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data/nsa-cryptanalysis-2-12-guardian-13-0905/metadata.json
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{
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"title": "CLASSIFICATION GUIDE FOR CRYPTANALYSIS, 2-12",
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"type": "REPORTED",
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"description": "An NSA/CSS classification guide for cryptanalysis establishing the precise classification level for each type of information about NSA's capabilities to exploit commercial and indigenous encryption systems — from the unclassified acknowledgement that NSA exploits cryptographic devices, through to the Top Secret protection of cryptographic modifications made to commercial products to render them exploitable and industry relationships used to obtain cryptographic details.",
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"long_description": "This is a TOP SECRET//COMINT NSA/CSS classification guide for cryptanalysis, guide number 02-12, effective 13 September 2005. The guide was issued by Cryptanalysis and Exploitation Services (S31) and establishes the classification level for ten distinct categories of information about NSA's cryptanalytic capabilities.\n\nThe guide's classification ladder is its most significant content, establishing precisely which facts about NSA's encryption exploitation activities can be disclosed and at what level. At the unclassified end, the guide states that the bare fact of NSA exploiting cryptographic devices is unclassified, as is the fact that NSA has cryptanalytic techniques against commercial systems and the fact of successful exploitation without specifying which system. Moving up the classification ladder, the fact that NSA works with Second Party partners on exploitation is Confidential. Working with unspecified Third Party partners is Secret. The fact that NSA obtains cryptographic details of commercial systems through industry relationships is Top Secret at a minimum, with identification of the specific system or company additionally protected as COMINT and by an ECI.\n\nA significant entry is item 5: \"The fact that NSA/CSS makes cryptographic modifications to commercial or indigenous cryptographic information security devices or systems in order to make them exploitable\" is classified at a minimum of Top Secret//COMINT, with the specific system protected by an ECI.\n\nItem 10 similarly protects NSA's industry relationships: \"The fact that NSA/CSS obtains cryptographic details of commercial cryptographic information security systems through industry relationships\" is Top Secret at minimum, with the company or system name additionally protected as COMINT and ECI. This maps directly to the BULLRUN-related ECIs AMBULANT (protecting SIGINT Enabling relationships with industry) and PAWLEYS (protecting clandestine access to cryptographic material) identified in other published documents.\n\nThe definitions section clarifies key terms. An information security device or system is any system providing confidentiality, data integrity, authentication or authorisation. A cryptanalytic vulnerability is a flaw in design, implementation, system integration or usage of cryptography. An unintended cryptographic vulnerability is one where \"security is less than advertised by the manufacturer\" — a carefully worded definition that distinguishes NSA-inserted weaknesses from naturally occurring flaws without explicitly naming either.",
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"tags": [
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"CES",
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"classification guide",
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"cryptanalysis",
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"cryptography",
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"industry relationships",
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"ECI",
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"commercial encryption",
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"backdoors"
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],
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"document": {
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"creator": "NSA",
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"date_created": "2005-09-13",
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"classification": [
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"TOP SECRET",
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"COMINT"
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],
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"dissemination": [],
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"banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//20291123",
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"genre": "guide",
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"programs": [],
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"countries": [],
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"people": []
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},
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"publication": [
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{
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"publisher": "The Guardian",
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"date_published": "2013-09-05",
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"title": "Revealed: how US and UK spy agencies defeat internet privacy and security",
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"link": "https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security",
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"reporters": [
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"Ball, James",
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"Borger, Julian",
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"Greenwald, Glenn"
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],
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"contributors": [],
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"doc_source": "http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/sep/05/nsa-classification-guide-cryptanalysis",
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"note": "The Guardian's version is slightly more redacted compared to Der Spiegel's."
