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TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
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particular type of targeting and be familiar with them. Those are the rules of the road that the court and the AG and the DNI and our office and SIGINT Director and everybody else expect you to understand. What else do you need to do?
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28. (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Am I familiar with reverse targeting procedures in order to prevent reverse targeting?
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(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Know Reverse Targeting Issues
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(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) The last thing is you have got to be familiar with is the reverse targeting procedures. Congress is very concerned that if they made it easier for the Intelligence Community to target people reasonably believed to be outside of the United States, we'd turn right around and use that as a means of targeting people who are inside the United States but communicate with them. So be familiar with the procedures that govern that and prevent that from happening.
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29. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Highlights of Targeting and Minimization Procedures
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(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Highlights of Targeting and Minimization Procedures
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(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Now, the good news for you all is that I'm not going to sit down in front of you all and read a set of minimization procedures to you. You should read them and be familiar with them; I instead am going to go through the highlights that you need to be familiar with, which I've already said. Highlights of the targeting procedures as well as the minimization procedures...
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30. (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Do I have a reasonable belief that the target is outside the United States?
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31. (U//FOUO) Analyst has an obligation to continually verify the location of the target - verify and re-verify
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(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Verify and re-verify your Target's Status and Location
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(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) The first thing: targeting. You have to verify your target's status as a non-US person and their location. At all times, you have to do it initially. Do you have a reasonable belief that your target is a non-US person outside the United States? And you have to do it always. Some things can change. People move around. They move into and out of the United States. The reason we have this continuing obligation - this is why we have post- targeting analysis done by a lot of NSA people who look at things like HLR and VLR registrations of phones. If, all of the sudden, a phone that you're targeting registers in a cell inside the United States, you no longer have a reasonable belief your target is outside of the United States. So there are a lot of things like that done - IP [Internet Protocol] look-ups done for collection of email addresses.... that sort of thing. These tools are all there to help you - these organizations are there to help you - but in the end, the responsibility remains with the analyst. Things get through filters;
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TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
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77
data/faalsn1bvideotranscriptca-p11/metadata.json
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data/faalsn1bvideotranscriptca-p11/metadata.json
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{
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"title": "How the NSA verifies a target's location",
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"type": "REPORTED",
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"description": "This is an excerpt from a transcript of National Security Agency training videos that describe how to verify the location of a targeted device. It explains how the NSA monitors different types of mobile signaling information known as HLR and VLR registrations in order to locate individuals. It also makes clear that the agency is able to use location tracking to ascertain whether a target is in the United States.",
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"long_description": "This top secret NSA training transcript excerpt covers a section of analyst compliance training focused on the legal requirements of FAA Section 702 targeting — specifically the obligation to verify and continuously re-verify that a target is a non-U.S. person located outside the United States. The instructor explains that Congress explicitly designed FAA to prevent \"reverse targeting\" — the practice of using foreign-targeted collection authority as a backdoor to surveil people inside the United States by monitoring their communications with foreign targets. Analysts are reminded that this concern drove specific procedural requirements embedded in both the targeting and minimization procedures they are required to know.\n\nThe most technically significant passage explains how location verification works in practice: NSA conducts post-targeting analysis using Home Location Register (HLR) and Visitor Location Register (VLR) registrations — mobile network signaling data that records which cell a phone is currently registered in — alongside IP address lookups for email collection. If a targeted phone suddenly registers in a cell tower inside the United States, the analyst no longer has a reasonable basis to believe the target is outside the country, and collection must be halted or handled under different procedures. The instructor emphasizes that while automated tools and dedicated NSA organizations assist with this monitoring, the legal responsibility for compliance ultimately rests with the individual analyst — explicitly noting that things can \"get through filters.\"\n\nhttp://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/how-the-nsa-verifies-a-targets-location/639/",
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"tags": [
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"Section 702",
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"targeting procedures",
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"minimization procedures",
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"reverse targeting",
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"non-US persons",
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"location verification",
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"HLR",
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"Home Location Register",
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"VLR",
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"mobile tracking",
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"cell towers",
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"IP geolocation",
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"cell phone tracking",
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"analyst compliance",
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"training transcript",
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"legal authorities",
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"FISA",
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"domestic surveillance",
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"post-targeting analysis",
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"Attorney General",
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"DNI",
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"SIGINT Director",
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"surveillance law",
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"oversight"
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],
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"document": {
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"creator": "NSA",
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"date_created": "",
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"classification": [
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"TOP SECRET",
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"SI"
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],
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"dissemination": [
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"NOFORN"
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],
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"banner": "TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN",
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"genre": "guide",
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"programs": [],
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"countries": [],
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"people": []
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},
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"publication": [
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{
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"publisher": "The Washington Post",
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"date_published": "2013-12-10",
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"title": "New documents show how the NSA infers relationships based on mobile location data",
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"link": "https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2013/12/10/new-documents-show-how-the-nsa-infers-relationships-based-on-mobile-location-data/",
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"reporters": [
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"Soltani, Ashkan",
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"Gellman, Barton"
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],
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"contributors": []
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}
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],
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"aka_id": [
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{
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"id": "ACLU_-_2013-12-10_Target_Location"
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},
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{
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"id": "2013-12-10_Target_Location"
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},
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{
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"id": "EFF_-_20131210-wapo-target_location"
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},
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{
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"id": "nsa-target-location"
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}
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],
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"pdf_sha256": "16033eb3605169876968e4ee1d6670b86499529cc5dab447ccb8b492c70d29ef",
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"pages": 1
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}
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