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TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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# Special Collection Service
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## Pacific SIGDEV Conference
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## March 2011
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The Overall Classification of this Briefing:
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
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Dated: 20070108
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Declassify On: 20360301
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---
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TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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## The SCS Cyber Advantage
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SIGINT prowess provides cyber advantage
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* Unified operations provides holistic approach
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* The right intelligence delivered to the right customer
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Home field advantage in adversary's space
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* Where our customers want us and our adversaries do not
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* Capitalizing on the "element of surprise"
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Signal access for collection, exfil, and infil
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* Microwave, WiFi, WiMAX, GSM, CDMA, Satellite, etc.
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Living in the environment
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* Insights on infrastructure and configurations
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* Discovery of targets, signatures, and behavior
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Tailored intelligence products
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* Diverse products driven by national objectives and
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local needs through formal reporting, target packages,
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analytic insights, situational awareness, threat warning
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Unique platform for conducting and enabling IC operations
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* Fully leveraging 30-years of experience within the NSA and
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CIA enterprises and using existing authorities
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Broad Spectrum of Capability
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* Geographic Advantage
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* Signal Access
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* Analysis
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* Dissemination
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* Unique Platform for IC Operations
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Integrated Mission
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TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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Human enabled SIGINT
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Employ all the capabilities of the SCS to gain access to the targets – Maybe use a SIGINT focused mission to highlight how it can easily contribute to a cyber focus in the CNE/CNA/ CND world? Make the use of SIGINT information operations a liability for our adversaries in cyber operations
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Unique place within the Intelligence Community where we can and do blend CIA and NSA operations to further IC intelligence needs
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---
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TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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## 80 Points of Presence
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## 1000s of Opportunities on the Net
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SCS lives on the Net at worldwide Points of Presence
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SCS PoPs provide opportunities for access, enabling, and analysis
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Large Networks: 3,000 – 5,000
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WLANs: 10,000 – 30,000
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TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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Need to know how to better survey, populate databases, and understand what accesses we have 1 guy – 4 systems
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Significant diversity in the parts of the network that we see, not just fiber and router access
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---
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TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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## SCS Opportunities
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* TERRORISTS
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* CRIMINAL GROUPS
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* SATELLITE
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* SUPPLY CHAIN
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* FOREIGN INTEL AGENTS
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* CELL PHONE
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* HACKERS
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* TROJAN
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* BOTNET DDOS
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SCS PoPs provide opportunities for access, enabling, and analysis
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Look at what we are doing with a cyber viewpoint, not just SIGINT
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68
data/Special-Collection-Service-Pacific-SIGDEV/metadata.json
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68
data/Special-Collection-Service-Pacific-SIGDEV/metadata.json
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{
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"title": "Special Collection Service – Pacific SIGDEV Conference March 2011 – Supply Chain Excepts",
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"type": "REPORTED",
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"description": "This top-secret 2011 NSA presentation outlines how the Special Collection Service—a joint NSA–CIA program operating from U.S. embassies—leverages its global network of “points of presence” to conduct human-enabled SIGINT and cyber operations directly inside “adversary space.” Framed as a “home field advantage,” it portrays U.S. diplomatic sites as launchpads for infiltration, surveillance, and even supply chain attacks, blurring the line between diplomacy and digital espionage.",
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"long_description": "The 2011 NSA presentation on the Special Collection Service (SCS) reveals the breadth and scope of the U.S. intelligence community's global operations, emphasizing its ability to conduct surveillance and cyber operations from diplomatic facilities worldwide. Described as providing a \"home field advantage,\" the SCS leverages 80 “points of presence” (PoPs) located at U.S. embassies and consulates across the globe. These PoPs enable SIGINT collection, exfiltration, and manipulation of foreign communications, particularly in adversarial regions. The presentation highlights how SCS, with its joint NSA-CIA operations, can gain access to a wide array of communications infrastructure, including satellite links, microwave networks, and wireless systems such as WiFi and GSM. By living in the \"environment\" of their adversaries, the SCS can collect sensitive information undetected, opening up a range of intelligence opportunities for both the NSA and CIA.\n\nOne of the most striking aspects of the document is the implicit suggestion that these diplomatic locations are not only used for traditional SIGINT collection but also for cyber operations, including the manipulation and sabotage of foreign communications and supply chains. The presentation alludes to the potential for compromising hardware and software at various points in the supply chain, exploiting weaknesses in global networks to achieve intelligence-gathering objectives. It emphasizes the element of surprise, suggesting that SCS can remain undetected while conducting operations that span both cyber and SIGINT domains. This blurred distinction between cyber and traditional SIGINT operations further underscores the growing intersection of these fields in modern intelligence work.\n\nThe document also suggests that the NSA and CIA, through the SCS, possess unparalleled access to foreign networks and targets, ranging from terrorist groups and criminal organizations to foreign intelligence agents and hackers. This access is framed not just as a collection effort but as a platform for enabling broader intelligence community operations, blending SIGINT with cyber capabilities for a more integrated, comprehensive approach. While the details of specific operations remain classified, the document paints a picture of an intelligence enterprise capable of conducting sophisticated, far-reaching surveillance and cyber-espionage operations, all while operating within the cover of U.S. diplomatic missions.",
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"tags": [
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"Special Collection Service",
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"CIA",
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"cyber operations",
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"supply chain",
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"supply chain attacks",
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"diplomatic surveillance",
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"embassy",
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"consulates",
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"points of presence",
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"cyber espionage",
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"intelligence community",
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"SIGINT operations",
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"foreign communications",
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"satellite surveillance",
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"microwave",
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"WiFi",
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"GSM",
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"cyber infiltration",
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"adversary networks",
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"espionage",
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"foreign intelligence agents",
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"botnets",
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"terrorist organizations",
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"criminal organizations",
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"surveillance infrastructure",
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"intelligence sharing"
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],
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"document": {
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"creator": "NSA",
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"date_created": "2011-03-01",
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"classification": [
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"TOP SECRET",
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"COMINT"
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],
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"dissemination": [
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"REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL"
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],
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"banner": "TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL",
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"genre": "slides",
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"programs": [],
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"countries": [],
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"people": []
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},
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"publication": [
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{
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"publisher": "The Intercept",
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"date_published": "2019-01-24",
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"title": "Everybody Does It: The Messy Truth About Infiltrating Computer Supply Chains",
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"link": "https://theintercept.com/2019/01/24/computer-supply-chain-attacks/",
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"reporters": [
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"Lee, Micah",
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"Moltke, Henrik"
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],
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"contributors": [],
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"doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2019/01/24/special-collection-service-pacific-sigdev-conference-march-2011-supply-chain-excepts/",
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"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/5691430/Special-Collection-Service-Pacific-SIGDEV.pdf"
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}
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],
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"aka_id": [],
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"pdf_sha256": "9b482321b96d5fe55b76bfbef1c46cf7cf95ca6b83378baa5dbbd5a1fcbd2d7c",
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"pages": 4
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}
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