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UNITED STATES
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FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
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WASHINGTON, D.C.
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IN RE ORDERS OF THIS COURT
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INTERPRETING SECTION 215
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OF THE PATRIOT ACT
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Docket No. Misc. 13-02
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OPINION AND ORDER
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This matter involves a motion by the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU"), the
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American Civil Liberties Union of the Nation's Capital (“ACLU-NC"), and the Media Freedom
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and Information Access Clinic (“MFIAC") for release of certain opinions of the Foreign
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Intelligence Surveillance Court. In particular, movants seek release of opinions on Section 215
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of the Patriot Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1861¹---that is, the business records provision of the Foreign
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Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA"), codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1885c.
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For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that the ACLU and ACLU-NC have
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standing to seek this relief, as required by Article III of the Constitution, and that the Rules of the
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FISC do not preclude the Court from considering this request.² The Court concludes, however,
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that principles of comity---specifically, the "first-to-file" rule---require that the motion be denied
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to the extent that it concerns FISC opinions that are at issue in a separate suit brought by the
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ACLU in October 2011 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
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¹ See Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 287 (2001), codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
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§ 1861.
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² The Rules of the FISC may be found at www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/rules/FISC2010.pdf.
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[REDACTED]
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pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552.³
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As a matter of discretion and for the reasons set forth below, the Court will order the government
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to conduct a declassification review of any opinions responsive to the present motion that are not
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subject to that FOIA litigation and to report the results of that review to the Court.
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I. Procedural History
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On June 12, 2013, the ACLU, the ACLU-NC, and the MFIAC filed a motion with the
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FISC for release of certain court records. Specifically, the movants seek "publication of [FISC]
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opinions evaluating the meaning, scope, and constitutionality of Section 215 of the Patriot Act,
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50 U.S.C. § 1861" ("Section 215 Opinions"), "with only those redactions that satisfy the
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stringent First Amendment standard that applies in public-access cases." Motion at 1.
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Alternatively, the motion requests that the Court "exercise its discretion" to order such
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publication "in the public interest." Id.
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In support of that request, movants assert a qualified First Amendment right of access to
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the opinions in question. They contend that a prior opinion of the FISC denying a claim of right
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to obtain access to a FISC opinion, In re Motion for Release of Court Records, 526 F. Supp.2d
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484 (FISA Ct. 2007), was erroneous. In particular, they contend that the FISC erred in its
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application of the two-part "experience and logic" test for determining whether a First
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Amendment right of access to court proceedings or records attaches.⁴ Movants further contend
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³ ACLU v. FBI, No. 11 Civ. 7562 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2011). For the sake of convenience,
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the Court will refer to it as the “FOIA litigation."
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⁴ In assessing whether there is a First Amendment right of access to a criminal
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2
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(continued...)
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[REDACTED]
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that, because of this constitutional right, any restriction on access must serve a compelling
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governmental interest and be narrowly tailored to serve that interest. They acknowledge that
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narrow redactions to protect sensitive information, such as "intelligence sources and methods
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that have not been previously disclosed," would satisfy this standard. Id. at 14; see also id. at 16
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("This motion does not seek the disclosure of ... any properly classified information").
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The government, in response, contends that In re Motion for Release of Court Records
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was correctly decided and that movants have not established a First Amendment right of access
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to the opinions at issue. The government also contends that because movants were not parties to
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the Section 215 proceedings that resulted in the opinions they seek, they lack "standing" under
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the FISC Rules to request the Court to publish the opinions as a matter of discretion. On the
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government's interpretation, the judge who authored an opinion could still request publication
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sua sponte, and after consultation the Presiding Judge could direct publication, provided that the
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Executive Branch redacts from the public version any classified information.
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In their reply memorandum, movants further contend that the FISC has the authority to
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make classification decisions independent of the Executive Branch and to publish the opinions
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without an Executive Branch declassification review.
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⁴(...continued)
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proceeding, the Supreme Court has looked to "whether the place and process have historically
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been open to the press and the general public" and "whether public access plays a significant
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positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question." Press-Enter. Co. v.
