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U.S. FOREIGN
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INTELLIGENCE
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SURVEILLANCE COURT
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UNITED STATES
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FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
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WASHINGTON, D.C.
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IN RE OPINIONS & ORDERS ISSUED BY
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THIS COURT ADDRESSING BULK
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COLLECTION OF DATA UNDER VARIOUS
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PROVISIONS OF THE FOREIGN
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INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
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2013 DEC 20 PM 4:49
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LEEANN FLYNN HALL
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CLERK OF COURT
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Docket No. Misc. 13-08
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MOVANTS' REPLY IN SUPPORT OF THEIR
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MOTION FOR THE RELEASE OF COURT RECORDS
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David A. Schulz
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Jonathan Manes
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Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic
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Yale Law School
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P.O. Box 208215
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New Haven, CT 06520
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Phone: (212) 850-6103
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Fax: (212) 850-6299
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dschulz@lskslaw.com
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Alex Abdo
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Patrick Toomey
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Brett Max Kaufman
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Jameel Jaffer
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American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
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125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
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New York, NY 10004
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Phone: (212) 549-2500
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Fax: (212) 549-2654
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aabdo@aclu.org
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Arthur B. Spitzer
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American Civil Liberties Union of the
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Nation's Capital
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4301 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 434
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Washington, DC 20008
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Phone: (202) 457-0800
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Fax: (202) 457-0805
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artspitzer@aclu-nca.org
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.................................................................................... 1
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ARGUMENT............................................................................................................. 2
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I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT REQUIRES THIS COURT TO DETERMINE
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INDEPENDENTLY WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT HAS
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DEMONSTRATED A COMPELLING REASON TO REDACT ITS OPINIONS.................... 2
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A. Rule 62(a) does not relieve this Court of its obligation under the First
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Amendment to evaluate the government's justification for the
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proposed redactions. ......................................................................................... 3
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B. To satisfy the First Amendment right of access, the government should
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be required to justify its proposed redactions in light of the publicly
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known facts. .................................................................................................... 3
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C. Strict application of the First Amendment standard is particularly
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important here given the extraordinary public interest in disclosure of
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these opinions. ................................................................................................. 5
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II. AN EXECUTIVE BRANCH DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW DOES NOT
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SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT
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FOR KEEPING JUDICIAL OPINIONS SECRET.......................................................... 8
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A. The government ignores the essential role of the judiciary in
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independently assessing the public's right of access to judicial
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opinions. ......................................................................................................... 8
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B. Many of the government's proposed redactions are facially suspect
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and warrant careful judicial review. ............................................................... 10
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III. FOIA IS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF
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ACCESS. ............................................................................................................... 13
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A. FOIA's statutory standards for withholding differ significantly from
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the First Amendment's standard for sealing judicial opinions. ........................ 13
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B. The government's proposal to substitute FOIA review for First
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Amendment analysis would eviscerate the constitutional right of
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access. .......................................................................................................... 15
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CONCLUSION. .................................................................................................... 16
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
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The government's opposition fails to grapple with the key issues raised by this motion.
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At issue is the public's right to access opinions of an Article III court that interpret the
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Constitution and the nation's surveillance laws and that affect the privacy rights of millions of
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Americans. The government has declassified portions of the four opinions that it represents are
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responsive to this motion for public access, but it wrongly contends that its unilateral
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declassification review resolves this motion that the Court, in other words, has no role to play
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in determining which portions of its opinions are released and whether the government's
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extensive redactions satisfy the strict First Amendment standard that governs the sealing of
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judicial opinions. That is emphatically not the case.
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While much of this Court's work may not be subject to a constitutional right of access,
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this motion concerns opinions containing significant legal interpretation of the Constitution and
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statutory law. For those sorts of opinions, at least, the First Amendment has always required
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courts to operate openly to allow the public to assure itself that judicial proceedings are fair and
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just, to improve the quality of proceedings and the performance of participants, and to educate
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the public. It obligates the courts to determine-independently, even in cases concerning national
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security-whether any proposed sealing of their opinions is narrowly tailored to serve
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compelling interests. Adherence to the Constitution's command is especially vital in this case,
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given the importance of the opinions sought to the ongoing public, judicial, and legislative
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debates about the legality and wisdom of permitting the government to acquire Americans'
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sensitive data in bulk.
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An independent judicial determination is also important here because many of the
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redactions proposed by the government are inexplicable. As but one particularly egregious
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example, the government has redacted the dates of dozens of seemingly innocuous events,
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1
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including the dates that it notified this Court of instances in which it "exceeded the scope of
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authorized collection" under the Court's bulk-collection orders. The availability of statutory
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review under the Freedom of Information Act to challenge these redactions is no substitute for
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the constitutional review required by the First Amendment.
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To give effect to the constitutional right of access, this Court should require the
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government to justify its proposed redactions, permit Movants an opportunity to respond, and
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then make findings on the record about whether the proposed redactions are narrowly tailored to
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avert a substantial risk of harm to a compelling governmental interest.
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ARGUMENT
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I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT REQUIRES THIS COURT TO DETERMINE
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INDEPENDENTLY WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT HAS DEMONSTRATED
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A COMPELLING REASON TO REDACT ITS OPINIONS.
