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UNITED STATES
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
WASHINGTON, D.C.
IN RE ORDERS ISSUED BY THIS COURT
INTERPRETING SECTION 215 OF THE
PATRIOT ACT
Docket No.: Misc. 13-02
THE UNITED STATES' OPPOSITION TO THE
MOTION OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION, ET AL., FOR THE RELEASE OF COURT RECORDS
JOHN P. CARLIN
Acting Assistant Attorney General
for National Security
J. BRADFORD WIEGMANN
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
TASHINA GAUHAR
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
JEFFREY M. SMITH
NICHOLAS J. PATTERSON
U.S. Department of Justice
National Security Division
950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530
Phone: (202) 514-5600
Fax: (202) 514-8053
Attorneys for the United States of America
---
The American Civil Liberties Union and two other entities (hereinafter “ACLU") seek
the publication of opinions of this Court that "evaluat[e] the meaning, scope, and
constitutionality of Section 215 of the Patriot Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1861." Motion at 1. The
ACLU's primary argument is that such publication is compelled by the First Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution, an argument that repeats contentions that this Court twice rejected when the
ACLU raised them six years ago. See id. at 6-15. This Court's ruling in *In re Motion for
Release of Court Records*, 526 F. Supp. 2d 484 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. 2007) ("In re Release"),
was correct at the time this Court issued it, as was this Court's ruling denying the ACLU's
motion for reconsideration, see *In re Motion for Release of Court Records, Memorandum
Opinion, Docket No. Misc. 07-01* (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. Feb. 8, 2008) (“In re Release II")
(attached as Appendix A). The ACLU decided not to appeal those decisions, and both remain
correct today.
The ACLU's secondary argument is that this Court should exercise its discretion to
publish its opinions “evaluating the meaning, scope, and constitutionality of Section 215." See
Motion at 15-18. The ACLU has no standing to bring such a motion because it was not a party
to any relevant opinion. See U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC"), Rule of
Procedure 62(a) (2010) (providing that the process for deciding whether to publish a FISC
opinion begins “sua sponte or on motion by a party"). The Court should thus deny the Motion.
Of course, a judge of this Court who has issued an opinion may, if he or she elects, sua sponte
begin the process for considering whether that opinion should be published. See id. If the Court,
in its discretion, chooses to undertake this process, it should, as explained below, simply follow
its clear rules, including FISC Rules of Procedure 3 and 62.
1
---
In any event, the Government is mindful of the delicate balance between the need for
secrecy in conducting intelligence activities to protect national security and the interest in
transparency and public accountability. For this reason, the Government continues to review
material, including opinions of this Court, for potential declassification and release to the public,
where national security will allow. Thus, a declassification review process is already occurring.
BACKGROUND
The ACLU previously came before this Court on the "Motion of the American Civil
Liberties Union for Release of Court Records," filed on August 9, 2007 (“ACLU 2007 Motion").
In that motion, the ACLU sought the release of what it identified as court orders and government
pleadings regarding a program of surveillance of suspected international terrorists by the
National Security Agency ("NSA") that had previously been conducted without court
authorization. See ACLU 2007 Motion at 2 n.2, 3-9. This Court after considering the ACLU's
motion, an opposition by the Government, and the ACLU's reply—issued a Memorandum
Opinion and Order denying the ACLU Motion on December 11, 2007. See *In re Motion for
Release of Court Records*, 526 F. Supp. 2d 484.
This Court held that the First Amendment does not provide a right of public access to
such records, in whole or in part, under the test establishing such a right in *Press-Enterprise Co.
v. Superior Court*, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (“Press-Enterprise II"). See *In re Release*, 526 F. Supp. 2d
at 491-97. Additionally, the Court declined to exercise any residual discretion it might possess
"to undertake the searching review of the Executive Branch's classification decisions requested
by the ACLU," without prejudice to the ACLU's “pursuing whatever remedies may be available
to it in a district court through a... request addressed to the Executive Branch" under the
2
---
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 ("FOIA"). See *In re Release*, 526 F. Supp. 2d
at 497.
On December 20, 2007, the ACLU filed a "Motion for Reconsideration or
Reconsideration En Banc," the Government responded on January 8, 2008, and this Court denied
the ACLU's request for reconsideration on February 8, 2008. In denying the ACLU's
reconsideration motion, this Court held that the ACLU's motion "presents nothing that can be
regarded as an intervening change in controlling law or newly available evidence. Furthermore,
the ACLU fails to demonstrate clear error or manifest injustice in the prior opinion." See *In re
Release II*, at 3-4. Specifically, this Court held that “the ACLU has failed to demonstrate any
error, let alone clear error or manifest injustice, in the Court's prior holding that the ACLU has
no First Amendment right of access to the documents it seeks." Id. at 9. This Court also
reaffirmed that it would not release the requested records as a matter of discretion because the
"unacceptable risks to the national security and to the proper functioning of the FISA process...
simply outweigh the potential benefits from discretionary release." Id. at 10.
The ACLU did not subsequently appeal this Court's opinion in *In re Release* or its denial
of reconsideration in *In re Release II* to the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
of Review.
In the instant Motion, the ACLU requests that this Court publish FISC opinions
evaluating the meaning, scope, and constitutionality of Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act,
50 U.S.C. § 1861. Motion at 1. The ACLU relies on the same legal arguments it twice
submitted to this Court in 2007 and which, as described above, this Court previously denied.
3
---
The ACLU, for a third time, argues for disclosure of this Court's records pursuant to a First
Amendment right of access or for this Court to release the records as a matter of discretion.
ARGUMENT
I. There Is No First Amendment Right of Access to Judicial Opinions of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court.
The ACLU seeks to re-litigate an issue this Court has correctly decided against it. See *In
re Release*, 526 F. Supp, 2d 484; *In re Release II*, Docket No. Misc. 07-01. The current Motion
should be denied for the same reasons. In rejecting the ACLU's earlier challenge, this Court
applied the "experience and logic" test that the Supreme Court established in *Press-Enterprise
Co. v. Superior Court*, 478 U.S. 1, 9, and held that "[e]lectronic surveillance proceedings under
50 U.S.C. §§ 1804-1805 do not ... meet th[e]se tests." *In re Release*, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 492;
see also *id.* at 497 (holding that the First Amendment provides no public right of access to FISC
documents); *In re Release II*, at 9 (holding that the ACLU "failed to demonstrate any error, let
alone clear error or manifest injustice, in the Court's prior holding that the ACLU has no First
Amendment right of access to the documents it seeks"). This Court should follow its well-
reasoned earlier opinions in evaluating the ACLU's current motion—which essentially repeats
the ACLU's prior arguments and deny the ACLU's Motion.
