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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20320108
# NSA Relationship With the Israeli SIGINT National Unit
04/26/2007
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20320108
## Israeli SIGINT National UNIT
## "Who Are Those Guys?"
* SIGINT arm of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF)
* Hqtrs in Tel Aviv - other production Centers - Syria, PA, Egypt, Lebanon
- informal
* Approximately 5,500 enlisted conscripts
– 1,200 career officers
- WORKED HARD / Low Pay
- 2ND TO AIR FORCE
* NSA's Most Valued Third Party partner
- MCUA
* Strong analytic and technical capabilities
- DA/00
* Planned Move to Negev - NOT POPULAR
- collect FROM 22 countries
- imbalance
04/26/2007
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20320108
## Terms of SIGINT Relationship with Israel
* Initiated by CIA 1950s
* SECRET level technology exchange for SIGINT
* Formal Relationship With NSA1970s
* initially CAT II
- CT Focus
* later expanded to CAT III
- Behind the scene tool for security guarantees
* Guidelines for SIGINT Cooperation
* CHIPPEWA Circuit: 24/7 direct link
* 10.6 million last year
04/26/2007
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## Guidelines For SIGINT Cooperation with Israel
* 1984 - Identifies and defines areas of exchange (analytical and technical)
* 1989-revised to reflect growth in the partnership
* Broadly Written
* Cooperation is FORNSAT-based
* *some notable exceptions
04/26/2007
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20320108
## Representation
* 1992 - First SIGINT Liaison Officer in Tel Aviv
* ISNU Washington Liaison Officer
* Based from Israeli Embassy
* Frequent visits to NSA
04/26/2007
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20320108
## June 2007 Temporary SLO
* Fill-in During SLO R&R
* cover position
* In-country SIGINT support to COS and US Ambassador
* ensures coordination between NSAW and ISNU
04/26/2007
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20320108
## Events in Gaza and Northern Israel
* Kidnapping of Cpl Gil'ad Shalit, IDF soldier, on 25 June, in Israeli territory
* SUMMER RAIN - IDF Response
* 12 July ambush and kidnapping of two IDF in Northern Israel
* CHANGE OF DIRECTION –IDF
* BROKEN SHELL -ISNU
* War Scenario
- Kial Butt - take NANCY Air Power
* High anxiety - heavy reliance on NSA for support
04/26/2007
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## What Did ISNU Want?
* Everything!!!
* Heavy Israeli focus on:
* soldier's condition and location
* geolocational data
- Proclen Area Dani Lattfor
* Iran's role in kidnappings
* tactical ELINT
* increased tasking of NSA collection
* USG policy issues
* geolocational data
* NSA resources
04/26/2007
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20320108
## Israeli Expectations vs Reality
* ISNU Commander address workforce
- " long Haul -
* Assessed as short-duration IDF operation
* eradicate Hizballah's rocket capability from S. Lebanon
* effect release of kidnapped soldiers
* ISG enjoys popular “9/11- type” support
04/26/2007
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UNCLASSIFIED
## Reality Check
* Hizballah well-prepared/motivated
- tarrein Frucnad IJIZE
- DIDN't exhibit lessons learned from previous encounters,
- lack of coord / Agreement within IDF
* Logistical support from Iran and Syria
- ZELZAL
* Use of civilian neighborhoods
* Bad world press
- Lost 2 FROM ISNU.
- * HODIT Failed to engage with close in weapons systems
* crew not MU Right Ferame OF MIND
04/26/2007
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UNCLASSIFIED
---
UNCLASSIFIED
## Life In Tel Aviv
* Business as usual
* Hotels and restaurants packed
* Increased terror/missile threat
- DINONA hang gliden
- Joffaj
* Little sympathy for civilian non-Israeli casualties from man-on-the street
04/26/2007
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UNCLASSIFIED
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20320108
## Aftermath
* Public confidence in IDF erodes
* IDF image damaged
* Political fallout
* Olmert popularity plunges
* IDF CoS sacked - more to come
* Military morale/confidence low
ISNU Gearing for Round II this Summer
04/26/2007
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UNCLASSIFIED
CARLTON
04/26/2007
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UNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSIFIED
Questions?

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{
"title": "NSA Relationship With the Israeli SIGINT National Unit",
"type": "REPORTED",
"description": "This top secret April 2007 NSA presentation provides an overview of the relationship between NSA and Israel's SIGINT National Unit (ISNU), detailing the organizational structure of Israeli signals intelligence, the history and terms of cooperation since the 1950s, and specific intelligence challenges that arose during the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war when Israeli requests raised USG policy issues over geolocational data and NSA resources.",
"long_description": "The presentation begins with background information on ISNU, describing it as the SIGINT arm of the Israeli Defense Forces headquartered in Tel Aviv with production centers focused on Syria, Palestinian territories, Egypt, and Lebanon. The unit comprises approximately 5,500 enlisted conscripts and 1,200 career officers who work hard for low pay and are considered second in prestige only to the Israeli Air Force. The document characterizes ISNU as \"NSA's Most Valued Third Party partner\", possessing strong analytic and technical capabilities. Handwritten annotations on the slides indicate that ISNU collects intelligence from 22 countries and that there is an \"imbalance\" in the relationship, though the nature of this imbalance is not elaborated.\n\nThe historical overview traces the SIGINT relationship back to the 1950s when the CIA initiated a secret-level technology exchange, with formal NSA cooperation beginning in the 1970s. The partnership initially operated at Category II level focused on counterterrorism, later expanding to Category III status serving as a \"behind the scene tool for security guarantees.\" The 1984 Guidelines for SIGINT Cooperation identified and defined areas of analytical and technical exchange, revised in 1989 to reflect growth in the partnership. The document notes the guidelines are \"broadly written\" and cooperation is primarily FORNSAT-based (foreign satellite intelligence) with \"some notable exceptions.\" A dedicated CHIPPEWA circuit provides 24/7 direct communications, transmitting 10.6 million items in the previous year. NSA established its first SIGINT liaison officer position in Tel Aviv in 1992, with ISNU maintaining a reciprocal liaison officer based at the Israeli Embassy in Washington with frequent NSA visits.\n\nThe core of the presentation examines events during the summer 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, beginning with the June 25 kidnapping of IDF Corporal Gilad Shalit in Israeli territory, followed by the July 12 ambush and kidnapping of two additional IDF soldiers in northern Israel. The Israeli military responses—Operation Summer Rain and Operation Change of Direction—along with ISNU's Operation Broken Shell, created a \"war scenario\" characterized by \"high anxiety\" and \"heavy reliance on NSA for support.\" The slide titled \"What Did ISNU Want?\" lists Israeli requests including everything related to the kidnapped soldiers' condition and location, geolocational data (with a handwritten note marking this as a \"problem area\"), intelligence on Iran's role in the kidnappings, tactical electronic intelligence (ELINT), and increased NSA collection tasking. The presentation identifies \"USG policy issues\" around providing geolocational data and allocating NSA resources as constraint points.\n\nThe assessment describes a significant gap between Israeli expectations and battlefield reality. ISNU's commander initially assessed the operation would be short-duration, aimed at eradicating Hezbollah's rocket capability from southern Lebanon and securing release of kidnapped soldiers, with the Israeli government enjoying popular \"9/11-type\" support. However, the \"Reality Check\" slide reveals that Hezbollah was well-prepared and motivated, operated effectively from civilian neighborhoods, received logistical support from Iran and Syria, and generated \"bad world press\" for Israel. Handwritten annotations indicate problems including loss of two ISNU personnel, coordination failures within the IDF, and specific military failures. Despite the conflict, the presentation notes that life in Tel Aviv continued as \"business as usual\" with hotels and restaurants packed, though there was increased terror and missile threat. A particularly striking observation states there was \"little sympathy for civilian non-Israeli casualties from man-on-the street.\"\n\nThe aftermath section documents significant political and military consequences: public confidence in the IDF eroded with the IDF's image damaged, Prime Minister Olmert's popularity plunged, the IDF Chief of Staff was sacked with more dismissals expected, and military morale and confidence were low. The final substantive slide ominously notes that \"ISNU Gearing for Round II this Summer\"—apparently anticipating another conflict in 2007. The presentation concludes with several slides showing photographs that appear to be from the conflict zone and Tel Aviv, though specific details of these images are not described in the document text. Throughout the presentation, handwritten annotations provide additional context and commentary, suggesting this briefing was actively used and annotated by personnel involved in managing the NSA-ISNU relationship during and after the 2006 war.",
"tags": [
"ISNU",
"NSA third-party partnerships",
"IDF",
"Israel Defense Forces intelligence",
"tel aviv",
"MENA",
"regional analysis",
"CIA",
"secret cooperation",
"intelligence cooperation",
"FORNSAT",
"CHIPPEWA",
"Operation Summer Rain",
"Operation Change of Direction",
"Operation Broken Shell",
"geolocation",
"targeted killing",
"tactical ELINT",
"war planning"
],
"document": {
"creator": "NSA",
"date_created": "2007-04-26",
"classification": [
"TOP SECRET",
"COMINT"
],
"dissemination": [
"REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL"
],
"banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20320108",
"genre": "slides",
"programs": [
"CHIPPEWA"
],
"countries": [
"Israel",
"Syria",
"Palestine",
"Egypt",
"Lebanon",
"Iran"
],
"people": [
"Shalit, Gilad"
]
},
"publication": [
{
"publisher": "The Intercept",
"date_published": "2019-05-29",
"title": "Israel Hated American Ban on Sharing Intel for Assassinations, So U.S. Made New Rules",
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2019/05/29/israel-drone-strikes-intelligence-nsa/",
"reporters": [
"Hussain, Murtaza"
],
"contributors": [],
"doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2019/05/29/nsa-presentation-on-isnu-relationship/",
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/6025736/Isnu-Nsa.pdf"
}
],
"pdf_sha256": "3cd15e598e8add726856ae4bba30424a0b786328c3d004bd285cc738afef6559",
"pages": 17
}