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Movants' initial papers demonstrated that the opinions of this Court addressing the
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statutory and constitutional authority for the government's bulk collection of data are subject to
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the public's First Amendment right of access. *See Mot. of ACLU and MFIA for Release of Ct.
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Records* ("Mot.") at 12-21. The government's opposition does not dispute or deny this
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controlling fact. Instead, it argues that no relief is required because declassified versions of the
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requested opinions have been released by the executive branch, and because this Court should
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defer to the executive's decision to redact classified information from its opinions. This is wrong.
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Where the constitutional right of access applies, a court must determine whether the party
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seeking to deny public access has established a substantial probability of harm to a compelling
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interest before the constitutional right may be abridged. *See Mot.* at 22–23; *Press-Enterprise Co.
|
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v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II)*, 478 U.S. 1, 9–11 (1986). The government does not even
|
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attempt to carry this burden.
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2
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A. Rule 62(a) does not relieve this Court of its obligation under the First Amendment
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to evaluate the government's justification for the proposed redactions.
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Rather than address its constitutional burden, the government simply "[p]ut[s] aside" the
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First Amendment and argues for dismissal on the basis of FISC Rule 62(a). *See Gov't Opp'n to
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Mot. for Release of Court Records* ("Opp'n") at 5-7. The government asserts that "the Court is
|
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empowered only to 'direct the Executive Branch to review the [opinion] and redact it as
|
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necessary to ensure that properly classified information is appropriately protected.'" Opp'n at 5.
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But a court rule cannot displace a constitutional right. *See Boumediene v. Bush*, 553 U.S. 723,
|
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733 (2008) (statutory procedures cannot displace constitutional privileges where those
|
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procedures do not represent an "adequate and effective substitute"); *In re New York Times Co.*,
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828 F.2d 110, 115 (2d Cir. 1987) ("Obviously, a statute cannot override a constitutional right.").
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While Rule 62(a) permits the Court to publish opinions *sua sponte* or on motion by a party, it
|
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cannot limit the scope of the First Amendment right of access.
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|
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Neither the discretion of this Court under Rule 62(a) to request that the executive
|
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undertake a declassification review, nor the potential for the public to request copies of the
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opinions directly from the executive under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), are
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adequate substitutes for the constitutional inquiry required under *Press-Enterprise II*. Before
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access may be denied to a judicial opinion of an Article III court construing the Constitution and
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the law, that court must determine whether a denial of access is permitted under the strict
|
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standards required by the First Amendment. *See Mot.* at 21–24; *Press-Enterprise II*, 478 U.S. at
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13-15.
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B. To satisfy the First Amendment right of access, the government should be
|
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required to justify its proposed redactions in light of the publicly known facts.
|
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|
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Because the public has a First Amendment right to inspect the opinions at issue, the
|
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government must demonstrate to this Court that the *Press-Enterprise II* standards have been
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3
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satisfied with respect to each item of information it asks this Court to withhold from the public.
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As Judge Saylor did in addressing an earlier request for access, the Court should require the
|
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government to explain the need for each of its proposed redactions. *See In re Orders of this
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Court Interpreting Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act (In re Section 215 Orders)*, No. Misc. 13-02,
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2013 WL 5460064, at *8 (FISA Ct. Sept. 13, 2013); *In re Section 215 Orders*, No. Misc. 13-02
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(FISA Ct. Nov. 20, 2013). As discussed below, see *infra* Part II, the government must do more
|
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than simply assert that the information is classified. Rather, it must provide an explanation of the
|
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compelling interest that requires continued secrecy of the fact at issue, and a showing that each
|
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redaction is both necessary and narrowly tailored to protect that interest. The government's
|
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explanation should not be conclusory and should support each of its proposed redactions. *Cf. In
|
||||
re Section 215 Orders*, No. Misc. 13-02 (FISA Ct. Nov. 20, 2013) ("[T]he government shall
|
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submit a detailed explanation of its conclusion that the Opinion is classified in full and cannot be
|
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made public, even in redacted form.").
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|
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The Court should allow Movants an opportunity to respond to the government's
|
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explanation and should then independently assess whether the First Amendment access right may
|
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be overcome. The First Amendment mandates such a process. *See Globe Newspaper Co. v.
|
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Superior Court for Norfolk Cnty.*, 457 U.S. 596, 609 n.25 (1982) ("[R]epresentatives of the press
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and general public 'must be given an opportunity to be heard on the question of their
|
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|
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1 Movants have already fully addressed the government's meritless argument that they lack
|
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standing to assert this constitutional right of access. *See Opp'n* at 2-4; *Mot.* at 10–12; see also
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Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. by MFIAC for Recons. of this Court's Sep. 13, 2013 Op. on the
|
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Issue of Article III Standing, *In re Section 215 Orders*, No. Misc. 13-02 (FISA Ct. Oct. 11,
|
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2013), http://1.usa.gov/1sTGrg4 (arguing that MFIAC satisfies the requirements for
|
||||
constitutional standing to seek access to this court's opinions interpreting Section 215 of the
|
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PATRIOT Act).
