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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
# PRC Information Warfare & Huawei
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON//
NOFORN
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
# PRC Information Warfare & Huawei
[REDACTED]
S31182
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
VIP guests at Huawei booth Malaysia Tech Conference: 2001 (Hugo Chavez)
TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON//REL
USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
1
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Overview
* (U) Incorporated 1988, headquartered in Shenzhen China
* (U) Leader in next generation telecommunications networks – products and end-to-end solutions
* (U) Rapid increase in global market share. (2008 Revenue: $23 B - 65% outside of China, 41% growth last year and 71% this year)
* (U) 100,000+ employees – (45,000 are R & D)
* (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Affiliations with to the Peoples' Liberation Army, Ministry of State Security, & Ministry of Public Security
* (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Indications PRC government may take advantage of market penetration for its own SIGINT purposes.
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Global Presence
Global Presence
* UK
* Netherlands
* France
* Portugal
* Spain
* Romania
* Germany
* Poland
* Sweden
* Russia
* Ukraine
* Italy
* Greece
* Bulgaria
* Turkey
* Morocco
* Tunisia
* Algeria
* Egypt
* Nigeria
* Saudi Arabia
* Kenya
* Zimbabwe
* South Africa
* UAE
* Kazakhstan
* Kyrgyzstan
* Uzbekistan
* Turkmenistan
* Pakistan
* Bangladesh
* Nepal
* India
* Sri Lanka
* Thailand
* Cambodia
* Vietnam
* Malaysia
* Singapore
* Indonesia
* Shenzhen
* Huawei Technologies (Headquarters)
* South Korea
* Japan
* Philippines
* Australia
* Canada
* USA
* Mexico
* Venezuela
* Colombia
* Ecuador
* Brazil
* Peru
* Paraguay
* Argentina
* Chile
* (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) 30 Regional Headquarters with over 120 branch offices outside China
* -(U//FOUO)3 level customer service system (HQ, regional, local)
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Global Presence
Global Presence
Huawei Technologies (Headquarters)
* (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) 30 Regional Headquarters with over 120 branch offices outside China
* -(U//FOUO)3 level customer service system (HQ, regional, local)
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
Mention that growth has occurred, was known 8 regional headquarters and 85 branch offices
Main growth in the U.S. markets and Latin American market
TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON//REL
USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
3
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## The GIG
(U//FOUO) The Operational Area (OA) of the GIG consists of global information networks to include the Global Information Grid (GIG). The GIG is the globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, and managing information on demand to war fighters, policy makers, and support personnel.
(U//FOUO) The GIG includes owned and leased communications and computing systems and services, software (including applications), data, security services, other associated services, and National Security Systems (NSS). Non-GIG IT includes stand-alone, self-contained, or embedded IT that is not, and will not be connected to the enterprise network. The OA is also comprised of adversary military, government, and commercial networks, including neutral or friendly cyberspace deemed critical to the adversary's operational effectiveness.
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Market Dominance
Contract sales breakdown by market
Developed markets
15%
China market
25%
Emerging markets
60%
Employees breakdown
R&D
1/2
Sales & marketing
1/6
Service
1/6
Others
1/6
Developed Markets
Growth Markets
(2009) 87k+ employees, 18k+ local employees outside of China
100+ branches worldwide
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Doctrinal insight
(U//FOUO) The PRC expects future wars to be fought over natural resources. Chinese military doctrine support the disruption of telecommunications infrastructure, as well as the introduction of IW against its adversaries. China is spending billions to secure access to crude oil, and other critical natural resources in Africa, the Middle East and Central America.
(U//FOUO) In the majority of these regions the are also building the roads, bridges, railroad and deepwater ports and of course substantial telecommunications infrastructure -- often provided free or with low interest loans.
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Doctrinal insight
Source of Petroleum Imports
by China (%)
Latin America
3%
Russia
[10%]
Est
Asia
7%
Others
5%
West Africa
28%
Middle
East
47%
2005
Source: Comtrade database, UNCTAD (2006)
© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2006
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## TAT 14
Landing Points
* Blaabjerg, Denmark
* Bude, U.K.
* Katwijk, Netherlands
* Manasquan, NJ
* Norden, Germany
* St. Valery, France
* Tuckerton, NJ
Defense Industry Communications
\*\*Sub-contracted in 2008
© 2002 TeleGeography, Inc.
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON//
NOFORN
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## TAT 14
Landing Points
* Blaabjerg, Denmark
* Bude, U.K.
* Katwijk, Netherlands
* Manasquan, NJ
* Norden, Germany
* St. Valery, France
* Tuckerton, NJ
Defense Industry Communications
\*\*Sub-contracted in 2008
© 2002 TeleGeography, Inc.
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
2008 upgrade of these TAT 14 lines. US has rights to the line, but contracted Mitsubishi to upgrade the line. Mitsubishi subcontracted the work Out to Huawei. Who in turn upgraded the system with a High End router of their own.
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{
"title": "PRC Information Warfare & Huawei",
"type": "REPORTED",
"description": "This NSA intelligence briefing on Huawei analyzes Huawei’s global telecommunications presence and its potential links to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and Chinese government intelligence activities. It highlights concerns that Huawei’s international market expansion — including its subcontracted 2008 upgrade of the TAT-14 transatlantic cable carrying U.S. and defense communications — could be exploited by China for signals intelligence (SIGINT) purposes.",
"long_description": "This intelligence briefing produced by the NSA that examines Huawei Technologies’ global operations, affiliations, and potential use in Chinese information warfare and SIGINT collection. It outlines Huawei’s rapid international expansion since its founding in 1988, noting its extensive reach across Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Americas, with over 100,000 employees and dozens of regional headquarters outside China. The briefing asserts that Huawei has affiliations with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the Ministry of State Security (MSS), and the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), raising concerns that the Chinese government could leverage the company’s growing role in foreign telecommunications infrastructure for espionage or offensive cyber operations.\n\nThe document situates these concerns within the context of China’s broader information warfare and resource-security strategy, observing that Chinese doctrine anticipates future conflicts over natural resources and emphasizes disrupting adversary telecommunications systems. It notes China’s simultaneous investments in energy, infrastructure, and telecommunications—often through state-subsidized or low-interest development projects—in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America as a means of expanding geopolitical influence and creating dual-use communication networks potentially exploitable for intelligence purposes.\n\nA major focal point of the briefing is Huawei’s subcontracted work on the TAT-14 transatlantic telecommunications cable, a vital system linking the U.S. and Europe and carrying defense industry communications. In 2008, Mitsubishi was contracted to upgrade the cable and subcontracted the work to Huawei, which installed its own high-end routing equipment. The NSA expressed concern that such installations could enable unauthorized access or “backdoor” capabilities, allowing the Chinese government to monitor sensitive communications traversing the cable. Overall, the document reflects deep U.S. and allied intelligence apprehension that Huawei’s commercial market penetration might be used as a vehicle for Chinese SIGINT collection and cyber-espionage targeting Western defense and infrastructure networks.",
"tags": [
"TAT-14",
"transatlantic cables",
"telecommunications",
"Huawei",
"Mitsubishi",
"subcontract",
"routers",
"network infrastructure",
"cable tapping",
"submarine cables",
"signals intelligence",
"chinese espionage",
"PLA",
"PRC",
"Ministry of State Security",
"MSS",
"Ministry of Public Security",
"MPS",
"chinese government",
"chinese intelligence",
"cyber espionage",
"cyber operations",
"defense communications",
"defense industry",
"military communications",
"telecommunications infrastructure",
"infrastructure",
"global information grid",
"GIG",
"network exploitation",
"supply chain attacks",
"supply chain",
"backdoors",
"espionage",
"intelligence assessment",
"corporate intelligence",
"Africa",
"middle east",
"Latin America",
"Europe",
"Asia",
"international markets",
"market penetration",
"resource security",
"energy security",
"crude oil",
"telecom dominance",
"telecom strategy",
"telecommunications surveillance",
"industrial espionage",
"internet backbone",
"backbones",
"global communications",
"supply chain security",
"hardware implants"
],
"document": {
"creator": "NSA",
"date_created": "",
"classification": [
"TOP SECRET",
"COMINT"
],
"dissemination": [
"REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL"
],
"banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL",
"genre": "slides",
"programs": [],
"countries": [
"Malaysia",
"China",
"Denmark",
"United Kingdom",
"Netherlands",
"Germany",
"France",
"Algeria",
"Argentina",
"Australia",
"Bangladesh",
"Brazil",
"Bulgaria",
"Cambodia",
"Canada",
"Chile",
"Colombia",
"Ecuador",
"Egypt",
"Greece",
"India",
"Indonesia",
"Italy",
"Japan",
"Kazakhstan",
"Kenya",
"Kyrgyzstan",
"Mexico",
"Morocco",
"Nepal",
"Nigeria",
"Pakistan",
"Paraguay",
"Peru",
"Philippines",
"Poland",
"Portugal",
"Romania",
"Russia",
"Saudi Arabia",
"Singapore",
"South Africa",
"South Korea",
"Spain",
"Sri Lanka",
"Sweden",
"Thailand",
"Tunisia",
"Turkey",
"Turkmenistan",
"Ukraine",
"United Arab Emirates",
"Uzbekistan",
"Venezuela",
"Vietnam",
"Zimbabwe"
],
"people": [
"Chávez, Hugo"
]
},
"publication": [
{
"publisher": "The Intercept",
"date_published": "2019-01-24",
"title": "Everybody Does It: The Messy Truth About Infiltrating Computer Supply Chains",
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2019/01/24/computer-supply-chain-attacks/",
"reporters": [
"Lee, Micah",
"Moltke, Henrik"
],
"contributors": [],
"doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2019/01/24/prc-information-warfare-huawei/",
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/5691429/PRC-Information-Warfare-Huawei.pdf"
}
],
"pdf_sha256": "1c2792d94c59a98db15b64975dedafc77bfbab296056ce89b4de189ce8f0fb40",
"pages": 11
}