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Speaker ID: since the last VFUG in July we have deployed:
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- Two systems for OPI~MENA: one against an Iraqi political target and one against a
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Saudi leadership target.
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- One system for OPI~RCIT targeting a Gazprom official.
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- A 5 way multi-speaker system for OPI~LANG/OPI~SC against Afghan counter
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narcotics targets
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We have now cleared our order book for speaker id systems and so look forward to a
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well deserved, quiet, peaceful and reflective Autumn. Seriously though, if you believe
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we can help you with identifying your target of interest amongst the deluge of traffic
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that you have to wade through, feel free to approach us and we will happily discuss
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your requirements and hopefully offer a swift and accurate solution.
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87
data/Pages-From-VFUG-minutes-Sept-2008/metadata.json
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data/Pages-From-VFUG-minutes-Sept-2008/metadata.json
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{
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"title": "Voice/Fax User Group Minutes of September 2008 meeting",
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"type": "REPORTED",
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"description": "Page 3 of 7 of the minutes of GCHQ's Voice/Fax User Group (VFUG), September 2008: plans for data-quality testing, a request that linguists flag \"Pick Your Own Number\" calls in the B3M voice database, and the B14/MCS team's update on the Diariser and on speaker and language identification. The Intercept's PDF shows only the speaker ID section; the rest of the page is in the file (see the archive comment).",
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"long_description": "The page opens with the next phase of User Confidence (data quality) testing, part of the next \"Stepping Stone\" and due to start on 9 October 2008, to be carried out by the newly formed Content PUT. A suggestion from the LISTEN 08 briefing, agreed at the meeting, asks linguists to record \"Pick Your Own Number\" (PYON) cases in B3M with a 'techref PYON' comment: calls where a speaker on a UK-code number turns out to be based in another country.\n \nItem 4 is the B14/MCS update on voice processing. Version 5.0 of the Diariser was deployed over the summer; its main change is a rewritten modem arbiter that better identifies V-series modems so that OPC~CAP can demodulate them. Since July, new speaker ID systems were deployed for OPI~MENA (against an Iraqi political target and a Saudi leadership target), for OPI~RCIT (against a Gazprom official) and for OPI~LANG/OPI~SC (a five-way multi-speaker system against Afghan counter-narcotics targets). Language ID had no new deployments: models were being improved with non-SIGINT language data from speech-to-text corpora, which the team notes is no substitute for linguist-verified SIGINT data, and identifying one target language among unidentified others is said to produce false positives.\n",
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"tags": [
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"speaker identification",
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"voice analytics",
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"target identification",
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"multi-speaker systems",
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"leadership targets",
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"counternarcotics",
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"energy sector",
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"Gazprom",
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"VFUG",
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"OPI-MENA",
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"OPI-RCIT",
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"OPI-LANG",
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"OPI-SC",
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"traffic volume",
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"diarisation",
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"modem identification",
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"fax",
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"OPC-CAP",
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"language identification",
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"speech to text",
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"training data",
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"false positives",
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"data quality testing",
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"User Confidence Testing",
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"Stepping Stone",
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"Content PUT",
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"LISTEN 08",
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"Pick Your Own Number",
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"PYON",
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"B14",
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"MCS",
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"minutes"
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],
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"document": {
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"creator": "GCHQ",
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"date_created": "2008-09",
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"classification": [
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"TOP SECRET",
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"STRAP 1"
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],
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"dissemination": [],
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"banner": "TOP SECRET STRAP1",
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"genre": "report",
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"programs": [
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"DIARISER",
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"B3M"
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],
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"countries": [
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"Iraq",
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"Saudi Arabia",
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"Russia",
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"Afghanistan"
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],
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"people": []
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},
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"publication": [
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{
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"publisher": "The Intercept",
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"date_published": "2018-01-19",
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"title": "Finding Your Voice: Forget About Siri and Alexa — When It Comes to Voice Identification, the “NSA Reigns Supreme”",
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"link": "https://theintercept.com/2018/01/19/voice-recognition-technology-nsa/",
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"reporters": [
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"Kofman, Ava"
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],
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"contributors": [],
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"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/4352015/Pages-From-VFUG-minutes-Sept-2008.pdf"
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}
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],
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"aka_id": [],
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"archive_comment": "The Intercept's PDF shows only an excerpt (the Speaker ID section) through a soft crop. The file itself contains the whole of page 3 of 7, including GCHQ staff names; the PDF is held as published. The page image and transcript show the visible excerpt only. The cropped-out content was described by Libroot ('Going Through Snowden Documents, Part 9' 2026-10-11 https://libroot.org/posts/going-through-snowden-documents-part-9/), with the names redacted.",
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"pdf_sha256": "b32baeff6d9d1637a841e835e35f275281c67902e1a8f5ec9bde1f27ef614fbd",
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"pages": 1,
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"versions": {
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"vfug-libroot": {
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"pdf_sha256": "80b5663fd3460f259f6327800ad78ee7c9f4e3b7345e6ca0556243386af4751b",
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"changed_pages": [
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1
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]
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}
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}
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}
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TOP SECRET STRAP1
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[REDACTED] reported: the next phase will see User Confidence Testing (Data Quality
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Testing) performed as part of the next Stepping Stone. This is due to start on 9
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October. The Content PUT has now been formed and will carry out the User
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Confidence Testing.
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[REDACTED] suggested at [REDACTED]'s LISTEN 08 briefing that linguists record occurrences
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of Pick Your Own Number (PYON) in B3M using the 'techref' method in the
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proc_cmnt_text field. So, if you have e.g. two speakers with UK-code tels but one
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speaker reveals he is based in another country, this may be a case of PYON and you
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could enter 'techref PYON' in B3M. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] agreed to the
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suggestion.
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4. B14 / MCS update (courtesy of [REDACTED])
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a) Voice
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Diariser: over the summer we have successfully deployed version 5.0 of the Diariser.
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The main difference between this and version 4.9 is the complete re-write of the
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modem arbiter, which now ensures more effective identification of various V series
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modems to assist OPC~CAP in de-modulating them.
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Speaker ID: since the last VFUG in July we have deployed:
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- Two systems for OPI~MENA: one against an Iraqi political target and one against a
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Saudi leadership target.
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- One system for OPI~RCIT targeting a Gazprom official.
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- A 5 way multi-speaker system for OPI~LANG/OPI~SC against Afghan counter
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narcotics targets
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|
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We have now cleared our order book for speaker id systems and so look forward to a
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well deserved, quiet, peaceful and reflective Autumn. Seriously though, if you believe
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we can help you with identifying your target of interest amongst the deluge of traffic
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that you have to wade through, feel free to approach us and we will happily discuss
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your requirements and hopefully offer a swift and accurate solution.
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Language ID:
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No new deployments. I have however, been concentrating on improving currently
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deployed models using non-sigint language data accrued from our Speech to Text
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(STT) corpora. Experimentation has shown that it is possible to improve accuracy to
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a certain extent by "brute-forcing" the language id algorithm with vast volumes of
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data, although this is by no means a substitute for actual "linguist-truthed" sigint
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language data accrued from the target set that the system will eventually run against.
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It is also quite problematic to service a requirement where we are seeking to identify
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one target language from a number of others, some of which are unidentified.
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Inevitably this will lead to false positive identifications of the target language as the
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algorithm will assume that because a language is not included in the background
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3 of 7
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This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under
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other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on 01242 221491 x30306 (non-sec) or email infoleg@gchq
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TOP SECRET STRAP1
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