way to
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bring about a meaningful and comprehensive airing of the issues. It would also be
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consistent with Section 501, because proceedings will remain ex parte and any sensitive
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information in the Government's application or Court's order may remain protected.
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Moreover, the Court should follow the Center's suggestion and consider this case en
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banc. This case presents foundational issues concerning whether Congress has
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authorized the Executive Branch to engage in massive collection of personal data that
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seemingly has no end point.
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I. The Court Should Receive on the Public Record Competing Legal
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Arguments from the Government and Amici on the Lawfulness of Bulk
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Metadata Collection.
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The Government concedes in its Response that this Court has inherent power to
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receive a public brief from amici curiae on whether Section 501 authorizes the bulk
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collection at issue. See Resp. at 1, 8-10. Yet the Government contends that Section 501
|
||||
prohibits it from publicly filing its own legal argument in support of the bulk collection,
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thus preventing any amicus from grappling directly with the Government's actual legal
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justifications. Resp. at 10-12. The Government's position misinterprets Section 501, and
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would deny this Court the chief benefit of amicus participation—a full and informed
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briefing on both sides of the relevant issues. This Court both can and should require the
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Government to publicly file its legal justifications.
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75451.5
|
||||
2
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The ability of the Court to receive an amicus brief that comprehensively addresses
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the legal arguments of the Government will be greatly enhanced if the Government is
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directed to file its own public memorandum of law defending the program. The
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Government's legal arguments are scattered across various sources that have been
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declassified in piecemeal fashion. For example, this Court's Amended Memorandum
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Opinion of August 29, 2013 cites a Government 2006 Memorandum of Law in No. BR
|
||||
06-05, the docket for the first telephony metadata order. That memorandum of law was
|
||||
made public only this week. Beginning in August 2013, the Government has addressed
|
||||
publicly the legality of bulk telephony metadata collection in a White Paper, briefs and
|
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legal memoranda in the Supreme Court, see In re Electronic Privacy Information Center,
|
||||
(No. 13-58), at least two district courts, see Government Defendants' Opposition to
|
||||
Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunctions at 31-44, Klayman v. Obama, No. 13-cv-
|
||||
00851 (D.D.C. Nov. 12, 2013); Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion
|
||||
to Dismiss the Complaint, at 19-29, ACLU v. Clapper, 13 Civ. 3994 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26,
|
||||
2013), congressional testimony, and a speech before the Brookings Institution. These
|
||||
briefs, statements, and speeches do not, however, address elements of the reasoning in the
|
||||
August opinion, such as the Court's reliance on earlier opinions construing the term
|
||||
"relevance" in Title IV of FISA on governing the use of of pen registers for metadata.
|
||||
|
||||
The Government appears to argue that Section 501 precludes it from filing a
|
||||
public legal memorandum in this Court because that section requires that the proceedings
|
||||
be ex parte and that the application and orders remain secret. Id. at 11. But requiring the
|
||||
Government to publicly file its legal memorandum would not violate either of those
|
||||
requirements. The Government's argument appears to conflate "ex parte" with “in
|
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|
||||
75451.5
|
||||
3
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|
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camera." To say that a proceeding must be held ex parte does not necessarily mean that it
|
||||
must be held in secret; rather, it simply means that it must be held without providing
|
||||
notice to the other party. See Mission Eng'g Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 883 F. Supp.
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488, 489 (C.D. Cal. 1995). The proceedings will still be “ex parte" because appearance
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of amici will not alter the fact that the Government is the only party present. Nor does
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"ex parte" always require consideration “in camera," as can be seen by the inclusion in
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Section 501(f)(5), 50 USC § 1861(f)(5), of authority to proceed “in camera" as well as
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||||
"ex parte" in proceedings involving recipients of Section 501 orders. See Section 802(d),
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||||
50 USC § 1885a(d) (the court shall review classified information “in camera and ex
|
||||
parte"). The inclusion of both terms in that section is in contrast to Section 501(c), which
|
||||
requires only that the proceedings be ex parte, and thus as a statutory matter does not
|
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preclude an open part of a proceeding when no classified matter would be disclosed.
|
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|
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Additionally, directing the Government to file its legal memorandum publicly
|
||||
would not require the Government or the Court to divulge anything that must be kept
|
||||
secret. Indeed, much if not all of the information that would be contained in such a
|
||||
memorandum has already been made public. The Government has declassified the fact
|
||||
of the collection and the Government or this Court has made public various opinions,
|
||||
orders, and legal arguments related to the Program. In fact, the Government publicly
|
||||
filed a detailed legal defense of its bulk metadata collection just last week in the District
|
||||
Court for the District of Columbia. See Government Defendants' Opposition to
|
||||
Plaintiffs' Motion for Prelimary Injunctions at 31-44, Klayman v. Obama, No. 13-cv-
|
||||
00851 (D.D.C. Nov. 12, 2013). No reasonable reading of Section 501's non-disclosure
|
||||
|
||||
75451.5
|
||||
4
|
||||
|
||||
requirements compels the Court to simply ignore what has already been made public.²
|
||||
And Rule 7(j) of this Court provides a model for the Government's service of a redacted
|
||||
submission provided that it “must clearly articulate the government's legal arguments."
