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TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
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# (U) SIGINT Development Support II Program Management Review
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24 April 2013
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
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SIGDEV
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SIGINT DEVELOPMENT
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The overall classification of this brief is
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
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Dated: 20070108
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Declassify On: 20291123
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SDS
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Booz Allen Hamilton
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SIGINT | Development | Support
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Team
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TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
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---
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TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
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## PMR Agenda
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* Strategic & Technical Overview - [REDACTED]
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* Placemats & Highlights – Client Service Leads (CSLs) & Senior Mission Technical Leads (SMTLs)
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* PMR Spotlight
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* MONSTERMIND - [REDACTED]
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* SDS Support to CHELSEABLUE - [REDACTED]
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* Technical Health - [REDACTED]
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SDS
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Booz | Allen | Hamilton
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SIGINT | Development | Support
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Team
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TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
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---
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TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
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(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)
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SID Priority: Traditionally Inaccessible Network
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SIGINT Development Challenge: Establish a proven foundation of targets in Pakistan's National Telecommunications Corporation's (NTC) VIP Division.
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Mission Example and Result: Successfully enabled positive identification of users in NTC's VIP division who focus on maintaining the Green Exchange. The Green Exchange branch houses ZXJ-10 switches, which are the backbone of Pakistan's Green Line communications network. This network is used by senior Pakistani civilian and military leadership. Four machines in the VIP division who have Green Exchange related documents on their machines were successfully implanted.
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Our Approach
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* Evaluated currently tasked selectors related to NTC's VIP division.
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* Conducted SIGDEV against known selectors to identify other related targets.
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* Collaborated with R&T to use SECONDDATE and QUANTUM to successfully implant four new CNE accesses within the Green Exchange.
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GREEN EXCHANGE ISLAMABAD ROOM MAP
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GLASS
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WINDOW
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GLASS
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WINDOW
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GLASS
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WINDOW
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GLASS
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WINDOW
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* DOOR
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* REVOLVING CHAIR
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* CHAIR
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* TABLE
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* Aluminium Partitioning
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* WALL
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STAFF ROOM
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SWITCH ROOM
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RECTIFIER
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IPE SHELF
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IPE SHELF
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Slipper Rack
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Entrance
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A.Es ROOM
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SPARES RACK
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M.D.F FRAME
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SIGINT Development Outcome: Four new CNE accesses were gained for the VIP Division and a baseline of collection related to the Green Exchange was established.
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(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)
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SDS
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Booz | Allen | Hamilton
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SIGINT | Development | Support
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Team
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TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
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---
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TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
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SID Priority: Traditionally Inaccessible Target Networks
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(TS//SI//NF)
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SIGINT Development Challenge: Passive access in Lebanon is limited, thereby hindering SIGDEV, Discovery, and Mobility Exploitation. TAO project REXKWONDO successfully enabled Country-Wide Shaping and Man-in-the-Middle (MiTM) capabilities against Lebanon's Internet traffic for the first time ever.
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Mission Example and Result: Combined CT SIGDEV and CNE analysis effort within REXKWONDO, the Lebanese owned OGERO ISP, resulted in multiple successful CNE operations that yielded initial access and collection from Lebanon's International Gateway routers. Currently shaping Hizballah-related traffic to SSO-STORMBREW, providing SIGDEV discovery opportunities for S2I, S2E, and SSG\NAC via
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XKEYSCORE and MARINA.
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Our Approach
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* S2I53 CT SIGDEV SDS analysts provided technical support on various high-interest targets and assisted in exploitation and implant of the head of the OGERO NOC and the core routers.
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* Collaboration between multiple divisions within TAO and S2I5 led to the development of a custom-built router exploit and new HAMMERCORE implant builds.
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* The OGERO ISP gateway router (RB) was exploited via HAMREX to enable SECONDDATE MiTM.
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* The OGERO upstream Liban Telecom routers were exploited with CGDB, then implanted with HAMMERCORE and HAMMERSTEIN to enable successful Shaping of Hizballah Unit 1800 related traffic for multiple CT projects.
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* Traffic was exfiltrated to STORMBREW from core routers and was accessible to S21, S2E, and SSGINAC analysts via XKEYSCORE in less than 24 hours following the successful shaping tasking.
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```
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Data Le... Protocol Quality Sigad AppId... Application AppID (+Fingerprints)
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547 TCP g US-3105S8 http/get http get ndist discovery IR CERT II
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34 TCP g US-3105S8 http/post http post heuristics/oA BHAM/user
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34 TCP g US-3105S8
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34 TCP g US-3105S8
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84 TCP g US-3105S8
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34 TCP g US-310556
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21 TCP g US-3105S8
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34 TCP g US-3105S8
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34 TCP g US-3105S8
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34 TCP g US-3105S8 http/post BHAM/user
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34 TCP g US-3105S8 http/post BHAM/user
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34 TCP g US-310556 http/post BHAM/user
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34 TCP g US-3105S8 http/post BHAM/user
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641 TCP g US-3105S8 mail/webmail rowser.Mic
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275 TCP g US-3105S8 http/get wabPRJ/Lin
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84 TCP g US-3105S8 http/post BHAM/user
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84 TCP g US-3105S8 http/post BHAM/user
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84 TCP g US-3105S8 http/post BHAM/user
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Equals Filter
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Column: Application
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Equals: maps/google_earth/respo
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advertisement/http/get
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advertisement/http/go...
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analytics/web/google
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domain/google
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http/get
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http/head
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http/post
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http/post/ocsp-request
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http/post/x-www-form...
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mail/webmail/hotmail
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mail/webmail/windowslive
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maps/google_earth/get
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maps/google_earth/req...
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maps/google_earth/res...
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Apply Not:
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```
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| | | | |
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| -- | -- | -- | -- |
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| 03reubup-e9enecqfwwy_oaho<facebookMachine> | OGERO ISP NEEDS 2 | US-310558 | LE.QTHABTAAMDT2
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| curtncl7oa3k0<tclicYahoo-uicl-b> curtncl7oa3k0<yahooBCookie> | OGERO ISP NEEDS 2 | US-310558 | LE.QTHABTAAMDT2
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| curtncl7oa3k0<tclicYahoo-uicl-b> curtncl7oa3k0<yahooBCookie> | OGERO ISP NEEDS 2 | US-310558 | LE.QTHABTAAMDT2
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| b3115b9949185eba<GooglePREFID> | OGERO ISP NEEDS 2 | US-310558 | LE.QTHABTAAMDT2
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| b3115b9949185eba<GooglePREFID> | OGERO ISP NEEDS 2 | US-310558 | LE.QTHABTAAMDT2
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SIGINT Development Outcome: SDS collaboration across the TAO and S2I5 previously denied access to the International Gateway routers in Lebanon and Sole-Source Discovery against Hizballah. 100 +MB of Hizballah Unit 1800 data has been collected and ingested into XKEYSCORE. S2122 confirms CADENCE dictionary and XKEYSCORE fingerprint hits. NSA SIGINT Enterprise analysts can now conduct SIGDEV on any target IP range of interest in Lebanon using a single passive database [US-3105S8] in XKEYSCORE.
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(TS//SI//NF)
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SDS
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Booz | Allen | Hamilton
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SIGINT | Development | Support
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Team
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TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
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85
data/Select-Slides-FINAL-PMR-4-24-13-Redacted/metadata.json
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85
data/Select-Slides-FINAL-PMR-4-24-13-Redacted/metadata.json
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{
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"title": "SIGINT Development Support II Program Management Review, 24 April 2013 (select slides)",
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"type": "REPORTED",
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"description": "These selected slides briefly celebrate two NSA “success stories”: penetrating Pakistan’s Green Line infrastructure with SECONDDATE-enabled implants, and seizing country-wide leverage over Lebanon’s internet backbone through Ogero to siphon off Hezbollah-related data. It shows how U.S. intelligence treated supposedly inaccessible national networks as targets to be shaped, exploited, and folded into its global surveillance machine.\n\nSee extra slide in \"NSA Supply Chain Attack From PMR 4-24-13\" https://theintercept.com/document/2019/01/24/nsa-supply-chain-attack-from-pmr-4-24-13/",
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"long_description": "This document offers a revealing snapshot of two NSA SIGINT development wins, framed as routine operational progress. The first centers on Pakistan’s National Telecommunications Corporation (NTC) and its VIP Division, which maintains the Green Line network used by senior civilian and military leadership. Analysts conducted selector analysis and SIGDEV work to map out additional targets before deploying SECONDDATE and QUANTUM to implant four new CNE accesses directly into machines holding Green Exchange–related documents. The tone treats the compromise of a core national communications system—one explicitly built for a government’s top leadership—as a technical milestone rather than a geopolitical intrusion, underscoring how the agency normalizes access to “traditionally inaccessible” foreign networks.\n\nThe second operation highlights an even broader achievement: enabling country-wide shaping and man-in-the-middle capabilities against Lebanon’s internet traffic. Working under the TAO project REXKWONDO, NSA components collaborated to exploit Ogero, the Lebanese state-run ISP, targeting its NOC and core routers with custom-built exploits and HAMMERCORE implants. This compromise allowed the agency to shape and divert traffic—particularly data linked to Hezbollah Unit 1800—into STORMBREW collection systems, making new intelligence streams available to XKEYSCORE analysts within a day. Presented as a clean technical success, the narrative glosses over the political sensitivity of commandeering an entire nation’s international gateway, while offering an unvarnished look at the scale and ambition of U.S. offensive SIGINT operations.",
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"tags": [
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"Computer Network Exploitation",
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"Tailored Access Operations",
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"network shaping",
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"traffic shaping",
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"MITM",
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"routers",
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"switches",
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"Hezbollah",
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"cyber espionage",
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"SIGDEV",
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"Green Line",
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"Green Exchange",
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"National Telecommunications Corporation",
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"NTC",
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"VIP Division",
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"wireless",
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"offensive cyber operations",
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"Ogero",
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"internet traffic shaping",
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"counterterrorism",
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"middle east",
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"network intrusion",
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"data exfiltration",
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"communications network",
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"malware implants",
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"Internet Service Providers",
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"internet backbone"
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],
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"document": {
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"creator": "NSA",
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"date_created": "2013-04-24",
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"classification": [
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"TOP SECRET",
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"SI"
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],
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"dissemination": [
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"NOFORN"
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],
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"banner": "TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN",
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"genre": "slides",
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"programs": [
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"MONSTERMIND",
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"CHELSEABLUE",
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"SECONDDATE",
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"QUANTUM",
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"REXKWONDO",
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"STORMBREW",
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"XKEYSCORE",
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"MARINA",
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"HAMMERCORE",
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"HAMREX",
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"CADENCE",
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"HAMMERSTEIN",
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"SSO"
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],
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"countries": [
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"Pakistan",
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"Lebanon"
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],
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"people": []
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},
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"publication": [
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{
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"publisher": "The Intercept",
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"date_published": "2016-08-19",
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"title": "The NSA Leak Is Real, Snowden Documents Confirm",
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"link": "https://theintercept.com/2016/08/19/the-nsa-was-hacked-snowden-documents-confirm/",
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"reporters": [
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"Biddle, Sam"
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],
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"contributors": [
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"Lee, Micah"
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],
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"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/3031638/Select-Slides-FINAL-PMR-4-24-13-Redacted.pdf"
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}
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],
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"pdf_sha256": "4103f204df93220da73eac2e35334d37a8cd630dab083d53a9b35217219b23e7",
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"pages": 4
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}
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