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Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986). "If the particular proceeding in question passes these tests
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of experience and logic, a qualified First Amendment right of public access attaches." Id. at 9.
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⁵ The Court has also received, accompanied by motions for leave to file, two amici curiae
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(continued...)
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3
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[REDACTED]
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II. The ACLU and ACLU-NC Have Standing Under Article III to Seek the
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Relief Requested.
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The FISC is an Article III court.⁶ In order for the federal judicial power to be exercised
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under Article III, there must be an actual case or controversy before the court. See, e.g., Clapper
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v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013); DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S.
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332, 341 (2006). "One element of the case-or-controversy requirement' is that plaintiffs 'must
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establish that they have standing to sue." Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1146 (quoting Raines v. Byrd,
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521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997)). Although the parties have not addressed whether movants have
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standing under Article III, the Court is nonetheless obliged to verify that standing exists. See
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e.g., Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 331 (1977).
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"To establish Article III standing, an injury must be concrete, particularized, and actual or
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imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling."
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⁵(...continued)
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briefs in support of the Motion. See Brief of Amici Curiae U.S. Representatives Amash, Broun,
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Gabbard, Griffith, Holt, Jones, Lee, Lofgren, Massie, McClintock, Norton, O'Rourke, Pearce,
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Salmon, Sanford, and Yoho (hereinafter “Congressional Amici") in Support of the Motion, filed
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on June 28, 2013; Brief of Amici Curiae the Reporters Committee for the Freedom of the Press;
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ABC, Inc.; the Associated Press; Bloomberg, L.P.; Dow Jones & Company, Inc.; Gannet Co.,
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Inc.; Los Angeles Times; the McClatchy Company; National Public Radio, Inc.; the New York
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Times Company; the New Yorker; the Newsweek/Daily Beast Company LLC; Reuters America
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LLC; Tribune Company; and the Washington Post (hereinafter “Media Amici") in Support of the
|
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Motion, filed on July 15, 2013. The Court granted the motions for leave to file these two briefs
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on July 18, 2013, and has reviewed and benefited from them.
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⁶ See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 731 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (applying to the FISC
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"the constitutional bounds that restrict an Article III court") (per curiam); In re Motion, 526 F.
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Supp. 2d at 486 ("the FISC is an inferior federal court established by Congress under Article
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III"); In re Kevork, 634 F. Supp. 1002, 1014 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (district court judges retain
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"Article III status" when acting as members of the FISC), aff'd, 788 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1986).
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4
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[REDACTED]
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Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147 (internal quotations omitted); accord, e.g., Davis v. Federal Election
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Comm'n, 554 U.S. 724, 733 (2008). Here, movants complain that withholding the Section 215
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Opinions from the public violates their First Amendment right of access. The claimed injury is
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actual, rather than imminent: the Section 215 Opinions are not now available to the public. Nor
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is there any real question that this claimed injury is fairly traceable to the government's decision
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not to make the Section 215 Opinions public and to the grounds for such withholding---that is,
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the government's determination that the opinions are classified---and that it would be redressed
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by this Court's directing that those opinions be published.
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There is a more substantial question whether movants have an injury that is sufficiently
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concrete and particularized to confer Article III standing. The injury-in-fact prerequisite for
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Article III standing "helps assure that courts will not pass upon... abstract, intellectual
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problems, but adjudicate concrete, living contest[s] between adversaries." Federal Election
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Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20 (1998) (internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, an injury
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is particularized for standing purposes if it affects a claimant "in a personal and individual way."
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Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 n.1 (1992). Here, movants assert a right of
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access that is indistinguishable from those of any other interested member of the public.
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Nevertheless, for the reasons explained below, movants could have a concrete and particularized
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injury in fact if the lack of public access to the Section 215 Opinions impedes their own activities
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in a concrete, particular way---or to put the point differently, if public access to the Section 215
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Opinions would be of concrete, particular assistance to them in their own activities.