|
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|
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4
|
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|
||||
exclusion."" (quoting *Gannett Co. v. DePasquale*, 443 U.S. 368, 401 (1979) (Powell, J.,
|
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concurring)).
|
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|
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C. Strict application of the First Amendment standard is particularly
|
||||
important here given the extraordinary public interest in disclosure of these opinions.
|
||||
|
||||
The overwhelming public interest in understanding this Court's analysis of the legality of
|
||||
bulk collection demands a rigorous application of the First Amendment. Courts have long
|
||||
recognized that "access is particularly appropriate when the subject matter of the litigation is of
|
||||
especial public interest." *In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig.*, 821 F.2d 139, 146 (2d Cir.
|
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1987). This Court's opinions regarding bulk collection involve some of the most contested and
|
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important issues in the public arena today. A public debate regarding the legality of bulk
|
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collection by the NSA-often marked by confusion and outrage-has continued unabated since
|
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June, when Edward Snowden first revealed the practice of bulk collection.
|
||||
|
||||
The President, congressional leaders, and the heads of the intelligence agencies have
|
||||
acknowledged that the Snowden leaks triggered an important public debate about national
|
||||
security and surveillance. President Obama welcomed the debate as "healthy for our democracy"
|
||||
and as a sign of the "maturity" of our nation. *See Transcript: What Obama Said on NSA
|
||||
Controversy*, Wall St. J., June 7, 2013, http://on.wsj.com/19CrIgI. National Intelligence Director
|
||||
James Clapper agreed: "As loathe as I am to give any credit for what's happened here ... I think
|
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it's clear that some of the conversations that this has generated, some of the debate ... actually
|
||||
probably needed to happen." *Agence France-Presse, NSA Chief Clapper Praise Snowden: Data
|
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Spying Debate 'Probably Needed to Happen', Raw Story*, Sep. 12, 2013,
|
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http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2013/09/12/nsa-chief-clapper-praises-snowden-data-spying-debate-
|
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probably-needed-to-happen/ (second alteration in original). Even Senator Dianne Feinstein, who
|
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had once insisted that "through four years of oversight, the [Senate Select Committee on
|
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|
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5
|
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|
||||
Intelligence] has not identified a single case in which a government official engaged in a willful
|
||||
effort to circumvent or violate the law," S. Rep. No. 122-172, at 6 (2012), called for greater
|
||||
transparency and oversight of the programs following the Snowden leaks. *See Dianne Feinstein,
|
||||
Op-Ed., Make NSA Programs More Transparent, Wash. Post*, July 30, 2013,
|
||||
http://wapo.st/18v002j.
|
||||
|
||||
At the center of this debate is the scope of the NSA's authority and the role of this Court
|
||||
in approving programs of bulk collection. While some members of Congress have insisted that
|
||||
"[t]he FISA Court is taking [its] mandate seriously," Tom Risen, *FISA Judge Denies
|
||||
Surveillance Court Offers 'Rubber Stamp, 'U.S. News & World Report*, Oct. 16, 2013,
|
||||
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/10/16/fisa-judge-denies-surveillance-court-offers-
|
||||
rubber-stamp (quoting Sen. Feinstein), other commentators have called for reform of the Court
|
||||
that would make it “as much like other courts as possible,” Editorial, *Privacy and the FISA
|
||||
Court, L.A. Times*, July 10, 2013, http://lat.ms/19CrTEi; *see id.* (“These legal issues—the reach
|
||||
of the Patriot Act and application of the 'special needs' doctrine—have enormous implications
|
||||
for the privacy of Americans. They would be debated by judges in public and ultimately resolved
|
||||
by the Supreme Court."); Editorial, *NSA Oversight Should Be Tough, Clear, and Fair, Wash.
|
||||
Post*, Nov. 2, 2013, wapo.st/JrUGRI. And in recent months, current and former members of the
|
||||
Court have taken the unorthodox step of defending their institution to the public. *See Letter from
|
||||
Hon. Reggie B. Walton, Presiding Judge, FISC, to Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Senate
|
||||
Comm. on the Judiciary* (Oct. 11, 2013), http://1.usa.gov/19Csvdo (detailing FISC procedures
|
||||
|
||||
6
|
||||
|
||||
and practices); Frederic Frommer, *Federal Judge: FISA Court Not a Rubber Stamp, Huffington
|
||||
Post*, July 11, 2013, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/federal-judge-fisa-court-not-rubber-stamp.²
|
||||
|
||||
Finally, the District Court for the District of Columbia's December 16 ruling that the
|
||||
NSA's bulk collection and querying of phone record metadata is most likely unconstitutional
|
||||
highlights the significant and positive role that judicial transparency can play in enhancing this
|
||||
public debate. *See Klayman v. Obama*, No. 13-cv-0851, 2013 WL 6571596 (D.D.C. Dec. 16,
|
||||
2013). The overwhelming public response to the opinion, both positive³ and negative,⁵
|
||||
illustrates the productive dialogue that judicial decisions can and should generate—precisely the
|
||||
dialogue hindered by the government's redaction of the opinions requested here. Indeed, even a
|
||||
leading academic defender of the NSA's surveillance activities argued that Judge Leon's
|
||||
opinion, though “unpersuasive in its reasoning," nevertheless “starts a conversation that might
|
||||
lead to some very interesting places.”⁶ Just days ago, the President's own review group joined
|
||||
|
||||
² Other former members of the FISC, meanwhile, have publicly criticized elements of the
|
||||
Court's procedures. *See, e.g., Hon. James G. Carr, Op-Ed., A Better Secret Court, N.Y. Times*,
|
||||
July 22, 2013, http://nyti.ms/19CsG81; Stephen Braun, *Former Judge Admits Flaws with Secret
|
||||
FISA Court, Associated Press*, July 9, 2013, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/oversight-board-hears-
|
||||
testimony-nsa-spying (quoting Hon. James Robertson).
