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{
"title": "BULLRUN CoI - Briefing Sheet",
"type": "REPORTED",
"description": "A GCHQ briefing sheet introducing the BULLRUN Community of Interest — the access control framework protecting Five Eyes capabilities to defeat encryption across TLS/SSL, HTTPS, SSH, VPNs, IPSec, encrypted chat and encrypted VoIP — covering the classification structure, handling procedures and protective marking guidance for intelligence derived from cryptanalytic exploitation.",
"long_description": "The briefing sheet is GCHQ's internal introduction to BULLRUN, a Community of Interest originated by NSA and adopted by GCHQ in parallel, with CSEC, DSD and GCSB expected to do likewise. Set out in fifteen numbered paragraphs across four pages, it defines what the compartment protects: both the \"fact of\" a capability against a specific network security technology and the resulting decrypts, whether plaintext or metadata events.\n\nThe stated motivation is that the ability to exploit targets' encrypted communications is \"extremely fragile\" and often enabled through sensitive ECI programmes, and that an aggressive NSA-led effort had recently made major improvements in defeating network security and privacy through Computer Network Exploitation, collaboration with other intelligence agencies, investment in high-performance computers and the development of advanced mathematical techniques — with several ECI compartments potentially applying to the sources, methods and techniques involved. At the time of writing, virtually all GCHQ decryption was carried out by Penetrating Target Defences (PTD) using ARTHUR processing, with decrypts going to the IIB in the NOCON CoI and some placed in ENDUE because of the sensitivity or fragility of the capability. BULLRUN exists because that arrangement did not scale: making best use of the new capabilities required decryption processing to be deployed beyond PTD and its results to reach a wide range of analysts, and the compartment is the counterbalance to the protection lost in doing so.\n \nThe types of security covered are given as TLS/SSL, HTTPS (for example webmail), SSH, encrypted chat, VPNs and encrypted VoIP, explicitly \"not limited to\" that list. Notably, the sheet names no specific exploitable instance of any of them: those are published in a separate Annexe available only to indoctrinated staff. The methods used to achieve exploitation are protected alongside the technologies, including support from organisations internal and external to GCHQ, and the document is blunt that indoctrination buys no insight into them — access to BULLRUN \"does NOT imply any need-to-know the details of sources and methods and, in general, there will be NO need-to-know.\" Requests for that detail go to OPC-SEC and may require clearance for further ECIs.\n\nThe CoI is owned by the Deputy Director for Penetrating Target Defences, with management delegated to the PTD Lead for Special Operations and Policy and the PTD Security and Release Authority (OPC-SEC). Access must be sponsored by a GC8 or above with a business case documenting need-to-know; contractor access is limited, requires a strong case and is to be discussed with the Authority's delegates before submission; requests go by email to PTDAccesses, and sponsors are responsible for notifying OPC-SEC when someone no longer needs access. Material must carry the label \"BULLRUN\" in addition to its privacy marking, and use of that marking is restricted to GCHQ and its Sigint 2nd Parties.\n\nProtective marking guidance then sets three tiers. At SECRET STRAP1 COMINT AUSCANZUKUS EYES: the fact that GCHQ has unspecified capabilities against network security technologies such as TLS/SSL, HTTPS, SSH, VPNs and IPSec, with the caveat that capability does not necessarily equate to decryption capability. At TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT AUSCANZUKUS EYES: the fact that GCHQ or a 2nd Party partner has some capability against a class or type of technology. At TOP SECRET STRAP2 COMINT BULLRUN AUSCANZUKUS EYES: capability against a specific technology, exploitation of specific communications, and the decrypts themselves — any of which may additionally be protected by further ECIs and tighter Eyes restrictions.\n\nThe handling rules are the sheet's sharpest provision. Reports derived from BULLRUN material must not reveal or imply that the source data was decrypted, and must not reveal the network communication technology that carried the communication; dissemination of BULLRUN-derived data other than in product reports requires prior approval from OPC-SEC. The effect is that the fact of decryption is kept out of finished intelligence, so a customer reading a BULLRUN-sourced report would have no way to tell that it rested on broken encryption. The document closes with a plain-language glossary of HTTPS, IPSec, SSH, SSL, TLS, VoIP and VPN, which suggests it was written for managers and sponsors without a cryptanalytic background rather than for the cryptanalysts themselves.",
"tags": [
"PTD",
"OPC-SEC",
"ECI",
"CSEC",
"DSD",
"GCSB",
"TLS",
"SSL",
"HTTP",
"SSH",
"VPNs",
"IPSec",
"PPTP",
"encrypted chat",
"encrypted VoIP",
"Computer Network Exploitation",
"HPC",
"High Performance Computing",
"advanced mathematics",
"access control",
"indoctrination",
"need-to-know",
"protective marking",
"classification guide",
"handling procedures",
"fact of capability",
"metadata",
"VPN decryption",
"VPN exploitation"
],
"document": {
"creator": "GCHQ",
"date_created": "",
"classification": [
"TOP SECRET",
"STRAP 1",
"COMINT"
],
"dissemination": [],
"banner": "TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT",
"genre": "other",
"programs": [
"BULLRUN",
"ARTHUR",
"IIB",
"ENDUE"
],
"countries": [],
"people": []
},
"publication": [
{
"publisher": "The New York Times",
"date_published": "2013-09-05",
"title": "N.S.A. Able to Foil Basic Safeguards of Privacy on Web",
"link": "https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/us/nsa-foils-much-internet-encryption.html",
"reporters": [
"Perlroth, Nicole",
"Larson, Jeff",
"Shane, Scott"
],
"contributors": [
"Markoff, John"
],
"version": "nsa-bullrun-brief-nyt-13-0905"
},
{
"publisher": "ProPublica",
"date_published": "2013-09-05",
"title": "Revealed: The NSA's Secret Campaign to Crack, Undermine Internet Security",
"link": "https://www.propublica.org/article/the-nsas-secret-campaign-to-crack-undermine-internet-encryption",
"reporters": [
"Larson, Jeff"
],
"contributors": [
"Markoff, John"
]
},
{
"publisher": "Der Spiegel",
"date_published": "2014-12-28",
"title": "Prying Eyes: Inside the NSA's War on Internet Security",
"link": "https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/inside-the-nsa-s-war-on-internet-security-a-1010361.html",
"reporters": [
"Appelbaum, Jacob",
"Gibson, Aaron",
"Grothoff, Christian",
"Müller-Maguhn, Andy",
"Poitras, Laura",
"Sontheimer, Michael",
"Stöcker, Christian"
],
"contributors": [],
"doc_url": "https://cdn.prod.www.spiegel.de/media/60437fa9-0001-0014-0000-000000035531/media-35531.pdf",
"version": "spiegel_-_media-35531"
}
],
"aka_id": [],
"archive_comment": "The document was first published by ProPublica and the New York Times on 5 September 2013, accompanying their joint reporting on the BULLRUN programme. Der Spiegel published it again on 28 December 2014 as part of their encryption investigation. Three published versions exist with slightly different redactions — Der Spiegel's version is the least redacted. The Guardian also ran a joint story (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security) with ProPublica and NYTimes, but it didn't publish this document.",
"pdf_sha256": "96b35ab2cb1736c44e6fef4d7b7ab06728b71eba33c205d447b10bf58ab0f7e8",
"pages": 4,
"versions": {
"nsa-bullrun-brief-nyt-13-0905": {
"pdf_sha256": "e381aa52291afff7cc1ace3d085b1306dfc1225671d6f88019369ff4d08955c0",
"changed_pages": [
1,
2,
3
]
},
"spiegel_-_media-35531": {
"pdf_sha256": "830cb311574fd6631328a3e49ea2a01cca472156f10a84e5adcaacfa450a5528",
"changed_pages": [
1
]
}
}
}

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TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
BULLRUN CoI - Briefing Sheet
Introduction
1. The ability to exploit targets' encrypted communications is extremely fragile and is
often enabled through sensitive ECI programmes. The need to take additional
measures to protect that capability has long been recognised. Currently, virtually
all decryption is carried out by PTD (ARTHUR) processing with decrypts going to
the IIB in the NOCON CoI; some decrypts are placed in the ENDUE CoI due to
the sensitivity or fragility of the exploitation capability.