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},
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{
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"publisher": "Der Spiegel",
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"date_published": "2014-12-28",
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"title": "Prying Eyes: Inside the NSA's War on Internet Security",
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"link": "https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/inside-the-nsa-s-war-on-internet-security-a-1010361.html",
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"reporters": [
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"Appelbaum, Jacob",
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"Gibson, Aaron",
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"Grothoff, Christian",
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"Müller-Maguhn, Andy",
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"Poitras, Laura",
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"Sontheimer, Michael",
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"Stöcker, Christian"
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],
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"contributors": [],
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"doc_url": "https://cdn.prod.www.spiegel.de/media/b1667ccd-0001-0014-0000-000000035546/media-35546.pdf",
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"version": "spiegel_-_media-35546"
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}
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],
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"aka_id": [],
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"pdf_sha256": "44651321fc24685dd08c9bb34fe5afc151199f3c7d96303f9450273dcd9dc406",
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"pages": 3,
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"versions": {
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"spiegel_-_media-35546": {
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"pdf_sha256": "a857e0ae1ebcf66420f264de5c5b7b1a0bb83c1e779854fe9d9ffd8abfde976f",
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"changed_pages": [
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1,
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2,
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3
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]
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}
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}
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}
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//20291123
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
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CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
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(U//FOUO) CLASSIFICATION GUIDE FOR
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CRYPTANALYSIS, 2-12
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Effective Date: 13 September 2005
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CLASSIFIED BY: [REDACTED]
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REASON FOR CLASSIFICATION: 1.4 (c)
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DECLASSIFY ON: 20291123
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ENDORSED BY: [REDACTED]
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Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
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Dated: 20041123
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Declassify On: 20291123
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1
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//20291123
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//20291123
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(U//FOUO) CLASSIFICATION GUIDE TITLE/NUMBER: CRYPTANALYSIS Guide 02-12
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(U) PUBLICATION DATE: 13 September 2005
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(U) OFFICE OF ORIGIN: Cryptanalysis & Exploitation Services (S31)
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(U//FOUO) POC: [REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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(U//FOUO) PHONE: [REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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(U//FOUO) ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY: [REDACTED]
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| Description of Information | Classification/ Markings | Reason | Declass | Remarks |
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| :------------------------- | :----------------------- | :----- | :------ | :------ |
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| 1. (U) The fact that NSA/CSS exploits cryptographic information security devices and systems. | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | |
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| 2. (C) The fact that NSA/CSS works with Second Party partners on exploiting cryptographic information security devices and systems. | CONFIDENTIAL | 1.4 (c) | 20291123 | . |
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| 3. (S) The fact that NSA/CSS works with unspecified Third Party partners on exploiting cryptographic information security devices and systems. | SECRET | 1.4 (c) | 20291123 | |
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| 4. (U) The fact that NSA/CSS exploits unintended cryptographic vulnerabilities in commercial or indigenous information security devices and systems, as long as neither the vulnerability nor the targeted device/ system is identified. | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | |
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| 5. (TS//SI) The fact that NSA/CSS makes cryptographic modifications to commercial or indigenous cryptographic information security devices or systems in order to make them exploitable. | TOP SECRET// COMINT at a minimum | 1.4 (c) | 20291123 | (U) Specifying the specific system is protected by an ECI.. |
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| 6. (U) The fact that NSA/CSS has cryptanalytic techniques to exploit cryptographic components of commercial or indigenous information security devices or systems. | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | (U) Additional details will raise the classification and may be protected by an ECI. |
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| 7. (C) The fact that NSA/CSS has the ability to recover cryptovariables used to exploit commercial or indigenous cryptographic information security devices or systems. | CONFIDENTIAL | 1.4 (c) | 20291123 | (C) Details of CV recovery are protected by an ECI.<br><br>(C) Specifying a specific system for which we can recovery CVs is protected by an ECI. |
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2
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//20291123
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//20291123
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| Description of Information | Classification/ Markings | Reason | Declass | Remarks |
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| :------------------------- | :----------------------- | :----- | :------ | :------ |
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| 8. (U) The fact that NSA/CSS successfully exploits cryptographic components of commercial or indigenous cryptographic information security devices or systems without specifying the device or system. | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | (U) Additional details will require the classification and may be protected by an ECI. |
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| 9. (U//FOUO) The fact that NSA/CSS successfully exploits cryptographic components of commercial or indigenous cryptographic information security devices or systems when the device or system is specified. | TOP SECRET// COMINT at a minimum | 1.4 (c) | 20291123 | (U) Additional details may be protected by an ECI. |
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| 10. (TS) The fact that NSA/CSS obtains cryptographic details of commercial cryptographic information security systems through industry relationships. | TOP SECRET at a minimum | 1.4 (c) | 20291123 | (C) Identification of the system or company is protected as COMINT and ECI. |
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(U) DEFINITIONS:
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(U//FOUO) Information security device or system: A device or system that provides any of the following services for communications or information systems: confidentiality, data integrity, authentication and authorization.
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(U//FOUO) Cryptanalytic vulnerability: A flaw in the design, implementation or system integration of cryptography used in an information security device, or a flaw in the way that a cryptographic information security device is used.
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(U//FOUO) Unintended cryptographic vulnerability: Security is less than advertised by the manufacturer.
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(U//FOUO) Indigenous: Non-commercial cryptographic information security system or device developed by a SIGINT target.
