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{
"title": "Iran – Current Topics, Interaction with GCHQ",
"type": "REPORTED",
"description": "This NOFORN top secret April 2013 NSA document, shows how Iran significantly improved its offensive cyber capabilities by learning from cyberattacks against it, such as the April 2012 attack on its own oil industry, subsequently launching its own destructive attacks against Saudi Aramco and U.S. financial institutions.",
"long_description": "This top secret NSA document from April 2013 consists of director-level talking points prepared for a meeting with GCHQ regarding current topics related to Iran, focusing on three main areas: Iranian cyber attacks, crisis contingency planning, and trilateral intelligence cooperation with Israel. The document opens by emphasizing successful joint NSA-GCHQ operations during multiple high-priority events including the storming of the British Embassy in Tehran, Iran's discovery of the FLAME malware on its networks, and intelligence support to policymakers during P5+1 nuclear negotiations with Iran. The briefing notes that updated contingency plans have been coordinated with GCHQ to reflect changes in both intelligence access capabilities and Iran's evolving offensive capabilities.\n\nThe most significant section addresses Iranian cyber attacks and represents a candid intelligence assessment of blowback from Western offensive cyber operations. The NSA reports that Iran is conducting an ongoing series of distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) attacks against numerous U.S. financial institutions, currently in the third phase of attacks that began in August 2012. SIGINT reporting indicates these attacks are explicitly \"in retaliation to Western activities against Iran's nuclear sector\" and that senior officials in the Iranian government are aware of and directing these operations. The NSA expects Iran will continue these attacks while adapting tactics and techniques to circumvent defensive countermeasures. More concerning is Iran's August 2012 destructive cyber attack against Saudi Aramco, during which data was destroyed on tens of thousands of computers—the first destructive attack the NSA had observed from Iran. The document makes the critical assessment that \"Iran, having been a victim of a similar cyber attack against its own oil industry in April 2012, has demonstrated a clear ability to learn from the capabilities and actions of others.\" While the NSA states it has no current indications that Iran plans such a destructive attack against U.S. or UK targets, the agency cannot rule out the possibility, especially given increasing international pressure on the Iranian regime.\n\nThe contingency planning section describes NSA's coordination throughout the U.S. Intelligence Community with plans synchronized with CENTCOM, EUCOM, and CYBERCOM. The planned battle rhythm focuses on production deadlines feeding daily briefings and intelligence requirements for policymakers and Combatant Commands. NSA's Iran Division has held video teleconferences with GCHQ's Iran leadership team to discuss ongoing contingency planning efforts. The document describes how successful joint surge operations with GCHQ have refined processes for maintaining mission continuity, seamless transition, and maximizing target coverage during critical events including Iran's discovery of computer network exploitation (CNE) tools on their networks in both 2012 and 2013. The third section reveals previously undisclosed trilateral intelligence cooperation: in January 2013, the first-ever trilateral video teleconference on an Iranian issue was held between NSA, GCHQ, and ISNU (Israeli SIGINT National Unit) participants during an NSA-ISNU analytic workshop on Iranian Leadership. This trilateral effort focuses on a specific redacted topic, with the document noting that respective bilateral relationships had progressed to where all participants recognized the need for trilateral engagement. However, a \"Potential Landmine\" warning clarifies that while GCHQ has long advocated for broad trilateral arrangements with NSA and ISNU to target Iran, SID policy opposes such blanket cooperation, and this specific trilateral should not be interpreted as a change in that policy—in other areas, NSA and GCHQ continue sharing information from their respective bilateral relationships with Israel separately rather than in joint sessions.",
"tags": [
"blowback effects",
"offensive cyber operations",
"Saudi Aramco",
"destructive malware",
"data destruction",
"DDoS",
"retaliation",
"cyber warfare",
"Israel collaboration",
"GCHQ collaboration",
"nuclear program",
"adversary tradecraft",
"Computer Network Exploitation"
],
"document": {
"creator": "NSA",
"date_created": "2013-04-12",
"classification": [
"TOP SECRET",
"COMINT"
],
"dissemination": [
"NOFORN"
],
"banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN",
"genre": "report",
"programs": [],
"countries": [
"Iran",
"Israel"
],
"people": []
},
"publication": [
{
"publisher": "The Intercept",
"date_published": "2015-02-10",
"title": "NSA Claims Iran Learned from Western Cyberattacks",
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2015/02/10/nsa-iran-developing-sophisticated-cyber-attacks-learning-attacks/",
"reporters": [
"Greenwald, Glenn"
],
"contributors": [],
"doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2015/02/10/iran-current-topics-interaction-gchq/",
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1658374/iran-current-topics-interaction-with-gchq.pdf"
}
],
"pdf_sha256": "7857876b92f90f67424b569f5a80e9c22b892316ba7982d620adefa124b8ed99",
"pages": 2
}