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UNITED STATES
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2013 2013.01-7 JUH-7 P11 2:06
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FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
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WASHINGTON, D.C.
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CLERMO
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IN RE MOTION FOR CONSENT TO DISCLOSURE )
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OF COURT RECORDS OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, )
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A DETERMINATION OF THE EFFECT OF THE )
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COURT'S RULES ON STATUTORY ACCESS RIGHTS )
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Docket No.: Misc. 13-01
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THE UNITED STATES' OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION
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OF THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION
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JOHN P. CARLIN
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Acting Assistant Attorney General
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for National Security
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J. BRADFORD WIEGMANN
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Deputy Assistant Attorney General
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TASHINA GAUHAR
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Deputy Assistant Attorney General
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JEFFREY M. SMITH
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NICHOLAS J. PATTERSON
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U.S. Department of Justice
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National Security Division
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950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
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Washington, D.C. 20530
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Phone: (202) 514-5600
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Fax: (202) 514-8053
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Attorneys for the United States of America
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Movant seeks to obtain from the Government copies of an opinion of this Court which is
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currently subject to seal pursuant to this Court's rules. This Court should deny the instant
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Motion both because it is outside this Court's jurisdiction and because there is good reason not to
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vacate the seal on the opinion.
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BACKGROUND
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Movant Electronic Frontier Foundation brings the instant Motion seeking this Court's
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intervention in support of Movant's ongoing Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") lawsuit
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currently pending before Judge Amy Berman Jackson of the U.S. District Court for the District
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of Columbia in which Movant contends that the U.S. Department of Justice has unlawfully
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withheld records responsive to its FOIA request. See *Electronic Frontier Found. v. Dep't of
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Justice*, No. 12-CV-1441-ABJ (D.D.C. filed Aug. 30, 2012). In response to Movant's FOIA
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request, the Department of Justice located five documents. Only two of these documents are
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relevant here, and they are two copies of the same document. One is an unredacted version of an
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opinion of this Court, and the other is a partially redacted version of the same opinion. See
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*Electronic Frontier Found*., No. 12-CV-1441, Doc. No. 11-2.
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The Department of Justice moved for summary judgment in the FOIA case. See
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*Electronic Frontier Found*., No. 12-CV-1441, Doc. No. 11-1. With regard to the two versions of
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the responsive opinion of this Court, the Government contended that the Department had no
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discretion to release the opinion under the FISC's Rules of Procedure. See *id*. at 11-15. The
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Department also argued that this opinion, as well as the other material withheld in that case, is
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properly classified and therefore exempt from release pursuant to Exemptions 1 and 3 of FOIA.
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*Id*. at 15-25.
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1
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Rather than respond to the Department's motion for summary judgment, Movant sought
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and received a stay of that litigation and came to this Court. Movant styles its request as one "for
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entry of an order consenting to the disclosure of certain Court records." Motion at 2. In fact, the
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"certain Court records" consist of a single opinion of this Court, the relevant copies of which are
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in the possession of the Department of Justice. And, "consenting to the disclosure" would
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require issuance of an order vacating this Court's seal over its opinion, which would not result in
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the release of the Court's opinion in its entirety but might ultimately lead to disclosure of
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portions of the Court's opinion at a later stage in the FOIA case.
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ARGUMENT
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The Motion at issue is outside the jurisdiction of this Court. This is not, as Movant
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suggests, a case about whether Movant has a legal right to this Court's files; it is an action in aid
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of Movant's FOIA suit against the Department of Justice seeking records from the Department's
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files. This action is outside the inherent jurisdiction previously recognized by this Court with
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respect to its supervisory power over its own records and files. Moreover, even if this Court had
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jurisdiction over this Motion, it should deny it, rather than allow another court to determine
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whether any portions of its opinion should be released under FOIA. Any such release would be
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incomplete and quite possibly misleading to the public about the role of this Court and the issues
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discussed in the opinion.
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I. This Court Does Not Have Jurisdiction Over This Motion
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The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC"), like other Article III courts, is a
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"court[] of limited jurisdiction marked out by Congress." *Int'l Custom Prods., Inc. v. United
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States*, 467 F.3d 1324, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting *Aldinger v. Howard*, 427 U.S. 1, 15
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(1976)). Thus, this Court's jurisdiction is limited to that which Congress explicitly conferred on
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2
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it plus those limited areas in which a court possesses inherent jurisdiction. See *Chambers v.
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NASCO, Inc*., 501 U.S. 32, 43-44 (1991) ("It has long been understood that '[c]ertain implied
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powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the nature of their institution.'").
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Neither this Court's statutory jurisdiction nor its inherent jurisdiction extends to this Motion.
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This Court's statutory jurisdiction is limited to certain applications and certifications that
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may be filed by the Government, see 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804, 1823, 1842, 1861, 1881(b), 1881(c),
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and 1881(d), and two types of petitions that a private party may file, neither of which is
|
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applicable here. See 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f) (permitting a person receiving a production order to file
|
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a petition to challenge that order); 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a) (permitting an electronic service provider
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that receives a Section 1881(a) directive to file a petition to challenge that directive). Indeed,
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Movant does not claim that this Court's statutory jurisdiction encompasses the instant Motion.
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See Motion at 4-5.
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Instead, Movant relies entirely on this Court's earlier holding that it has inherent
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jurisdiction "to adjudicate a claim of right to the court's very own records and files." *Id*. at 5
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(quoting *In re Release of Court Records*, 526 F. Supp. 2d 484, 487 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct.
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2007)). But, unlike the movant in *In re Release* who claimed that the First Amendment and the
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common law required this Court to open its files and make documents available to the public,
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Movant here does not claim a right "to the court's very own records and files." Movant is not
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asking this Court to release any documents, nor to open up its files. Indeed, Movant does not
|
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cite any "claim of right" against this Court at all. Rather, Movant is functionally asking this
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Court to vacate in part the seal on a FISC proceeding to which it is not a party so that another
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court can order the Government to release an opinion of this Court from the Government's files.
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Movant provides no authority to support the contention that this Court has inherent jurisdiction
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3
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over such an action or that the Court's inherent jurisdiction may extend to cases where the "claim
|
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of right" is not against this Court, but rather is a FOIA claim against the Government being
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adjudicated by another court.
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Because this Motion does not fall within the Court's statutory or inherent jurisdiction, it
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should be dismissed.¹
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II. The Opinion at Issue Is Sealed Pursuant to This Court's Rules
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The opinion Movant seeks cannot be released by the Government not only because it is
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classified but also because it is under this Court's seal. As Judge Bates has explained, "[t]he
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FISC is a unique court," whereas "[o]ther courts operate primarily in public, with secrecy the
|
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exception; the FISC operates primarily in secret, with public access the exception." In re
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Release, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 487-88. The FISC maintains this operational secrecy because, unlike
|
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any other court, its "entire docket relates to the collection of foreign intelligence by the federal
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government." Id. at 487.
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The FISC's operations are governed "by FISA, by Court rule, and by statutorily
|
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mandated security procedures issued by the Chief Justice of the United States [which] [t]ogether
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represent a comprehensive scheme for the safeguarding and handling of FISC proceedings and
|
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records." Id. at 488. In this scheme, the first line of defense for the protection of the FISC's
|
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records, including opinions, is the FISC's Rules of Procedure.
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_______
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¹ This does not mean, however, that the Court is without the power to unseal its opinions. As discussed
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below, Rule 62(a) of this Court's rules provides that a judge of this Court may, on motion by a party or
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sua sponte, after consultation with the other judges of the Court and with review and redaction by the
|
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Executive Branch for classification, direct that an opinion that he or she authored be published. See U.S.
|
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Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, Rule of Procedure 62(a) (2010). This procedure, which allows
|
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for input from all judges on the Court and the Executive Branch, and which is not required in response to
|
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a motion from a non-party otherwise not involved in the case, is the proper mechanism by which this
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Court considers whether or not its opinions should be unsealed and made available to the public.
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4
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A plain reading of the FISC's Rules of Procedure, as well as the longstanding practice of
|
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the FISC and the Government implementing these rules, makes clear that FISC opinions,
|
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including the instant opinion, are sealed and, with one exception that is not applicable here, the
|
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Government cannot release copies of FISC opinions in its possession without permission from
|
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the FISC. Under FISC Rule 62(a), FISC opinions can only be made public if the "Judge who
|
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authored an order, opinion, or other decision ... *sua sponte* or on motion by a party request[s]
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that it be published." See U.S. Foreign Intelligence Court, Rule of Procedure 62(a) (2010).
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When such a request is made, "the Presiding Judge, after consulting with other Judges of the
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Court, may direct that an order, opinion or other decision be published." Id.
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The FISC Rule provides a critical role for the Executive Branch before publication but
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makes clear that the FISC is the decisionmaker regarding unsealing: "Before publication, the
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Court may, as appropriate, direct the Executive Branch to review the order, opinion, or other
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decision and redact it as necessary to ensure that properly classified information is appropriately
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protected pursuant to Executive Order 13526 (or its successor)." Id.
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Furthermore, FISC Rule 62's next subsection reinforces the FISC's limits on the
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unsealing of orders. In what is essentially a catchall clause, FISC Rule 62(b) states that "[e]xcept
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when an order, opinion, or other decision is published or provided to a party upon issuance, the
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Clerk may not release it, or other related record, without a Court order." See U.S. Foreign
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Intelligence Surveillance Court, Rule of Procedure 62(b) (2010).
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The Rule provides one exception under which the Government may release a FISC order
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without Court approval, but even then, places a tight constraint on such action. Under FISC Rule
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62(c)(1), the Government "may provide copies of Court orders, opinions, decisions, or other
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Court records, to Congress, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. §§ 1871(a)(5), 1871(c), or 1881f(b)(1)(D), or
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5
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any other statutory requirement, without prior motion to and order by the Court." See U.S.
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Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, Rule of Procedure 62(e)(1) (2010). The Government,
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however, "must contemporaneously notify the Court in writing whenever it provides copies of
|
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Court records to Congress and must include in the notice a list of the documents provided."
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See id.
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This language makes clear that the Government's right to provide copies of opinions to
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Congress (albeit with contemporaneous notice to this Court) is an explicit exception to the
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otherwise applicable rule that the Government may not disclose copies of FISC opinions without
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an order from the Court. Indeed, it would make little sense for FISC Rule 62 explicitly to
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articulate this limited exception for disclosures to Congress if the Government had the ability to
|
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unseal and publish FISC opinions without Court approval in other circumstances.
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Longstanding practice also supports this reading of the FISC Rules of Procedure. As this
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Court is aware, prior to the 2010 FISC Rules of Procedure, the Government had, when it needed
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to disclose an order, opinion, decision, or other record of this Court to Congress, filed an *in
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camera* motion asking this Court to unseal the records for that purpose, a step that was necessary
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only because this Court's orders, opinions, and other records are viewed as being under seal.
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That practice would have been unnecessary, and the Court's prior orders in this regard would be
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of no operative consequence, if the rules did not serve as a seal barring the release of FISC
|
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opinions and orders without Court approval. The 2010 revisions to the FISC Rules of Procedure,
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while relaxing the procedure to allow provision of materials to Congress with notice rather than
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Court approval, did not purport to alter the underlying principle that FISC orders and opinions
|
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are under seal. Since that time, under the current FISC Rules of Procedure, when the
|
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Government has needed to provide FISC orders and related records to other courts in connection
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6
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with criminal cases in which FISA information is to be used against a criminal defendant, the
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Government has filed motions with this Court to unseal the records for this purpose, and the
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Court has granted such motions. Again, these unsealing orders would be unnecessary were there
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no seal in effect. This consistent practice demonstrates that FISC orders, opinions, and related
|
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records are under seal, that both the Government and this Court have treated them as such, and
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that the Government does not have discretion to disclose such records without the approval of
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this Court.
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Thus, when read together and in light of longstanding practice, the different sections of
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FISC Rule 62 reveal that the Court places tight controls on the unsealing of orders, retaining
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authority to determine whether opinions should be disclosed in almost all instances. The instant
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opinion, because it has not been unsealed by this Court, is still under seal, and the Government
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cannot release it to Movant.
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III. This Court Should Not Vacate the Seal on the Opinion
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Even assuming this Court has jurisdiction over this Motion, it should deny the Motion. If
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this Court grants Movant the relief sought, the consequence would be that the Government could
|
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release the opinion or any portion of it in its discretion, and that another court, not as familiar as
|
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this Court with the equities at issue, could order the release of the opinion or some portion of it.
|
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If this Court were to find that its Rules of Procedure do not operate to seal its opinions at all, the
|
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consequences would be even more dramatic: the Government would be free to release any
|
||||
opinion or portion thereof without Court approval, and other courts could likewise order the
|
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release of any FISC opinion.
|
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|
||||
Of course, the Government could continue to assert classification of FISC opinions as
|
||||
grounds for non-disclosure under FOIA. As a practical matter, if any release were to occur, it is
|
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|
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7
|
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|
||||
likely that it would be only unclassified portions of an opinion not intertwined with or tending to
|
||||
reveal classified information. This Court has no way to judge *ex ante* whether such a selective
|
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release of material would provide a misleading view of this Court's opinion or otherwise
|
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undermine important interests in the Court's oversight of the Government's activities.
|
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Moreover, whatever the outcome of this particular case, granting the relief sought by Movant
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here will set a precedent that could lead to many more requests for releases of this Court's
|
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opinions.
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|
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A release involving the disclosure of some parts of a FISC opinion while concealing
|
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other parts creates a substantial risk of public misunderstanding or confusion regarding this
|
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Court's decision or reasoning. Because the facts presented in applications to the FISC typically
|
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involve classified intelligence activities, the disclosure of which could be harmful to the nation's
|
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security, and the facts and the legal analysis of FISC opinions are so inextricably intertwined,
|
||||
exercising the classified information from the FISC's analysis would result in a remnant void of
|
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much or any useful meaning.²
|
||||
|
||||
While classification decisions regarding national security information are within the
|
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exclusive purview of the Executive Branch, this Court has an independent equity in ensuring that
|
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its opinions are not presented to the public in a highly incomplete or misleading manner. The
|
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Court's sealing rules protect this equity, as well as protecting classified information. Granting
|
||||
Movant's request at a time when the Court does not know what portions of its opinion might
|
||||
ultimately be released would vitiate that equity in this case and set a precedent for future cases in
|
||||
which third parties will seek releases of this Court's sealed opinions.
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_______
|
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² The Court, of course, has a means of providing public access to its opinions in those cases where it
|
||||
determines that meaningful access to the opinion is possible and desirable. See U.S. Foreign Intelligence
|
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Surveillance Court, Rule of Procedure 62(a) (2010). That the Court did not consider the opinion at issue
|
||||
here a good candidate for public release is unsurprising given the fact-intensive nature of FISC opinions.
|
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|
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8
|
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|
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IV. The Fact That Movant May Be Unsuccessful in the District Court in Compelling the
|
||||
Department of Justice to Release a Classified, Sealed FISC Opinion Does Not Mean
|
||||
That Plaintiff Faces a "Catch-22"
|
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|
||||
Movant misinterprets FISC Rule 62(a) and its relation to FOIA, positing a "Catch-22"
|
||||
where none exists. In fact, it is well-established that requesters cannot receive records either
|
||||
from a district court or the Executive Branch when the records are under seal. The fact that there
|
||||
are two separate reasons why Movant cannot obtain the FISC opinion it seeks—because it is
|
||||
properly classified by the Executive Branch and because it is under this Court's seal—does not
|
||||
imply a "Catch-22."
|
||||
|
||||
Indeed, the D.C. Circuit has held that the Government may withhold materials in a FOIA
|
||||
case if the materials are under seal and the sealing court intended to prevent the Government
|
||||
from disclosing the materials. In *Morgan v. U.S. Dep't of Justice*, 923 F.2d 195 (D.C. Cir.
|
||||
1991), which involved a FOIA request where the requestor sought documents in the
|
||||
Government's possession that had been sealed by a district court, the D.C. Circuit held that "the
|
||||
proper test for determining whether an agency improperly withholds records under seal is
|
||||
whether the seal, like an injunction, prohibits the agency from disclosing the records." *Id*. at 197
|
||||
(citing *GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc*., 445 U.S. 375, 386-87
|
||||
(1980) (holding that (1) an agency does not abuse its discretion under the FOIA by honoring a
|
||||
court order enjoining the agency from releasing records because in such a case there "simply [is]
|
||||
no discretion for the agency to exercise," and (2) respect for the judicial process requires the
|
||||
agency to honor the injunction)). The D.C. Circuit held that if the seal prohibits disclosure, "the
|
||||
FOIA does not compel the agency to release the information." *Id*. Morgan's logic has particular
|
||||
force in the context of an opinion of this "uniquely nonpublic" court, *In re Release*, 526 F. Supp.
|
||||
|
||||
9
|
||||
|
||||
2d at 491 n.18, which "operates primarily in secret, with public access the exception," *id*. at 488.³
|
||||
See also *Gerstein v. U.S. Dep't of Justice*, No. C-03-04893 RMW, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
|
||||
41276, at *17-*21 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2005) (finding that the Department of Justice properly
|
||||
withheld under FOIA sealed search warrants where disclosure to third parties would eliminate
|
||||
the courts' ability to keep the warrants confidential); *Nguyen v. FBI*, No. 04-0018 RWR, 2006
|
||||
U.S.Dist. LEXIS 75943, at *1-*2 (Oct. 19, 2006) (finding that the Federal Bureau of
|
||||
Investigation properly withheld under FOIA a sealed court order concerning third party
|
||||
informant).
|
||||
|
||||
But in any event, the United States has not asked this Court to hold that the Government
|
||||
may withhold the opinion pursuant to FOIA. That is a decision for Judge Jackson to make in the
|
||||
FOIA litigation pending before her. The United States is arguing here that this Court should,
|
||||
absent a dismissal on jurisdictional grounds, recognize that its opinion is under seal and decline
|
||||
to vacate the seal for the reasons stated above. In this regard, Movant appears to misconstrue
|
||||
this Court's opinion regarding FISC records and FOIA in *In re Motion for Release of Court
|
||||
Records*. In that case, the movant had not filed a FOIA request but had instead requested that the
|
||||
FISC release orders and other materials. *In re Release*, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 485. In rejecting the
|
||||
movant's request, the FISC stated that a party could "submit[] a FOIA request," *id*. at 496 n.32,
|
||||
_______
|
||||
³ In *Morgan*, the D.C. Circuit gave the D.C. district court handling the FOIA case leave to stay
|
||||
proceedings pending a clarification from the Maryland district court that had issued the seal that
|
||||
prohibited the Department of Justice from releasing the materials. *Morgan*, 923 F.2d at 198. (The
|
||||
Government has not sought such a clarification in this case because there has never been any doubt that
|
||||
under the FISC rules—based on the language of the rules and the longstanding practice thereunder—the
|
||||
Government cannot release a FISC opinion without Court approval.) In subsequent litigation, the
|
||||
Maryland district court that had sealed the materials issued a Memorandum and Order granting a motion
|
||||
of the United States for clarification and denying Morgan's motion to remove the seal. *United States v.
|
||||
Morgan*, No. H-83-00351 (D. Md. July 3, 1991). Specifically, the court clarified the issue of its intent by
|
||||
holding that the "sealing Order, which was affirmed when the Fourth Circuit declined to unseal the notes,
|
||||
was intended to operate as the functional equivalent of an injunction prohibiting disclosure of the matters
|
||||
under seal." *Id*. at 5. The Fourth Circuit then affirmed the district court's decision clarifying the intent of
|
||||
the order sealing the documents and denying the motion to remove the seal. *U.S. v. Morgan*, 962 F.2d 8
|
||||
(4th Cir. 1992) (Table).
|
||||
|
||||
10
|
||||
|
||||
for such records and pursue "whatever remedies may be available to it in a district court." *Id*. at
|
||||
497. In so doing, the FISC did not state that such records would necessarily be released or could
|
||||
be released in the absence of a FISC order unsealing the materials. *Id*.
|
||||
|
||||
The United States agrees that a FOIA request and subsequent suit in the district court is
|
||||
the proper method for Movant to test whether it has a legal right to obtain the opinion. The
|
||||
Government has argued in the district court that Movant has no such right to obtain a classified,
|
||||
sealed FISC opinion. The fact that Movant lacks a legal right to obtain the document it seeks
|
||||
does not imply a "Catch-22." Rather, as in *Morgan* and the other cases cited above, it indicates
|
||||
that neither this Court nor the Executive Branch is obliged under FOIA to release the opinion.
|
||||
|
||||
11
|
||||
|
||||
CONCLUSION
|
||||
|
||||
For the reasons stated above, the Court should deny the Motion.⁴
|
||||
|
||||
June 7, 2013
|
||||
|
||||
Respectfully submitted,
|
||||
|
||||
JOHN P. CARLIN
|
||||
Acting Assistant Attorney General
|
||||
for National Security
|
||||
|
||||
J. BRADFORD WIEGMANN
|
||||
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
|
||||
|
||||
TASHINA GAUHAR
|
||||
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
|
||||
|
||||
Nicholas J. Patterson
|
||||
|
||||
JEFFREY M. SMITH
|
||||
NICHOLAS J. PATTERSON
|
||||
U.S. Department of Justice
|
||||
National Security Division
|
||||
950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
|
||||
Washington, D.C. 20530
|
||||
Phone: (202) 514-5600
|
||||
Fax: (202) 514-8053
|
||||
|
||||
Attorneys for the United States of America
|
||||
_______
|
||||
⁴ Even if this Court were to grant the relief sought in the Motion, the opinion at issue would remain
|
||||
classified and could not be given to Movant absent a decision to declassify it, in whole or in part, by the
|
||||
Executive Branch, whether on its own initiative or by Order of a court reviewing a FOIA request.
|
||||
|
||||
12
|
||||
|
||||
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
|
||||
|
||||
I hereby certify that a true copy of the United States of America's Opposition to the
|
||||
Motion of the Electronic Frontier Foundation was served via Federal Express and email on this
|
||||
7th day of June, 2013, addressed to:
|
||||
|
||||
David L. Sobel
|
||||
Electronic Frontier Foundation
|
||||
1818 N Street, N. W., Suite 410
|
||||
Washington, DC 20036
|
||||
|
||||
Mark Rumold
|
||||
Electronic Frontier Foundation
|
||||
454 Shotwell Street
|
||||
San Francisco, CA 94110
|
||||
|
||||
Nicholas J. Patterson
|
||||
Nicholas J. Patterson
|
||||
27
data/FOIA/FISC_-_doj-opposition-motion/metadata.json
Normal file
27
data/FOIA/FISC_-_doj-opposition-motion/metadata.json
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "The United States' Opposition to the Motion of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, In re Motion for Consent to Disclosure of Court Records or, in the Alternative, A Determination of the Effect of the Courts Rules on Statutory Access Rights",
|
||||
"type": "foia",
|
||||
"description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
|
||||
"long_description": "",
|
||||
"tags": [],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "FISC",
|
||||
"date_created": "2013-06-07",
|
||||
"classification": [],
|
||||
"dissemination": [],
|
||||
"programs": [],
|
||||
"countries": [],
|
||||
"people": []
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
|
||||
"date_published": "2013-06-07",
|
||||
"link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34432",
|
||||
"reporters": [],
|
||||
"contributors": []
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "28b7ea44b82cec602e4b25c3afbc67cb641013472123e194b773ffbfcab40817",
|
||||
"pages": 14
|
||||
}
|
||||
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Reference in a new issue