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[REDACTED]
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3
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//20291123
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//20291123
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
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CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
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(U//FOUO) CLASSIFICATION GUIDE FOR
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CRYPTANALYSIS, 2-12
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Effective Date: 13 September 2005
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CLASSIFIED BY: [REDACTED] Chief, CES
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REASON FOR CLASSIFICATION: 1.4 (c)
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DECLASSIFY ON: 20291123
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ENDORSED BY: [REDACTED], Director of Policy
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Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
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Dated: 20041123
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Declassify On: 20291123
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1
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//20291123
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//20291123
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(U//FOUO) CLASSIFICATION GUIDE TITLE/NUMBER: CRYPTANALYSIS Guide 02-12
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(U) PUBLICATION DATE: 13 September 2005
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(U) OFFICE OF ORIGIN: Cryptanalysis & Exploitation Services (S31)
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(U//FOUO) POC: [REDACTED] S3109
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[REDACTED] S3109
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(U//FOUO) PHONE: [REDACTED] 963-4871
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[REDACTED] 963-5209
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(U//FOUO) ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY: [REDACTED], Chief/Cryptanalysis & Exploitation Services (S31)
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| Description of Information | Classification/ Markings | Reason | Declass | Remarks |
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| :------------------------- | :----------------------- | :----- | :------ | :------ |
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| 1. (U) The fact that NSA/CSS exploits cryptographic information security devices and systems. | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | |
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| 2. (C) The fact that NSA/CSS works with Second Party partners on exploiting cryptographic information security devices and systems. | CONFIDENTIAL | 1.4 (c) | 20291123 | . |
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| 3. (S) The fact that NSA/CSS works with unspecified Third Party partners on exploiting cryptographic information security devices and systems. | SECRET | 1.4 (c) | 20291123 | |
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| 4. (U) The fact that NSA/CSS exploits unintended cryptographic vulnerabilities in commercial or indigenous information security devices and systems, as long as neither the vulnerability nor the targeted device/ system is identified. | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | |
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| 5. (TS//SI) The fact that NSA/CSS makes cryptographic modifications to commercial or indigenous cryptographic information security devices or systems in order to make them exploitable. | TOP SECRET// COMINT at a minimum | 1.4 (c) | 20291123 | (U) Specifying the specific system is protected by an ECI.. |
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| 6. (U) The fact that NSA/CSS has cryptanalytic techniques to exploit cryptographic components of commercial or indigenous information security devices or systems. | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | (U) Additional details will raise the classification and may be protected by an ECI. |
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| 7. (C) The fact that NSA/CSS has the ability to recover cryptovariables used to exploit commercial or indigenous cryptographic information security devices or systems. | CONFIDENTIAL | 1.4 (c) | 20291123 | (C) Details of CV recovery are protected by an ECI.<br><br>(C) Specifying a specific system for which we can recovery CVs is protected by an ECI. |
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2
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//20291123
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//20291123
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| Description of Information | Classification/ Markings | Reason | Declass | Remarks |
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| :------------------------- | :----------------------- | :----- | :------ | :------ |
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| 8. (U) The fact that NSA/CSS successfully exploits cryptographic components of commercial or indigenous cryptographic information security devices or systems without specifying the device or system. | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | (U) Additional details will require the classification and may be protected by an ECI. |
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| 9. (U//FOUO) The fact that NSA/CSS successfully exploits cryptographic components of commercial or indigenous cryptographic information security devices or systems when the device or system is specified. | TOP SECRET// COMINT at a minimum | 1.4 (c) | 20291123 | (U) Additional details may be protected by an ECI. |
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| 10. (TS) The fact that NSA/CSS obtains cryptographic details of commercial cryptographic information security systems through industry relationships. | TOP SECRET at a minimum | 1.4 (c) | 20291123 | (C) Identification of the system or company is protected as COMINT and ECI. |
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(U) DEFINITIONS:
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(U//FOUO) Information security device or system: A device or system that provides any of the following services for communications or information systems: confidentiality, data integrity, authentication and authorization.
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(U//FOUO) Cryptanalytic vulnerability: A flaw in the design, implementation or system integration of cryptography used in an information security device, or a flaw in the way that a cryptographic information security device is used.
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(U//FOUO) Unintended cryptographic vulnerability: Security is less than advertised by the manufacturer.
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(U//FOUO) Indigenous: Non-commercial cryptographic information security system or device developed by a SIGINT target.
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(U//FOUO) If you have any questions about the content of this page, contact [REDACTED] DC32,
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[REDACTED]
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3
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//20291123
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