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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
# Tracking Targets Through Proxies & Anonymizers
## (and the air speed velocity of an unladen swallow)
Also known as:TTTPaAatasvoaus
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
## CLASSIFICATION
* Classification of this briefing is:
TS//SI//REL 5EYES
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
## Agenda Items
* The issue at hand... (proxies, anonymizers & TOR, oh my!)
* What we do about, and how we approach, this issue...
* A couple examples of tracking targets through anonymizers (AnchorFree & Tor)
* Closing remarks and questions
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
## Up Front Caveat
Before we begin this briefing, I want to set the stage by saying that there is no silver bullet for tracking target communications through anonymizers. Any methodology set forth in this briefing requires both manual analysis and (generally) luck.
With that out of the way...
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
## The issue at hand...(proxies, anonymizers & Tor, oh my!)
* Targets generally don't like to have their communications tracked by government agencies or filtered by national firewalls.
* If they are tech-savvy enough, they will use anonymizers to try to mask their real IP/ location.
* This generally makes for sad analysts. :(
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
## What we do about the issue at hand...
* The only way to track communications through anonymizers is if you understand how those anonymizers work. If you don't know what the traffic looks like, how will you recognize it in SIGINT?
* Generally our process is as follows:
* Identify new proxy/anonymizer
* Research/use anonymizer, document what happens, what does traffic look like, what client traffic does it pass through(if any)?
* Create fingerprints in SIGINT to identify such proxy traffic
* Correlate proxy traffic with known target activity
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
## Anchorfree
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
## Anchorfree
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
## Anchorfree
AnchorFree owns a bunch of servers on the Internet.
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
## Anchorfree
Then you have a user that downloads Hotspot Shield to proxy their traffic...
AnchorFree owns a bunch of servers on the Internet.
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
## Anchorfree
Then you have a user that downloads Hotspot Shield to proxy their traffic...
AnchorFree owns a bunch of servers on the Internet.
We'll pretend they want to go to Yahoo (or whereever else)
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
## Anchorfree
When the user starts HSS, their browser sets up an encrypted connection to a randomly picked server...
AnchorFree owns a bunch of servers on the Internet.
We'll pretend they want to go to Yahoo (or whereever else)
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
## Anchorfree
When the user starts HSS, their browser sets up an encrypted connection to a randomly picked server...
AnchorFree owns a bunch of servers on the Internet.
We'll pretend they want to go to Yahoo (or whereever else)
Then they access the webpage from the AnchorFree IP address.
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
## Anchorfree
From testing, the IP address that the user connects to, and the IP they show up as are NOT the same. But there is a direct correlation between the two.
When the user starts HSS, their browser sets up an encrypted connection to a randomly picked server...
Then they access the webpage from the AnchorFree IP address.
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
## AnchorFree....so what?
We can build static mappings between the inside/tunnel IP address and the IP they show up as...
So when we see a target access their account from an AnchorFree IP, we know which IP to go look for tunnel connections to in order to find their real client IP address...
We can also write XKS fingerprints to look for AnchorFree tunnels en masse from interesting locations.
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
## Tor
Example of Tor user connecting to facebook.com
TOR user
Facebook.com
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
## Tor
Example of Tor user connecting to facebook.com
1) the user selects 3 relatively random Tor nodes to use.
TOR user
Facebook.com
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
## Tor
Example of Tor user connecting to facebook.com
1) the user selects 3 relatively random Tor nodes to use.
2) The user then sets up layers of SSL tunnels through them all to get to facebook. A layer is stripped off along each hop.
TOR user
Facebook.com
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
## Tor
Example of Tor user connecting to facebook.com
1) the user selects 3 relatively random Tor nodes to use.
2) The user then sets up layers of SSL tunnels through them all to get to facebook. A layer is stripped off along each hop.
TOR user
Facebook.com
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
## Tor
Example of Tor user connecting to facebook.com
1) the user selects 3 relatively random Tor nodes to use.
2) The user then sets up layers of SSL tunnels through them all to get to facebook. A layer is stripped off along each hop.
TOR user
Facebook.com
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
## Tor
Example of Tor user connecting to facebook.com
1) the user selects 3 relatively random Tor nodes to use.
2) The user then sets up layers of SSL tunnels through them all to get to facebook. A layer is stripped off along each hop.
TOR user
Facebook.com
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
## Tor
Example of Tor user connecting to facebook.com
1) the user selects 3 relatively random Tor nodes to use.
2) The user then sets up layers of SSL tunnels through them all to get to facebook. A layer is stripped off along each hop.
TOR user
Facebook.com
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
## Interesting tidbits about Tor
* TOR uses SSL tunnels for encryption, we are able to identify what their SSL certificates look like (which allows us to identify Tor circuits in SIGINT).
* GOLDENFORTIN dataset and exit node traffic
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
## And now for something completely different...
* A lot of research we do on anonymizers consists of open source research:
* The Interwebz (forums, RFC's, 2010 Circumvention Tool Usage Report, etc)
* Trial and Error / Wireshark
* Basically RTFM'ing about how stuff works and translating that to the SIGINT system.
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
## Contact Info
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
## Questions?
NOBODY EXPECTS THE SPANISH INQUISITION!!!!
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

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{
"title": "Tracking Targets Through Proxies & Anonymizers",
"type": "REPORTED",
"description": "This NSA presentation details methods for tracking and de-anonymizing internet users who employ privacy tools like Tor, proxies, and VPN services such as AnchorFree's Hotspot Shield. The document explains how the agency reverse-engineers anonymization tools, creates \"fingerprints\" to identify their traffic in surveillance systems, and correlates encrypted connections to reveal users' real IP addresses and locations—acknowledging this work \"makes for sad analysts\" when targets successfully obscure their identities.",
"long_description": "This NSA presentation reveals the agency's systematic approach to defeating internet anonymization tools that individuals use to protect their privacy and avoid surveillance. The document, written in an unusually casual and irreverent style filled with pop culture references and humor, explains methodologies for tracking targets who use proxy servers, VPN services like AnchorFree's Hotspot Shield, and the Tor anonymity network. The presentation candidly acknowledges that tech-savvy targets \"generally don't like to have their communications tracked by government agencies\" and notes that the use of these privacy tools \"generally makes for sad analysts\" - followed by a sad face emoji. The author outlines a four-step process: identify new anonymization services, research and test them to understand how they work, create \"fingerprints\" in NSA surveillance systems to recognize their traffic patterns, and finally correlate that traffic with known target activity to reveal users' real identities and locations. The presentation admits upfront there is \"no silver bullet\" and that success requires \"both manual analysis and (generally) luck.\"\n\nThe technical details demonstrate sophisticated capabilities to unravel privacy protections. For AnchorFree's Hotspot Shield, the NSA discovered that while users connect to one IP address and appear to websites as coming from a different IP address, there exists a \"direct correlation between the two\" that can be mapped. This allows analysts to work backwards from a target's anonymized web activity to find their real IP address by examining tunnel connections. For Tor, which routes traffic through three randomly selected nodes wrapped in layers of SSL encryption, the NSA exploits the identifiable characteristics of Tor's SSL certificates to spot Tor circuits in intercepted traffic, and references a dataset called GOLDENFORTIN related to Tor exit node traffic. The presentation's methodology relies heavily on reverse-engineering these tools through open source research, packet analysis with Wireshark, and what the author cheekily describes as \"basically RTFM'ing about how stuff works and translating that to the SIGINT system.\"",
"tags": [
"Tor",
"proxies",
"anonymizers",
"AnchorFree",
"deep packet inspection",
"traffic fingerprinting",
"network fingerprints",
"traffic analysis",
"traffic correlation",
"anonymity",
"de-anonymization",
"privacy tools",
"VPNs",
"VPN analysis",
"proxy detection",
"IP address tracking",
"user identification",
"SIGINT analysis",
"encryption breaking",
"SSL",
"certificate analysis",
"network analysis",
"IP correlation",
"target tracking",
"communications tracking",
"network reconnaissance",
"connection mapping",
"SIGINT fingerprints",
"signature detection",
"traffic signatures",
"mass surveillance",
"identity revelation",
"tech-savvy targets",
"censorship circumvention",
"analysts",
"target analysis",
"proxy traffic",
"traffic classification",
"Monty Python",
"humor"
],
"document": {
"creator": "NSA",
"date_created": "",
"classification": [
"TOP SECRET",
"SI"
],
"dissemination": [
"REL 5EYES"
],
"banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY",
"genre": "slides",
"programs": [
"XKEYSCORE",
"GOLDENFORTIN"
],
"countries": [],
"people": []
},
"publication": [
{
"publisher": "The Intercept",
"date_published": "2016-06-28",
"title": "He Was a Hacker for the NSA and He Was Willing to Talk. I Was Willing to Listen.",
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2016/06/28/he-was-a-hacker-for-the-nsa-and-he-was-willing-to-talk-i-was-willing-to-listen/",
"reporters": [
"Maass, Peter"
],
"contributors": [
"McNeill, Sheelagh"
],
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2919708/Tracking-Targets-Through-Proxies-amp-Anonymizers.pdf"
}
],
"pdf_sha256": "86f9fde96a89b84519529d7eb18b20f94da4b70b2ac43547ef54fcc76fab2af2",
"pages": 25
}