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data/FOIA/FISC_-_br14-01-order/FISC_-_br14-01-order.md
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TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
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UNITED STATES
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FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
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WASHINGTON, D.C.
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IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
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BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN
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ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION OF
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TANGIBLE THINGS
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Docket No. BR 14-01
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ORDER GRANTING THE GOVERNMENT'S MOTION TO AMEND
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THE COURT'S PRIMARY ORDER DATED JANUARY 3, 2014
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This matter is before the Court on the motion of the government to amend the
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Primary Order issued on January 3, 2014, in the above-captioned docket ("January 3
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Primary Order" or "Jan. 3 Primary Order"), which was submitted on February 5, 2014
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("Motion"). In the January 3 Primary Order, the Court approved the government's
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application pursuant to Section 501 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
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("FISA" or "the Act"), codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1861, as amended (also known as Section
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215 of the USA PATRIOT Act),¹ for orders requiring the production to the National
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Security Agency ("NSA"), in bulk and on an ongoing basis, of call detail records or
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1 "Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
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to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001," Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (Oct.
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26, 2001) ("PATRIOT Act"), amended by, "USA PATRIOT Improvement
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Reauthorization Act of 2005," Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (Mar. 9, 2006); "USA
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PATRIOT Act Additional Reauthorizing Amendments Act of 2006," Pub. L. No. 109-
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178, 120 Stat. 278 (Mar. 9, 2006); and Section 215 expiration extended by "Department of
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Defense Appropriations Act, 2010," Pub. L. No. 111-118 (Dec. 19, 2009); "USA
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PATRIOT-Extension of Sunsets," Pub. L. No. 111-141 (Feb. 27, 2010); “FISA Sunsets
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Extension Act of 2011," Pub. L. No. 112-3 (Feb. 25, 2011); and, "PATRIOT Sunsets
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Extension Act of 2011," Pub. L. No. 112-14, 125 Stat. 216 (May 26, 2011).
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TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
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"telephony metadata" created by certain telecommunications carriers. The January 3
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Primary Order approved and adopted a detailed set of minimization procedures
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restricting NSA's access to and use of the telephony metadata produced in response to
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the Court's orders. The purpose of the Motion is to modify the applicable minimization
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procedures. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is granted.
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Before discussing the changes proposed by the government in the Motion, some
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background discussion is warranted. An application by the government for a
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production order under Section 215 must include, among other things, "an enumeration
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of the minimization procedures adopted by the Attorney General under subsection (g)
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of this section that are applicable to the retention and dissemination" of the tangible
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things that are received as part of the production. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(B). Subsection
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(g) defines the term "minimization procedures" as follows:
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(A) specific procedures that are reasonably designed in light of the
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purpose and technique of an order for the production of tangible things,
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to minimize the retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of nonpublicly
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available information concerning unconsenting United States persons
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consistent with the need of the United States to obtain, produce, and
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disseminate foreign intelligence information;
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(B) procedures that require that nonpublicly available information, which
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is not foreign intelligence information, as defined in section 1803(e)(1) of
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this title, shall not be disseminated in a manner that identifies any United
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States person, without such person's consent, unless such person's
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identity is necessary to understand foreign intelligence information or
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assess its importance; and
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(C) notwithstanding subparagraphs (A) and (B), procedures that allow for
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the retention and dissemination of information that is evidence of a crime
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which has been, is being, or is about to be committed and that is to be
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retained or disseminated for law enforcement purposes.
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Id. § 1861(g)(2).
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To approve an application under Section 215, this Court must find that the
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application "meets the requirements of subsections (a) and (b)," including the
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Page 2
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requirement that the application provide an enumeration of minimization procedures
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that have been adopted by the Attorney General and that meet the definition set forth in
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subsection (g). See id. § 1861(c)(1). Upon approval, the Court must, among other
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things, "direct that minimization procedures adopted pursuant to subsection (g) of this
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section be followed." Id.