2. In recent years there has been an aggressive effort, lead by NSA, to make major
improvements in defeating network security and privacy involving multiple
sources and methods, all of which are extremely sensitive and fragile. These
include: Computer Network Exploitation (CNE); collaboration with other
Intelligence Agencies; investment in high-performance computers; and
development of advanced mathematical techniques [REDACTED]
3. Making the best use of these new capabilities requires that decryption processing
be widely deployed beyond PTD and the results of that processing be available to
a wide range of analysts. This inevitably makes it harder to protect this sensitive
and fragile capability and we need to counterbalance this by introducing
measures to control access to this material and heighten awareness of the
sensitivities amongst those who have access.
4. To achieve this, NSA has introduced the BULLRUN CoI to protect our abilities to
defeat the encryption used in network communication technologies. This covers
both the "fact of" a capability against a specific technology and resulting decrypts
(which may be either plaintext or metadata (events). GCHQ is also introducing
BULLRUN. (CSEC, DSD and GCSB are expected to do likewise.)
Control Authority
5. The BULLRUN CoI is owned by the Deputy Director for Penetrating Target
Defences (PTD). Authority to manage the CoI is delegated to the PTD Lead for
Special Operations and Policy (currently [REDACTED]) and the PTD Security
and Release Authority (OPC-SEC, currently [REDACTED]).
BULLRUN Sensitivity and Coverage
6. It is imperative to protect the fact that GCHQ, NSA and their Sigint partners have
capabilities against specific network security technologies as well as the number
and scope of successes. These capabilities are among the Sigint community's
most fragile, and the inadvertent disclosure of the simple "fact of" could alert the
adversary and result in immediate loss of the capability. Consequently, any
admission of "fact of" a capability to defeat encryption used in specific network
communication technologies or disclosure of details relating to that capability
must be protected by the BULLRUN COI and restricted to those specifically
1 of 4
This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under
other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED] or email [REDACTED]
TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
indoctrinated for BULLRUN. The various types of security covered by BULLRUN
include, but are not limited to, TLS/SSL, https (e.g. webmail), SSH, encrypted
chat, VPNs and encrypted VOIP. The specific instances of these technologies
that can be exploited will be published in a separate Annexe (available to
BULLRUN indoctrinated staff).
7. In addition to the specific technologies that GCHQ or its Sigint partners are able
to exploit, the methods used to achieve the exploitation must also be protected.
These include support from other organisations, both internal and external to
GCHQ. Access to BULLRUN does NOT imply any "need-to-know" the details of
sources and methods used to achieve exploitation and, in general, there will be
NO "need-to-know". Requests for access to information on sources and methods
should be sent to OPC-SEC; if considered appropriate, this access may require
clearance for certain ECIs.
8. BULLRUN material, data, and details must be protected with the use of the
BULLRUN CoI and be marked with the label "BULLRUN," in addition to the
required privacy marking and other descriptors. Use of the BULLRUN marking
is restricted to GCHQ and its Sigint 2nd Parties.
Access and Security
9. Requests for access to the CoI must be sponsored by a GC8 or above and must
be accompanied by a business case outlining the "need-to-know". Access for
contractors will be limited and will require a strong business case; such requests
should be discussed with the CoI Authority's delegates before submission.
Requests for access are to be sent by email to PTDAccesses.
10. Knowledge of BULLRUN information and access to the BULLRUN CoI will only
be granted to indoctrinated individuals.
11. It is the responsibility of sponsors (or their successors) to notify OPC-SEC (via
PTDAccesses) when an individual no longer require access to BULLRUN.
Handling Procedures
12. Owners of BULLRUN materials are responsible for correctly marking the
information and for ensuring that it is handled according to guidelines for
protecting classified or COI information.
13. Reports derived from BULLRUN material shall not reveal (or imply) that the
source data was decrypted. The network communication technology that carried
the communication should not be revealed.
14. Further dissemination, other than in product reports, of any data or information
derived from BULLRUN data must be thoroughly justified and receive prior
approval from OPC-SEC.
2 of 4
This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under
other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED] or email [REDACTED]
TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
15. All questions or concerns regarding BULLRUN material and information should
be directed to OPC-SEC.
Protective Marking Guidance
The following offers some guidance on Protective Markings (PM) for BULLRUN
material. Questions regarding PMs can be directed to the CoI Authority's delegates.
At SECRET STRAP1 COMINT AUSCANZUKUS EYES :
The fact that GCHQ has unspecified capabilities against network security
technologies eg TLS/SSL, HTTPS, SSH, VPNs, IPSec. NB capability does not
necessarily equate to decryption capability.
At TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT AUSCANZUKUS EYES :
The fact that GCHQ or its 2nd Party partners has some capability against the
encryption used in a class or type of network communications technology. For
example, VPNs, IPSec, TSL/SSL, HTTPS, SSH, encrypted chat, encrypted VoIP.
At TOP SECRET STRAP2 COMINT BULLRUN AUSCANZUKUS EYES :
The fact that GCHQ or a 2nd Party partner has a capability against a specific
encrypted network security technology - see Annexe for details. (At a minimum,
specific capabilities may be protected by additional ECIs and restriction on "Eyes".)
The fact that GCHQ or its partners exploits specific encrypted network
communications - see Annexe for details. (At a minimum, specific capabilities may
be protected by additional ECIs and restriction on "Eyes".)
Decrypts (plaintext or derived events / metadata) obtained from BULLRUN
capabilities. (At a minimum, specific capabilities may be protected by additional
restriction on "Eyes" and, in a few cases, additional ECIs.)
GLOSSARY
(U) HTTPS - HTTP traffic secured inside an SSL/TLS session, indicated by the
https:// URL, commonly using TCP port 443
(U) IPSEC -- IPSec, or IP Security, is the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
standard for layer 3 real-time communication security. IPSec allows two hosts (or two
gateways) to establish a secure connection, sometimes called a tunnel. All traffic is
protected at the network layer.
(U) SSH - Secure Shell. A common protocol used for secure remote computer
access
3 of 4
This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under
other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED] or email [REDACTED]
TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
(U) SSL - Secure Sockets Layer. Commonly used to provide secure network
communication. Widely used on the internet to provide secure web browsing,
webmail, instant messaging, electronic commerce, etc.
(U) TLS - Transport Layer Security. The follow-on to SSL, SSLv3 and TLSv1.0 are
nearly identical.
(U) VoIP - Voice over Internet Protocol. A general term for the using IP networks to
make voice phone calls. The application layer protocol can be standards-based (e.g.,
H.323, SIP), or proprietary (e.g., Skype).
(U) VPN - Virtual Private Network. A private network that makes use of the public
telecommunications infrastructure, maintaining privacy via the use of a tunneling
protocol and security procedures that typically include encryption. Common protocols
include IPSEC and PPTP.
4 of 4
This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under
other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED] or email [REDACTED]

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BULLRUN CoI – Briefing Sheet
Introduction
1. The ability to exploit targets’ encrypted communications is extremely fragile and is often enabled through sensitive ECI programmes. The need to take additional measures to protect that capability has long been recognised. Currently, virtually all decryption is carried out by PTD (ARTHUR) processing with decrypts going to the IIB in the NOCON CoI; some decrypts are placed in the ENDUE CoI due to the sensitivity or fragility of the exploitation capability.
2. In recent years there has been an aggressive effort, lead by NSA, to make major improvements in defeating network security and privacy involving multiple sources and methods, all of which are extremely sensitive and fragile. These include: Computer Network Exploitation (CNE); collaboration with other Intelligence Agencies; investment in high-performance computers; and development of advanced mathematical techniques. Several ECI compartments may apply to the specific sources, methods, and techniques involved.
3. Making the best use of these new capabilities requires that decryption processing be widely deployed beyond PTD and the results of that processing be available to a wide range of analysts. This inevitably makes it harder to protect this sensitive and fragile capability and we need to counterbalance this by introducing measures to control access to this material and heighten awareness of the sensitivities amongst those who have access.
4. To achieve this, NSA has introduced the BULLRUN CoI to protect our abilities to defeat the encryption used in network communication technologies. This covers both the “fact of” a capability against a specific technology and resulting decrypts (which may be either plaintext or metadata (events). GCHQ is also introducing BULLRUN. (CSEC, DSD and GCSB are expected to do likewise.)
Control Authority
5. The BULLRUN CoI is owned by [REDACTED] for Penetrating Target Defences (PTD). Authority to manage the CoI is delegated to [REDACTED] (currently [REDACTED]) and [REDACTED] ([REDACTED], currently [REDACTED]).
BULLRUN Sensitivity and Coverage
6. It is imperative to protect the fact that GCHQ, NSA and their Sigint partners have capabilities against specific network security technologies as well as the number and scope of successes. These capabilities are among the Sigint community’s most fragile, and the inadvertent disclosure of the simple “fact of” could alert the adversary and result in immediate loss of the capability. Consequently, any admission of “fact of” a capability to defeat encryption used in specific network communication technologies or disclosure of details relating to that capability must be protected by the BULLRUN COI and restricted to those specifically indoctrinated for BULLRUN. The various types of security covered by BULLRUN include, but are not limited to, TLS/SSL, https (e.g. webmail), SSH, encrypted chat, VPNs and encrypted VOIP. The specific instances of these technologies that can be exploited will be published in a separate Annexe (available to BULLRUN indoctrinated staff).
7. In addition to the specific technologies that GCHQ or its Sigint partners are able to exploit, the methods used to achieve the exploitation must also be protected. These include support from other organisations, both internal and external to GCHQ. Access to BULLRUN does NOT imply any “need-to-know” the details of sources and methods used to achieve exploitation and, in general, there will be NO “need-to-know”. Requests for access to information on sources and methods should be sent to OPC-SEC; if considered appropriate, this access may require clearance for certain ECIs.
8. BULLRUN material, data, and details must be protected with the use of the BULLRUN CoI and be marked with the label “BULLRUN,” in addition to the required privacy marking and other descriptors. Use of the BULLRUN marking is restricted to GCHQ and its Sigint 2nd Parties.
Access and Security
9. Requests for access to the CoI must be sponsored by a GC8 or above and must be accompanied by a business case outlining the “need-to-know”. Access for contractors will be limited and will require a strong business case; such requests should be discussed with the CoI Authority’s delegates before submission. Requests for access are to be sent by email to PTDAccesses.
10. Knowledge of BULLRUN information and access to the BULLRUN CoI will only be granted to indoctrinated individuals.
11. It is the responsibility of sponsors (or their successors) to notify [REDACTED] when an individual no longer require access to BULLRUN.
Handling Procedures
12. Owners of BULLRUN materials are responsible for correctly marking the information and for ensuring that it is handled according to guidelines for protecting classified or COI information.
13. Reports derived from BULLRUN material shall not reveal (or imply) that the source data was decrypted. The network communication technology that carried the communication should not be revealed.
14. Further dissemination, other than in product reports, of any data or information derived from BULLRUN data must be thoroughly justified and receive prior approval from [REDACTED].
15. All questions or concerns regarding BULLRUN material and information should be directed to [REDACTED].
Protective Marking Guidance
The following offers some guidance on Protective Markings (PM) for BULLRUN material. Questions regarding PMs can be directed to the CoI Authority’s delegates.
At SECRET STRAP1 COMINT AUSCANZUKUS EYES :
The fact that GCHQ has unspecified capabilities against network security technologies eg TLS/SSL, HTTPS, SSH, VPNs, IPSec. NB capability does not necessarily equate to decryption capability.
At TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT AUSCANZUKUS EYES :
The fact that GCHQ or its 2nd Party partners has some capability against the encryption used in a class or type of network communications technology. For example, VPNs, IPSec, TSL/SSL, HTTPS, SSH, encrypted chat, encrypted VoIP.
At TOP SECRET STRAP2 COMINT BULLRUN AUSCANZUKUS EYES :
The fact that GCHQ or a 2nd Party partner has a capability against a specific encrypted network security technology – see Annexe for details. (At a minimum, specific capabilities may be protected by additional ECIs and restriction on “Eyes”.)
The fact that GCHQ or its partners exploits specific encrypted network communications – see Annexe for details. (At a minimum, specific capabilities may be protected by additional ECIs and restriction on “Eyes”.)
Decrypts (plaintext or derived events / metadata) obtained from BULLRUN capabilities. (At a minimum, specific capabilities may be protected by additional restriction on “Eyes” and, in a few cases, additional ECIs.)
GLOSSARY
(U) HTTPS – HTTP traffic secured inside an SSL/TLS session, indicated by the https:// URL, commonly using TCP port 443
(U) IPSEC -- IPSec, or IP Security, is the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) standard for layer 3 real-time communication security. IPSec allows two hosts (or two gateways) to establish a secure connection, sometimes called a tunnel. All traffic is protected at the network layer.
(U) SSH – Secure Shell. A common protocol used for secure remote computer access
(U) SSL – Secure Sockets Layer. Commonly used to provide secure network communication. Widely used on the internet to provide secure web browsing, webmail, instant messaging, electronic commerce, etc.
(U) TLS – Transport Layer Security. The follow-on to SSL, SSLv3 and TLSv1.0 are nearly identical.
(U) VoIP – Voice over Internet Protocol. A general term for the using IP networks to make voice phone calls. The application layer protocol can be standards-based (e.g., H.323, SIP), or proprietary (e.g., Skype).
(U) VPN – Virtual Private Network. A private network that makes use of the public telecommunications infrastructure, maintaining privacy via the use of a tunneling protocol and security procedures that typically include encryption. Common protocols include IPSEC and PPTP.

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TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
BULLRUN CoI - Briefing Sheet
Introduction
1. The ability to exploit targets' encrypted communications is extremely fragile and is
often enabled through sensitive ECI programmes. The need to take additional
measures to protect that capability has long been recognised. Currently, virtually
all decryption is carried out by PTD ([REDACTED]) processing with decrypts going to
the IIB in the NOCON CoI; some decrypts are placed in the ENDUE CoI due to
the sensitivity or fragility of the exploitation capability.
2. In recent years there has been an aggressive effort, lead by NSA, to make major
improvements in defeating network security and privacy involving multiple
sources and methods, all of which are extremely sensitive and fragile. These
include: Computer Network Exploitation (CNE); collaboration with other
Intelligence Agencies; investment in high-performance computers; and
development of advanced mathematical techniques. Several ECI compartments
may apply to the specific sources, methods, and techniques involved.
3. Making the best use of these new capabilities requires that decryption processing
be widely deployed beyond PTD and the results of that processing be available to
a wide range of analysts. This inevitably makes it harder to protect this sensitive
and fragile capability and we need to counterbalance this by introducing
measures to control access to this material and heighten awareness of the
sensitivities amongst those who have access.
4. To achieve this, NSA has introduced the BULLRUN CoI to protect our abilities to
defeat the encryption used in network communication technologies. This covers
both the "fact of" a capability against a specific technology and resulting decrypts
(which may be either plaintext or metadata (events). GCHQ is also introducing
BULLRUN. (CSEC, DSD and GCSB are expected to do likewise.)
Control Authority
5. The BULLRUN CoI is owned by the Deputy Director for Penetrating Target
Defences (PTD). Authority to manage the CoI is delegated to the PTD Lead for
Special Operations and Policy (currently [REDACTED]) and the PTD Security
and Release Authority (OPC-SEC, currently [REDACTED]).
BULLRUN Sensitivity and Coverage
6. It is imperative to protect the fact that GCHQ, NSA and their Sigint partners have
capabilities against specific network security technologies as well as the number
and scope of successes. These capabilities are among the Sigint community's
most fragile, and the inadvertent disclosure of the simple "fact of" could alert the
adversary and result in immediate loss of the capability. Consequently, any
admission of "fact of" a capability to defeat encryption used in specific network
communication technologies or disclosure of details relating to that capability
must be protected by the BULLRUN COI and restricted to those specifically
1 of 4
This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under
other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
indoctrinated for BULLRUN. The various types of security covered by BULLRUN
include, but are not limited to, TLS/SSL, https (e.g. webmail), SSH, encrypted
chat, VPNs and encrypted VOIP. The specific instances of these technologies
that can be exploited will be published in a separate Annexe (available to
BULLRUN indoctrinated staff).
7. In addition to the specific technologies that GCHQ or its Sigint partners are able
to exploit, the methods used to achieve the exploitation must also be protected.
These include support from other organisations, both internal and external to
GCHQ. Access to BULLRUN does NOT imply any "need-to-know" the details of
sources and methods used to achieve exploitation and, in general, there will be
NO "need-to-know". Requests for access to information on sources and methods
should be sent to OPC-SEC; if considered appropriate, this access may require
clearance for certain ECIs.
8. BULLRUN material, data, and details must be protected with the use of the
BULLRUN CoI and be marked with the label "BULLRUN," in addition to the
required privacy marking and other descriptors. Use of the BULLRUN marking
is restricted to GCHQ and its Sigint 2nd Parties.
Access and Security
9. Requests for access to the CoI must be sponsored by a GC8 or above and must
be accompanied by a business case outlining the "need-to-know". Access for
contractors will be limited and will require a strong business case; such requests
should be discussed with the CoI Authority's delegates before submission.
Requests for access are to be sent by email to PTDAccesses.
10. Knowledge of BULLRUN information and access to the BULLRUN CoI will only
be granted to indoctrinated individuals.
11. It is the responsibility of sponsors (or their successors) to notify OPC-SEC (via
PTDAccesses) when an individual no longer require access to BULLRUN.
Handling Procedures
12. Owners of BULLRUN materials are responsible for correctly marking the
information and for ensuring that it is handled according to guidelines for
protecting classified or COI information.
13. Reports derived from BULLRUN material shall not reveal (or imply) that the
source data was decrypted. The network communication technology that carried
the communication should not be revealed.
14. Further dissemination, other than in product reports, of any data or information
derived from BULLRUN data must be thoroughly justified and receive prior
approval from OPC-SEC.
2 of 4
This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under
other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
15. All questions or concerns regarding BULLRUN material and information should
be directed to OPC-SEC.
Protective Marking Guidance
The following offers some guidance on Protective Markings (PM) for BULLRUN
material. Questions regarding PMs can be directed to the CoI Authority's delegates.
At SECRET STRAP1 COMINT AUSCANZUKUS EYES :
The fact that GCHQ has unspecified capabilities against network security
technologies eg TLS/SSL, HTTPS, SSH, VPNs, IPSec. NB capability does not
necessarily equate to decryption capability.
At TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT AUSCANZUKUS EYES :
The fact that GCHQ or its 2nd Party partners has some capability against the
encryption used in a class or type of network communications technology. For
example, VPNs, IPSec, TSL/SSL, HTTPS, SSH, encrypted chat, encrypted VoIP.
At TOP SECRET STRAP2 COMINT BULLRUN AUSCANZUKUS EYES :
The fact that GCHQ or a 2nd Party partner has a capability against a specific
encrypted network security technology - see Annexe for details. (At a minimum,
specific capabilities may be protected by additional ECIs and restriction on "Eyes".)
The fact that GCHQ or its partners exploits specific encrypted network
communications - see Annexe for details. (At a minimum, specific capabilities may
be protected by additional ECIs and restriction on "Eyes".)
Decrypts (plaintext or derived events / metadata) obtained from BULLRUN
capabilities. (At a minimum, specific capabilities may be protected by additional
restriction on "Eyes" and, in a few cases, additional ECIs.)
GLOSSARY
(U) HTTPS - HTTP traffic secured inside an SSL/TLS session, indicated by the
https:// URL, commonly using TCP port 443
(U) IPSEC -- IPSec, or IP Security, is the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
standard for layer 3 real-time communication security. IPSec allows two hosts (or two
gateways) to establish a secure connection, sometimes called a tunnel. All traffic is
protected at the network layer.
(U) SSH - Secure Shell. A common protocol used for secure remote computer
access
(U) SSL - Secure Sockets Layer. Commonly used to provide secure network
communication. Widely used on the internet to provide secure web browsing,
webmail, instant messaging, electronic commerce, etc.
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This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under
other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
(U) TLS - Transport Layer Security. The follow-on to SSL, SSLv3 and TLSv1.0 are
nearly identical.
(U) VoIP - Voice over Internet Protocol. A general term for the using IP networks to
make voice phone calls. The application layer protocol can be standards-based (e.g.,
H.323, SIP), or proprietary (e.g., Skype).
(U) VPN - Virtual Private Network. A private network that makes use of the public
telecommunications infrastructure, maintaining privacy via the use of a tunneling
protocol and security procedures that typically include encryption. Common protocols
include IPSEC and PPTP.
4 of 4
This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under
other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT