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U.S. FOREIGN
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INTELLIGENCE
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SURVEILLANCE COURT
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2013 SEP -9 PM 12:24
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LEE ANN FLYNN HALL
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CLERK OF COURT
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United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
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In re Motion for Declaratory Judgment to Disclose
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Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders and Directives
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Case No. 13-06
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Facebook, Inc. ("Facebook") hereby moves this Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and
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Rule 6(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
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("FISC"), for a declaratory judgment, or such other relief as the Court may deem appropriate,
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confirming that Facebook may lawfully disclose aggregate data regarding any orders and/or
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directives that Facebook may have received under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
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("FISA") and/or FISA Amendments Act ("FAA"), 50 U.S.C. § 1801-1881g.1
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I. Background
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Facebook, a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Delaware with its
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principal place of business in Menlo Park, California, is an online social networking service that
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enables people to connect and share information with their friends, family, and coworkers.
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Facebook is a global company with more than one billion active monthly users throughout the
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world. The company's technologies facilitate the sharing of information through the social graph
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– the digital mapping of people's real world social connections.
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Over the past several months, Facebook and other entities have been the subject of
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intense media coverage concerning an alleged surveillance program operated by the United
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States government called "PRISM." See The Guardian, NSA Prism Program Taps In To User
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1
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Nothing in this Motion is intended to confirm or deny that Facebook has received any orders or directives
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pursuant to FISA or the FAA.
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1
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Data of Apple, Google, and Others (June 6, 2013), available at
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http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data; The Washington Post,
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U.S. British Intelligence Mining Data From Nine U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret
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Program (June 6, 2013) available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-
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intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-
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program/2013/06/06/3a0e0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970eeb04497_story.html. These news reports
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have raised serious concerns among the people around the world who use Facebook and the
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public at large about the Internet surveillance activities of the U.S. government and the responses
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of providers who may receive orders issued by this Court.
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Within the constraints imposed by the position of the U.S. government, Facebook has
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taken substantial steps to respond to these concerns. On June 7, 2013, Facebook Chief Executive
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Officer Mark Zuckerberg posted a public message on Facebook that clarified that Facebook
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carefully reviews all government requests for legal sufficiency, has never received a bulk order
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for metadata, and "is not and has never been part of any program to give the US or any other
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government direct access to our servers." See http://newsroom.fb.com/News/709/Personal-
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Response-From-Mark-Zuckerberg-About-PRISM. The following week, on June 14, 2013,
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Facebook released information covering the second half of 2012, which showed, for the first
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time, the aggregate number of law enforcement and national security requests it received from
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government authorities in the United States, as well as the aggregate number of accounts
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specified in those requests, within ranges of 1,000. See
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http://newsroom.fb.com/News/636/Facebook-Releases-Data-Including-All-National-Security-
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Requests. And on August 27, 2013, Facebook published a global report of government requests
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for the first half of 2013 which again included the aggregate number of all U.S. law enforcement
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2
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and national security requests, and accounts specified in those requests, within ranges of 1,000.
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See https://www.facebook.com/about/government_requests.
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Despite Facebook's efforts to push for more transparency, which have included extensive
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discussions with government officials, the U.S. government has taken the position that Facebook
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is prohibited from disclosing the specific number and type of any such requests as well as even
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aggregate numbers of any national security requests within ranges. Based on the government's
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response to similar requests made by both Google, Inc. and Microsoft Corporation, Facebook
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understands that the government believes that publishing such information would be unlawful.
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To appropriately and effectively respond to these inaccurate news reports and the related
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public concerns, Facebook seeks to be as transparent as possible regarding its receipt of orders
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under FISA and the FAA, if any. To that end, Facebook moves this Court to declare that it may
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lawfully disclose the following aggregate unclassified numbers covering a 6-month period
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(collectively, "the Aggregate Data"): (1) the total number of FISA court orders it has received
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during the period, if any, under specific FISA authorities, such as Physical Search Orders,
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Business Record Orders, and Wiretap and Pen Register/Trap and Trace Orders; (2) the total
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number of user accounts specified in such FISA orders; (3) the total number of Directives it has
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received during the period under 18 U.S.C. § 1881a, if any; and (4) the total number of user
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accounts specified under such directives. Facebook further requests the ability to release, in
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aggregate numbers, the number of requests that called for content of communications versus
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those that called for transaction or subscriber information.
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II. Facebook May Lawfully Disclose the Aggregate Data.
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Neither FISA nor the FAA prohibit Facebook from disclosing the Aggregate Data. The
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First Amendment also ensures Facebook's right to report these data and to respond to public
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3
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criticism.
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A. FISA and the FAA Do Not Prohibit Facebook From Disclosing the Aggregate
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Data.
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FISA and the FAA contain two confidentiality provisions. The first provides that orders
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and directives require the recipient to provide assistance to the government “necessary to
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accomplish the electronic surveillance in such a manner as will protect its secrecy.” 50 U.S.C. §
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1805(c)(2)(B); see also id. § 1881a(h)(1)(A) (providing the same for acquisition of foreign
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intelligence information). The second requires that the recipient “maintain under security
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procedures approved by the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence any
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records concerning the surveillance or the aid furnished that such person wishes to retain.” Id. §
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1805(c)(2)(C); see also id. § 1881a(h)(1)(B) (providing the same for acquisition of foreign
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intelligence information). Neither provision precludes Facebook from disclosing the Aggregate
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Data.
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With respect to the first confidentiality provision, the recipient’s obligation to provide
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assistance to the government “necessary to accomplish” the intelligence-gathering “in such a
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manner as will protect its secrecy” imposes upon the recipient an obligation to assist the
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government in a way that preserves the secrecy of the particular surveillance or acquisition.
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This provision, however, does not prohibit disclosure of the Aggregate Data because disclosure
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of such data would not compromise the “secrecy” of any particular electronic surveillance or
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acquisition. In light of Facebook’s over one billion active users and the generalized information
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included in the Aggregate Data, disclosure could not lead any user to infer that he or she is or has
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been the target of an order or directive. Moreover, disclosure of the Aggregate Data would not
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diminish Facebook’s obligation under FISA and the FAA to provide any assistance required of it
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4
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under any order or directive in a manner protective of the secrecy of that surveillance or
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acquisition.
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Similarly, although 50 U.S.C. §§ 1805(c)(2)(C) and 1881a(h)(1)(B) require providers to
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"maintain under security procedures approved by the Attorney General and the Director of
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National Intelligence any records concerning" the acquisition "or the aid furnished that such"
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recipient "wishes to" retain, those provisions on their face do not prohibit disclosure of aggregate
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numbers. Disclosing aggregate data, without indicating the specific process the government has
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invoked, does not put the secrecy of any particular FISA order or FAA directive in jeopardy.
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B. Facebook has a First Amendment Right to Disclose the Aggregate Data and
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Respond to Public Criticism.
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A restriction on the disclosure of the Aggregate Data would be a content-based restriction
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on speech and thus subject to strict scrutiny. See Doe v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861, 878 (2d Cir.
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2008) (noting, in the context of an analogous challenge to the non-disclosure provisions of the
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National Security Letter statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2709, that "the Government has conceded that strict
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scrutiny is the applicable standard"). To survive strict scrutiny review, “the Government must
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demonstrate that the nondisclosure requirement is 'narrowly tailored to promote a compelling
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Government interest." Id. (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm '1, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000)).
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"If a less restrictive alternative would serve the Government's purpose, the legislature must use
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that alternative." Playboy Entm 't, 529 U.S. at 813 (citation omitted).
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Undoubtedly, the security of the nation is a compelling government interest. See Haig v.
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Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981). However, Facebook's disclosure of Aggregate Data would not
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compromise the secrecy of the government's surveillance or acquisition efforts. Facebook
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provides services to more than one billion subscribers; it is difficult to see how the disclosure of
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5
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the Aggregate Data could make any individual user suspicious, much less aware, that he or she
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was the target of government intelligence-gathering. As one court has recognized in the context
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of analyzing the prohibition on disclosure of National Security Letters, the plausibility of the
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notion that disclosure of the receipt of government-issued national security orders may
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compromise a national security investigation diminishes as the size of the recipient's customer
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base grows. See In re Nat'l Sec. Letter, 2013 WL 1095417, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2013).
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Moreover, the government's own public release of similar data demonstrates that a
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prohibition on Facebook's disclosure is not narrowly tailored to the government's interest.
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Indeed, FISA already provides for the publication of aggregate data by the Attorney General. 50
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U.S.C. § 1807, and such reports have previously been released to the public. More importantly,
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the government itself has committed to the publication of the aggregate numbers of orders issued
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during a 12-month period and the aggregate number of targets affected by these orders across all
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providers.2 And the Director of National Intelligence ("DNI") recently has agreed to report each
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of the following categories of surveillance that the intelligence community has demanded:
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* FISA orders based on probable cause (Titles I and III of FISA, and Sections 703 and
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704)
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* Orders under Section 702 of FISA
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* FISA Business Records (Title V of FISA)
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* FISA Pen Register/Trap and Trace (Title IV of FISA)
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* National Security Letters issued pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. §§
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1681u(a) and (b), 15 U.S.C. § 1681v, and 18 U.S.C. § 2709.
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See generally Office of the Director of National Intelligence, IC On the Record,
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icontherecord.tumblr.com, posted dated August 29, 2013.
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2
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See Letter to Majority Leader Harry Reid, United States Senate from Peter J. Kadzik, Principal
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Deputy Assistant Attorney General (Aug. 30, 2013) available at
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http://www.justice.gov/oip/foia/foia_library/2013fisa-ltr.pdf (noting that during 2012, the government
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made 1,856 applications to the FISC for authority to conduct electronic surveillance and/or physical
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searches for foreign intelligence purposes, and (2) the FISC did not deny any applications in whole or in
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part.)
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6
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Finally, construing FISA and the FAA to bar disclosure fails strict scrutiny review
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because of the significant public interest in this information. As evidenced by the intense media
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coverage of PRISM and Facebook's alleged involvement therein, there is an ongoing debate over
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the government's use of its surveillance powers under FISA and the FAA. The government has
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confirmed that it uses its powers under FISA and the FAA and has weighed in on the public
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debate about the value of such programs. See Director of National Intelligence Statement on
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Activities Authorized Under Section 702 of FISA (June 6, 2013), available at
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http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/191-press-releases-2013/869-dni-
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statement-on-activities-authorized-under-section-702-of-fisa ("Information collected under this
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program is among the most important and valuable foreign intelligence information we collect,
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and is used to protect our nation from a wide variety of threats."). By this motion, Facebook
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seeks to contribute to this important debate in a responsible way that is commensurate with the
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information that the government has released or intends to release regarding the very same
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surveillance and acquisition activity.
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III. Conclusion
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For the foregoing reasons, Facebook requests that this Court issue a judgment declaring
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that it may disclose the Aggregate Data. Facebook also requests that the Court set a briefing
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schedule for this motion that would allow it an opportunity to respond to any opposition the
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government files in response to this petition.3
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3
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Facebook is amenable to coordinating the schedule in this matter with the schedule to be entered
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in Case Nos. Misc. 13-03 and 13-04, which involve similar, but not identical, requests for relief filed by
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Google and Microsoft.
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7
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IV. Rule 7 Statement
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Pursuant to FISC Rule of Procedure 7(1), Facebook states that its undersigned counsel,
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Chris Sonderby, holds a Top Secret security clearance, which was granted by the Federal Bureau
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of Investigation to permit him to advise Facebook concerning classified legal process. He is also
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a member in good standing of the State Bar of California. He has not previously appeared before
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this Court. Carl Nichols is a member in good standing of the bars of the District of Columbia
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and Commonwealth of Virginia. He does not presently hold a security clearance and has not
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previously appeared before this Court.
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Dated: September 9, 2013
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Chris Sonderby
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Facebook, Inc.
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Tel: (202) 663-6226
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Fax: (650) 472-8007
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1601 Willow Road
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Menlo Park, CA 94025
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Carl J. Nichols
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Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and
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Dorr LLP
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1875 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
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Washington, D.C. 20006
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Tel: (202) 663-6226
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Fax: (202) 663-6363
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Carl.nichols@wilmerhale.com
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Attorneys for Facebook
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8
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I hereby certify that at or before the time of filing this submission, the Government (care
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of the Security and Emergency Planning Staff, United States Department of Justice) has been
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served by hand delivery with a copy of this motion pursuant to Rule 8(a) of the FISC Rules of
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Procedure.
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Dated: September 9, 2013
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Carl J. Nichols
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Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and
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Dorr LLP
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1875 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
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Washington, D.C. 20006
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Tel: (202) 663-6226
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Fax: (202) 663-6363
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Carl.nichols@wilmerhale.com
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Attorney for Facebook
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9
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29
data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-06-motion-130909/metadata.json
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29
data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-06-motion-130909/metadata.json
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@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
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{
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"title": "Motion, In re Motion for Declaratory Judgment to Disclose Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders and Directives, No. Misc. 13-06 (FISA Ct. Sept. 9, 2013)",
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"type": "foia",
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"description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
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"long_description": "",
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"tags": [],
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"document": {
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"creator": "FISC",
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"date_created": "2013-09-09",
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"classification": [],
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"dissemination": [],
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"programs": [
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"PRISM"
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],
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"countries": [],
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"people": []
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},
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"publication": [
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{
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"publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
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"date_published": "2013-09-09",
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"link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34495",
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"reporters": [],
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"contributors": []
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}
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],
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"pdf_sha256": "4fcbbf1339300f326cda5222f68c24f05bb6586269d399f1c0191aed6076937c",
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"pages": 9
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}
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