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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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(U) Topic: Iran - Current Topics, Interaction with GCHQ
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(U) Director's Talking Points:
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* (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Emphasize that we have successfully worked multiple high-priority surges with GCHQ that have allowed us to refine maintaining mission continuity and seamless transition, and maximize our target coverage. These jointly-worked events include the storming of the British Embassy in Tehran, Iran's discovery of FLAME, and support to policymakers during the multiple rounds of P5 plus 1 negotiations.
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(U//FOUO) SIGINT Director's Talking Points:
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* (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Note that our posture on Iran will serve us well going into any crisis or Event, but we still are taking a broader look at Iran, in the context of a possible crisis. This year we have updated contingency plans with GCHQ to reflect the changes in our access and Iran's capabilities.
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(U) Background:
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* (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) NSA has seen Iran further extending its influence across the Middle East over the last year.
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1. (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Iranian Cyber Attacks: Iran continues to conduct distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) attacks against numerous U.S. financial institutions, and is currently in the third phase of a series of such attacks that began in August 2012. SIGINT indicates that these attacks are in retaliation to Western activities against Iran's nuclear sector and that senior officials in the Iranian government are aware of these attacks. NSA expects Iran will continue this series of attacks, which it views as successful, while striving for increased effectiveness by adapting its tactics and techniques to circumvent victim mitigation attempts.
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(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Iran's destructive cyber attack against Saudi Aramco in August 2012, during which data was destroyed on tens of thousands of computers, was the first such attack NSA has observed from this adversary. Iran, having been a victim of a similar cyber attack against its own oil industry in April 2012, has demonstrated a clear ability to learn from the capabilities and actions of others. While NSA has no indications at this time that Iran plans to conduct such an attack against a U.S. or UK target, we cannot rule out the possibility of such an attack, especially in the face of increased international pressure on the regime.
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2. (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Iran Crisis Contingency Planning: NSA's posture on Iran will serve us well going into any crisis or event. We continually update contingency plans to reflect the changes in both our access and Iran's capabilities.
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* (TS//REL TO USA, FVEY) NSA's crisis and event plans have been coordinated throughout the U.S. IC and are designed to sync with plans at CENTCOM, EUCOM and CYBERCOM.
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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Classified By:[REDACTED]
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Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
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Dated: 20070108
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Declassify On: 20370801
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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* (TS//REL TO USA, FVEY) NSA's planned battle rhythm focuses on production deadlines that will feed daily briefings and intelligence requirements for policy makers and Combatant Commands.
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* (TS//REL TO USA, FVEY) MEA's Iran Division has held one VTC with GCHQ's Iran lead, [REDACTED] and his team, with another scheduled for 23 April to discuss ongoing contingency planning efforts on both sides.
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(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) NSA has successfully worked multiple high-priority surges with GCHQ that have allowed us to refine maintaining mission continuity and seamless transition, and maximize our target coverage. These jointly worked events include the storming of the British Embassy in Tehran; Iran's discovery of computer network exploitation tools on their networks in 2012 and 2013; and support to policymakers during the multiple rounds of P5 plus 1 negotiation on Iran's nuclear program.
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3. (TS//SI//REL TO USA, GBR) NSA-GCHQ-ISNU Trilateral Discussions: In January 2013, during an NSA-ISNU analytic workshop on Iranian Leadership, the first ever trilateral VTC on an Iranian issue was held with NSA, GCHQ and ISNU participants. The focus of the trilateral effort, which was kicked off by the VTC, is the [REDACTED] the [REDACTED]. The respective NSA-ISNU and GCHQ-ISNU bilateral relationships had gotten to the point that each participant recognized the need for the trilateral engagement to advance this specific topic. The trilateral relationship is limited to the topic of [REDACTED] and will serve as a proof of concept of this kind of engagement.
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(U) Potential Landmine:
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* (TS//SI//NF) GCHQ has long advocated that it work with NSA and the ISNU in a trilateral arrangement to prosecute the Iranian target. SID policy has been opposed to such a blanket arrangement, and this specific trilateral should not be interpreted as a broad change of approach. In other areas, NSA and GCHQ have agreed to continue to share information gleaned from the respective bilateral relationships with ISNU.
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(U) Date of Material: 12 April 2013
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(U//FOUO) Originator: [REDACTED], S2E4 Iran Division Chief, [REDACTED]
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(U//FOUO) Alt. POC: [REDACTED] S2E Foreign Partner Strategist, [REDACTED]
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(U//FOUO) Classification Review By: [REDACTED] S2E Chief of Staff, [REDACTED]
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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Classified By: [REDACTED]
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Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
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Dated: 20070108
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Declassify On: 20370801
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56
data/iran-gchq-intercept-15-0210/metadata.json
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data/iran-gchq-intercept-15-0210/metadata.json
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{
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"title": "Iran – Current Topics, Interaction with GCHQ",
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"type": "REPORTED",
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"description": "This NOFORN top secret April 2013 NSA document, shows how Iran significantly improved its offensive cyber capabilities by learning from cyberattacks against it, such as the April 2012 attack on its own oil industry, subsequently launching its own destructive attacks against Saudi Aramco and U.S. financial institutions.",
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"long_description": "This top secret NSA document from April 2013 consists of director-level talking points prepared for a meeting with GCHQ regarding current topics related to Iran, focusing on three main areas: Iranian cyber attacks, crisis contingency planning, and trilateral intelligence cooperation with Israel. The document opens by emphasizing successful joint NSA-GCHQ operations during multiple high-priority events including the storming of the British Embassy in Tehran, Iran's discovery of the FLAME malware on its networks, and intelligence support to policymakers during P5+1 nuclear negotiations with Iran. The briefing notes that updated contingency plans have been coordinated with GCHQ to reflect changes in both intelligence access capabilities and Iran's evolving offensive capabilities.\n\nThe most significant section addresses Iranian cyber attacks and represents a candid intelligence assessment of blowback from Western offensive cyber operations. The NSA reports that Iran is conducting an ongoing series of distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) attacks against numerous U.S. financial institutions, currently in the third phase of attacks that began in August 2012. SIGINT reporting indicates these attacks are explicitly \"in retaliation to Western activities against Iran's nuclear sector\" and that senior officials in the Iranian government are aware of and directing these operations. The NSA expects Iran will continue these attacks while adapting tactics and techniques to circumvent defensive countermeasures. More concerning is Iran's August 2012 destructive cyber attack against Saudi Aramco, during which data was destroyed on tens of thousands of computers—the first destructive attack the NSA had observed from Iran. The document makes the critical assessment that \"Iran, having been a victim of a similar cyber attack against its own oil industry in April 2012, has demonstrated a clear ability to learn from the capabilities and actions of others.\" While the NSA states it has no current indications that Iran plans such a destructive attack against U.S. or UK targets, the agency cannot rule out the possibility, especially given increasing international pressure on the Iranian regime.\n\nThe contingency planning section describes NSA's coordination throughout the U.S. Intelligence Community with plans synchronized with CENTCOM, EUCOM, and CYBERCOM. The planned battle rhythm focuses on production deadlines feeding daily briefings and intelligence requirements for policymakers and Combatant Commands. NSA's Iran Division has held video teleconferences with GCHQ's Iran leadership team to discuss ongoing contingency planning efforts. The document describes how successful joint surge operations with GCHQ have refined processes for maintaining mission continuity, seamless transition, and maximizing target coverage during critical events including Iran's discovery of computer network exploitation (CNE) tools on their networks in both 2012 and 2013. The third section reveals previously undisclosed trilateral intelligence cooperation: in January 2013, the first-ever trilateral video teleconference on an Iranian issue was held between NSA, GCHQ, and ISNU (Israeli SIGINT National Unit) participants during an NSA-ISNU analytic workshop on Iranian Leadership. This trilateral effort focuses on a specific redacted topic, with the document noting that respective bilateral relationships had progressed to where all participants recognized the need for trilateral engagement. However, a \"Potential Landmine\" warning clarifies that while GCHQ has long advocated for broad trilateral arrangements with NSA and ISNU to target Iran, SID policy opposes such blanket cooperation, and this specific trilateral should not be interpreted as a change in that policy—in other areas, NSA and GCHQ continue sharing information from their respective bilateral relationships with Israel separately rather than in joint sessions.",
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"tags": [
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"blowback effects",
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"offensive cyber operations",
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"Saudi Aramco",
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"destructive malware",
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"data destruction",
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"DDoS",
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"retaliation",
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"cyber warfare",
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"Israel collaboration",
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"GCHQ collaboration",
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"nuclear program",
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"adversary tradecraft",
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"Computer Network Exploitation"
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],
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"document": {
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"creator": "NSA",
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"date_created": "2013-04-12",
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"classification": [
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"TOP SECRET",
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"COMINT"
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],
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"dissemination": [
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"NOFORN"
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],
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"banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN",
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"genre": "report",
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"programs": [],
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"countries": [
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"Iran",
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"Israel"
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],
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"people": []
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},
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"publication": [
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{
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"publisher": "The Intercept",
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"date_published": "2015-02-10",
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"title": "NSA Claims Iran Learned from Western Cyberattacks",
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"link": "https://theintercept.com/2015/02/10/nsa-iran-developing-sophisticated-cyber-attacks-learning-attacks/",
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"reporters": [
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"Greenwald, Glenn"
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],
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"contributors": [],
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"doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2015/02/10/iran-current-topics-interaction-gchq/",
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"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1658374/iran-current-topics-interaction-with-gchq.pdf"
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}
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],
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"pdf_sha256": "7857876b92f90f67424b569f5a80e9c22b892316ba7982d620adefa124b8ed99",
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"pages": 2
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}
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