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TOP SECRET STRAP1
Contents
* What is CNE?
* Why do CNE?
* CNE Teams
* Partners
* Challenges
* Contacts
PTD "We penetrate targets' defences.”
This information is exempt under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and may be exempt under other UK information legislation. Refer any FOIA queries to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
---
TOP SECRET STRAP1
What is CNE?
“Computer & Network Exploitation delivers to GCHQ data of intelligence value by remote access to computers, computer networks and telecom networks without the knowledge or consent of their owners and users, within the appropriate legal framework“
PTD "We penetrate targets' defences.”
This information is exempt under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and may be exempt under other UK information legislation. Refer any FOIA queries to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
---
TOP SECRET STRAP1
OR....
Legally accessing computers/networks remotely without the owners permission to:
* Produce Intelligence
* Do Effects
* Support others: PTD, CND, Partners
PTD "We penetrate targets' defences.”
This information is exempt under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and may be exempt under other UK information legislation. Refer any FOIA queries to GCHQ o [REDACTED]
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
---
TOP SECRET STRAP1
Why do CNE?
Passive Sigint won't always work
* Can overcome crypt or collection difficulties
* Access to data at rest
To enable conventional Sigint
* Used as an enabler of crypt
* Redirect traffic
PTD "We penetrate targets' defences.”
This information is exempt under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and may be exempt under other UK information legislation. Refer any FOIA queries to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
---
TOP SECRET STRAP1
CNE teams
PTD "We penetrate targets' defences.”
This information is exempt under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and may be exempt under other UK information legislation. Refer any FOIA queries to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
---
TOP SECRET STRAP1
Legalities & Policy
CNE must comply with current legislation:
* Computer Misuse Act (CMA) 1990 states that unauthorised access or modification is illegal when:
* person in UK and computer in UK
* person overseas and computer in UK
* person in UK and computer overseas
PTD "We penetrate targets' defences.”
This information is exempt under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and may be exempt under other UK information legislation. Refer any FOIA queries to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
---
TOP SECRET STRAP1
Legal & Policy
Exemption is obtained from the CMA using Intelligence Services Act (ISA) warrants:
* Section 5: UK targets (requires at least Foreign Secretary signature)
* Section 7: overseas targets (can be signed by DO unless sensitive)
European Human Rights Act
PTD "We penetrate targets' defences.”
This information is exempt under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and may be exempt under other UK information legislation. Refer any FOIA queries to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
TOP SECRET STRAP1
Covert Infrastructure, Access & Dataflow
All CNE activity must be UK deniable
* Intermediary machines/Covert Infrastructure used to:
* gain access to targets via the internet
* bring data back into corporate repositories
PTD "We penetrate targets' defences.”
This information is exempt under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and may be exempt under other UK information legislation. Refer any FOIA queries to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
---
TOP SECRET STRAP1
Infrastructure
Implementation/maintenance CNE core infrastructure
* CNE Desktop
* Network
* Servers
* Storage
* Sys Admin
PTD "We penetrate targets' defences.”
This information is exempt under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and may be exempt under other UK information legislation. Refer any FOIA queries to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
---
TOP SECRET STRAP1
CNE Operations
* Network End Points
* Counter Terrorism
* Single End Points
* Data Harvesting
* Effects
* CNE Scarborough
PTD "We penetrate targets' defences.”
This information is exempt under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and may be exempt under other UK information legislation. Refer any FOIA queries to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
---
TOP SECRET STRAP1
Types of Operation
Masquerades
* Use credentials obtained from CNE or passive collection to gain access to email, chat rooms etc
Content Delivery
* Individually crafted email attacks that dupe target into visiting an exploitation web server
PTD "We penetrate targets' defences.”
This information is exempt under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and may be exempt under other UK information legislation. Refer any FOIA queries to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
---
TOP SECRET STRAP1
Types of Operation
Router Ops
* Targeting network infrastructure via gaining access to Admin machines
Remote Access
* Use security weaknesses to survey and gain access to computers/devices using public/private tools
PTD "We penetrate targets' defences.”
This information is exempt under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and may be exempt under other UK information legislation. Refer any FOIA queries to GCHQ o [REDACTED]
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
---
TOP SECRET STRAP1
Effects
Making something happen a target's computer.
* Degrading comms to slow network.
* Bringing down target's web browser.
* Changing users' passwords on extremist website.
PTD "We penetrate targets' defences.”
This information is exempt under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and may be exempt under other UK information legislation. Refer any FOIA queries to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
---
TOP SECRET STRAP1
EREPO
* EREPO is the covername for router operations
* Provides access to in country collection through exploitation of routers
* Target data more accessible to SIGINT collection
* Provides crypt material, event tip-offs, target metadata
PTD "We penetrate targets' defences.”
This information is exempt under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and may be exempt under other UK information legislation. Refer any FOIA queries to GCHQ o [REDACTED]
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
---
TOP SECRET STRAP1
Capability - Implants
Develops techniques and technical assets, mainly software, for use in CNE Operations.
* Teams:
* Microsoft
* UNIX
* Hardware
* Mobiles
PTD "We penetrate targets' defences.”
This information is exempt under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and may be exempt under other UK information legislation. Refer any FOIA queries to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
---
TOP SECRET STRAP1
Capability - Research
* Vulnerabilities Research and Exploit development
* Find the holes/weaknesses
* Use them to gain execution
* Future Techniques
* QUANTUM
* MUGSHOT
PTD "We penetrate targets' defences.”
This information is exempt under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and may be exempt under other UK information legislation. Refer any FOIA queries to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
---
TOP SECRET STRAP1
Capability - Prototyping
* Analyst and Operator Tools
* Automation
* STARGATE
* HIGHNOTE
PTD "We penetrate targets' defences.”
This information is exempt under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and may be exempt under other UK information legislation. Refer any FOIA queries to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
---
TOP SECRET STRAP1
Joint working
* 2nd Parties, SIS and Security Service
* all do CNE but have different targets and toolsets
* Close working with OPD-GNE, OPC-TDSD, OPD-JS and other teams within Active Approaches
PTD "We penetrate targets' defences.”
This information is exempt under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and may be exempt under other UK information legislation. Refer any FOIA queries to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
---
TOP SECRET STRAP1
Deconfliction
Deconfliction carried out with Second Parties:
* Implants may interfere with each other
* More activity increases risk of being found
* Deconfliction by IP addresses, not target.
* 'Primacy' agreed and tasking shared.
PTD "We penetrate targets' defences.”
This information is exempt under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and may be exempt under other UK information legislation. Refer any FOIA queries to GCHQ o [REDACTED]
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
---
TOP SECRET STRAP1
CNE support PTD
Includes:
* Password Cracking
* VPN Exploitation
* CV/Key Extraction
* WHARFRAT
PTD "We penetrate targets' defences.”
This information is exempt under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and may be exempt under other UK information legislation. Refer any FOIA queries to GCHQ o [REDACTED]
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
---
TOP SECRET STRAP1
Challenges
* Avoiding detection by target or another agency
* Remaining within the law while increasing pace
* Staying ahead of the game
* Diversifying toolkit
* Meeting increasing customer demands
* Demystifying what we do
* Co-existing with partners
PTD "We penetrate targets' defences.”
This information is exempt under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and may be exempt under other UK information legislation. Refer any FOIA queries to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
---
TOP SECRET STRAP1
Contacts
* Email [REDACTED]
* Call [REDACTED]
* Visit A3c
* [REDACTED]
PTD "We penetrate targets' defences.”
This information is exempt under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and may be exempt under other UK information legislation. Refer any FOIA queries to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.

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{
"title": "GCHQ – Computer Network Exploitation",
"type": "REPORTED",
"description": "This document outlines GCHQ’s Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) capabilities, detailing how teams remotely access computers and networks without owners’ consent to gather intelligence, support operations, and conduct effects. It also covers operational tools, techniques, infrastructure, joint working with partners, deconfliction, and challenges such as avoiding detection and meeting increasing intelligence demands.",
"long_description": "The document provides an overview of GCHQ’s Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) operations, emphasizing their role in obtaining intelligence through remote access to computers, networks, and telecom systems without the knowledge or consent of the owners. It highlights the strategic purpose of CNE, including producing actionable intelligence, supporting other operational teams, and overcoming challenges that passive SIGINT cannot address, such as encrypted communications or inaccessible data. The text details the types of operations conducted, ranging from masquerades and content delivery to router exploitation and remote access, illustrating the breadth and technical sophistication of these activities.\n\nThe document underscores the need for operations to remain covert and deniable, with data routed through intermediary machines and covert infrastructure to protect UK attribution. The document further explains the internal organization and capabilities of CNE teams, including research, prototyping, and deployment of implants, as well as specialized tools for password cracking, VPN exploitation, and cryptographic key extraction, highlighting the technical complexity and resource investment in these operations.\n\nAdditionally, the document addresses collaborative aspects, such as joint work with other UK intelligence agencies and second-party partners, along with deconfliction measures to prevent operational interference. It discusses operational challenges like avoiding detection and meeting increasing intelligence demands, emphasizing the dynamic and high-stakes nature of CNE work.",
"tags": [
"Computer Network Exploitation",
"remote access",
"covert access",
"intelligence collection",
"hacking",
"exploits",
"web browsers",
"PTD",
"implants",
"exploit development",
"vulnerabilities",
"vulnerability research",
"masquerades",
"content delivery",
"router operations",
"network endpoints",
"password cracking",
"VPNs",
"VPN exploitation",
"covert infrastructure",
"intermediary machines",
"deniability",
"sysadmins",
"Scarborough",
"detection avoidance",
"CNE teams"
],
"document": {
"creator": "GCHQ",
"date_created": "",
"classification": [
"TOP SECRET",
"STRAP 1"
],
"dissemination": [],
"banner": "TOP SECRET STRAP1",
"genre": "slides",
"programs": [
"EREPO",
"QUANTUM",
"MUGSHOT",
"STARGATE",
"HIGHNOTE",
"WHARFRAT"
],
"countries": [],
"people": []
},
"publication": [
{
"publisher": "The Intercept",
"date_published": "2018-02-17",
"title": "How U.K. Spies Hacked a European Ally and Got Away With It",
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2018/02/17/gchq-belgacom-investigation-europe-hack/",
"reporters": [
"Gallagher, Ryan"
],
"contributors": [],
"doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2018/02/17/computer-network-exploitation-presentation/",
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/4380643/GCHQ-Computer-Network-Exploitation-presentation.pdf"
},
{
"publisher": "de Volkskrant",
"date_published": "2018-02-17",
"title": "Waarom kwam de Britse geheime dienst zo makkelijk weg met het hacken van Belgacom?",
"link": "https://www.volkskrant.nl/economie/waarom-kwam-de-britse-geheime-dienst-zo-makkelijk-weg-met-het-hacken-van-belgacom~a4570187/",
"reporters": [
"Modderkolk, Huib"
],
"contributors": [],
"reporting_only": true
}
],
"aka_id": [],
"pdf_sha256": "ca4a323b47f5c31ab32d49ec4ccb1f360ba578cff3ace8ffd8a43d28fe959ec0",
"pages": 22
}