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TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
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# (U) SIGINT Development Support II Program Management Review
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24 April 2013
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
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SIGDEV
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SIGINT DEVELOPMENT
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The overall classification of this brief is
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
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Dated: 20070108
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Declassify On: 20291123
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SDS
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Booz | Allen | Hamilton
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SIGINT | Development | Support
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Team
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1
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TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
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---
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TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
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SID Priority: Traditional Inaccessible Target Network
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(TS//SI//NF)
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SIGINT Development Challenge: Identify access methods into segregated networks involved in [REDACTED].
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Mission Example and Result: Discovered detailed plans for [REDACTED] classified Voice-Over-IP network, resulting in intelligence acted on by a joint NSA-IC partner team in an overseas location to perform supply-chain interdiction on the shipment. Information briefed to senior staff for IC partners, NSA and third party partners.
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Our Approach
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* Identified order from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] and tracked to [REDACTED], then into China, as the source vendor.
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* Extensive analysis through Cloud ABR and XKEYSCORE enabled identification of multiple selectors for targeting.
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* Coordinated with TAO to enable CNE access against key support personnel.
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* Drafted inputs for urgent cables sent to overseas stations and foreign partners in order to coordinate ground operations.
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* Shifted schedule to collaborate in near-real-time with overseas stations. Provided IC Partner with documentation from end-point accesses, critical to duplicate original shipment packing.
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SIGINT Development Outcome: The analysis and reporting on this target identified, with high granularity, [REDACTED]'s method of hardware procurement. As a result of these efforts, NSA and its IC partners are now positioned for success with future opportunities
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(TS//SI//NF)
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SDS
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Booz | Allen | Hamilton
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SIGINT | Development | Support
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Team
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23
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TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
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66
data/NSA-Supply-Chain-Attack-From-PMR-4-24-13/metadata.json
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66
data/NSA-Supply-Chain-Attack-From-PMR-4-24-13/metadata.json
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{
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"title": "NSA Supply Chain Attack From PMR 4-24-13",
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"type": "REPORTED",
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"description": "This document is a top-secret NSA report detailing a SIGINT development operation in which a classified Voice-over-IP network shipment was intercepted and subjected to a supply-chain interdiction, allowing NSA and its intelligence community partners to gain access to the hardware and intelligence. It describes the operational process, including tracking the shipment through China, coordinating with Tailored Access Operations (TAO), and using tools like XKEYSCORE to identify targeting selectors, ultimately enabling detailed surveillance and future operational opportunities.",
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"long_description": "",
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"tags": [
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"supply chain",
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"supply chain attacks",
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"interdiction",
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"Tailored Access Operations",
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"Computer Network Operations",
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"Computer Network Exploitation",
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"Computer Network Attack",
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"Computer Network Defense",
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"load station",
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"beacon implant",
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"Booz Allen Hamilton",
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"hardware attack",
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"transit interdiction",
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"network exploitation",
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"VoIP",
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"implants",
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"covert infrastructure",
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"procurement",
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"shipment tracking",
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"overseas bases"
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],
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"document": {
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"creator": "NSA",
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"date_created": "2013-04-24",
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"classification": [
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"TOP SECRET",
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"SI"
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],
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"dissemination": [
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"NOFORN"
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],
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"banner": "TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN",
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"genre": "slides",
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"programs": [
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"Cloud ABR",
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"XKEYSCORE"
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],
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"countries": [
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"China"
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],
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"people": []
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},
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"publication": [
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{
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"publisher": "The Intercept",
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"date_published": "2019-01-24",
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"title": "Everybody Does It: The Messy Truth About Infiltrating Computer Supply Chains",
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"link": "https://theintercept.com/2019/01/24/computer-supply-chain-attacks/",
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"reporters": [
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"Lee, Micah",
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"Moltke, Henrik"
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],
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"contributors": [],
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"doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2019/01/24/nsa-supply-chain-attack-from-pmr-4-24-13/",
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"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/5691427/NSA-Supply-Chain-Attack-From-PMR-4-24-13.pdf"
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}
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],
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"pdf_sha256": "4a7b47bbc4f4eb8b51bdab6fa19df2a3388315ae4199ab6e634e3c7ce99b1225",
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"pages": 2
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}
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