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As required by FISA, the application filed by the government in this docket
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enumerated detailed minimization procedures for proposed use in connection with
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telephony metadata received in response to the requested production orders. See
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Application for Certain Tangible Things for Investigations to Protect Against
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International Terrorism (filed Jan. 3, 2014) at 15-25. The Court concluded that those
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procedures, which were adopted by the Attorney General, satisfied the above-described
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requirements of subsection (g), and directed that the government "strictly adhere" to
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them. See Jan. 3 Primary Order at 4. Among other things, the minimization
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procedures proposed by the government and approved by the Court in the January 3
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Primary Order authorize NSA analysts to access the telephony metadata only through a
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query process that requires a reasonable, articulable suspicion (RAS), as determined by
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a limited set of NSA personnel, that each selection term or "seed" (e.g., a telephone
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number) that will be used to search the data is associated with an international terrorist
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organization listed in the order. See id, at 4-12. The minimization procedures proposed
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by the government and adopted by the Court also effectively limit the results of queries
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to identifiers (e.g., telephone numbers) within three "hops" of the identifier used to
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conduct the query. See id, at 11-12.²
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In the Motion, the government proposes two changes to the previously-
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² The first "hop" from a seed returns results including all identifiers (and their
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associated metadata) that have been in contact or are connected with the seed. See
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Application for Certain Tangible Things for Investigations to Protect Against
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International Terrorism (filed Jan, 3, 2014), Tab A ([REDACTED]) n.5. The second hop returns results that include all identifiers (and their associated
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metadata) that have been in contact or are connected with an identifier revealed by the
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first hop. See id. The third hop returns results that included all identifiers (and their
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associated metadata) that have been in contact or are connected to an identifier at the
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second hop. See id.
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Page 3
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approved minimization procedures. The first change would generally preclude the
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government from querying the telephony metadata without first having obtained, by
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motion, a determination by this Court that each selection term to be used satisfies the
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RAS standard. See Motion at 2-3.³ The second change would limit the results of each
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query to metadata associated with identifiers that are within two, rather than three,
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"hops" of the approved seed used to conduct the query. See id, at 3.⁴ To effectuate
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these changes, the government proposes striking subparagraph (3)C from the January 3
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Primary Order and replacing it with a new subparagraph (3)C that is set forth in the
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Motion. See id, at 3-10.
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³ The proposal includes a provision that would allow the Director or Acting
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Director of NSA to authorize the "emergency querying" of a seed upon determining
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that (1) "an emergency exists with respect to the conduct of such querying before an
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order authorizing such use of a selection term can with due diligence be obtained" and
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(2) "the RAS standard has been met with respect to the selection term." Motion at 3.
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As soon as practicable, but not later than seven days following any use of this
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emergency provision, the government would be required to make a motion to the Court
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for approval of the query based on a determination that the RAS standard was satisfied.
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See id, at 3-4. In the event the Court were to determine that RAS was lacking, the
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government would be required to take appropriate remedial measures, including any
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steps the Court might direct (e.g., destroying the results of the emergency query and
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recalling any reports or other disseminations based on those results). See id. at 8.
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⁴ Other important aspects of the process would remain largely the same. For
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example, NSA would still be required to ensure through "adequate and appropriate
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technical and management controls" that queries of the telephony metadata are
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conducted only using RAS-approved selection terms. See Motion at 4. RAS approvals
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made by the Court (like RAS approvals made by NSA under the current process) would
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be effective for 180 days for any selection term reasonably believed to be used by a
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United States person; other RAS approvals would be effective for one year. See id.
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NSA would be permitted to use as a querying seed any selection term that is the subject
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of ongoing Court-authorized electronic surveillance pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1805, based
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on the Court's finding of probable cause to believe that the selection term is being used
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or is about to be used by an agent or agents of one of the terrorist groups enumerated in
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the Primary Order in this docket. See id. at 8-9.
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Page 4
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Both proposed changes have been adopted by the Attorney General, as required
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by subsection (b)(2)(B). See Motion at 15.⁵ Furthermore, both bear directly on the
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balancing of privacy and national security interests that is required by the first
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component of the definition of "minimization procedures" set forth in subsection (g).
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That portion of the definition requires:
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specific procedures that are reasonably designed in light of the purpose and
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technique of an order for the production of tangible things, to minimize the
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retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of nonpublicly available information
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concerning unconsenting United States persons consistent with the need of the
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United States to obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence
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information....
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50 U.S.C. § 1861(g)(2)(A).
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Limiting query results to two, rather than three, "hops" will have the effect of
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enhancing the protection of "nonpublicly available information concerning
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unconsenting United States persons." Id. Eliminating the third hop will reduce the
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amount of metadata - including metadata of or concerning United States persons – that
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is accessed by NSA analysts. Of course, metadata that is never accessed cannot be used
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or disseminated by the government.⁶
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Regarding the requirement that the proposed procedures be "consistent with the
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need of the United States to obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence
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information," id., the Court observes that metadata returned at the third hop is less
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likely to have foreign intelligence value than the metadata returned at the first and
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second hops. That is because identifiers that are three steps removed from a RAS-
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⁵ The Deputy Attorney General approved the proposed amendments. See
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Motion at 15. FISA defines "Attorney General" to include the Deputy Attorney
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General. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(g).
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⁶ For this reason, limiting query results to two hops also will help to limit the
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dissemination of United States-person identifying information in accordance with the
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second component of the definition of "minimization procedures" that is set forth on
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page 2 above. See 50 U.S.C. 1861(g)(2)(B).
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Page 5
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approved selection term are less likely to have a connection to international terrorism
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than those that are more closely connected to the seed identifier. For these reasons, the
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Court has no difficulty concluding that the proposed reduction in the number of hops
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from three to two is consistent with the applicable definition of "minimization
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procedures."
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The government's proposal to require RAS determinations by the FISC is less
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straightforward. To be sure, this change would enhance the protection of "nonpublicly
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available information concerning unconsenting United States persons," id, that is
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included in the telephony metadata received by NSA. In applying the warrant
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requirement of the Fourth Amendment in the context of more intrusive investigative
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measures used in criminal investigations, the Supreme Court has recognized the value
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of having a "neutral and detached magistrate" determine whether the circumstances
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justify the intrusion:
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The point of the Fourth Amendment... is not that it denies law
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enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men
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draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those
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inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
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judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of
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ferreting out crime.
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Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
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Although the protection of the Fourth Amendment does not extend to the
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government's acquisition or use of the telephony metadata at issue here, see Smith v.
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Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1978), the Supreme Court's reasoning in Johnson can plausibly
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be extended to the RAS determinations that are required to query the data. Having a
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disinterested judicial officer determine whether each selection term has the requisite
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connection to international terrorism can reasonably be expected to minimize the risk of
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erroneous queries and the attendant risk that United States-person information will be
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accessed or disseminated without adequate justification.
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The proposed judicial approval requirement is also "consistent with the need of
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the United States to obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence information."
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50 U.S.C. § 1861(g)(2)(A). The substantive standard for querying the metadata – the
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RAS standard - will remain the same. Although requiring that RAS determinations be
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Page 6
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made by an entity outside NSA will burden the approval process to some degree, the
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Executive Branch, which has primary responsibility for safeguarding our national
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security, proposed this change and thus presumably believes it to be workable. Further,
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the emergency exception described in footnote 3 above will give the government
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reasonable flexibility in appropriate situations to act expeditiously when obtaining prior
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judicial approval for particular queries is not feasible.
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Although the Court is satisfied that the effect of the government's proposal to
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require RAS approvals by the FISC would be consistent with Section 215's definition of
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"minimization procedures," that is not the end of the discussion. FISA contemplates
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that the Executive Branch, which formulates the minimization procedures and receives
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the tangible things from the recipient of the production order, will apply those
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procedures, with appropriate oversight by the FISC. See 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(B); see
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also 50 U.S.C. § 1803(h). Historically, the minimization procedures proposed by the
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government and approved by the Court under FISA have reflected this allocation of
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responsibilities, which also recognizes the distinct roles of the Executive Branch and the
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Judiciary in our system of government. The government's proposal to require RAS
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determinations by the FISC as a prerequisite to NSA queries of the database would
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deviate from this framework by giving the Court a more prominent role not just in
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overseeing Executive Branch compliance with FISC-approved procedures, but in the
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actual application of those procedures. It could also impose substantial new burdens on
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the FISC that are not contemplated by FISA.
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The Executive Branch, of course, cannot unilaterally compel the FISC, an Article
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III court, to assume the RAS-approval function, and the Court would be within its
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discretion under FISA to reject this aspect of the Motion. See 50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1)
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(permitting the Court to grant the government's application "as modified").
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The Court is cognizant of the fact that this program is under review by the other
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branches of government and that changes may result from the review. While this
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policymaking assessment is ongoing, the Executive Branch is asking the Court for
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additional assistance in reassuring the public that adequate protection is afforded to
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information concerning United States persons that is being acquired pursuant to a FISC
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order.
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The Court sees nothing in the language of the Act that would preclude it from
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accepting the Executive Branch's invitation to assume responsibility for making RAS
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determinations. This role in fact parallels the FISC's core judicial function of
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Page 7
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determining whether applications for authority to conduct electronic surveillance or
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physical search are supported by probable cause. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1805, 1824.⁷ Indeed,
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the Court has previously approved query requests in this matter, albeit under distinct
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circumstances and pursuant to different authority.⁸ Provided that the number of
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⁷ This matter is distinguishable from In Re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct.
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Rev. 2002), in which the FISC, under the rubric of "minimization procedures" and over
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the government's objection, prohibited law enforcement officials from directing or
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controlling the use of FISA proceedings to enhance criminal investigations or
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prosecutions. Id. at 720. To effectuate that prohibition, the FISC required that certain
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Executive Branch officials participate, effectively as "chaperones," in meetings and
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consultations between other Executive Branch officials. Id. The Foreign Intelligence
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Surveillance Court of Review held that the prohibition imposed by the FISC was
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inconsistent with language of FISA, and that by asserting authority to govern the
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internal organization and investigative procedures of the Executive Branch, the FISC
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"may well have exceeded the constitutional bounds that restrict an Article III court."
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Id. at 731. Here, the Executive Branch is asking the Court to undertake what is
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essentially a core judicial function, and one which, as discussed in the text above, is not
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inconsistent with the language of the Act.
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⁸ In 2009, after the Executive Branch reported widespread noncompliance by
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NSA with the RAS-approval provisions of the FISC's orders in this matter, the Court, on
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its own motion, mandated that all queries of the telephony metadata be approved by
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the Court pending investigation of the incident and restoration of the Court's
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confidence that NSA was prepared to comply with its orders. See Docket No. BR 08-13,
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Order dated March 2, 2009, at 18-19. In taking this unusual step, the Court expressly
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invoked its "authority and responsibility to 'determine [and] enforce compliance' with
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Court orders and Court-approved procedures [under] 50 U.S.C. § 1803(i)," which has
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since been renumbered as 50 U.S.C. § 1803(h). See id. at 14. Once adequate remedial
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measures had been implemented by the Executive Branch, NSA was permitted to
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resume making RAS determinations on its own, with oversight by the FISC and other
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elements of the Executive Branch. See Docket No. BR 09-13, Primary Order (Sept. 3,
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2009) at 6-18. Insofar as the Court is aware, there is at present no similar pattern of
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pervasive noncompliance.
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Page 8
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TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
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selectors used to query the metadata remains relatively close to the present level, the
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Court is satisfied that it will be able to undertake the additional work that will be
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required, at least until the expiration of the January 3 Primary Order. In consideration
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of the unique facts and circumstances that are now presented, the Court will approve
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the Executive Branch's proposal to require RAS approvals by the FISC as a prerequisite
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to queries of the telephony metadata acquired pursuant to the Court's orders in this
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matter.
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For the foregoing reasons, the Motion to amend the January 3 Primary Order is
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granted. Subsection (3)C of that Primary Order shall be stricken and replaced with the
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revised subsection (3)C that is set forth in the Motion.
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In light of the ongoing public interest in this matter and the President's recent
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public remarks regarding the proposed changes that are the subject of the Motion, the
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government is directed to review this Order for declassification in anticipation of likely
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publication by the Court pursuant to FISC Rule 62(a). The Court understands that a
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declassification review of the January 3 Primary Order is already underway. Because
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the revised subsection (3)C of the Primary Order is set forth in the Motion, the
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government is also directed to conduct a declassification review of the Motion. The
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government shall complete its declassification reviews of this Order, the January 3
|
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Primary Order, and the Motion as promptly as is practicable and report to the Court
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with the results of such review no later than February 17, 2014.
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SO ORDERED, this 5th day of February, 2014, in Docket Number BR 14-01.
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REGGIE B. WALTON
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Presiding Judge, United States Foreign
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Intelligence Surveillance Court
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[REDACTED]
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TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN-
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Page 9
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27
data/FOIA/FISC_-_br14-01-order/metadata.json
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data/FOIA/FISC_-_br14-01-order/metadata.json
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@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
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{
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"title": "Order Granting the Government's Motion to Amend the Court's Primary Order Dated January 3, 2014 (Feb. 5, 2014)",
|
||||
"type": "foia",
|
||||
"description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
|
||||
"long_description": "",
|
||||
"tags": [],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "FISC",
|
||||
"date_created": "2014-02-05",
|
||||
"classification": [],
|
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"dissemination": [],
|
||||
"programs": [],
|
||||
"countries": [],
|
||||
"people": []
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
|
||||
"date_published": "2014-02-05",
|
||||
"link": "https://clearinghouse.net/doc/76768/",
|
||||
"reporters": [],
|
||||
"contributors": []
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "7ad281439251bf90c85ae3004383defaae800eecbc9c1585cc0d0b952e03acbc",
|
||||
"pages": 9
|
||||
}
|
||||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue