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[REDACTED]
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
# GRIMPLATE
## First Steps Toward Identifying Adversarial Use of BitTorrent
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] NSA/R4
Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
Dated: 20070108
Declassify On: 20370117
The overall briefing is classified
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY
---
CONFIDENTIAL
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
RESEARCH DIRECTORATE
ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE
## Agenda
* Motivation
* BitTorrent's TCP and UDP layers
* DHT overview
* What does it mean to crawl DHT?
* Pilot implementation
* Collaboration
CONFIDENTIAL
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
RESEARCH DIRECTORATE
ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE
## GRIMPLATE Motivation
* BitTorrent sessions are seen on a daily basis between NIPRnet hosts and adversary space (PRC, RU, etc.)
* NTOC has no way of knowing if this is innocuous file sharing or malicious activity.
* Peer-to-Peer (P2P) is not allowed on NIPRnet, but most commands do not see it as harmful.
* If we can glean some indication of the type of data that's leaving NIPRnet, we can build a case for shutting this activity down.
* Interest is not limited to NIPRnet scenario
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY
---
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
RESEARCH DIRECTORATE
ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE
## BitTorrent's TCP and UDP Layers
* TCP
* Used to exchange pieces of files amongst peers
* UDP
* Used to exchange routing messages
* Who should I ask for file pieces?
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
---
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
RESEARCH DIRECTORATE
ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE
## BitTorrent DHT
* Nodes: clients participating in DHT
* Peers: clients participating in piece exchange to share file
* DHT: distributed key, value store
* Nodes have 160 bit pseudo-random node ID
* Keys are 160 bit hash of .torrent file metadata - info_hash
* Values are list of IP addresses and ports of peers mapped to info_hash
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
---
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
RESEARCH DIRECTORATE
ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE
## Mainline DHT Messages
ping Query = {“t”:”aa”, “y”:”q”, “q”:”ping”, “a”:{“id”:”abcdefghij0123456789″}}
ping Response = {“t":"aa”, “y”:”r”, “r”:” {“id”:”mnopqrstuvwxyz123456″}}
find_node Query = {“t":"aa”, “y”:”q”, “q”:”find_node”,
“a”:{“id”:”abcdefghij0123456789”, “target”:”mnopqrstuvwxyz123456″}}
find_node Response = { "t":"aa”, “y":"r”, “r”:{“id”:”0123456789abcdefghij”, “nodes”:”def456...” }}
get_peers Query = {“t”:”aa”, “y”:”q”, “q”:”get_peers”,
“a”:{“id”:”abcdefghij0123456789”, “info_hash”:”mnopqrstuvwxyz123456″}}
get_peers Response, with peers = { "t":"aa”, “y":"r", “r”:{“id”:”0123456789abcdefghij”,
“token”:”aoeusnth”, “values”: ["axje.u”, “idhtnm″]}}
get_peers Response, with closest nodes = {“t”:”aa”, “y”:”r”, “r”:{“id”:”0123456789abcdefghij”,
“token”:”aoeusnth”, “nodes”:”def456..." } }
Announce peer = {“t":"aa”, “y”:”q”, “q”:”announce_peer”,
“a”:{“id”:”abcdefghij0123456789”, “info_hash”:”mnopqrstuvwxyz123456”, “port” : 6881,
"token" : “aoeusnth"}}
Response = {“t”:”aa”, “y":"r", “r”:{“id”:”0123456789abcdefghij″}}
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
---
SECRET //REL FVEY
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
RESEARCH DIRECTORATE
ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE
## What's it mean to crawl DHT?
* Goal: Harvest complete node list for entire DHT and peer list for info_hashes found in NIPRNET defensive tools or SIGINT
* Regular client node lookup is iterative process
* O (log n) search
* routing table is starting point
* Approach:
* spray find_node messages across DHT and store responses
* query for peers of info_hashes of interest
SECRET //REL FVEY
---
SECRET //REL FVEY
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
RESEARCH DIRECTORATE
ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE
## What does DHT crawler collect?
* For each node in the DHT:
* 160 bit node ID
* IP address
* Port
* For targeted info_hashes:
* List of the node ID, IP address, and port of nodes sharing targeted file
* Entries may be stale
SECRET //REL FVEY
---
SECRET //REL FVEY
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
RESEARCH DIRECTORATE
ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE
## What value is the data?
* Use "community detection" algorithms to identify swarms that are likely to be malicious
* Download files being shared by likely malicious swarms
* Build BitTorrent mitigation case for NIPRnet
* General SIGINT reporting
* File download without identification of likely malicious swarms impractical
SECRET //REL FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
RESEARCH DIRECTORATE
ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE
## Pilot on PACKAGEGOODS Server
* Deploy modification of existing crawler – dedicated PG server
* Run analytics on "swarm” metadata to determine malicious activity
* Experiment with subnet range and ID space and message interval to determine server processing and bandwidth requirements
* Test if crawler catches info_hashes we see from target in XKS
* Must we proactively collect peers to address “SIGINT lag"?
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
RESEARCH DIRECTORATE
ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE
## SIGINT Lag
* BitTorrent "swarm” may be inactive by the time target info_hash reported by SIGINT system
* May require preemptive collection of peers
* DHT has on the order of 8 active million nodes
* info_hash/DHT address space: 2^160
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY
---
SECRET//REL FVEY
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
RESEARCH DIRECTORATE
ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE
## Next Steps
* Enhanced analytics
* Community discovery
* Distributed crawler
* Peer pre-fetch
* Target file download
* avoid lending "utility”
SECRET //REL FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY
## Prior Work
GCHQ - SEBACIUM
POC: [REDACTED]
CES – XKS schema/micro-plugin
Prototype analytics
POC: [REDACTED]
TAO-ROC – OGC approval for operational tests
PACKAGEGOODS connection
POC: [REDACTED]
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
RESEARCH DIRECTORATE
ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE
## GRIMPLATE Collaboration
CES - Digital Network Exploitation Applications
[REDACTED]
NTOC
V25 - Malicious Activity Discovery-Characterization
V45/47 – Technology Development
V46 - Technology Planning and Assessment
S2B - Office of China and Korea, CNE Access Development Branch
S2H – AP Russia Production Center, Russia SIGINT Development Division
TAO-ROC - Production Operations Division
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY
---
CONFIDENTIAL
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
RESEARCH DIRECTORATE
ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE
"go grimplate"
CONFIDENTIAL
---
UNCLASSIFIED
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
RESEARCH DIRECTORATE
ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE
## Questions
Why am I grim?
UNCLASSIFIED