|
||||
That some or all of the Government's brief is made public does not mean that sensitive
|
||||
information in the application or order must also be revealed.
|
||||
|
||||
In testimony before the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board on July 9,
|
||||
2013, Tr. at 34, a former member of this Court, James Robertson, described the
|
||||
importance of hearing competing views:
|
||||
|
||||
Now judges are learned in the law and all that, but anybody who has been a judge
|
||||
will tell you that a judge needs to hear both sides of a case before deciding.
|
||||
It's quite common, in fact it's the norm to read one side's brief or hear one side's
|
||||
argument and think, hmm, that sounds right, until we read the other side.
|
||||
|
||||
Now that the fact of the Program is declassified, this Court has released its recent
|
||||
opinions, and the Government is making public arguments before other courts and
|
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|
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² The Government submits that an amicus brief does not belong in a business
|
||||
records docket and should be accepted only as a brief on "an abstract legal issue, Resp. at
|
||||
9, and placed in a separate public miscellaneous docket, Resp. at 1, n.1, where the Court
|
||||
could use it in adjudicating a “future" application, id at 8. The Court's miscellaneous
|
||||
public dockets appear to be used for ancillary matters, each under a case number, in
|
||||
which final relief is sought on a question of public release of information. The question
|
||||
whether bulk metadata collection is authorized by Section 501 is not a comparably
|
||||
ancillary issue.
|
||||
The Court has discretion to provide for docketing in a manner that best enables it
|
||||
to achieve fully informed adjudication of competing legal views. One way is to establish
|
||||
procedures for reconsideration of the present order. That would address the stated
|
||||
concern of the Government about a classified docket because the fact of the present
|
||||
docket and collection order is declassified. Another way is to establish procedures for the
|
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next authorization (the present order expires on January 3, 2014) and to begin them in
|
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time for action on it. Or the Court could begin the procedures under the present docket
|
||||
and transfer them to the next when it is established. Whichever path the Court takes in its
|
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discretion, the objective should be to connect consideration of the competing briefs to an
|
||||
actual decision on authorization of bulk telephony metadata collection.
|
||||
|
||||
75451.5
|
||||
5
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||||
|
||||
elsewhere, it is time for argument to be joined in public before this Court, which has the
|
||||
unavoidable responsibility of adjudicating the lawfulness of this collection.
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|
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II. Bulk Telephony Metadata Collection Presents Questions of Exceptional
|
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Importance that Merit En Banc Review.
|
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|
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A. The Standard
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The Government states that the Center has no standing to seek en banc review.
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Resp. at 11. But we have not sought to file, and under the rules of this Court could not
|
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file, a petition for hearing or rehearing en banc that is required to be submitted to the
|
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members of the Court for a vote. We have made a suggestion to the Court. Under Rule
|
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49 of this Court, a Judge to whom a matter has been presented may request that all Judges
|
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be polled with respect to whether the matter should be considered or reheard en banc. It
|
||||
would serve the public interest to make that request and for the members of the Court to
|
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act favorably on it.
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|
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The Government offers one reason why en banc review is "not necessary"—
|
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namely, that fifteen judges of this Court have ruled the same way on bulk telephony
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||||
metadata orders. Resp at 12. The standard the Government addresses – "to secure or
|
||||
maintain uniformity of the court's decisions" – is one of two alternative standards for en
|
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banc review. The other standard, which is the basis for the Center's suggestion (Motion
|
||||
at 5), is that "the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance." Section
|
||||
103(a)(2)(A)(ii), 50 USC §1803(a)(2)(A)(ii); see also FISC Rule 45. The Government's
|
||||
Response makes no effort to refute the undeniable exceptional importance of the question
|
||||
whether Section 501 authorizes the bulk metadata collection at issue.
|
||||
|
||||
75451.5
|
||||
6
|
||||
|
||||
B. The Center's Amicus Brief Would Address Numerous Questions of
|
||||
Exceptional Importance.
|
||||
|
||||
At issue in the Center's amicus brief would be the Government's authority to
|
||||
collect massive amounts of data on the activities of its citizens in secret. The scope of the
|
||||
Program is unprecedented, both because of its incredible breadth and because it targets
|
||||
purely domestic telephony data. Yet this massive program was undertaken without clear
|
||||
congressional authorization or public knowledge and approved by secret court orders
|
||||
until the existence of the Program was publicly revealed. The Government has developed
|
||||
powerful tools to search the mass of collected information to identify connections of
|
||||
interest. The conjunction of the collection of mass information with the very power of
|
||||
these search tools makes it exceptionally important to consider whether the Congress has
|
||||
authorized the collection.
|
||||
|
||||
Yet the statutory provision the Government invokes to justify the Program does
|
||||
not, on its face, appear to support any kind of data collection "program" at all. Rather,
|
||||
Section 501 provides for access to business records relevant to "an investigation,"
|
||||
suggesting that Congress intended that section to apply on a case-by-case basis for
|
||||
specific investigatory purposes, and not as the foundation for a program to collect data
|
||||
pertaining to virtually all Americans in perpetuity.
|
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|
||||
The extraordinary importance of these issues is magnified by the legal predicate
|
||||
the Program establishes for other bulk collection. Neither the Government nor this Court
|
||||
has articulated any limiting principle for the expansive interpretation of Section 501
|
||||
advanced by the Government and accepted by this Court. Without such a limit, that
|
||||
interpretation coud be applied to justify the collection of virtually any kind of data that
|
||||
can be classified as a "business record," such as data relating to electronic
|
||||
|
||||
75451.5
|
||||
7
|
||||
|
||||
communications and credit card and other financial transactions within the United States.
|
||||
On this view, Congress has handed the Executive Branch virtual carte blanche to
|
||||
determine the limits of its own data collection programs.
|
||||
|
||||
Among the specific issues that should be addressed in briefs by the Government
|
||||
and an amicus are the following:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Does the collection fit within the overall structure and limitations of
|
||||
Section 501 or FISA as a whole?
|
||||
|
||||
The Telephony Records Program is in tension with the structure of Section 501 in
|
||||
at least two respects: first, Section 501 is directed on its face to the Federal Bureau of
|
||||
Investigation; and second, Section 501 lacks key safeguards present in other sections of
|
||||
FISA, such as a set duration authority for orders issued under those sections, indicating
|
||||
that Congress intended Section 501 to provide for the FBI's discrete collections of
|
||||
business records in connection with an investigation, not to serve as the foundation for a
|
||||
massive, perpetual data collection program by the National Security Agency.
|
||||
|
||||
In contrast to other FISA authorities, Section 501 explicitly applies to one
|
||||
Government entity, the FBI. For electronic surveillance orders under Title I or search
|
||||
orders under Title III, a “Federal officer" may make the application. In Title V regarding
|
||||
business records, authority is given the FBI Director or, depending on the sensitivity of
|
||||
the application, to subordinate levels within the FBI. Section 501(a)(1) and (3), 50 USC
|
||||
§1861(a)(1) and (3). Both the minimization and use provisions of Section 501 apply to
|
||||
records "received" by the FBI. Section 501(g) and (h), 50 USC § 1861(g) and (h).
|
||||
Nothing in the statutory text authorizes or contemplates the wholesale contracting out to
|
||||
the NSA of authority that Congress vested in the FBI.
|
||||
|
||||
75451.5
|
||||
8
|
||||
|
||||
Section 501 differs from other collection authorities under FISA in another
|
||||
fundamental respect: it lacks a key limitation like those Congress enacted in other
|
||||
sections that contemplate significant data collection for an extended period of time – an
|
||||
expiration date for data collection orders issued thereunder. The absence of such a
|
||||
limitation indicates that Congress intended Section 501 to provide for discrete data
|
||||
collections in the limited circumstances its plain language suggests - in connection with
|
||||
authorized investigations – and not as part of a perpetual data collection "program."
|
||||
|
||||
Title I on electronic surveillance, Title IV on pen registers for metadata, and Title
|
||||
VII on overseas collection from within the United States, each authorize collection for
|
||||
periods of time ranging from 90 days to one year. See Section 105(d)(1), 50 USC §
|
||||
1805(d)(1); Section 402(e)(1), 50 USC § 1842(e)(1); Section 702(a), 50 USC § 1881a(a).
|
||||
Title III provides that a physical search order may be for a limited number of days.
|
||||
Section 304(d)(1), 50 USC § 1824(d)(1). But while Congress provided for collection
|
||||
over a period of time in these other provisions, it did not do that in Section 501. The
|
||||
reason is that, unlike Sections 105, 402 and 702, which are aimed at the collection of
|
||||
ongoing communications and data created on a continual basis, Section 501 contemplates
|
||||
specific and discrete orders to produce “tangible things (including books, records, papers,
|
||||
documents, and other items)," not a continuous collection program. The Government
|
||||
elsewhere suggests it could overcome this by burdening the Court with daily applications,
|
||||
but that would make distortion of the statute only more obvious.
|
||||
|
||||
This leads to a broader point about the lack of fit between the Program and FISA
|
||||
as a whole. In Title VII, 50 U.S.C. § 1881 et seq., when Congress addressed large-scale,
|
||||
programmatic collection from within the United States targeted against persons
|
||||
|
||||
75451.5
|
||||
9
|
||||
|
||||
reasonably believed to be outside the United States, it worked with the Executive Branch
|
||||
to enact legislation that specifically allocates responsibilities among the branches of
|
||||
Government, including the specific legislative determination of standards to be applied
|
||||
by this Court in reviewing and approving the Government's certifications for that broad
|
||||
collection. Section 501 has no such legislative standards. While Court-devised
|
||||
limitations on the Program, such as the Reasonable Articulable Standard or the number of
|
||||
hops permitted for searches, may be salutary, the fact remains the Court has had to create
|
||||
key features of the governance of the Program. That Congress omitted such key features
|
||||
from Section 501 while including similar standards in other provisions indicates that
|
||||
Congress did not intend for Section 501 to authorize large-scale programmatic data
|
||||
collection.
|
||||
|
||||
2. Does Section 501's “relevance” standard, as adopted in the USA
|
||||
PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, authorize the bulk
|
||||
telephony metadata program?
|
||||
|
||||
It is equally hard to see how the Telephony Records Program can be squared with
|
||||
the statutory relevance standard Congress established when it revised Section 501 in the
|
||||
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-77 (March
|
||||
9, 2006). Section 501 authorizes mandatory prodution of things "relevant to an
|
||||
authorized investigation” involving international terrorism. That is not a mandate for
|
||||
indiscriminate and continuous collection of all telephony metadata. After all, it is
|
||||
obvious (and uncontested by the Government) that nearly all of the metadata has no
|
||||
relevance whatever to any investigation.
|
||||
|
||||
The legislative history further undercuts the argument that Congress intended
|
||||
Section 501's relevance standard to authorize something like the current Program.
|
||||
|
||||
75451.5
|
||||
10
|
||||
|
||||
Although there was debate about the exact reach of that standard, even the broader
|
||||
interpretations offered during that debate would be far too limited to justify the current
|
||||
Program. At the outset of the Senate's consideration of the report of the Conference
|
||||
Committee for the Improvement and Reauthorization Act, which sought to reconcile very
|
||||
different Senate and House bills concerning the laguage of Section 501, Senator Arlen
|
||||
Specter, who as Judiciary Committee Chairman was leader of the Senate conferees and
|
||||
the Senate floor manager, placed in the Record a detailed explanation of the conference
|
||||
report. 151 Cong. Rec. S13442-43 (Dec. 12, 2005).³ He noted the Senate's preference
|
||||
to tie business record collection to limited categories of persons, explaining that the more
|
||||
general relevance standard accepted by the conference “will apply only in extraordinary
|
||||
circumstances." Id. at S13443. He characterized the burden law enforcement would face
|
||||
in going beyond the categories of the Senate bill as "an uphill battle." Id. From that
|
||||
description to the Senate, there is no reason to believe Section 501 was an effort to enact
|
||||
a predicate for bulk collection.
|
||||
|
||||
The Government has pointed to a statement made by Senator Kyl that "[t]he
|
||||
relevance standard is exactly the standard employed for the issuance of discovery orders
|
||||
in civil litigation, grand jury subpoenas in a criminal investigation, and for each and
|
||||
every one of the 335 different administrative subpoenas currently authorized by the
|
||||
United States Code." Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to
|
||||
Dismiss the Complaint, ACLU v. Clapper, 13 Civ. 3994 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2013), at 23
|
||||
|
||||
³ The Conference Committee issued its report on December 9, 2005. When cloture failed
|
||||
in the Senate, Congress enacted short-term extensions until March 10, 2006. The
|
||||
Improvement and Reauthorization Act finally cleared the Senate and was signed into law,
|
||||
together, with the USA PATRIOT Act Additional Authorizing Amendments Act of 2006,
|
||||
Pub. L. 109-178 (March 9, 2006).
|
||||
|
||||
75451.5
|
||||
11
|
||||
|
||||
n.12 (quoting 152 Cong. Rec. S1379, 1395 (Feb. 16, 2006)). While Senator Kyl's
|
||||
understanding of "relevance" may have differed from that of Senator Specter, it too does
|
||||
not justify the unprecedent scope of the Program. To the contrary, even under Senator
|
||||
Kyl's view, as well as similar views expressed by other Senators, the scope of any
|
||||
collection under Section 501 should resemble what is permissible under civil discovery
|
||||
orders, grand jury subpoenas, and numerous adminstrative subpoena authorities. None of
|
||||
these vehicles allows data collection of the scope and duration undertaken here.
|
||||
|
||||
Yet, despite the plain language of Section 501 and the legislative history
|
||||
underlying its relevance standard, it is apparent that several individual opinions of this
|
||||
Court have adopted an exceptionally broad definition of “relevance." That definition is
|
||||
focused not, as the text of Section 501 would have it, on whether the specific records are
|
||||
relevant to a specific authorized investigation, but rather on whether the NSA's analytical
|
||||
methods for uncovering investigative leads require bulk data collection. In considering
|
||||
the meaning of “relevance" in Section 501, Judge Eagan's Amended Memorandum
|
||||
Opinion of August 29, 2013 in BR 13-109 quotes approvingly a 2010 opinion
|
||||
interpreting 50 USC § 1842(c)(2) (which provides for a relevance standard in
|
||||
applications for authorization for installation of pen registers and trap and trace devices).
|
||||
The 2010 opinion states that the "finding of relevance most crucially depended on the
|
||||
conclusion that bulk collection is necessary for NSA to employ tools that are likely to
|
||||
generate useful investigative leads to help identify and track terrorist operatives." See
|
||||
Mem. Op. at 20. On this view, the relevance standard does not work to limit the
|
||||
permissible scope of data collection to what the Government actually needs for a specific
|
||||
investigation, but rather functions as an elastic statutory term whose meaning expands, by
|
||||
|
||||
75451.5
|
||||
12
|
||||
|
||||
virtue of a kind of blank check from Congress, as information technology provides even
|
||||
more powerful tools for agencies of the Executive Branch to identify matters of interest
|
||||
in masses of information about ordinary conduct, such as the local calls of all Americans.
|
||||
It is a matter of extraordinary importance whether that view of Section 501 is correct,
|
||||
both now and as data analytical tools become increasingly powerful.
|
||||
|
||||
A final consideration arises from the fact that interpreting Section 501 to
|
||||
authorize the Program raises serious constitutional questions. Courts have a duty, where
|
||||
possible, to interpret statutes so as to avoid serious constitutional issues. See, e.g., Boos
|
||||
v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 331 (1988). Here, although it can be argued that the public has
|
||||
no expectation of privacy in telephone records in the hands of third-party telephone
|
||||
companies, see Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), members of the Supreme Court
|
||||
have recently suggested that the Fourth Amendment may be read to provide protection in
|
||||
this context. As Justice Sotomayor put it: "[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the
|
||||
premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information
|
||||
voluntarily disclosed to third parties.... This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in
|
||||
which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parites in the
|
||||
course of carrying out mundane tasks." United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957
|
||||
(2012) (Sotomayor, J. concurring); see also id. at 963-64 (Alito, J. concurring joined by
|
||||
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer and Kagan) (concluding that government use of a GPS device
|
||||
to track a person's location for a month violated an expectation of privacy, even after
|
||||
noting that "cell phones and other wireless devices now permit wireless carriers to track
|
||||
and record the location of users"). Recognizing the seriousness of these constitutional
|
||||
|
||||
75451.5
|
||||
13
|
||||
|
||||
issues, Congress should not be deemed to authorize such an expansive Program absent
|
||||
clear statutory language that does so expressly.
|
||||
|
||||
3. Did the extension until June 2015 of the sunset of Section 501 enact this
|
||||
Court's interpretation of Section 501?
|
||||
|
||||
Both Judge Eagan's Amended Memorandum Opinion of August 29, 2013 and
|
||||
Judge McLaughlin's Opinion of October 11, 2013 (BR 13-158) invoke the "doctrine of
|
||||
ratification through reenactment" to hold that Congress essentially adopted this expansive
|
||||
view of relevance under Section 501 when it extended provisions of the USA PATRIOT
|
||||
Act in 2011. The theory advanced is that when Congress extended the sunset of Section
|
||||
501 from May 2011 to June 2015, all members of Congress were either aware or had an
|
||||
opportunity to be aware that Section 501 was being used by the Executive Branch to
|
||||
justify its bulk collection of telephony metadata. But even assuming that amending a
|
||||
sunset date is properly treated the same as a reenactment of a statute (itself a dubious
|
||||
proposition), application of the doctrine to the circumstances surrounding the 2011
|
||||
reauthorization is both unprecedented and inappropriate.
|
||||
|
||||
At the outset, it must be noted that the “ratification through reenactment” doctrine
|
||||
is not a stand-alone rule for determining the meaning of a statutory provision; rather it is
|
||||
one of numerous available canons for interpreting the meaning of a statute beyond its
|
||||
text. Like all such canons, this doctrine cannot override the clear meaning of the law.
|
||||
See Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 121 (1994) (stating that the government's
|
||||
reenactment argument could not overcome the fact that the existing interpretation was
|
||||
contrary to the statute). As argued above, the plain language, statutory structure and
|
||||
legislative history do not support this Court's interpretation of Section 501, and the
|
||||
ratification doctrine alone cannot trump Congress's originally intended meaning.
|
||||
|
||||
75451.5
|
||||
14
|
||||
|
||||
Even leaving aside for the moment the secret nature of the FISA Court's
|
||||
proceedings and orders, the ratification doctrine should not be applied here. First, the
|
||||
opinions of this Court—the court that is charged with considering the Government's
|
||||
applications in the first instance—do not constitute a “settled judicial interpretation." See
|
||||
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 567 (1988); see also Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S.
|
||||
624, 645 (1998). This Court's interpretation of Section 501 has never been subject to
|
||||
appellate review by the FISA Court of Review, let alone by the Supreme Court. See
|
||||
United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 55 n.13 (1964) (declining to hold that Congress
|
||||
adopted the interpretation of four judicial opinions, as those opinions did not constitute
|
||||
settled law); Micron Tech., Inc. v. United States, 243 F.3d 1301, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
|
||||
(the decision by the Court of International Trade "was hardly the last word regarding the
|
||||
interpretation" of the statutory provision at issue); In re Coastal Grp., 13 F.3d 81, 85 (3d
|
||||
Cir. 1994) (two decisions of the bankruptcy court did not constitute “settled judicial
|
||||
interpretation" under Pierce). Second, the doctrine is generally applied where there is
|
||||
some indication that Congress intended to ratify the existing interpretation; mere silence
|
||||
in reenacting the provision is not enough. Such an indication could be found in
|
||||
affirmative statements of approval from Congress, see Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575,
|
||||
582 (1978) (noting that the legislative history expressly stated approval of the existing
|
||||
interpretation); McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 132 n.8 (1988)
|
||||
(declining to apply the doctrine where the legislative history merely made a passing
|
||||
reference to a prior judicial decision); Micron, 243 F.3d at 1311 (holding that there was
|
||||
no indication that Congress was aware of the decision by the Court of International
|
||||
Trade), or in the fact that the prior judicial interpretation comports with the statutory
|
||||
|
||||
75451.5
|
||||
15
|
||||
|
||||
structure and Congress's purpose for reenactment, see Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A.,
|
||||
557 U.S. 230, 239-240 (2009) (finding that the existing interpretation furthered
|
||||
Congress's purpose in reenacting that provision); Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 580-81 (holding
|
||||
that Congress evidenced an intent to adopt the existing interpretation, in part because it
|
||||
exhibited detailed knowledge of the existing law and selectively departed from that law
|
||||
in certain respects). No such indication from Congress is present here. As the
|
||||
Government would have it, Congress should be assumed to have adopted this Court's
|
||||
interpretation simply because this Court had issued orders prior to the reauthorization.
|
||||
|
||||
The secretive nature of these proceedings makes application of the ratification
|
||||
doctrine even more problematic. The doctrine is based on the legal assumption that
|
||||
Congress is aware of well-settled interpretations when it reenacts a statute—an
|
||||
assumption that be must be employed cautiously given the significant consequences of its
|
||||
use. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. E.P.A., 824 F.2d 1146, 1162 n.10
|
||||
(D.C. Cir. 1987). Such an assumption may be justified where the source of the
|
||||
interpretation is the Supreme Court or unanimous courts of appeal. That was the case in
|
||||
the two Supreme Court decisions, Forest Grove and Lorillard, cited by the opinions of
|
||||
Judges Eagan and McLaughlin in support of applying the ratification doctrine to Section
|
||||
501. In Forest Grove School District, the doctrine was applied to an enactment that
|
||||
followed two Supreme Court opinions affirming the Court's interpretation of the
|
||||
statutory language. 557 U.S. at 239-40. In Lorillard, the doctrine was invoked when
|
||||
"every court to consider the issue" had interpreted the language in question in the same
|
||||
way. 434 U.S. at 580. But employing that legal assumption here, where no opinion by
|
||||
this Court justifying its interpretation of Section 501 had even been authored, let alone
|
||||
|
||||
75451.5
|
||||
16
|
||||
|
||||
made public, at the time of the reauthorization is far more precarious. It requires the
|
||||
Court essentially to engage in detailed fact-finding, including the examination of what
|
||||
materials were made available to Congress, when those materials were made available,
|
||||
what portions of any such materials were redacted, whether members of Congress in fact
|
||||
had a meaningful opportunity to scrutinize those materials, and whether those materials
|
||||
fairly and adequately informed Congress about the Court's underlying legal reasoning.
|
||||
|
||||
Judge Eagan's opinion illustrates the dangers of this exercise, as well as the need
|
||||
for argument by parties other than the Government. The opinion argues that applying the
|
||||
ratification doctrine is appropriate here because Congress was made aware of this Court's
|
||||
approval of Program by way of a five-page secret "Report on the National Security
|
||||
Agency's Bulk Collection Programs for USA PATRIOT Act Reauthorization"
|
||||
(hereinafter "the February 2011 Report"). Id. at 24-26.⁴ But that is simply incorrect. As
|
||||
stated above, no opinion of this Court had yet been authored that provided a full
|
||||
substantive justification for its interpretation of Section 501. The Report itself, which is
|
||||
not a neutral analysis of the Program's legality but rather the Government's effort to
|
||||
justify the Program to Congress, contains only a cursory description of this Court's orders
|
||||
authorizing the Program and provides no legal reasoning. And it is uncertain whether the
|
||||
Report was even made available to all members of Congress. See Peter Wallsten, House
|
||||
Panel Withheld Document on NSA Survellience Program From Members, Wash. Post.,
|
||||
Aug. 16, 2013. While the Government has stated in its motion to dismiss in the Clapper
|
||||
case that the Senate Intelligence Committee made the report available to all Senators, it
|
||||
has made no similar representation concerning the House of Representatives. See
|
||||
|
||||
⁴ The opinion cites to Ex. 3, which appears to include the probably unredacted "Report."
|
||||
|
||||
75451.5
|
||||
17
|
||||
|
||||
Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss the Complaint,
|
||||
ACLU v. Clapper, 13-cv-03994, at 27 n.15 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2013). The Report might
|
||||
have been a useful first step in informing Congress about the Program, but it was far
|
||||
from affording, as Judge Eagan asserts, "each Member" with "full knowledge" of the
|
||||
"underlying legal interpretation" of Section 501. Mem. Op. at 26-27.
|
||||
|
||||
Judge McLaughlin also cites, Mem. Op. at 3, the Supreme Court's decision in
|
||||
Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981). The Government previously cited that opinion for
|
||||
the proposition that where Congress ratifies statutory language that has been subject to a
|
||||
"longstanding administrative construction," it is presumed to have adopted that
|
||||
construction. See Administration White Paper, Bulk Collection of Telephony Metadata
|
||||
Under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, at 19 (Aug. 9, 2013). But that decision
|
||||
concerned a longstanding administrative interpretation that had been publicly available
|
||||
for congressional scrutiny for 70 years. 453 U.S. at 296-298. And courts have held that
|
||||
application of the doctrine typically requires an indication that Congress was aware of the
|
||||
existing administrative interpretation and intended to adopt it. See Brown, 513 U.S. at
|
||||
121 (ratification inappropriate without an indication that Congress considered the
|
||||
interpretation).
|
||||
|
||||
The publicly released version of the February 2011 Report illustrates another
|
||||
problem with applying the ratification doctrine to Section 501—the secretive nature of
|
||||
the Government's Program prevented debate by the members or the public, and no one
|
||||
from outside Congress was there to question the Government's and this Court's legal
|
||||
interpretation. This meant that the legislative process did not operate in normal fashion.
|
||||
For example, the secrecy greatly restricted any members of Congress inclined to vote
|
||||
|
||||
75451.5
|
||||
18
|
||||
|
||||
against extending Section 501 because they believed it had been misused in the
|
||||
authorization of the Program. They would have known they could not fully explain a
|
||||
"no" vote to their constituents because they could not reveal the Program's existence.
|
||||
|
||||
III. Given the Government's View, this Court Sitting En Banc May be the Only
|
||||
Opportunity for Collegial Judicial Decision Making Regarding Bulk
|
||||
Telephony Metadata Collection
|
||||
|
||||
This Court, sitting en banc, may be the only Court on which Judges can come
|
||||
together to provide collective judgment to the legal questions presented by the Telephony
|
||||
Records Program. The Government has argued at every turn that private litigants in other
|
||||
forums cannot challege the orders of this Court under Section 501. For example, it
|
||||
successfully opposed the Supreme Court petition for mandamus of the Electronic Privacy
|
||||
Information Center on the ground that only the Government or a telecommunication
|
||||
company, as recipient of an order for the records of its customers, may seek appellate
|
||||
review of an order of this Court approving continuation of the Program. The Solicitor
|
||||
General argued that if the petitioner can bring its claim in any court the proper course
|
||||
would be an action in a federal district court. At the same time, the government also has
|
||||
sought dismissal of any lawsuit raising a challenge to the Program in federal district
|
||||
court. It has argued that the plaintiffs lack standing and that Section 501 impliedly
|
||||
precludes judicial review of the statutory claim that bulk collection pursuant to an order
|
||||
of this Court violates Section 501. If successful, these arguments would foreclose any
|
||||
avenue to federal appellate consideration through a district court.
|
||||
|
||||
Additionally, if the Government continues to prevail in this Court on all
|
||||
applications to individual judges to extend the Telephony Records Program, and no
|
||||
telecommunication provider asserts an interest of its customers, no appeal can be taken to
|
||||
|
||||
75451.5
|
||||
19
|
||||
|
||||
the FISA Court of Review or thereafter to the Supreme Court. For seven years already,
|
||||
the Telephony Records Program has not been the subject of either en banc consideration
|
||||
or appellate review—the kind of collegial judicial examination that our system of law
|
||||
relies on to correct error in individual judgments. En banc review by this Court, under
|
||||
the authority provided by Congress, would provide that opportunity.
|
||||
|
||||
CONCLUSION
|
||||
|
||||
For the foregoing reasons, the Center for National Security Studies requests that
|
||||
the Court establish the procedures requested in its motion.
|
||||
|
||||
Respectfully submitted,
|
||||
|
||||
Michael Davidson, D.C. Bar No.
|
||||
449007
|
||||
3753 McKinley Street, NW
|
||||
Washington, DC 20015
|
||||
(202) 362-4885
|
||||
mdavid2368@aol.com
|
||||
|
||||
Paul M. Smith, D.C. Bar No. 358870
|
||||
Michael T. Borgia*
|
||||
Jenner & Block, LLP
|
||||
1099 New York Avenue, N.W.,
|
||||
Suite 900
|
||||
Washington, DC 20001
|
||||
(202) 639-6000 (telephone)
|
||||
(202) 639-6066 (fax)
|
||||
|
||||
Of Counsel
|
||||
|
||||
*Admitted in New York. Admission
|
||||
pending in the District of Columbia.
|
||||
Practicing under the supervision of the
|
||||
partnership of Jenner & Block LLP.
|
||||
|
||||
Date: November 22, 2013
|
||||
|
||||
Kate A. Martin
|
||||
Kate A. Martin, D.C. Bar No. 949115
|
||||
Center for National Security Studies
|
||||
1730 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., S. 700
|
||||
Washington, D.C. 20006
|
||||
(202) 721-5650 (telephone)
|
||||
(202) 530-0128 (fax)
|
||||
kmartin@cnss.org
|
||||
|
||||
Joseph Onek, D.C. Bar No. 43611
|
||||
The Raben Group
|
||||
1640 Rhode Island Ave., N.W., S. 600
|
||||
Washington, D.C. 20036
|
||||
(202) 587-4942 (telephone)
|
||||
(202) 463-4803 (fax)
|
||||
jonek@rabengroup.com
|
||||
|
||||
Counsel for Movant Center for National
|
||||
Security Studies
|
||||
|
||||
75451.5
|
||||
20
|
||||
|
||||
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
|
||||
|
||||
I, Kate A. Martin, hereby certify that on November 22, 2013, pursuant to
|
||||
procedures established by the Security and Emergency Planning Staff, United States
|
||||
Department of Justice under FISC Rule 8, I caused copies of the Reply of the Center for
|
||||
National Security Studies in Support of Motion to Establish a Public Briefing Schedule
|
||||
Including the Filing of Briefs by Amici Curiae, for Leave to File an Amicus Curiae Brief,
|
||||
and a Suggestion for Hearing En Banc to be hand-delivered to:
|
||||
|
||||
Christine Gunning
|
||||
United States Department of Justice
|
||||
Litigation Security Group
|
||||
145 N Street, NE
|
||||
Suite 2W-115
|
||||
Washington, DC 20530
|
||||
|
||||
Kate A. Martin
|
||||
|
||||
75451.5
|
||||
21
|
||||
27
data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-158-response-131125/metadata.json
Normal file
27
data/FOIA/FISC_-_br13-158-response-131125/metadata.json
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "Reply of the Center for National Security Studies in Support of Motion to Establish a Public Briefing Schedule Including the Filings of Briefs by Amici Curiae, for Leave to File an Amicus Curiae Brief, and a Suggestion for Hearing En Banc, In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED]",
|
||||
"type": "foia",
|
||||
"description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
|
||||
"long_description": "",
|
||||
"tags": [],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "FISC",
|
||||
"date_created": "2013-11-22",
|
||||
"classification": [],
|
||||
"dissemination": [],
|
||||
"programs": [],
|
||||
"countries": [],
|
||||
"people": []
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
|
||||
"date_published": "2013-11-22",
|
||||
"link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34522",
|
||||
"reporters": [],
|
||||
"contributors": []
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "a568eb4261f6cb6d31379aafff01f7a93eadaeed0ff30387bf32d023a50b59bb",
|
||||
"pages": 21
|
||||
}
|
||||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue