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data/gchq-tsi-target/gchq-tsi-target.md
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data/gchq-tsi-target/gchq-tsi-target.md
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UK CONFIDENTIAL
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Version 6, dated 11/08
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Side 1
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The issue on GCWeb is the definitive version; printed copies may be out of date. Terms are defined in the glossary at http://www[REDACTED]/operations/pol_legal/leg/compliance/glossary.shtml.
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Legal Authorisation Flowchart: TARGETING
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SUMMARY
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| Nationality/Location | UK | 2nd Party /BOT | Other or unknown |
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| :------------------- | :------ | :------------- | :--------------- |
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| UK | Warrant | Warrant | Warrant |
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| 2nd Party/BOT | STA | STA | STA |
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| Other or unknown | STA | STA | Nil |
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Are you targeting the comms of a particular company, organisation or individual?
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YES
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NO
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MAYBE
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Is the target named on a 16(3) authorisation?
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Filtering without targeting needs no additional authorisation. For tasking, consult the collection flowchart
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Do you believe the target is in the UK? (see footnotes 1,2)
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YES
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NO/Don't know
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MAYBE
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Some domains/IPs/VPNs are for specific organisations, others are available to a range of users. Make a judgement.
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Is the target specified on a RIPA 8(1) warrant and his comms address on the schedule?
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YES
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Appropriate legal authorisation in place. Go ahead.
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NO
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PTO
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Footnotes
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(1) Without authorisation, you must not indirectly target the communications of someone in the UK by using a foreign selector.
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(2) In the absence of any other information, you should assume the user of a .uk email address is in the UK.
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(3) In the absence of any other information, you may assume the user of a .com or other non-geographic address is not in the US.
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---
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UK CONFIDENTIAL
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Version 6, dated 11/08
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Side 2
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The issue on GCWeb is the definitive version; printed copies may be out of date. Terms are defined in the glossary at http://www[REDACTED]/operations/pol_legal/leg/compliance/glossary.shtml.
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Legal Authorisation Flowchart: TARGETING
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NO
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Were you already targeting their comms before their arrival in the UK?
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NO
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YES
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You need a RIPA 8(1) warrant or 16(3) authorisation to begin collecting comms: consult OPP-LEG
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Do you want to continue examination of intercept content?
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NO
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Targeting can remain on cover for a week or so but no examination of traffic is allowed. To establish when the target has left the UK, you should use geolocational tools if possible; otherwise you may examine one item of content every 48 hours.
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NO/Don't Know
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YES
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You need a RIPA 16(5) authorisation from a nominated SCS to allow sustained targeting to continue up to 5 working days for NS, or 1 working day for SC & EWB; no new selectors.
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Yes Beyond the validity of the RIPA 16(5)
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You need a RIPA 8(1) warrant or RIPA 16(3) authorisation to continue collecting comms: consult OPP-LEG.
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If you subsequently get information that the target is in the UK you must act on this new knowledge.
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Is the entity in a BOT or a 2nd Party country? (see footnote 3)
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YES
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You need a nominated Grade 6 STA and can only use UK assets if target is in or a 2nd Party.
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NO
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Is the target a national of/registered in UK/BOT 2nd Party?
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YES
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NO
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Appropriate legal authorisation in place. Go ahead.
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---
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UK CONFIDENTIAL
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Version 5, dated 11/06
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Side 1
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The issue on GCWeb is the definitive version; printed copies may be out of date. Terms are defined in the glossary at http://www.[REDACTED]/operations/policy/legalities/authorisation/definitions.shtml.
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Legal Authorisation Flowchart: COLLECTION
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Will you intercept only technical characteristics?
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YES
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No further authorisation is required.
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NO
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Will you be intercepting comms content?
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NO
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Is one end US?
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YES
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You can survey for up to 2 hours' worth of data but may not return to the same bearer until you believe its composition has changed.
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NO
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You can assume appropriate legal authorisation is in place.
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Is the collection at least one end foreign?
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NO
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Unlikely to be proper GCHQ business: consult OPP-LEG.
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YES
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Will all intercept pass through a TND or dictionary?
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NO
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ie this is full or coarse unselected take.
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PTO
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Some domains/VPNs are for specific organisations, others are available to a range of users. If you are in effect targeting a specific organisation, see the Targeting flowchart
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---
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UK CONFIDENTIAL
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Version 5, dated 11/06
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Side 2
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The issue on GCWeb is the definitive version; printed copies may be out of date. Terms are defined in the glossary at http://www.[REDACTED]/operations/policy/legalities/authorisation/definitions.shtml.
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Legal Authorisation Flowchart: COLLECTION
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This is SD/survey so you should consider proportionality.
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Is one end US/CAN/AUS/NZ?
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NO
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Assume appropriate authorisation is in place. Go ahead.
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YES
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Nominated Grade 6 STA is required. If the link is one end US you can survey for up to 2 hours' worth of data, but may not return to the same bearer until you believe its composition has changed
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data/gchq-tsi-target/metadata.json
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data/gchq-tsi-target/metadata.json
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{
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"title": "TSI — Legal Authorisation Flowcharts: Targeting & Collection",
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"type": "REPORTED",
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"description": "This document contains internal GCHQ flowcharts outlining the mandatory legal authorization required for both Targeting specific entities and Collection (interception) of communications content, based primarily on the target's location, nationality, and whether the activity involves UK or \"Second Party\" countries, primarily referencing the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA).",
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"long_description": "The document consists of two distinct legal authorization flowcharts: one for \"Targeting\" and one for \"Collection,\" created for internal GCHQ use and subject to version control (Version 6, dated 11/08, for Targeting; Version 5, dated 11/06, for Collection).\n\nThe Targeting Flowchart dictates the specific warrant or authorization regime needed before pursuing the communications of a particular company, organization, or individual. The required authorization (such as RIPA 8(1) warrant, 16(3) authorization, or STA) depends on a matrix considering the target's nationality/registration (UK, Second Party/BOT, Other/Unknown) against their location (UK, Second Party/BOT, Other/Unknown). It includes specific protocols for when a target is believed to be in the UK, requiring warrants, or if they unexpectedly arrive in the UK during an operation.\n\nThe Collection Flowchart focuses on the authorization needed for intercepting communications themselves, distinct from naming a target. Intercepting only technical characteristics requires \"No further authorisation.\" Collecting content, however, prompts checks regarding whether the collection is US-end, whether at least one end is foreign, and whether all intercept will pass through a TND or dictionary filter. Full, coarse, or unselected collection requires further consideration of proportionality and, in the case of collection involving US, Canadian, Australian, or New Zealand ends, requires a nominated Grade 6 STA (Senior Technical Advisor) or limitations on survey duration.",
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"tags": [
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"legal authorities",
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"legal compliance",
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"intelligence oversight",
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"jurisdiction",
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"target location",
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"nationality",
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"communications interception",
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"surveillance policy",
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"geolocation"
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],
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"document": {
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"creator": "GCHQ",
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"date_created": "2011-11-01",
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"classification": [
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"UK CONFIDENTIAL"
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],
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"dissemination": [],
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"banner": "UK CONFIDENTIAL",
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"genre": "slides",
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"programs": [],
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"countries": [],
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"people": []
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},
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"publication": [
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{
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"publisher": "The Intercept",
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"date_published": "2015-06-22",
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"title": "Spies Hacked Computers Thanks to Sweeping Secret Warrants, Aggressively Stretching U.K. Law",
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"link": "https://theintercept.com/2015/06/22/gchq-reverse-engineering-warrants/",
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"reporters": [
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"Fishman, Andrew",
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"Greenwald, Glenn"
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],
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"contributors": [],
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"doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2015/06/22/tsi-legal-flowcharts/",
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"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2106842/tsi-legal-authorisation-flowcharts-targeting-amp.pdf"
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}
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],
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"pdf_sha256": "00bfcb768ed7f84059678a3f9764fc23b9d6610d50e7691399b1531e58a6341d",
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"pages": 4
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}
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