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data/Special-Source-Operations/Special-Source-Operations.md
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data/Special-Source-Operations/Special-Source-Operations.md
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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Special Source Operations
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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# Special Source Operations
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The Cryptologic Provider of Intelligence from Global High-Capacity Telecommunications Systems ♪
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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# Today's Cable Program
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## Three Access Portfolios
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### Corporate
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* BLARNEY - FISA
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* FAIRVIEW
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* STORMBREW
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* OAKSTAR
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* PRISM
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* FAA
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### Foreign
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* RAMPART-A (3rd Party)
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* WINDSTOP (2nd Party)
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### Unilateral
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* [REDACTED]
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* RAMPART-I/X
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* RAMPART-T (ClanSIG)
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* [REDACTED]
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* MYSTIC
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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---
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UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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# Got Fiber??
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## WORLDWIDE UNDERSEA FIBEROPTIC
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## ROUTES PLANNED AND IN PLACE
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UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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# Incredible Challenges...
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## How To Find Target Communication on a Typical Fiber Optic Cable?
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1 Cable X 12 Fibers X 64 wavelengths X 10 B bits/Sec = 100 Million
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Simultaneous Telephone or Internet Sessions
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(TS//SI//REL) [REDACTED]
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(TS//SI//REL) [REDACTED]
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International Internet Growth
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(Billions of bits/second)
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6000
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5000
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4000
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3000
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2000
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1000
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0
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[REDACTED]
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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# SSO Foreign Programs
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## Partnering with Foreign SIGINT partners to enable access to foreign intelligence
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[REDACTED]
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## Partnerships developed jointly with Foreign Affairs Directorate
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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# RAMPART A
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(TS//SI//NF) Unconventional special access program leveraging Third Party partnerships:
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* High-capacity international fiber transiting major congestion points around the world
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* Foreign Partners provide access to cables and host U.S. equipment
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* U.S. provides equipment for transport, processing and analysis
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* No U.S. collection by Partner and No Host Country collection by U.S. – there ARE exceptions!
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* Shared tasking and collection
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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---
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SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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# Typical RAM-A Configuration
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## RAMPART-A Typical Operation
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### USA
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Site D/E
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NSA
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### Country X
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Site B
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Processing Center
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Site C
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Partner Analysts
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Site A
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Access Point
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International Cable
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SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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---
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SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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# Cable to Database
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```
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Front End Cable --> Switch Controller --> DNR --> LOPERS --> FASCIA
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--> DNI --> WC-2 & DEEP DIVE --> PINWALE
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--> Tipping --> TURMOIL --> MARINA TRAFFICTHIEF
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--> Survey --> ACS --> TWISTEDPATH, BLACKPEARL
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```
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SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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102
data/Special-Source-Operations/metadata.json
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data/Special-Source-Operations/metadata.json
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{
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"title": "Special Source Operations",
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"type": "REPORTED",
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"description": "This document provides an overview of the NSA’s Special Source Operations (SSO), characterizing the division as the premier \"Cryptologic Provider\" for intelligence derived from global high-capacity telecommunications. It outlines a three-tiered access portfolio—Corporate, Foreign, and Unilateral—designed to manage the \"incredible challenge\" of intercepting target communications across undersea fiber-optic cables that carry millions of simultaneous sessions.",
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"long_description": "This document categorizes the NSA's vast surveillance reach into three distinct operational portfolios. The Corporate portfolio includes well-known programs like PRISM and BLARNEY (FISA-based), which rely on U.S. company cooperation. The Foreign portfolio centers on RAMPART-A (Third Party) and WINDSTOP (Second Party/Five Eyes), leveraging international partnerships to tap cables at global \"congestion points.\" Finally, the Unilateral portfolio includes clandestine efforts like MYSTIC and RAMPART-T (ClanSIG), where the NSA operates without the host country’s overt cooperation or through highly specialized clandestine SIGINT techniques.\n\nThe document illustrates the staggering technical scale of modern fiber-optic surveillance. A single cable with 12 fibers can support up to 100 million simultaneous sessions, requiring sophisticated filtering to find specific target data amidst massive international internet growth. To solve this, the NSA employs a \"Cable to Database\" pipeline that bifurcates traffic into DNR (Dialed Number Recognition) and DNI (Digital Network Intelligence). Metadata and content are then funneled into specialized repositories: telephony records move to FASCIA, internet content to PINWALE, and internet metadata to MARINA and TRAFFICTHIEF.\n\nA significant portion of the briefing focuses on the RAMPART-A model, where Third Party partners host U.S. processing equipment (Site B) at physical access points (Site A). While the document claims a general rule of \"No U.S. collection by Partner and No Host Country collection by U.S.,\" it explicitly notes that \"there ARE exceptions!\" This suggests a flexible legal and policy framework that allows for the collection of host-country data under specific, highly classified conditions. This integrated architecture ensures that \"survey\" data—processed through systems like TURMOIL and ACS—populates discovery tools like BLACKPEARL, enabling analysts to map global networks in near real-time.",
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"tags": [
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"cable tapping",
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"fiber optic cables",
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"undersea cables",
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"telecommunications",
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"partner access",
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"cable access",
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"Foreign Affairs Directorate",
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"FAD",
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"international partnerships",
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"special access",
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"intelligence cooperation",
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"information sharing",
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"SSO",
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"telecommunications infrastructure",
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"global communications",
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"ClanSIG",
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"clandestine operations",
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"data filtering",
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"surveillance architecture",
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"congestion points",
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"international gateways",
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"internet backbone"
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],
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"document": {
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"creator": "NSA",
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"date_created": "2011-01-01",
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"classification": [
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"TOP SECRET",
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"COMINT"
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],
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"dissemination": [
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"NOFORN"
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],
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"banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN",
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"genre": "slides",
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"programs": [
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"RAMPART-A",
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"WINDSTOP",
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"BLARNEY",
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"FAIRVIEW",
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"STORMBREW",
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"OAKSTAR",
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"PRISM",
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"RAMPART-I",
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"RAMPART-T",
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"SSO",
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"RAMPART-X",
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"ClanSIG",
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"MYSTIC",
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"LOPERS",
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"WEALTHYCLUSTER-2",
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"DEEPDIVE",
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"TURMOIL",
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"FASCIA",
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"PINWALE",
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"MARINA",
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"TRAFFICTHIEF",
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"TWISTEDPATH",
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"BLACKPEARL",
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"ACS"
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],
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"countries": [],
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"people": []
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},
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"publication": [
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{
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"publisher": "The Intercept",
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"date_published": "2014-06-18",
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"title": "How Secret Partners Expand NSA’s Surveillance Dragnet",
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"link": "https://theintercept.com/2014/06/18/nsa-surveillance-secret-cable-partners-revealed-rampart-a/",
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"reporters": [
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"Gallagher, Ryan"
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],
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"contributors": [],
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"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200860/odd-s3-overviewnov2011-v1-0-redacted-information.pdf"
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},
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{
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"publisher": "Dagbladet Information",
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"date_published": "2014-06-19",
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"title": "NSA ‘third party’ partners tap the Internet backbone in global surveillance program",
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"link": "https://www.information.dk/udland/2014/06/nsa-third-party-partners-tap-the-internet-backbone-in-global-surveillance-program",
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"reporters": [
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"Geist, Anton",
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"Gjerding, Sebastian",
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"Moltke, Henrik",
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"Poitras, Laura"
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],
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"contributors": [],
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"doc_source": "http://www.information.dk/databloggen/501064",
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"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200860/odd-s3-overviewnov2011-v1-0-redacted-information.pdf"
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}
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],
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"aka_id": [],
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"pdf_sha256": "ef27fb96c997e3012f8e5a34e970ffdf563ef4b4f7b99078fc02111858d2186f",
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"pages": 8
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}
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