A. The ACLU Fails the “Experience" Prong of Press-Enterprise II.
In *In re Release* and *In re Release II*, this Court correctly applied the "experience" prong
of the *Press-Enterprise II* test, which asks whether "the place and the process have historically
been open to the press and general public," 478 U.S. at 8 (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted), and held that the ACLU did not satisfy this prong. 526 F. Supp. 2d at 492-93. This
same analysis applies here.
4
---
In arguing that this Court "erred," Motion at 7, in applying the "experience" test to its
prior right of access motion, the ACLU misunderstands this Court's analysis. The ACLU claims
that the Court "failed to identify the proper focus of the 'experience' prong" by focusing on "the
past practice of the specific forum [the FISC]" rather than "the type of judicial records or process
to which" the movant sought access. Motion at 6-7. However, this Court's "experience"
analysis was clearly consistent with the Supreme Court's interpretation: "the 'experience' test of
*Globe Newspaper* does not look to the particular practice of any one jurisdiction, but instead to
the experience in that type or kind of hearing throughout the United States." *El Vocero de P.R.
(Caribbean Intern. News Corp.) v. Puerto Rico*, 508 U.S. 147, 150 (1993) (per curiam)
(quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). In *In re Release*, this Court looked to the
FISC's experience in handling its unique type of proceedings and in handling its unique kinds
of records.[^1]
Indeed, this Court rejected a similar challenge to its application of the *Press-Enterprise II*
test raised by the ACLU in its 2007 motion for reconsideration. This Court held that the ACLU,
in arguing that the "experience" test should analyze the tradition of public access to decisions of
Article III courts generally, was presenting "an incorrect framing of the question." *In re Release*
[^1]: The ACLU's comparison of *In re Release* to the case in *El Vocero* is inapposite. In *El
Vocero*, the Supreme Court analyzed a particular type of hearing—a preliminary hearing—which
is common to many jurisdictions throughout the United States, unlike the FISC's unique type of
proceedings. *El Vocero*, 508 U.S. at 150-51. The Supreme Court found that although the Puerto
Rican Supreme Court had relied on a Puerto Rican tradition of closed preliminary hearings, the
"established and widespread tradition of open preliminary hearings among the States was
canvassed in *Press-Enterprise* and is controlling here." *Id.* (citations omitted). In other words,
the Supreme Court held that the traditions of a particular jurisdiction in handling a particular type
or kind of hearing were overcome by the general experience of how all U.S. jurisdictions
handled such hearings.
5
---
II, at 6. Instead, this Court found *Press-Enterprise II* "requires that the tests of experience and
logic be applied to the 'particular proceeding in question.'" *Id.* (quoting *Press-Enterprise II*,
478 U.S. at 9 (emphasis added by this Court)). Thus, this Court found that the tests of
"experience" and "logic" have not been applied to categories as sweeping as all decisions of
Article III courts, but "rather to narrower classes that permit a meaningful assessment of the
effects of public access on a particular type of judicial process—for example, district court
proceedings (and related records) that are ancillary to grand jury operations." *In re Release II*, at
6 (citing *In re Motions of Dow Jones & Co.*, 142 F.3d 496, 502-03 (D.C. Cir. 1998); *United
States v. Smith*, 123 F.3d 140, 148-50 (3d Cir. 1997)).
As this Court explained, "[t]he FISC is a unique court." *In re Release*, 526 F. Supp. 2d at
487. Whereas "[o]ther courts operate primarily in public, with secrecy the exception; the FISC
operates primarily in secret, with public access the exception." *Id.* at 488. The FISC maintains
this operational secrecy because, unlike any other court, its "entire docket relates to the
collection of foreign intelligence by the federal government." *Id.* at 487. Indeed, proceedings
before the FISC involve highly sensitive and classified matters involving national security,
relating, for example, to efforts by the United States to foil acts of international terrorism. By
their very nature, such proceedings need to be conducted in secrecy. Additionally, unlike the
operations of any other court, the FISC's operations are governed "by FISA, by Court rule, and
by statutorily mandated security procedures issued by the Chief Justice of the United States
[which] [t]ogether . . . represent a comprehensive scheme for the safeguarding and handling of
FISC proceedings and records." *Id.* at 488. Thus, the FISC's proceedings and the handling of its
records are different in type or kind from the proceedings and handling of records in any other
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---
U.S. court, and it is appropriate "to apply the *Press-Enterprise II* tests to the proceedings and
records of the FISC, rather than to the decisions of all Article III courts." *In re Release II*, at 6.
Having established the uniqueness of the type of proceedings and handling of records, the
Court applied the "experience" test of *Press-Enterprise II*, which asks whether "the place and
the process have historically been open to the press and general public." *In re Release*, 526 F.
Supp. 2d at 492 (quoting *Press-Enterprise II*, 478 U.S. at 8). The Court explained that "the
FISC has never held a public hearing in its history, and [only a few] opinions have been released
to the public in nearly three decades of operation." *Id.*
The ACLU is incorrect in asserting that this Court limited its "analysis to whether the two
published opinions of this Court 'establish a tradition of public access...'" Motion at 7. Rather,
the Court employed an expansive analysis “the FISC has issued literally thousands of classified
orders to which the public has had no access," *In re Release*, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 492—in support
of its holding that "there is no tradition of public access to government briefing materials filed
with the FISC." *Id.* This is because, again, proceedings before the FISC involve highly sensitive
and classified matters related to the nation's security, such as efforts to thwart acts of
international terrorism.
While this Court did examine its two published opinions, it did so in the context of
refuting the ACLU's argument that the Court had a tradition of releasing "FISC decisions of
broad legal significance." 526 F. Supp. 2d at 493. The ACLU attempts to reintroduce
essentially the same disclosure argument it previously made, and this Court rejected. Just as in
*In re Release*, where the ACLU argued for release of certain FISC records based on their
"broader significance" and "legal analysis and legal rulings concerning the meaning of FISA,"
7
---
*id.* at 493 (citing ACLU Reply at 13), the ACLU argues here for the release of specific FISC
records because of their "critical importance" to public debate, Motion at 1, and because the
records "interpret[] the meaning of public statutes." *Id.* at 8. However, as the Court noted in *In
re Release*, although it has released a very limited number of opinions of broad legal
significance, the FISC does not have a tradition of releasing opinions based on these criteria.
Indeed, "the FISC has in fact issued other legally significant decisions that remain classified and
have not been released to the public." *In re Release*, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 493; see also *In re
Release II*, at 6-7 n.9 ("reject[ing] the [ACLU's] suggestion . . . that the amorphous and ill-
defined category of 'decisions of broad legal significance' constitutes the proper frame of
reference under *Press-Enterprise II*").
For these reasons, this Court was correct in holding that “the FISC is not a court whose
place or process has historically been open to the public," and the Court should reaffirm that the
ACLU's motion "does not satisfy the experience test for a First Amendment right of access." *In
re Release*, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 493; see also *In re Release II*, at 6 (finding that "the 'experience'
test is clearly not satisfied, for the reasons stated in the Court's prior opinion"); cf. *Am. Lib.
Ass'n v. Faurer*, 631 F. Supp. 416, 421 (D.D.C. 1986) (holding that “no First Amendment right
exists where disclosure of classified information would possibly endanger national security, even
though the information had been previously in the public domain"), aff'd sub nom. *Am. Lib.
Ass'n v. Odom*, 818 F.2d 81 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (affirmed on other grounds).
B. The ACLU Also Cannot Establish the "Logic" Prong of Press-Enterprise II.
Under *Press-Enterprise II*, both the "experience and logic" tests must be satisfied. 478
U.S. at 9 (emphasis added). Accordingly, as a threshold issue, because the ACLU's First
Amendment claim fails the "experience" test—like its claim in *In re Release*, it "runs counter to
8
---
a long-established and virtually unbroken practice of excluding the public from FISA
applications and orders"—the claim "fails" regardless of whether it passes the "logic" test. *In re
Release*, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 493 (citing *Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz*, 886 F.2d 60, 64 (4th Cir.
1989) (failure to establish right of access because first prong is not satisfied); *United States v. El-
Sayegh*, 131 F.3d 158, 161 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (same)).
In *In re Release*, this Court also found that the benefits the ACLU claimed would result
in that case (which are quite similar to those posited by the ACLU here, see Motion at 9-13),
"fall short of satisfying the 'logic' test under *Press-Enterprise II*." *In re Release*, 526 F. Supp.
2d at 494; see also *In re Release II*, at 7 (holding that the "ACLU has failed to demonstrate any
error in the Court's application of the 'logic' test"). This Court observed that, "to a considerable
degree, comparable benefits could be ascribed to public access to any type of proceeding," 526
F. Supp. 2d at 494, and therefore the argument "proves too much,' since it provides a rationale
under which 'even grand jury proceedings would be public.'" *Id.* (quoting *In re Boston Herald,
Inc.*, 321 F.3d 174, 187 (1st Cir. 2003)); see also *North Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Ashcroft*, 308
F.3d 198, 217 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding that were the "logic" prong only to determine whether
openness serves some good, "it is difficult to conceive of a government proceeding to which the
public would not have a First Amendment right of access").
This Court also observed that "the detrimental consequences of broad public access to
FISC proceedings or records would greatly outweigh any such benefits" resulting from a finding
of a First Amendment right of access to FISC records and proceedings. *In re Release*, 526 F.
Supp. 2d at 494. In this vein, the Court found that the possible harms from a finding of a First
Amendment-based right of access "are real and significant, and, quite frankly, beyond debate."
*Id.* This observation is highly relevant here where the ACLU again seeks "broad public access to
9
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FISC proceedings or records." *Id.* Compare *id.* at 485 (noting that the ACLU "seeks the release
of what it identifies as court orders and government pleadings regarding a program of
surveillance of suspected international terrorists by the National Security Agency (NSA) that had
previously been conducted without court authorization") with Motion at 11 n.5 (seeking
"opinions that evaluate the meaning, scope, and constitutionality of Section 215"). These
concerns are similar to the concerns highlighted by other courts in decisions finding that the
"logic" requirement was not met in the context of other types of proceedings and records.[^2] Other
concerns unique to FISA's national security context "are equally supportive of the conclusion
that public access to FISA surveillance records does not and would not play 'a significant
positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question.'" *Id.* at 494-95 (quoting
*Press-Enterprise II*, 478 U.S. at 8).
An additional consideration recognized by this Court is that a finding of a First
Amendment right of access "would result in a diminished flow of information [from the
Government to the Court], to the detriment of . . . the FISA process." 526 F. Supp. 2d at 496-
[^2]: See *In re Release*, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 494 n.26 (citing *In re Boston Herald, Inc.*, 321
F.3d at 188 (discussing privacy concerns and the chilling of sources of information regarding
public access to records regarding eligibility for assistance under Criminal Justice Act (CJA));
*Smith*, 123 F.3d at 148 (making grand jury proceedings public could result in flight of those
about to be indicted and expose the "accused but exonerated . . . to public ridicule") (internal
quotation marks omitted); *Baltimore Sun Co.*, 886 F.2d at 64 (access to search warrant affidavit
may disclose wiretaps not yet terminated or reveal identities of, and thereby endanger,
informants); *United States v. Corbitt*, 879 F.2d 224, 229-35 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting privacy
concerns of defendants and third parties, and the risks of impeding flow of information from
confidential sources and of compromising ongoing investigations, regarding claim of public
access to presentence report); *Times Mirror Co.*, 873 F.2d at 1215-16 (access to search warrant
proceedings, or to supporting affidavits while investigation is ongoing, would risk destruction of
evidence, coordination of false testimony, and flight of suspects, and result in public
embarrassment of persons named). But see *In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside
Office of Gunn*, 855 F.2d 569, 573 (8th Cir. 1988) ("logic" prong satisfied for access to search
warrant affidavits).
10
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97.[^3] Specifically, if the Court were to find a First Amendment-based right of access to FISC
opinions, the "greater risk of declassification and disclosure over Executive Branch objections"
would have the potential to "chill the government's interactions with the Court." *Id.* at 496.
This Court observed that such a "chilling effect could damage national security interests, if, for
example, the government opted to forgo surveillance or search of legitimate targets in order to
retain control of sensitive information that a FISA application would contain." *Id.* In addition,
this Court found that in cases that are presented to the Court, "the free flow of information to the
FISC that is needed for an ex parte proceeding to result in sound decisionmaking and effective
oversight could also be threatened." *Id.*; see also *In re Release II*, at 7-8 (reiterating the harms
the Court described in *In re Release*).
Of course, recent unauthorized disclosures of classified information concerning
intelligence activities authorized by this Court pursuant to Section 215 have necessarily affected
the Government's assessment of the need for continued classification of certain information, but
they should not affect the constitutional analysis grounded in the unique nature of this Court. In
light of the recent unauthorized disclosures, the Government declassified some information,
including information concerning intelligence collection under Section 215, so as to provide the
[^3]: This Court's interpretation of the "logic" test was firmly grounded in the decisions of
other courts that had encountered similar situations. See *In re Release*, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 496
n.33 (citing *In re Boston Herald*, 321 F.3d at 188 (in CJA context, the "specter of disclosure . . .
might lead defendants (or other sources called upon by the court) to withhold information");
*Gonzales*, 150 F.3d at 1259 (analogizing to grand juries, which "function best in secret . . .
because secrecy 'encourage[s] free and untrammeled disclosures,'" and finding that "[w]ithout
an assurance that the information revealed at CJA hearings and in documents submitted to the
court will not be disclosed, a defendant and his or her counsel would be discouraged from fully
disclosing information") (quoting *Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Nw.*, 441 U.S. 211, 219 n.10
(1979)); *Corbitt*, 879 F.2d at 232-35 (relying on need to preserve "free flow of information" to
sentencing judge, and "untoward effects" disclosure could have "on the gathering of information
in future presentence investigations," in rejecting claimed First Amendment right of access to
presentence report)).
11
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public with appropriate context and to inform the ongoing public discussions of the activities in
question. To ensure that the exercise of those authorities and the need for secrecy is balanced
with the interest in transparency and public accountability, the Government continues to review
relevant material, including opinions of this Court, to determine whether, in light of present
circumstances, there is additional information that should be declassified and released to the
public, consistent with the need to protect sources and methods and national security. That it is
appropriate for the Government to conduct such a review at this time does not suggest that this
Court should recognize a broad-based constitutional right whose implications would stretch far
beyond the current circumstances, threatening the serious negative consequences that this Court
identified in *In re Release*.
***
Just as in *In re Release*, "with both the 'experience' and 'logic' tests unsatisfied," this
Court should conclude that "there is no First Amendment right of access to the requested
materials." *In re Release*, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 497; see also *In re Release II*, at 9 (holding that
"the ACLU has failed to demonstrate any error . . . in the Court's prior holding that the ACLU
has no First Amendment right of access to the documents it seeks").
II. The Court Has Discretion To Publish Any of Its Opinions, and if It Chooses to Do
So, It Should Follow the Process Set Forth in the Court's Rules.
To the extent that the ACLU moves this Court to publish certain of its opinions, the
Motion should be denied because only a party to an underlying opinion may move the Court for
publication. The ACLU correctly identifies the rule that governs the release of FISC opinions—
FISC Rule of Procedure 62(a). That Rule provides in its entirety:
12
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Rule 62. Release of Court Records
(a) Publication of Opinions. The judge who authored an order, opinion, or
other decision may sua sponte or on motion by a party request that it be
published. Upon such request, the Presiding Judge, after consulting with
other Judges of the Court, may direct that an order, opinion or other
decision be published. Before publication, the Court may, as appropriate,
direct the Executive Branch to review the order, opinion, or other decision
and redact it as necessary to ensure that properly classified information is
appropriately protected pursuant to Executive Order 13526 (or its
successor).
FISC Rule of Procedure 62(a).
Because the ACLU is not a party to any opinions at issue, its Motion should be denied.
Apart from this Motion, a *sua sponte* request from a judge who authored a particular opinion
could trigger this process. If a judge of this Court determines, *sua sponte*, that an opinion that he
or she authored should be published, then that judge may make a request to the Presiding Judge.
The Presiding Judge would then consult with the other judges of the Court and decide whether or
not to direct the publication of the opinion at issue. Because "[i]ts entire docket relates to the
collection of foreign intelligence by the federal government," the publication of this Court's
opinions is the exception rather than the rule. *In re Release*, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 487-88; see also
*id.* at 495 (observing that "release [of FISC materials] with redactions may confuse or obscure,
rather than illuminate, the decisions in question"). Nevertheless, publication is within the
Court's discretion, and the process for determining which opinions should be published is within
the sound discretion of the judges of this Court.
Once the Presiding Judge has decided to direct publication of an opinion, the Court is
empowered to "direct the Executive Branch to review the [opinion] and redact it as necessary to
ensure that properly classified information is appropriately protected." FISC Rule of Procedure
62(a). This power is necessary because "[i]n all matters, the Court and its staff shall comply
13
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with the security measures established pursuant to [congressional mandate], as well as Executive
Order 13526." FISC Rule of Procedure 3; see also FISC Rule of Procedure 62(b) (mandating
that a release of FISC records must be conducted "in conformance with the security measures
referenced in Rule 3"). Executive Order 13,526 "prescribes a uniform system for classifying,
safeguarding, and declassifying national security information," and under that system only
certain designated Executive Branch officials can classify or declassify national security
information. See E.O. 13,526 (Dec. 29, 2009). Thus, pursuant to this Court's Rules of
Procedure, the Court cannot release an opinion that contains (or may contain) classified
information without first ordering the Executive Branch to conduct a classification review of the
opinion and "redact it as necessary to ensure that properly classified information is appropriately
protected." FISC Rule of Procedure 62(a).
Indeed, as this Court has recognized, “if the FISC were to assume the role of
independently making declassification and release decisions . . . there would be a real risk of
harm to national security interests and ultimately to the FISA process itself." *In re Release*, 526
F. Supp. 2d at 491. "FISC judges do not make classification decisions and are not intended to
become national security experts." *Id.* at 495 n.31 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 25-26
(1978)). And, while they may have "more expertise in national security matters than a typical
district court judge, that expertise [does] not equal that of the Executive Branch, which is
constitutionally entrusted with protecting the national security." *Id.* Thus, this Court has
recognized that classification and declassification decisions are the province of the Executive
14
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Branch, and "there is no role for this Court independently to review, and potentially override,
Executive Branch classification decisions."[^4] 526 F. Supp. 2d at 491.
In its motion, the ACLU "recognize[s] that this Court's docket encompasses a great deal
of material that is properly classified," and states that it does not seek disclosure of "any properly
classified information." Motion at 16. Nevertheless, the ACLU suggests that the FISC could
release opinions "without prior Executive Branch review." *Id.* However, where an opinion
contains (or may contain) classified information, FISC Rule of Procedure 3, which incorporates
Executive Order 13,526, constrains the Court from releasing the opinion until classified
information has been redacted and recognizes that such redaction can only be done by authorized
officials within the Executive Branch. Indeed, this Court recently reiterated that "[i]t is
fundamentally the Executive Branch's responsibility to safeguard sensitive national security
information." *In re Motion for Consent to Disclosure of Court Records, Docket No. Misc. 13-
01*, at 6 (June 12, 2013) (citing *Department of Navy v. Egan*, 484 U.S. 518, 527-29 (1988))
(available at: www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/misc-13-01-opinion-order.pdf). This
Court's rules provide the way for the Executive Branch to do so.
Because this Court cannot release properly classified information, and only certain
designated officials within the Executive Branch can determine whether information remains
properly classified, it would be an abuse of discretion for the Court to release any opinion that
[^4]: This is not to say that Executive Branch classifications are never judicially reviewable.
The proper means to obtain such review is through a Freedom of Information Act request and
subsequent action in district court. See *In re Release*, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 491 n.18, 496 n.32.
15
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may contain classified information without first providing the Executive Branch an opportunity
to review the opinion and redact all properly classified information.[^5]
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the ACLU's Motion should be denied.
July 5, 2013
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN P. CARLIN
Acting Assistant Attorney General
for National Security
J. BRADFORD WIEGMANN
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
TASHINA GAUHAR
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Jeffrey Suits
JEFFREY M. SMITH
NICHOLAS J. PATTERSON
U.S. Department of Justice
National Security Division
950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530
Phone: (202) 514-5600
Fax: (202) 514-8053
Attorneys for the United States of America
[^5]: Sixteen members of the House of Representatives as *amici curiae* raise two concerns
regarding information sharing between the Executive Branch and Congress: (1) that because
much of the information they receive is classified, they cannot discuss it in congressional debate
or with their constituents, and (2) that some of the information is so sensitive that it is shared
only with congressional and/or committee leaders and not with all members of Congress. See
*Brief of Rep. Amash, et al.* (filed June 28, 2013). The relief sought by the ACLU could not
alleviate either of these concerns. As *amici* recognize, the ACLU "explicitly does not ask for the
disclosure of classified information,” *Amici Brief* at 13-14, and thus its Motion would not affect
the information that members cannot discuss publicly or that is so sensitive that only certain
leaders receive it.
16
---
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true copy of the United States' Opposition to the Motion of the
American Civil Liberties Union, *et al.*, for the Release of Court Records was served via Federal
Express overnight delivery on this 5th day of July, 2013, addressed to:
David A. Schulz
Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic
Yale Law School
40 Ashmun Street, 4th Floor
New Haven, CT 06511
david.schulz@yale.edu
Alex Abdo
Brett Max Kaufman
Patrick Toomey
Jameel Jaffer
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
New York, NY 10004
aabdo@aclu.org
Arthur B. Spitzer
American Civil Liberties Union of the
Nation's Capital
4301 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 434
Washington, DC 20008
artspitzer@aclu-nca.org
Gregory L. Diskant
Benjamin S. Litman
Richard I. Kim
Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP
1133 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036
blitman@pbwt.com
Nichdas J. Pattren
Nicholas J. Patterson
18
---
APPENDIX A
---
UNITED STATES
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
WASHINGTON, D.C.
IN RE MOTION FOR RELEASE
OF COURT RECORDS
Docket No.: MISC. 07-01
MEMORANDUM OPINION[^1A]
This matter first came before the Court on the "Motion of the American Civil Liberties
Union for Release of Court Records," filed on August 9, 2007 ("ACLU Motion"). In its motion,
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) sought the release of what it identifies as court
orders and government pleadings regarding a program of surveillance of suspected international
terrorists by the National Security Agency (NSA) that had previously been conducted without
court authorization. See ACLU Motion at 2 n.2, 3-9. After consideration of the motion; the
government's opposition to the motion, filed on August 31, 2007 ("Gov't Opp."); and the
ACLU's reply, filed on September 14, 2007 (“ACLU Reply"), the Court issued a Memorandum
Opinion and Order denying the ACLU Motion on December 11, 2007. See *In re Motion for
Release of Court Records, No. MISC. 07-01* (FISC Dec. 11, 2007) (*In re Motion*).
The ACLU sought public release of these documents "with only those redactions essential
to protect information that the Court determines . . . to be properly classified" after "independent
review," ACLU Motion at 2-3, under a standard less deferential than "ordinary district courts
accord" classification decisions of the Executive Branch, ACLU Reply at 8. Addressing the
three arguments presented by the ACLU, the Court held, first, that there was no common law
[^1A]: The FISC Security Officer has compared this opinion and the accompanying order to the
unclassified filings by the government in this case, and determined that the opinion and order do
not contain any classified information.
---
right of public access to the records as a whole, or to such portions of the records that the Court
might release after conducting such a review. *In re Motion*, slip op. at 10-12. The Court next
held that the First Amendment does not provide a right of public access to these records, in
whole or in part, under the criteria for establishing such a right in *Press-Enterprise Co. v.
Superior Court*, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (*Press-Enterprise II*). *In re Motion*, slip op. at 13-22. Finally,
the Court declined to exercise any residual discretion it may have "to undertake the searching
review of the Executive Branch's classification decisions requested by the ACLU," without
prejudice to the ACLU's "pursuing whatever remedies may be available to it in a district court
through a . . . request addressed to the Executive Branch" under the Freedom of Information Act,
5 U.S.C. § 552 (FOIA). *Id.* at 22.
On December 21, 2007, the ACLU filed a "Motion for Reconsideration or
Reconsideration En Banc” (“Recon. Motion"), and the government subsequently submitted a
response on January 8, 2008. For the reasons stated herein, the ACLU's request for
reconsideration will be denied.[^2A]
[^2A]: The ACLU's request for reconsideration en banc will also be denied. As authority for
this Court to sit en banc, the ACLU cites this Court's decision in *In re All Matters Submitted to
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court*, 218 F. Supp.2d 611 (FISC), rev'd sub nom. *In re
Sealed Case*, 310 F.3d 717 (FISC Rev. 2002). But the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of
Review specifically stated that FISA does not contemplate an en banc proceeding before this
Court. In re *Sealed Case*, 310 F.3d at 721 n.5. That statement by the Court of Review would
appear to put an end to the ACLU's motion for en banc reconsideration. But even assuming,
arguendo, that this Court does have authority to sit en banc in this case, the decision in this
matter simply does not warrant reconsideration en banc. This footnote has been circulated to all
the other judges of this Court, and they are in agreement with it.
2
---
I. The Standards for Reconsideration.
The rules of the FISC do not directly provide for motions for reconsideration. However,
FISC Rule of Procedure 1 states that "[i]ssues not addressed in these rules may be resolved under
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." FISC Rule 1.
In this case, it is logical to apply the standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) to the
ACLU's request for reconsideration.[^3A] A district court "properly invokes its discretion to grant a
Rule 59(e) motion if it finds there is: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the
availability of new evidence; or (3) the need to correct clear error or manifest injustice." *Lance
v. United Mine Workers of Am. 1974 Pension Trust*, 400 F. Supp.2d 29, 31 (D.D.C. 2005);
accord, *Ciralsky v. CIA*, 355 F.3d 661, 671 (D.C. Cir. 2004); *Firestone v. Firestone*, 76 F.3d
1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996). A motion for reconsideration is not an opportunity for a party
merely to reassert factual or legal arguments that were already presented,[^4A] or to rely on theories it
could have put forward earlier.[^5A]
The ACLU's motion for reconsideration presents nothing that can be regarded as an
intervening change in controlling law or newly available evidence. Furthermore, the ACLU fails
[^3A]: "Courts have routinely construed papers captioned 'motion to reconsider' as a motion
to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e)." *Emory v. Sec'y of the Navy*, 819 F.2d 291,
293 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam).
[^4A]: *Fresh Kist Produce, LLC v. Choi Corp.*, 251 F. Supp.2d 138, 140 (D.D.C. 2003);
*Consol. Edison Co. of New York v. O'Leary*, 184 F.R.D. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1998); *New York v.
United States*, 880 F. Supp. 37, 38 (D.D.C. 1995) (per curiam).
[^5A]: *Howard v. Gutierrez*, 503 F. Supp.2d 392, 394 (D.D.C. 2007); *Fresh Kist Produce*, 251
F. Supp.2d at 140.
3
---
to demonstrate clear error or manifest injustice in the prior opinion. The motion for
reconsideration is accordingly denied.
II. There Is No Common Law Right of Public Access.
In its prior opinion, the Court concluded that any common law right of public access that
might otherwise exist has been pre-empted by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978,
codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1871 (FISA), and the Security Procedures adopted
thereunder.[^6A] *In re Motion*, slip op. at 11-12. This is because FISA and the Security Procedures
strictly limit access to FISC records and proceedings, see *id.* at 6-10, and these limitations are
inconsistent with a common law right of public access.
The ACLU now asserts that this Court "erred in holding that it must treat the executive's
classification decisions as conclusive." Recon. Motion at 11. But the Court did not so hold.
Rather, the Court held that FISA and the Security Procedures promulgated thereunder were
inconsistent with the claim that the ACLU or other members of the public had a common law
right to require the Court independently to review Executive Branch classification decisions and
release documents found to be improperly classified. It was only in this context—that is, in the
course of holding that any common law right of access had been pre-empted – that the Court
noted that, "[u]nder FISA and the applicable Security Procedures, there is no role for this Court
independently to review, and potentially override, Executive Branch classification decisions." *In
re Motion*, slip op. at 11. Hence, the Court simply did not decide whether the FISC, in an
[^6A]: See Security Procedures Established Pursuant to Public L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783,
by the Chief Justice of the United States for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (May 18, 1979) ("Security Procedures"),
reprinted in H.R. Rep. No. 96-558, at 7-10 (1979).
4
---
appropriate case, would have the authority to override Executive Branch classification decisions
as a matter of discretion. The ACLU's claim of error therefore misses the mark, because it is
aimed at a holding that this Court did not in fact make. And the ACLU has failed to demonstrate
clear error or manifest injustice in the Court's actual holding, which was that any common law
right of public access that might otherwise exist has been pre-empted by FISA and the Security
Procedures.
As an independent ground for holding that there is no applicable common law right, the
Court also found that, “if the FISC were to assume the role of independently making
declassification and release decisions in the probing manner requested by the ACLU, there would
be a real risk of harm to national security interests and ultimately to the FISA process itself." *In
re Motion*, slip op. at 12. As noted below in the context of the "logic" test under *Press-Enterprise
II*, the ACLU fails to refute this rationale as well.
III. There Is No First Amendment Right of Access.
Contrary to the suggestion of the ACLU, the Court's prior opinion did not hold that "First
Amendment interests are not implicated by the sealing of judicial opinions concerning the scope
and meaning of FISA." Recon. Motion at 13. Rather, it applied the governing "experience and
logic" tests specified in *Press-Enterprise II*, 478 U.S. at 8-9, which is the controlling Supreme
Court precedent, to determine whether the ACLU had a First Amendment right to access the
opinions and records in question. See *In re Motion*, slip op. at 13-22.[^7A]
[^7A]: The ACLU does not challenge the holding, see *id.*, at 16, that both the experience and
logic tests must be satisfied to establish a First Amendment right of public access.
5
---
Under the "experience" test, the ACLU argues that the appropriate inquiry is whether
there is a tradition of public access to decisions of Article III courts. Recon. Motion at 13. That
is an incorrect framing of the question. *Press-Enterprise II* requires that the tests of experience
and logic be applied to the "particular proceeding in question" 478 U.S. at 9 (emphasis added).
Thus, the tests of experience and logic have not been applied to categories as sweeping as all
decisions of Article III courts, but rather to narrower classes that permit a meaningful assessment
of the effects of public access on a particular type of judicial process – for example, district court
proceedings (and related records) that are ancillary to grand jury operations. See *In re Motions of
Dow Jones & Co.*, 142 F.3d 496, 502-03 (D.C. Cir. 1998); *United States v. Smith*, 123 F.3d 140,
148-50 (3d Cir. 1997).[^8A] Moreover, as explained in the Court's earlier opinion, see *In re Motion*,
slip op. at 6-10, the FISC is a unique court created to deal with classified foreign intelligence
matters in a secure and non-public fashion. It is therefore appropriate in this case to apply the
*Press-Enterprise II* tests to the proceedings and records of the FISC, rather than to the decisions
of all Article III courts. And once FISC records and proceedings are accepted as the appropriate
category for analysis under *Press-Enterprise II*, the "experience" test is clearly not satisfied, for
the reasons stated in the Court's prior opinion. See *In re Motion*, slip op. at 14-16.[^9A]
[^8A]: Contrary to the ACLU's contention, see Recon. Motion at 13 n.13, the decision in
*Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court*, 457 U.S. 596 (1982), does not support the broad
analysis that the ACLU advocates. In that case, the tests of experience and logic were applied to
the category of criminal trials, not to all court proceedings or even to all trials.
[^9A]: The ACLU argues in its motion for reconsideration (Recon. Motion at 13) that the FISC
simply has no tradition of issuing decisions of broad legal significance, either publicly or
nonpublicly. But the fact remains that some "legally significant [FISC] decisions . . . remain
classified and have not been released to the public." *In re Motion*, slip op. at 15. More
fundamentally, the Court rejects the suggestion (see ACLU Reply at 13) that the amorphous and
(continued...)
6
---
With regard to the "logic" test, the Court did not hold, as the ACLU suggests, that
judicial decisions about the meaning of a federal statute should be "kept secret from the public
simply because the executive has demanded that they be kept secret." Recon. Motion at 15.
Rather, under the "logic" test, the relief requested by the ACLU – application by the FISC of a
more probing standard of judicial review of Executive Branch classification decisions than a
federal district court would apply -- would result in harmful consequences that outweigh any
likely public benefits. *In re Motion*, slip op. at 18-21.[^10A]
The ACLU has failed to demonstrate any error in the Court's application of the "logic"
test. In its prior opinion, the Court reasoned that the benefits to the public of the process
requested by the ACLU would be diminished, “insofar as release with redactions may confuse or
obscure, rather than illuminate, the decisions in question." *In re Motion*, slip op. at 19. The
Court also noted the harmful consequences of granting the relief requested. First, if the Court
were to engage in the heightened form of judicial review requested by the ACLU, the Court
might err in its declassification decisions and release properly classified information, thus
damaging the national security. *Id.* Second, the proper functioning of the FISA process would
be adversely affected if submitting sensitive information to the FISC could subject the Executive
Branch's classification decisions to a heightened form of judicial review. In particular, the
government might opt to forgo surveillance and search of legitimate targets in order to retain
(...continued)
ill-defined category of "decisions of broad legal significance" constitutes the proper frame of
reference under *Press-Enterprise II*.
[^10A]: Of course, nothing in the Court's prior opinion or in this opinion prevents release of
any part of a FISC decision under FOIA, should such release be appropriate pursuant to that
statute.
7
---
control of sensitive information; government officials might choose to conduct a search or
surveillance without FISC approval where the need for such approval is unclear; and in cases that
are submitted, the free flow of information to the FISC could be threatened. *Id.* at 20.
The ACLU contends that the Court erred in noting the diminished benefits of a redacted
or partial release of the documents in question, because "it is not appropriate for this Court (or
any other) to keep information secret on the grounds that its disclosure could confuse the public."
Recon. Motion at 16. But the Court did not keep information secret on the grounds that its
disclosure could confuse the public. Instead, the Court conducted the balancing of benefits and
harms required under the logic test. And in conducting that analysis, it was appropriate to
consider the quantum of benefit that inhered in the heightened review requested by the ACLU so
that the Court could make a correct judgment as to whether that benefit outweighed the
(considerable) costs. Here, the benefit was diminished because of the potential for confusion
from a redacted release.
The ACLU also argues against this Court's concern that, if the ACLU's motion were
granted, the Court might err by releasing information that in fact should remain classified, and
thereby damage the national security. Recon. Motion at 15. First, the ACLU asserts that these
risks are equally present in FOIA litigation. But as the prior opinion noted, the issue before the
Court was the cost of applying "the less deferential standard sought by the ACLU.” *In re
Motion*, slip op. 19 (emphasis added); see also *id.* at 21 n.32. Applying that less deferential
standard would increase the risk of erroneous release beyond that incurred in a FOIA action.
Second, the ACLU suggests that a heightened standard of review is appropriate because
constitutional rights are at stake. But that puts the cart before the horse. The purpose of the
8
---
experience and logic tests is to determine whether a constitutional right is in fact at stake.
The ACLU does not address the Court's concern that the government might opt to forgo
surveillance and search of legitimate targets in order to retain control of sensitive information.
Nor does the ACLU address the Court's concern about ensuring the free flow of information
from the government to the FISC in cases that are submitted. The ACLU does, however, suggest
that it is inappropriate for the Court to consider the possibility that government officials might
choose to conduct a search or surveillance without FISC approval where the need for such
approval is unclear. Recon. Motion at 16. But there is no basis for the ACLU's suggestion that
the Court's concern about government officials avoiding the FISC where the need for FISC
approval is unclear constitutes a "capitulation to lawlessness" or an acceptance of
"unconstitutional behavior" (Recon. Motion at 16).
For all of these reasons, the ACLU has failed to demonstrate any error, let alone clear
error or manifest injustice, in the Court's prior holding that the ACLU has no First Amendment
right of access to the documents it seeks.
IV. The Court Will Not Release the Records as a Matter of Discretion.
Finally, the ACLU's request that the Court exercise its discretion to review the sealed
materials "in the unusual circumstances presented here" (Recon. Motion at 17) does not warrant
reconsideration. The Court is aware of the ongoing congressional and public debate over
extending or replacing the Protect America Act of 2007, and it acknowledges that release of the
requested materials (at least in their unredacted form) could inform the public in that debate.
Nevertheless, the Court properly rejected the ACLU's request for release, and now denies
the ACLU's motion for reconsideration. As noted above and in the Court's original opinion,
9
---
even assuming that this Court has the discretion independently to declassify materials over the
Executive's objections, the searching review requested by the ACLU of the Executive Branch's
classification decisions—over and above that conducted by a district court under FOIA -- poses
unacceptable risks to the national security and to the proper functioning of the FISA process. As
already explained, these risks include the heightened possibility of erroneous judicial release of
properly classified materials; the forgoing of search or surveillance against legitimate targets;
avoidance of the FISC in cases where the need for FISC approval is unclear; and impediments to
the free flow of information in cases that are submitted. *In re Motion*, slip op. at 19-20. These
risks simply outweigh the potential benefits from discretionary release.
V. Conclusion.
The Court will therefore deny the ACLU's motion for reconsideration or reconsideration
en banc.
JOHN D. BATES
Judge, Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court
February 8, 2008
Date
I, Karen E. Sutton, Clerk,
FISC, certify that this document
is a true and correct copy
of the original.
10
---
UNITED STATES
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
WASHINGTON, D.C.
IN RE MOTION FOR RELEASE
OF COURT RECORDS
Docket No.: MISC. 07-01
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion of the American Civil Liberties Union for
Reconsideration or Reconsideration en Banc is DENIED.
JOHN D. BATES
Judge, Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court
February 8, 2008
DATE
I, Karen E. Sutton, Clerk,
FISC, certify that this document
is a true and correct copy
of the original.
---
[^1]: The ACLU's comparison of *In re Release* to the case in *El Vocero* is inapposite. In *El Vocero*, the Supreme Court analyzed a particular type of hearing—a preliminary hearing—which is common to many jurisdictions throughout the United States, unlike the FISC's unique type of proceedings. *El Vocero*, 508 U.S. at 150-51. The Supreme Court found that although the Puerto Rican Supreme Court had relied on a Puerto Rican tradition of closed preliminary hearings, the "established and widespread tradition of open preliminary hearings among the States was canvassed in *Press-Enterprise* and is controlling here." *Id.* (citations omitted). In other words, the Supreme Court held that the traditions of a particular jurisdiction in handling a particular type or kind of hearing were overcome by the general experience of how all U.S. jurisdictions handled such hearings.
[^2]: See *In re Release*, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 494 n.26 (citing *In re Boston Herald, Inc.*, 321 F.3d at 188 (discussing privacy concerns and the chilling of sources of information regarding public access to records regarding eligibility for assistance under Criminal Justice Act (CJA)); *Smith*, 123 F.3d at 148 (making grand jury proceedings public could result in flight of those about to be indicted and expose the "accused but exonerated . . . to public ridicule") (internal quotation marks omitted); *Baltimore Sun Co.*, 886 F.2d at 64 (access to search warrant affidavit may disclose wiretaps not yet terminated or reveal identities of, and thereby endanger, informants); *United States v. Corbitt*, 879 F.2d 224, 229-35 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting privacy concerns of defendants and third parties, and the risks of impeding flow of information from confidential sources and of compromising ongoing investigations, regarding claim of public access to presentence report); *Times Mirror Co.*, 873 F.2d at 1215-16 (access to search warrant proceedings, or to supporting affidavits while investigation is ongoing, would risk destruction of evidence, coordination of false testimony, and flight of suspects, and result in public embarrassment of persons named). But see *In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside Office of Gunn*, 855 F.2d 569, 573 (8th Cir. 1988) ("logic" prong satisfied for access to search warrant affidavits).
[^3]: This Court's interpretation of the "logic" test was firmly grounded in the decisions of other courts that had encountered similar situations. See *In re Release*, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 496 n.33 (citing *In re Boston Herald*, 321 F.3d at 188 (in CJA context, the "specter of disclosure . . . might lead defendants (or other sources called upon by the court) to withhold information"); *Gonzales*, 150 F.3d at 1259 (analogizing to grand juries, which "function best in secret . . . because secrecy 'encourage[s] free and untrammeled disclosures,'" and finding that "[w]ithout an assurance that the information revealed at CJA hearings and in documents submitted to the court will not be disclosed, a defendant and his or her counsel would be discouraged from fully disclosing information") (quoting *Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Nw.*, 441 U.S. 211, 219 n.10 (1979)); *Corbitt*, 879 F.2d at 232-35 (relying on need to preserve "free flow of information" to sentencing judge, and "untoward effects" disclosure could have "on the gathering of information in future presentence investigations," in rejecting claimed First Amendment right of access to presentence report)).
[^4]: This is not to say that Executive Branch classifications are never judicially reviewable. The proper means to obtain such review is through a Freedom of Information Act request and subsequent action in district court. See *In re Release*, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 491 n.18, 496 n.32.
[^5]: Sixteen members of the House of Representatives as *amici curiae* raise two concerns regarding information sharing between the Executive Branch and Congress: (1) that because much of the information they receive is classified, they cannot discuss it in congressional debate or with their constituents, and (2) that some of the information is so sensitive that it is shared only with congressional and/or committee leaders and not with all members of Congress. See *Brief of Rep. Amash, et al.* (filed June 28, 2013). The relief sought by the ACLU could not alleviate either of these concerns. As *amici* recognize, the ACLU "explicitly does not ask for the disclosure of classified information,” *Amici Brief* at 13-14, and thus its Motion would not affect the information that members cannot discuss publicly or that is so sensitive that only certain leaders receive it.
[^1A]: The FISC Security Officer has compared this opinion and the accompanying order to the unclassified filings by the government in this case, and determined that the opinion and order do not contain any classified information.
[^2A]: The ACLU's request for reconsideration en banc will also be denied. As authority for this Court to sit en banc, the ACLU cites this Court's decision in *In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court*, 218 F. Supp.2d 611 (FISC), rev'd sub nom. *In re Sealed Case*, 310 F.3d 717 (FISC Rev. 2002). But the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review specifically stated that FISA does not contemplate an en banc proceeding before this Court. In re *Sealed Case*, 310 F.3d at 721 n.5. That statement by the Court of Review would appear to put an end to the ACLU's motion for en banc reconsideration. But even assuming, arguendo, that this Court does have authority to sit en banc in this case, the decision in this matter simply does not warrant reconsideration en banc. This footnote has been circulated to all the other judges of this Court, and they are in agreement with it.
[^3A]: "Courts have routinely construed papers captioned 'motion to reconsider' as a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e)." *Emory v. Sec'y of the Navy*, 819 F.2d 291, 293 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam).
[^4A]: *Fresh Kist Produce, LLC v. Choi Corp.*, 251 F. Supp.2d 138, 140 (D.D.C. 2003); *Consol. Edison Co. of New York v. O'Leary*, 184 F.R.D. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1998); *New York v. United States*, 880 F. Supp. 37, 38 (D.D.C. 1995) (per curiam).
[^5A]: *Howard v. Gutierrez*, 503 F. Supp.2d 392, 394 (D.D.C. 2007); *Fresh Kist Produce*, 251 F. Supp.2d at 140.
[^6A]: See Security Procedures Established Pursuant to Public L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783, by the Chief Justice of the United States for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (May 18, 1979) ("Security Procedures"), reprinted in H.R. Rep. No. 96-558, at 7-10 (1979).
[^7A]: The ACLU does not challenge the holding, see *id.*, at 16, that both the experience and logic tests must be satisfied to establish a First Amendment right of public access.
[^8A]: Contrary to the ACLU's contention, see Recon. Motion at 13 n.13, the decision in *Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court*, 457 U.S. 596 (1982), does not support the broad analysis that the ACLU advocates. In that case, the tests of experience and logic were applied to the category of criminal trials, not to all court proceedings or even to all trials.
[^9A]: The ACLU argues in its motion for reconsideration (Recon. Motion at 13) that the FISC simply has no tradition of issuing decisions of broad legal significance, either publicly or nonpublicly. But the fact remains that some "legally significant [FISC] decisions . . . remain classified and have not been released to the public." *In re Motion*, slip op. at 15. More fundamentally, the Court rejects the suggestion (see ACLU Reply at 13) that the amorphous and (continued...) ill-defined category of "decisions of broad legal significance" constitutes the proper frame of reference under *Press-Enterprise II*.
[^10A]: Of course, nothing in the Court's prior opinion or in this opinion prevents release of any part of a FISC decision under FOIA, should such release be appropriate pursuant to that statute.

View file

@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
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