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5
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[REDACTED]
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The Supreme Court has held that claimants asserting a widely-shared right to receive
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information can establish an injury that is sufficiently concrete and particular for purposes of
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Article III standing. The respondents in Akins asserted a right to obtain "lists of [American Israel
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Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC)] donors ... and campaign-related contributions and
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expenditures... that, on respondents' view of the law, the [Federal Election Campaign Act]
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require[d] that AIPAC make public." 524 U.S. at 21. The Court found that the respondents'
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inability to obtain this information constituted a sufficient injury in fact under Article III because
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there was "no reason to doubt their claim that the information would help them (and others to
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whom they would communicate it) to evaluate candidates for public office, especially candidates
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who received assistance from AIPAC, and to evaluate the role that AIPAC's financial assistance
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might play in a specific election." Id. On that basis, the Court found that the respondents' injury
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was "concrete and particular." Id.
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The Court reached that conclusion in Akins notwithstanding the fact that the respondents'
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"asserted harm (their failure to obtain information) is one which is shared in substantially equal
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measure by all or a large class of citizens." Id. at 23 (internal quotations omitted). While
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acknowledging that some of its prior decisions contained statements suggesting that such
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"generalized grievances" do not confer standing, id. (citing, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74
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(internal quotations omitted)), the Court explained that such "judicial language ... invariably
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appears in cases where the harm at issue is not only widely shared, but is also of an abstract and
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indefinite nature -- for example, harm to the common concern for obedience to law." Akins, 524
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U.S. at 23 (emphasis added; internal quotations omitted). "The abstract nature of the harm" in
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6
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[REDACTED]
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those cases "deprives the case of the concrete specificity" necessary for a plaintiff to have
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standing. Id. at 24. "[W]here a harm is concrete, though widely shared, the Court has found
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'injury in fact." Id.⁷
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Courts have applied the same principles in evaluating Article III standing to assert a right
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of access to judicial or administrative proceedings. A party who had not herself been excluded
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from any juvenile court proceeding, and who had been permitted to attend the only proceedings
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she had sought to attend, had not suffered a particularized injury in fact and consequently lacked
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standing to bring a First Amendment challenge to a statute restricting public access to such
|
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proceedings. See Ernst v. Child & Youth Servs. of Chester Cnty., 108 F.3d 486, 499-500 (3d
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Cir. 1997). On the other hand, when an organization had been excluded from certain
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proceedings and that exclusion had been detrimental to its activities, the organization suffered a
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concrete and particularized injury in fact. See New York Civil Liberties Union v. New York City
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Transit Auth., 684 F.3d 286, 295 (2d Cir. 2012).⁸ In that case, agents of the plaintiff organization
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had sought to attend certain hearings and had been denied access as a result of the challenged
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policy of the agency conducting the hearings. The court found that the organization had
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"suffered a concrete injury as a result of the policy." Id. This injury was to a particularized
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interest of the organization because it represented clients before that agency and sought to
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⁷ As to the other two elements of Article III standing, the Court found in Akins that the
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claimants' injury was fairly traceable to a decision of the Federal Election Commission and
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would be redressed by the Court's setting aside that decision. Id. at 25.
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⁸ An organization will have Article III standing if it meets the same requirements that
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apply to individuals. E.g., New York Civil Liberties Union v. New York City Transit Auth., 684
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F.3d 286, 294 (2d Cir. 2012).
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7
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[REDACTED]
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|
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observe hearings in order to prepare for those appearances. Id. at 293, 295. Actual exclusion of
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the organization (through its agents), to the detriment of the organization's own activities,
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constituted a sufficient injury in fact for there to be standing under Article III. Id. at 295.⁹
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|
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In this case, movants contend that release of the Section 215 Opinions would inform and
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enhance public debate about Section 215, but they do not explain how release would aid their
|
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own activities or how continued withholding of the opinions is detrimental to them particularly.
|
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A sufficient injury in fact may not require great harm to movants' own activities, see New York
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Civil Liberties Union, 684 F.3d at 294 ("only a perceptible impairment of an organization's
|
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activities is necessary for there to be an injury in fact") (citation and internal quotations omitted),
|
||||
but some harm is necessary.¹⁰
|
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|
||||
The Court ordinarily would not look beyond information presented by the parties to find
|
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that a claimant has Article III standing. In this case, however, the ACLU's active participation in
|
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the legislative and public debates about the proper scope of Section 215 and the advisability of
|
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amending that provision is obvious from the public record and not reasonably in dispute.¹¹ Nor is
|
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|
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⁹ The causation and redressability requirements for Article III standing were also met, as
|
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the exclusion was a result of an agency policy that the organization sought to invalidate on First
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Amendment grounds. Id.
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|
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¹⁰ But see Fisher v. King, 232 F.3d 391, 396 n.5 (4th Cir. 2000) (including a brief
|
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discussion of standing that could be read to state that mere lack of access to a requested record
|
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constituted a sufficient injury in fact).
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|
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¹¹ See, e.g., Michelle Richardson, Legislative Counsel, ACLU Washington Legislative
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Office, Misdirection: The House Intelligence Committee's Misleading Patriot Act Talking Points
|
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(June 20, 2013) (https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/misdirection-house-intelligence-
|
||||
committees-misleading-patriot-act-talking); Testimony of Jameel Jaffer, Deputy Legal Director
|
||||
(continued...)
|
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8
|
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|
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[REDACTED]
|
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|
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it disputed that access to the Section 215 Opinions would assist the ACLU in that debate. The
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Court therefore concludes that the ACLU has satisfied that requirement. See, e.g., Ohio Citizen
|
||||
Action v. City of Englewood, 671 F.3d 564, 579 (6th Cir. 2012).
|
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|
||||
Accordingly, the Court finds that the withholding from the ACLU of the Section 215
|
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Opinions constitutes a concrete and particularized injury in fact to the ACLU for purposes of
|
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Article III standing. Because of the ACLU-NC's shared mission and interlocking membership
|
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with the ACLU (also a matter of public record not in dispute),¹² the Court makes the same
|
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finding regarding the ACLU-NC. The Court cannot, however, make such a finding as to
|
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MFIAC.¹³
|
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|
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¹¹(...continued)
|
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of the ACLU Foundation, and Laura W. Murphy, Director, Washington Legislative Office,
|
||||
ACLU, before the Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on Strengthening Privacy Rights and
|
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National Security: Oversight of FISA Surveillance Programs (July 31, 2013)
|
||||
(http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/7-31-13JafferTestimony.pdf); Testimony of Mr. Jaffer and
|
||||
Ms. Murphy before the House Committee on the Judiciary, Oversight Hearing on the
|
||||
Administration's Use of FISA Authorities (July 17, 2013) (at
|
||||
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/113th/07172013/Jaffer%2007172913.pdf).
|
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|
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¹² Persons who join the ACLU-NC thereby become members of the ACLU also. See
|
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http://ACLU-NCA.org/about.
|
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|
||||
¹³ MFIAC has submitted no information as to how the release of the opinions would aid
|
||||
its activities, or how the failure to release them would be detrimental. Moreover, a review of the
|
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public record has not revealed any indication that the MFIAC has participated in public debate
|
||||
about Section 215. Therefore, the Court is unable to find that MFIAC has suffered an injury in
|
||||
fact from lack of access to the Section 215 Opinions. MFIAC's lack of standing under Article III
|
||||
has no practical effect, however, because the other movants do have standing and they seek the
|
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same relief on identical grounds as MFIAC.
|
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9
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|
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[REDACTED]
|
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|
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III. FISC Rule 62(a) Does Not Preclude the Court From Entertaining the Motion.
|
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|
||||
The government contends that movants lack "standing" of a different sort than the Article
|
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III requirement. In the government's view, FISC Rule 62(a) precludes movants from requesting
|
||||
the Court to publish the Section 215 Opinions as an exercise of the Court's discretion.¹⁴ That
|
||||
Rule states as follows:
|
||||
|
||||
Publication of Opinions. The judge who authored an order, opinion, or other
|
||||
decision may sua sponte or on motion by a party request that it be published.
|
||||
Upon such request, the Presiding Judge, after consulting with other Judges of the
|
||||
Court, may direct that an order, opinion or other decision be published. Before
|
||||
publication, the Court may, as appropriate, direct the Executive Branch to review
|
||||
the order, opinion, or other decision and redact it as necessary to ensure that
|
||||
properly classified information is appropriately protected....
|
||||
|
||||
FISC Rule 62(a). The government argues that because movants were not parties to any of the
|
||||
Section 215 proceedings in which the opinions were issued, Rule 62(a) forecloses them from
|
||||
seeking publication. Under the government's interpretation, the judge who authored an opinion
|
||||
could nevertheless sua sponte request publication, and after consultation the Presiding Judge
|
||||
could direct publication, provided that the Executive Branch redacts from the public version any
|
||||
classified information. The government also states that a declassification review process for
|
||||
these opinions is underway.
|
||||
|
||||
¹⁴ The government does not assert that movants lack this form of "standing" insofar as
|
||||
they assert a First Amendment right of access, perhaps in view of the determination of the FISC
|
||||
in 2007 that "it would be quite odd if the FISC did not have jurisdiction in the first instance to
|
||||
adjudicate a claim of right to the court's very own records and files.” In re Motion, 526 F. Supp.
|
||||
2d at 487 (emphasis added). Of course, the government vigorously disputes that the claim of a
|
||||
First Amendment right of access is meritorious.
|
||||
10
|
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|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
|
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Movants submit that Rule 62(a) does not preclude the Court from entertaining their
|
||||
motion for two reasons: first, because a "party" who, as described in that Rule, may move for
|
||||
publication of an opinion does not have to have been a party to the proceeding that resulted in the
|
||||
opinion; and second, because Rule 62(a) should not be understood to extinguish the FISC's
|
||||
inherent power to consider movants' request. Movants further contend that the FISC has the
|
||||
authority to make classification decisions independent of the Executive Branch and to publish the
|
||||
opinions without an Executive Branch declassification review.
|
||||
|
||||
The Court concludes that the term "party" in Rule 62(a) refers to a party to the proceeding
|
||||
that resulted in the "opinion, order, or other decision" being considered for publication.
|
||||
Otherwise, the phrase "by a party" would be superfluous. Nevertheless, for reasons explained
|
||||
below, the Court is persuaded that Rule 62(a) does not preclude it from considering the present
|
||||
motion.
|
||||
|
||||
As the government acknowledges and Rule 62(a) explicitly states, the Court has the
|
||||
discretion to direct publication sua sponte. Given this discretion to act, it would serve no
|
||||
discernible purpose for the Court, by rule, to be precluded from considering reasoned arguments
|
||||
in favor of publication of certain opinions made by claimants with Article III standing to seek
|
||||
their publication. Indeed, although the Court does not reach the merits of the First Amendment
|
||||
claim, it is noteworthy that the government's reading of Rule 62(a), which would preclude non-
|
||||
parties from requesting publication, would logically extend to non-parties who claim a right to
|
||||
public access. Certainly, at least, nothing in the language of the Rule provides a basis for
|
||||
distinguishing assertions of right from requests for discretionary publication. Accordingly, the
|
||||
11
|
||||
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
government's interpretation of Rule 62(a) would lead to the same "odd" result that the FISC
|
||||
rejected in 2007: that the FISC could not "adjudicate a claim of right" to access "its very own
|
||||
records and files." In re Motion, 526 F. Supp.2d at 487.
|
||||
|
||||
Moreover, in referring to a "motion by a party" seeking publication, Rule 62(a) appears to
|
||||
contemplate the ordinary case where publication of an opinion is being considered shortly after
|
||||
its issuance, when non-parties are unlikely to know about a classified opinion and would not be
|
||||
able to present cogent arguments for publication. This case involves the extraordinary
|
||||
circumstances of (1) a particular FISC order (apparently) being unlawfully misappropriated,
|
||||
leaked to the press, and widely publicized; (2) the government's subsequent declassification and
|
||||
release of significant information about the context and legal underpinnings of that order; and (3)
|
||||
a high level of public and legislative interest in how the relevant statutory provision has been
|
||||
interpreted and applied and whether legislative changes should be made. This unusual
|
||||
combination of events, among other things, means that non-parties to the Section 215
|
||||
proceedings have sufficient information to make reasonably concrete, rather than abstract,
|
||||
arguments in favor of publication. Under the circumstances, there is no persuasive reason to
|
||||
interpret Rule 62(a) to preclude the Court from even considering their request.
|
||||
|
||||
IV. Principles of Comity Require Dismissal of the Motion With Regard to
|
||||
Opinions That Are the Subject of the Previously Commenced FOIA
|
||||
Litigation.
|
||||
|
||||
Movants acknowledge that there is ongoing FOIA litigation in the District Court for the
|
||||
Southern District of New York concerning disclosure of a set of FISC opinions. The subject of
|
||||
that litigation overlaps, if not entirely coincides, with the Section 215 Opinions subject to the
|
||||
12
|
||||
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
present motion. Other than movants' assertion that “the public's First Amendment right of
|
||||
access attaches to this Court's legal opinions interpreting public laws, irrespective of the
|
||||
government's statutory obligation under FOIA to disclose records in its possession,” Motion at
|
||||
13 n.6, the parties have not briefed the significance of the ongoing FOIA litigation. It is apparent
|
||||
to the Court, however, that it should examine sua sponte whether principles of comity—and
|
||||
specifically, the "first-to-file" rule—counsel against proceeding in this matter with regard to
|
||||
FISC opinions that are already part of the FOIA litigation.¹⁵
|
||||
|
||||
As a matter of comity, and in order to conserve judicial resources and avoid inconsistent
|
||||
judgments, federal courts do not engage in parallel adjudications involving the same parties and
|
||||
issues. See, e.g., UtahAmerican Energy, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor, 685 F.3d 1118, 1124 (D.C. Cir.
|
||||
2012) (per curiam); Church of Scientology of California v. Dep't of Army, 611 F.2d 738, 749-50
|
||||
(9th Cir. 1979). The general rule is that when two such actions are pending, the district court in
|
||||
which the second action is filed will decline to consider the matter in deference to the district
|
||||
court in which the first matter was filed. See UtahAmerican Energy, 685 F.3d at 1124; EEOC v.
|
||||
University of Pennsylvania, 850 F.2d 969, 976 (3d Cir. 1988), aff'd, 493 U.S. 182 (1990);
|
||||
Church of Scientology, 611 F.2d at 749-50. Under exceptional circumstances, the court with the
|
||||
earlier-filed action may defer to the court with the later-filed action, but in either case
|
||||
duplicative, parallel proceedings are avoided.¹⁶
|
||||
|
||||
¹⁵ Courts have discretion to examine matters of comity sua sponte. United States v. AMC
|
||||
Entertainment, Inc., 549 F.3d 760, 771 n.5 (9th Cir. 2008).
|
||||
|
||||
¹⁶ See, e.g., University of Pennsylvania, 850 F.2d at 978 (party filing first action sought
|
||||
(continued...)
|
||||
13
|
||||
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
The application of these principles to the FOIA context results in courts avoiding
|
||||
duplicative adjudication over the same documents between the same parties. Under the general
|
||||
first-to-file rule, the court with the later-filed action generally should defer to the court with the
|
||||
earlier-filed action, to the extent the matters involve the same party requesting the same
|
||||
documents. See UtahAmerican Energy, 685 F.3d at 1123-25 (abuse of discretion for judge with
|
||||
later-filed action to order release of document also at issue in earlier-filed action).
|
||||
|
||||
The FISC, of course, is not a district court, but rather an Article III court composed of
|
||||
district judges. The concerns underlying the first-to-file rule—avoiding duplicative effort and the
|
||||
possibility of inconsistent results—fully apply here. The opinions at issue in both cases are
|
||||
overlapping, if not coextensive. The FOIA litigation in New York commenced in October 2011,
|
||||
long before the motion was filed in this Court in June 2013. The parties in the two cases are
|
||||
substantially identical.¹⁷ The movants properly before this Court are the ACLU and a closely
|
||||
related entity, the ACLU-NC; the ACLU is a plaintiff in the FOIA litigation.¹⁸ Of course, the
|
||||
United States Government or its agencies are parties to both proceedings. Insofar as they involve
|
||||
|
||||
¹⁶(...continued)
|
||||
"to circumvent local law and preempt an imminent subpoena enforcement action"); Church of
|
||||
Scientology, 611 F.2d at 749-50 (proceedings in second court advanced to point where judicial
|
||||
economy was better served by that court's adjudicating the matter).
|
||||
|
||||
¹⁷ Application of the first-to-file rule does not require "exact identity" of parties, as long
|
||||
as some "parties in one matter are also in the other matter." Intersearch Worldwide, Ltd. v.
|
||||
Intersearch Group, Inc., 544 F. Supp.2d 949, 959 n.6 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
|
||||
|
||||
¹⁸ In addition, two of the attorneys for the movants before the FISC also represent the
|
||||
ACLU in the separate FOIA litigation.
|
||||
14
|
||||
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
the same documents, presumably the same officials are involved in declassification and release
|
||||
determinations in each case.
|
||||
|
||||
Finally, there is sufficient overlap between the issues in the two cases for the first-to-file
|
||||
rule to apply. Although the legal theories advanced by the ACLU in the two proceedings are
|
||||
different (statutory right-to-disclosure under FOIA rather than constitutional right-of-access
|
||||
under the First Amendment), substantially the same relief is sought in both cases: disclosure of
|
||||
the opinions with only such redactions as are necessary to protect intelligence sources and
|
||||
methods and other properly classified information. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (exempting from
|
||||
disclosure under FOIA matters that are "specifically authorized under criteria established by an
|
||||
Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and... are
|
||||
in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order"); Motion at 14, 16 (the motion does
|
||||
not seek disclosure of “intelligence sources and methods that have not been previously disclosed"
|
||||
or other "properly classified information"). The present motion thus asks the FISC to do the
|
||||
same thing that the ACLU is asking the District Court in New York to do in the FOIA litigation:
|
||||
ensure that the opinions are disclosed, with only properly classified information withheld.
|
||||
Having both courts proceed poses the risks of duplication of effort and inconsistent outcomes
|
||||
that the first-to-file rule is intended to avoid.
|
||||
|
||||
Under the first-to-file rule, dismissal by the court of second filing "is proper where the
|
||||
court of first filing provides adequate remedies.” Intersearch Worldwide, 544 F. Supp.2d at 963.
|
||||
The Court sees no reason to presume that the remedies available in the FOIA litigation in the
|
||||
Southern District of New York are inadequate. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the present
|
||||
15
|
||||
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
motion to the extent that it concerns the opinions that are at issue in the FOIA litigation. Such
|
||||
dismissal is without prejudice to reinstatement of a motion for publication with the FISC after
|
||||
resolution of the FOIA litigation in the Southern District of New York and any appeal
|
||||
therefrom.¹⁹
|
||||
|
||||
V. As an Exercise of Discretion, the Court Directs the Government to Perform
|
||||
and Report on the Results of Declassification Reviews of Any Section 215
|
||||
Opinions That Are Not Subject to the FOIA Litigation.
|
||||
|
||||
There may be FISC opinions that "evaluat[e] the meaning, scope, and constitutionality of
|
||||
Section 215," Motion at 1, but are not subject to the FOIA litigation (for example, because they
|
||||
were issued after the government had conducted its search for responsive records in response to
|
||||
the underlying FOIA request). The Court, however, is not in a position to identify any such
|
||||
Section 215 Opinions, because the record does not specify exactly what opinions are at issue in
|
||||
the FOIA litigation.
|
||||
|
||||
Assuming that there are such Section 215 Opinions that are not at issue in the FOIA
|
||||
litigation, movants and amici have presented several substantial reasons why the public interest
|
||||
might be served by their publication. The unauthorized disclosure in June 2013 of a Section 215
|
||||
order, and government statements in response to that disclosure, have engendered considerable
|
||||
public interest and debate about Section 215. Publication of FISC opinions relating to this
|
||||
provision would contribute to an informed debate. Congressional amici emphasize the value of
|
||||
public information and debate in representing their constituents and discharging their legislative
|
||||
|
||||
¹⁹ Upon such reinstatement, the FISC would presumably examine what, if any, preclusive
|
||||
effect the outcome of the FOIA litigation should be afforded.
|
||||
16
|
||||
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
responsibilities. Publication would also assure citizens of the integrity of this Court's
|
||||
proceedings.
|
||||
|
||||
In addition, publication with only limited redactions may now be feasible, given the
|
||||
extent of the government's recent public disclosures about how Section 215 is implemented.
|
||||
Indeed, the government advises that a declassification review process is already underway.
|
||||
|
||||
In view of these circumstances, and as an exercise of discretion, the Court has determined
|
||||
that it is appropriate to take steps toward publication of any Section 215 Opinions that are not
|
||||
subject to the ongoing FOIA litigation, without reaching the merits of the asserted right of public
|
||||
access under the First Amendment. Because the record in this matter does not specify exactly
|
||||
which (if any) Section 215 Opinions are not subject to the FOIA litigation, the Court is not in a
|
||||
position at this time to initiate the publication procedure described in Rule 62(a), whereby the
|
||||
judge who issued the opinion in question may request its publication. Instead, the Court will take
|
||||
the steps described below in order to facilitate consideration of publication pursuant to Rule
|
||||
62(a).
|
||||
|
||||
***
|
||||
|
||||
For the reasons stated above, it is HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
|
||||
|
||||
(1) The Court dismisses the Motion of the ACLU and the ACLU-NC to the extent that it
|
||||
requests publication of opinions that are at issue in the pending FOIA litigation in the District
|
||||
Court for the Southern District of New York. Such dismissal is without prejudice to
|
||||
reinstatement of a motion for publication with the FISC after resolution of that FOIA litigation,
|
||||
including any appeal therefrom.
|
||||
|
||||
17
|
||||
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
(2) The Court dismisses the claim of MFIAC for lack of standing.
|
||||
|
||||
(3) By October 4, 2013, the government (and, to the extent particularly identifying
|
||||
information is available to it as plaintiff in the FOIA litigation, the ACLU) shall make a written
|
||||
submission identifying which Section 215 Opinions are subject to the FOIA litigation. By that
|
||||
same date, the government shall identify which Section 215 Opinions, if any, are not subject to
|
||||
the FOIA litigation (or a separate order under Rule 62(a)) and propose a timetable to complete a
|
||||
declassification review and submit to the Court its proposed redactions, if any, for each such
|
||||
Section 215 Opinion. After that review and submission, the author of each such opinion, with
|
||||
the benefit of any proposed redactions, may decide whether to propose publication pursuant to
|
||||
Rule 62(a).
|
||||
|
||||
So ORDERED this 13th day of September, 2013, in Docket No. Misc. 13-02.
|
||||
|
||||
/s/ F. Dennis Saylor
|
||||
F. DENNIS SAYLOR IV
|
||||
Judge, United States Foreign
|
||||
Intelligence Surveillance Court
|
||||
|
||||
18
|
||||
27
data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-order-130813/metadata.json
Normal file
27
data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-02-order-130813/metadata.json
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "Opinion and Order, In re Orders of this Court Interpreting Section 215 of the Patriot Act",
|
||||
"type": "foia",
|
||||
"description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
|
||||
"long_description": "",
|
||||
"tags": [],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "FISC",
|
||||
"date_created": "2013-09-13",
|
||||
"classification": [],
|
||||
"dissemination": [],
|
||||
"programs": [],
|
||||
"countries": [],
|
||||
"people": []
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
|
||||
"date_published": "2013-09-13",
|
||||
"link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/33998",
|
||||
"reporters": [],
|
||||
"contributors": []
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "30670820d2d2151096b28a033344b457cf8997cb6a92d8a39fe2d939a2283568",
|
||||
"pages": 18
|
||||
}
|
||||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue