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{
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"title": "Intellipedia – BIOS Threats",
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"type": "REPORTED",
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"description": "This from an internal wiki for the U.S. intelligence community, titled “BIOS Threats” details the use of malicious BIOS implants as a means of achieving persistent system compromise for cyber espionage and attack purposes. It discusses the history, technical challenges, detection limitations, and global development of BIOS-based malware by both state and non-state actors, including U.S. and Chinese cyber units.",
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"long_description": "This document, from an internal wiki for the U.S. intelligence community, titled “BIOS Threats”, examines the development, detection challenges, and operational implications of firmware-level malware implants residing in computer BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) firmware. It outlines how such implants—though not always malicious—can be exploited for both Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) and Computer Network Attack (CNA) operations by state and non-state actors. The document provides historical and technical context, citing early examples such as the Chernobyl (CIH) virus of 1998 and subsequent research from Black Hat and CanSecWest conferences that demonstrated methods for persistent BIOS-level compromise. It also notes legitimate manufacturer-embedded firmware like LoJack for Laptops as an example of benign implants that nonetheless illustrate the feasibility of such persistence mechanisms.\n\nFrom an intelligence and counterintelligence perspective, the document assesses that BIOS implants are exceptionally difficult to detect, particularly on networks such as NIPRNet, where current security methods would only reveal indirect signs of infection through anomalous network activity. The text emphasizes that BIOS-based malware can survive standard mitigation measures, including hard drive reformatting, OS reinstallation, and even BIOS reflashing, by hiding in unused firmware memory regions. The report further discusses the potential use of expansion card firmware (graphics, sound, and network cards) as alternative persistence vectors, capable of supporting covert data exfiltration channels—for instance, sound card–based ultrasonic transmissions or modified NICs used for covert communication.\n\nIntelligence judgments within the report suggest that Chinese PLA-linked groups and a capability codenamed MAKERSMARK have both explored or implemented persistent BIOS-based CNE tools, though without clear operational overlap. Specific BIOS vendors such as AMI and Award are noted as being compromised, increasing the systemic threat. Supporting references include classified bulletins and analyses from USCYBERCOM, DIA, and NSA’s NTOC, highlighting BIOS-level compromise as a key enabler of hardware-based persistence and supply chain infiltration. Ultimately, the document underscores that BIOS implants represent one of the most insidious categories of cyber threats—capable of eluding conventional detection, surviving system rebuilds, and granting deep control over targeted computing infrastructure, making them a critical frontier in both offensive cyber operations and defensive countermeasures.",
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"tags": [
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"BIOS",
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"firmware implants",
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"Computer Network Exploitation",
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"Computer Network Attack",
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"persistent malware",
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"firmware persistence",
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"supply chain attacks",
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"rootkits",
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"AMI BIOS",
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"Award BIOS",
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"PLA cyber units",
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"CYBERCOM",
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"DIA",
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"NTOC",
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"CIH virus",
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"Chernobyl",
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"Black Hat",
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"CanSecWest",
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"DEF CON",
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"Core Security Technologies",
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"ACPI exploitation",
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"BIOS reflashing",
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"expansion card malware",
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"network card covert channel",
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"GPU",
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"graphics card malware",
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"sound card exfiltration",
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"ultrasonic exfiltration",
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"boot firmware",
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"dual BIOS systems",
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"hardware attack",
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"supply chain vulnerability",
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"insider threat",
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"malware persistence",
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"system integrity",
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"advanced persistent threat",
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"hardware implants",
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"intelligence community",
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"internal wiki",
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"Intellipedia",
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"malware mitigation",
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"root access",
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"hardware security",
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"system firmware",
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"embedded systems",
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"firmware exploitation",
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"computer hardware security",
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"persistent threat actor",
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"malware",
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"stealth malware"
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],
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"document": {
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"creator": "NSA",
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"date_created": "2012-03-13",
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"classification": [
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"TOP SECRET",
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"SI"
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],
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"dissemination": [
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"NOFORN"
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],
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"banner": "This page contains dynamic content -- Highest Possible Classification isTOP SECRET//SI/TK",
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"genre": "wiki",
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"programs": [
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"MAKERSMARK",
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"TOUCHWOLF",
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"STROMTIME",
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"A-SPACE"
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],
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"countries": [
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"Singapore",
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"Taiwan",
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"China"
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],
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"people": [
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"Heasman, John",
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"Sacco, Anibal",
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"Ortega, Alfredo",
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"Yam, Marcus",
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"Fisher, Dennis"
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]
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},
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"publication": [
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{
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"publisher": "The Intercept",
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"date_published": "2019-01-24",
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"title": "Everybody Does It: The Messy Truth About Infiltrating Computer Supply Chains",
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"link": "https://theintercept.com/2019/01/24/computer-supply-chain-attacks/",
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"reporters": [
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"Lee, Micah",
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"Moltke, Henrik"
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],
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"contributors": [],
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"doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2019/01/24/intellipedia-bios-threats/",
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"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/5691425/Intellipedia-BIOS-Threats.pdf"
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}
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],
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"pdf_sha256": "daccaf9249ebed5d2ede0c6068d47dce8f8cf9271c1173d344bff3403470a157",
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"pages": 7
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}
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