|
||||
|
||||
³ For general coverage of Judge Leon's opinion, *see Ellen Nakashima & Ann E. Marimow,
|
||||
Judge: NSA's Collecting of Phone Records Is Probably Unconstitutional, Wash. Post*, Dec. 16,
|
||||
2013, http://wapo.st/19CsNAD; and Charlie Savage, *Judge Questions Legality of N.S.A. Phone
|
||||
Records, N.Y. Times*, Dec. 16, 2013, http://nyti.ms/19CsRAB.
|
||||
|
||||
⁴ *See, e.g., Editorial, NSA's Phone Record Sweep-Up Harder To Defend: Our View, USA
|
||||
Today*, Dec. 17, 2013, http://usat.ly/19CsVQT.
|
||||
|
||||
⁵ *See, e.g., Robert F. Turner, Op-Ed., Why Judge Leon's NSA Ruling Is Wrong, Wall St. J.*,
|
||||
Dec. 17, 2013, http://on.wsj.com/19CsXZ0.
|
||||
|
||||
⁶ Orin Kerr, *Preliminary Thoughts On Judge Leon's Opinions, Volokh Conspiracy* (Dec. 16,
|
||||
2013, 6:54 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/12/16/preliminary-thoughts-judge-leons-opinion/.
|
||||
|
||||
7
|
||||
|
||||
that conversation with a three-hundred-page report that recommends, in part, greater
|
||||
transparency in this Court's operation.⁷
|
||||
|
||||
Whatever one thinks of the various viewpoints on this issue, the extraordinary—and
|
||||
inadequately informed—public debate surrounding this Court's activities requires a careful and
|
||||
rigorous application of the First Amendment standards governing public access to the Court's
|
||||
decisions.
|
||||
|
||||
II. AN EXECUTIVE BRANCH DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW DOES NOT
|
||||
SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT
|
||||
FOR KEEPING JUDICIAL OPINIONS SECRET.
|
||||
|
||||
The government urges the Court to accept its declassification review and respectfully step
|
||||
aside. This declassification review, however, fails to satisfy the government's constitutional
|
||||
burden to justify censoring portions of a judicial opinion. Moreover, the fruits of its
|
||||
declassification review in this case—four opinions redacted to shreds—amply illustrate the need
|
||||
for independent judicial review of the proposed redactions in light of the overwhelming public
|
||||
interest in understanding the Court's analysis and application of the nation's surveillance laws.
|
||||
|
||||
A. The government ignores the essential role of the judiciary in independently
|
||||
assessing the public's right of access to judicial opinions.
|
||||
|
||||
The government's misguided approach focuses on the wrong issue. It stresses that “the
|
||||
First Amendment does not justify judicial . . . involvement in Executive Branch classification
|
||||
decisions.” Opp'n at 4. But the issue is not what the executive branch can classify, but whether
|
||||
the executive branch can unilaterally restrict public access to a judicial decision. "While it is
|
||||
true, as an abstract proposition, that the government's interest in protecting classified information
|
||||
can be a qualifying compelling and overriding interest," the First Amendment “require[s] a
|
||||
|
||||
⁷ *President's Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies, Liberty and
|
||||
Security in a Changing World* 200–07 (Dec. 12, 2013), http://1.usa.gov/19Cu8aL.
|
||||
|
||||
8
|
||||
|
||||
judicial inquiry into the legitimacy of the asserted national security interest, and specific
|
||||
findings, sealed if necessary, about the harm to national security that would ensue if the request"
|
||||
is not granted. *United States v. Rosen*, 487 F. Supp. 2d 703, 717 (E.D. Va. 2007) (emphasis
|
||||
added). Indeed, "[a] blind acceptance by the courts of the government's insistence on the need
|
||||
for secrecy, without notice to others, without argument, and without a statement of reasons,
|
||||
would impermissibly compromise the independence of the judiciary and open the door to
|
||||
possible abuse." *In re Washington Post Co.*, 807 F.2d 383, 391–92 (4th Cir. 1986).
|
||||
|
||||
Accordingly, where First Amendment rights apply, courts routinely subject claims that
|
||||
information must remain secret to the heightened level of scrutiny the Constitution demands. *See
|
||||
Mot.* at 25–27; *see also, e.g., McGehee v. Casey*, 718 F.2d 1137, 1148–49 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
|
||||
(explaining, in the context of First Amendment challenge to censorship of article written by
|
||||
former government employee, that since “the judiciary's tasks include the protection of
|
||||
individual rights[,] . . . courts must assure themselves that the reasons for classification" are
|
||||
acceptable); *Doe v. Gonzales*, 386 F. Supp. 2d 66, 76 (D. Conn. 2005) ("While the court
|
||||
recognizes the [government's] expertise in the area of counter-terrorism and is inclined to afford
|
||||
their judgments in that area deference, those judgments remain subject to judicial review.");
|
||||
*United States v. Grunden*, 2 M.J. 116, 122 (C.M.A. 1977) (explaining that the trial judge "must
|
||||
be satisfied from all the evidence and circumstances" that classification warrants the closure of
|
||||
proceedings).
|
||||
|
||||
Courts must independently evaluate whether the executive's proposed sealing overcomes
|
||||
the public's right of access because the First Amendment requires it, but also because the
|
||||
standard for classification differs significantly from the First Amendment standard for sealing
|
||||
judicial opinions. Under Executive Order 13,526, information may be classified if an executive
|
||||
|
||||
9
|
||||
|
||||
official determines that “unauthorized disclosure . . . reasonably could be expected to result in
|
||||
damage to the national security." Exec. Order. 13,526 at § 1.1(4). But the First Amendment
|
||||
permits sealing only after a judicial determination that the sealing is narrowly tailored to avoid a
|
||||
"substantial probability” of harm. *Press-Enterprise II*, 478 U.S. at 14. Thus, in evaluating the
|
||||
withholding of records under these two different standards, courts might uphold classification
|
||||
even while finding the justifications for secrecy wanting under the First Amendment. *Compare,
|
||||
e.g., ACLU v. Dep't of State*, 878 F. Supp. 2d 215, 223–24 (D.D.C. 2012) (concluding that
|
||||
documents publicly disclosed by Wikileaks but not “officially acknowledged" remain properly
|
||||
classified), *with Bank Julius Baer & Co. v. Wikileaks*, 535 F. Supp. 2d 980, 985 (N.D. Cal. 2008)
|
||||
(*The First Amendment bars preliminary injunction against Wikileaks to prevent further
|
||||
dissemination of confidential bank records once “the cat is out of the bag.").
|
||||
|
||||
B. Many of the government's proposed redactions are facially suspect and warrant
|
||||
careful judicial review.
|
||||
|
||||
Here, the heavy redactions to the Court's opinions proposed by the government only
|
||||
underscore the need for independent judicial assessment of the sealing. While "release of
|
||||
redacted material is clearly a less restrictive means" of protecting a party's interest than blanket
|
||||
sealing, *Globe Newspaper Co. v. Pokaski*, 684 F. Supp. 1132, 1136 n.4 (D. Mass. 1988), aff'd in
|
||||
part, rev'd in part, 868 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1989), the judiciary must “independently examine the
|
||||
Government's redactions . . . to ensure that the redactions . . . are no greater than necessary,"
|
||||
*United States v. Moussaoui*, 65 F. App'x 881, 888 (4th Cir. 2003).
|
||||
|
||||
Despite the obligation to minimize redactions to those essential to protect a compelling
|
||||
interest, the government proposes extensive, and often questionable, redactions that seriously
|
||||
impair the public's ability to understand and evaluate the Court's reasoning and holdings. By
|
||||
way of example, the government seeks to shield from public view such items as:
|
||||
|
||||
10
|
||||
|
||||
* The definition of the "metadata" for which bulk collection is authorized;⁸
|
||||
* The duration of the bulk collection authorized;⁹
|
||||
* The manner in which internet metadata was used, beyond contact chaining;¹⁰
|
||||
* The nature and duration of the government's non-compliance with past orders;¹¹ and
|
||||
* Dozens of seemingly innocuous dates, such as the dates of FISC opinions and
|
||||
applications to the Court, and even the dates the government notified this Court of its
|
||||
violations of court-imposed limitations on its bulk collection programs.¹²
|
||||
|
||||
These redactions appear unjustified on their face and warrant the Court's attention.
|
||||
|
||||
Of these, perhaps the most troubling is the government's attempt to keep secret the
|
||||
categories of metadata it was authorized to collect—the very subject, in other words, of its
|
||||
applications. *See, e.g., Kollar-Kotelly Opinion* at 7–11; *Bates Opinion* at 2. Without this
|
||||
information, the opinions merely recite the Fourth Amendment's third-party doctrine, but they
|
||||
omit the information necessary to make sense of the Court's application of this doctrine to the
|
||||
government do so, and since FOIA does not permit a requester to seek records directly from a
|
||||
|
||||
⁸ *See Opinion and Order Authorizing Collection of Bulk Electronic Communications
|
||||
Metadata* at 7–11, 19 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (released Nov. 18, 2013), http://1.usa.gov/19Ct5rI
|
||||
("Kollar-Kotelly Opinion") ("[Redacted] like other forms of metadata, is not protected by the
|
||||
Fourth Amendment . . ."); *Opinion and Order Authorizing Reinstatement of Bulk Collection of
|
||||
Internet Metadata* at 2, 35, 71 (Bates, J.) (released Nov. 18, 2013), http://1.usa.gov/19CtjQ3
|
||||
("Bates Opinion") ("The government requests authority to [redacted] categories of [sixteen pages
|
||||
of redacted material].").
|
||||
|
||||
⁹ *See, e.g., Bates Opinion* at 4.
|
||||
|
||||
¹⁰ *See, e.g., Kollar-Kotelly Opinion* at 42–43 ("NSA proposes to employ two analytic methods
|
||||
on the body of archived meta data it seeks to collect. . . The two methods are: (1) Contact
|
||||
chaining – [ (21)] [Redacted].").
|
||||
|
||||
¹¹ *See, e.g., Bates Opinion* at 2–3 ("[T]he government acknowledges that NSA exceeded the
|
||||
scope of authorized acquisition continuously during the more than [redacted] years of acquisition
|
||||
under these orders."); *id.* at 105 ("[T]he unauthorized collection included: [redacted].").
|
||||
|
||||
¹² *See, e.g., Kollar-Kotelly Opinion* at 2, 3, 70; *Bates Opinion* at 4, 10, 13, 14; *Amended
|
||||
Memorandum Opinion Reauthorizing Bulk Collection of Telephony Metadata* at 20 (Eagan, J.)
|
||||
(published Sept. 17, 2013), http://1.usa.gov/19CtcHA ("Eagan Opinion"). As but one of many
|
||||
examples, Judge Bates's discussion of the government's violations goes as follows: “[O]n
|
||||
[redacted] the government provided written notice to the FISC that it had exceeded the scope of
|
||||
authorized collection [redacted]." Bates Opinion at 10.
|
||||
|
||||
11
|
||||
|
||||
government's requests. *See Ellen Nakashima & Greg Miller, Official Releasing What Appears
|
||||
To Be Original Court File Authorizing NSA To Conduct Sweeps, Wash. Post*, Nov. 18, 2013,
|
||||
http://www.wapo.st/IGqxNK (because "[t]hree pages [of the Kollar-Kotelly Opinion] describing
|
||||
the 'metadata' . . . were redacted," its "true scope" remains "unclear"). Judge Bates describes this
|
||||
application of doctrine to categories of metadata as "difficult line-drawing," *Bates Opinion* at
|
||||
71—precisely the type of "line-drawing" that the public must see to understand how the law is
|
||||
being construed and how the Constitution is being applied in this contested area. *See Mosaid
|
||||
Technologies Inc. v. LSI Corp.*, 878 F. Supp. 2d 503, 513 (D. Del. 2012) (rejecting proposal to
|
||||
redact discussion of how precedent “should (or should not) apply to the present facts").
|
||||
|
||||
Beyond the nature of the material the government seeks to redact, the sheer volume of its
|
||||
redactions in some cases "would have the practical effect of sealing the entire case" and leave an
|
||||
interested citizen with "no idea what to make" of the redacted opinions. *In re Platinum &
|
||||
Palladium Commodities Litig.*, 828 F. Supp. 2d 602, 604 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); *see CRAssociates,
|
||||
Inc. v. United States*, 102 Fed. Cl. 698 (Fed. Cl. 2011), aff'd, 475 F. App'x 341 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
|
||||
(rejecting proposed redactions since "the public version of th[e] document would scarcely be
|
||||
comprehensible"). For example, with approximately twenty-five pages redacted, Judge Kollar-
|
||||
Kotelly's opinion is full of impenetrable—but likely critical—passages that are void of the
|
||||
meaning they ought to have. Likewise, in redacting Judge Bates's opinion, the government seeks
|
||||
to shield dozens of consecutive pages wholesale, *see Bates Opinion* at 35–52, 57–70, while also
|
||||
excising the individual words or phrases that give meaning to his discussion, *see Bates Opinion*
|
||||
at 3, 5. Such extensive redactions “obscure any discussion of the actual nature" of the opinions
|
||||
and defeat the core oversight purpose of the access right. *In re Mosaid Technologies Inc.*, 878 F.
|
||||
|
||||
12
|
||||
|
||||
Supp. 2d at 507-08 (rejecting the parties' proposal to redact 40 percent of one transcript and 60
|
||||
percent of another).
|
||||
|
||||
Whether these redactions could be justified—and it is difficult to see how all of them
|
||||
could be—their nature and scope call for independent evaluation. Contrary to the government's
|
||||
position, a court cannot "delegate its authority" to edit and redact a judicial document and must
|
||||
instead "make its own redactions, supported by specific findings, after a careful review of all
|
||||
claims for and against access." *United States v. Amodeo*, 44 F.3d 141, 147 (2d Cir. 1995); *see
|
||||
also United States v. Moussaoui*, 65 F. App'x 881, 888 (4th Cir. 2003) (“The interest of the
|
||||
public in the flow of information is protected by our exercising independent judgment
|
||||
concerning redactions." (emphasis added)).
|
||||
|
||||
Given the extent of the government's proposed redactions and the tremendous public
|
||||
interest in the contents of these opinions, this Court's "independent judgment" is essential.
|
||||
|
||||
III. FOIA IS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF ACCESS.
|
||||
|
||||
In light of the judiciary's constitutional mandate to independently police access to its own
|
||||
proceedings and records, the government's reliance on FOIA—a statute governing access to
|
||||
executive materials—is wholly misplaced. The government's error not only demonstrates a
|
||||
disturbing insensitivity to core separation-of-powers principles, but it would also have the
|
||||
practical effect of narrowing or eliminating the public's First Amendment right of access.
|
||||
|
||||
A. FOIA's statutory standards for withholding differ significantly from the First
|
||||
Amendment's standard for sealing judicial opinions.
|
||||
|
||||
FOIA's statutory standards for determining when information may be withheld from the
|
||||
public cannot satisfy the constitutional right of access that applies to the opinions of this Court.
|
||||
The government is thus wrong in asserting that “there would be no point in this Court's merely
|
||||
duplicating the judicial review that the ACLU, and anyone else, can obtain by submitting a FOIA
|
||||
|
||||
13
|
||||
|
||||
request to the Department of Justice for these same records."¹³ Opp'n at 3–4 (quoting *In re
|
||||
Release*, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 496 n.32). The review this Court undertakes in applying First
|
||||
Amendment standards are not “the same standards as a district court would [apply] in the FOIA
|
||||
litigation," *id.* at 4, particularly where classified information is involved. Whereas *Press-
|
||||
Enterprise II* requires courts to exercise their independent judgment as to whether a compelling
|
||||
need requires some secrecy for information in a court opinion, FOIA directs courts to determine
|
||||
only whether the executive has shown that it appears 'logical' or 'plausible'" that the records
|
||||
sought are properly classified. *Wolf v. CIA*, 473 F.3d 370, 374–75 (D.C. Cir. 2007). In both cases
|
||||
appropriate deference is given to the “expertise of agencies engaged in national security and
|
||||
foreign policy," *id.* at 374, but the ultimate issue for the court to decide is very different where
|
||||
the constitutional right of access attaches.¹³
|
||||
|
||||
This difference may well be dispositive here: the government's proposed redactions to
|
||||
the four opinions at issue might satisfy FOIA's inquiry into whether the information is properly
|
||||
classified, but still fail to pass *Press-Enterprise II*'s exacting standard requiring a “substantial
|
||||
probability" of harm and “narrow[] tailoring." *Compare ACLU v. Dep't of State*, 878 F. Supp. 2d
|
||||
at 223–24, *with Bank Julius Baer*, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 985. The government thus fails to
|
||||
appreciate that these distinct standards of review—and the necessary possibility of divergent
|
||||
outcomes—prevent a court from supplanting the First Amendment right of access with FOIA.
|
||||
|
||||
¹³ *Cf. Wright v. FBI*, 613 F. Supp. 2d 24, 24–25 (D.D.C. 2009) (“Plaintiffs have relied upon
|
||||
the First Amendment, not FOIA, and the Government has cited to no case holding that FOIA is
|
||||
coterminous with the First Amendment. . . . Consequently, censorship is prohibited, even if the
|
||||
material falls within a FOIA Exemption, where the Government fails to show with reasonable
|
||||
specificity that its interest in censorship . . . outweighs the interest of prospective speakers in free
|
||||
dissemination of those speakers' views.").
|
||||
|
||||
14
|
||||
|
||||
B. The government's proposal to substitute FOIA review for First Amendment
|
||||
analysis would eviscerate the constitutional right of access.
|
||||
|
||||
The government's demand that Movants "respect, and not through [their] motion attempt
|
||||
to circumvent, the FOIA process enacted by Congress,” Opp'n at 4, if accepted by this Court,
|
||||
would upend the public's qualified constitutional right to inspect court records and attend court
|
||||
proceedings. Under this theory, the government could defeat public access by “classifying" court
|
||||
records or evidence to be submitted in court—even the Supreme Court—and demanding that
|
||||
members of the public rely solely on FOIA to seek access.¹⁴ Access as a constitutional right
|
||||
protected by the judicial branch would become, by this sleight of hand, a solely statutory matter.
|
||||
|
||||
Alternatively, the government could entirely defeat the public's right of access to this
|
||||
Court's opinions—wholly insulating them from public review—by refusing to take the opinions
|
||||
into its possession or to maintain copies over time. Since there is no affirmative requirement that
|
||||
the government do so, and since FOIA does not permit a requester to seek records directly from a
|
||||
court, *Mayo v. U.S. Gov't Printing Office*, 9 F.3d 1450, 1451 (9th Cir. 1993), public access to
|
||||
this Court's opinions would rise or fall on the vagaries of the Justice Department's document-
|
||||
retention policy. FOIA is thus no substitute for review required under the First Amendment and
|
||||
provides no proper basis to dismiss this motion.
|
||||
|
||||
¹⁴ In enacting the Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1–16 ("CIPA")
|
||||
Congress recognized that the need to use "classified" information in a criminal prosecution does
|
||||
not automatically justify an abridgment of the public's right of access. Where classified
|
||||
information is deemed by a judge to be relevant and admissible in a criminal prosecution, CIPA
|
||||
requires the government either to declassify it, find an acceptable non-classified alternative, or
|
||||
face consequences up to and including dismissal of the indictment; it does not authorize the
|
||||
prosecution to proceed in a closed courtroom or on a sealed record. *See generally Edward C. Liu
|
||||
& Todd Garvey, Cong. Research Serv., R41742, Protecting Classified Information and the
|
||||
Rights of Criminal Defendants: The Classified Information Procedures Act* 6–11 (2012).
|
||||
|
||||
15
|
||||
|
||||
CONCLUSION
|
||||
|
||||
For the foregoing reasons, Movants respectfully request that this Court deny the
|
||||
government's request to dismiss their motion and instead unseal its opinions addressing the
|
||||
constitutional and statutory bases for the "bulk collection" of records under various authorities
|
||||
within FISA, including but not limited to 50 U.S.C. § 1842. Movants request that these materials
|
||||
be released as quickly as possible and with only those redactions essential to protect information
|
||||
that the Court determines, after independent review, to warrant continued sealing. Given the
|
||||
relevance of the opinions to an ongoing debate of immense public interest, Movants also request
|
||||
expedited consideration of this motion, as well as oral argument before the Court.
|
||||
|
||||
Dated: December 20, 2013
|
||||
|
||||
Respectfully submitted,
|
||||
|
||||
/s/ David A. Shulz
|
||||
David A. Schulz
|
||||
Jonathan Manes
|
||||
Media Freedom and Information Access
|
||||
Clinic
|
||||
Yale Law School¹⁵
|
||||
P.O. Box 208215
|
||||
New Haven, CT 06520
|
||||
Phone: (212) 850-6103
|
||||
Fax: (212) 850-6299
|
||||
dschulz@lskslaw.com
|
||||
|
||||
Alex Abdo
|
||||
Brett Max Kaufman
|
||||
Patrick Toomey
|
||||
Jameel Jaffer
|
||||
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
|
||||
125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
|
||||
New York, NY 10004
|
||||
Phone: (212) 549-2500
|
||||
Fax: (212) 549-2654
|
||||
|
||||
¹⁵ This memorandum has been prepared with the assistance of Yale Law School students,
|
||||
Patrick Hayden '14, John Langford '14, Anjali Motgi '14, Max Mishkin '14, and Brianna van
|
||||
Kan '15. This brief does not purport to present the institutional views of Yale Law School, if
|
||||
any.
|
||||
|
||||
16
|
||||
|
||||
aabdo@aclu.org
|
||||
|
||||
Arthur B. Spitzer
|
||||
American Civil Liberties Union of the
|
||||
Nation's Capital
|
||||
4301 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 434
|
||||
Washington, DC 20008
|
||||
Phone: (202) 457-0800
|
||||
Fax: (202) 457-0805
|
||||
artspitzer@aclu-nca.org
|
||||
|
||||
17
|
||||
|
||||
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
|
||||
|
||||
I, Alex Abdo, certify that on this day, December 20, 2013, a copy of the foregoing brief
|
||||
was served by UPS on the following persons:
|
||||
|
||||
Eric H. Holder
|
||||
Attorney General
|
||||
Office of the Attorney General
|
||||
U.S. Department of Justice
|
||||
National Security Division
|
||||
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
|
||||
Washington, DC 20530
|
||||
|
||||
John P. Carlin
|
||||
Acting Assistant Attorney General for National Security
|
||||
U.S. Department of Justice
|
||||
National Security Division
|
||||
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
|
||||
Washington, DC 20530
|
||||
|
||||
Christine Gunning
|
||||
Litigation Security Group
|
||||
U.S. Department of Justice
|
||||
2 Constitution Square
|
||||
145 N Street, N.E.
|
||||
Suite 2W-115
|
||||
Washington, DC 20530
|
||||
|
||||
/s/ Alex Abdo
|
||||
Alex Abdo
|
||||
27
data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-08-reply-131223/metadata.json
Normal file
27
data/FOIA/FISC_-_misc-13-08-reply-131223/metadata.json
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "Movants' Reply in Support of Their Motion for Release of Court Records, In re Opinions & Orders Issued by this Court Addressing Bulk Collection of Data Under Various Provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, No. Misc. 13-08 (FISA Ct. Dec. 20, 2013).",
|
||||
"type": "foia",
|
||||
"description": "FISC/FISCR Court Filings",
|
||||
"long_description": "",
|
||||
"tags": [],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "FISC",
|
||||
"date_created": "2013-12-20",
|
||||
"classification": [],
|
||||
"dissemination": [],
|
||||
"programs": [],
|
||||
"countries": [],
|
||||
"people": []
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "ACLU,EFF",
|
||||
"date_published": "2013-12-20",
|
||||
"link": "https://donohueintellaw.ll.georgetown.edu/record/34499",
|
||||
"reporters": [],
|
||||
"contributors": []
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "663aa29edb8fa4295ce5bbf6af6b879de5113a26f650a9c6b10b0987ea4fd59e",
|
||||
"pages": 20
|
||||
}
|
||||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue