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data/nsa-cryptanalysis-2-12-guardian-13-0905/metadata.json
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{
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"title": "CLASSIFICATION GUIDE FOR CRYPTANALYSIS, 2-12",
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"type": "REPORTED",
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"description": "An NSA/CSS classification guide for cryptanalysis establishing the precise classification level for each type of information about NSA's capabilities to exploit commercial and indigenous encryption systems — from the unclassified acknowledgement that NSA exploits cryptographic devices, through to the Top Secret protection of cryptographic modifications made to commercial products to render them exploitable and industry relationships used to obtain cryptographic details.",
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"long_description": "This is a TOP SECRET//COMINT NSA/CSS classification guide for cryptanalysis, guide number 02-12, effective 13 September 2005. The guide was issued by Cryptanalysis and Exploitation Services (S31) and establishes the classification level for ten distinct categories of information about NSA's cryptanalytic capabilities.\n\nThe guide's classification ladder is its most significant content, establishing precisely which facts about NSA's encryption exploitation activities can be disclosed and at what level. At the unclassified end, the guide states that the bare fact of NSA exploiting cryptographic devices is unclassified, as is the fact that NSA has cryptanalytic techniques against commercial systems and the fact of successful exploitation without specifying which system. Moving up the classification ladder, the fact that NSA works with Second Party partners on exploitation is Confidential. Working with unspecified Third Party partners is Secret. The fact that NSA obtains cryptographic details of commercial systems through industry relationships is Top Secret at a minimum, with identification of the specific system or company additionally protected as COMINT and by an ECI.\n\nA significant entry is item 5: \"The fact that NSA/CSS makes cryptographic modifications to commercial or indigenous cryptographic information security devices or systems in order to make them exploitable\" is classified at a minimum of Top Secret//COMINT, with the specific system protected by an ECI.\n\nItem 10 similarly protects NSA's industry relationships: \"The fact that NSA/CSS obtains cryptographic details of commercial cryptographic information security systems through industry relationships\" is Top Secret at minimum, with the company or system name additionally protected as COMINT and ECI. This maps directly to the BULLRUN-related ECIs AMBULANT (protecting SIGINT Enabling relationships with industry) and PAWLEYS (protecting clandestine access to cryptographic material) identified in other published documents.\n\nThe definitions section clarifies key terms. An information security device or system is any system providing confidentiality, data integrity, authentication or authorisation. A cryptanalytic vulnerability is a flaw in design, implementation, system integration or usage of cryptography. An unintended cryptographic vulnerability is one where \"security is less than advertised by the manufacturer\" — a carefully worded definition that distinguishes NSA-inserted weaknesses from naturally occurring flaws without explicitly naming either.",
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"tags": [
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"CES",
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"classification guide",
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"cryptanalysis",
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"cryptography",
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"industry relationships",
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"ECI",
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"commercial encryption",
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"backdoors"
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],
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"document": {
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"creator": "NSA",
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"date_created": "2005-09-13",
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"classification": [
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"TOP SECRET",
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"COMINT"
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],
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"dissemination": [],
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"banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//20291123",
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"genre": "guide",
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"programs": [],
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"countries": [],
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"people": []
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},
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"publication": [
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{
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"publisher": "The Guardian",
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"date_published": "2013-09-05",
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"title": "Revealed: how US and UK spy agencies defeat internet privacy and security",
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"link": "https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security",
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"reporters": [
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"Ball, James",
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"Borger, Julian",
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"Greenwald, Glenn"
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],
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"contributors": [],
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"doc_source": "http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/sep/05/nsa-classification-guide-cryptanalysis",
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"note": "The Guardian's version is slightly more redacted compared to Der Spiegel's."
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},
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{
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"publisher": "Der Spiegel",
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"date_published": "2014-12-28",
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"title": "Prying Eyes: Inside the NSA's War on Internet Security",
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"link": "https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/inside-the-nsa-s-war-on-internet-security-a-1010361.html",
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"reporters": [
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"Appelbaum, Jacob",
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"Gibson, Aaron",
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"Grothoff, Christian",
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"Müller-Maguhn, Andy",
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"Poitras, Laura",
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"Sontheimer, Michael",
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"Stöcker, Christian"
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],
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"contributors": [],
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"doc_url": "https://cdn.prod.www.spiegel.de/media/b1667ccd-0001-0014-0000-000000035546/media-35546.pdf",
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"version": "spiegel_-_media-35546"
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}
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],
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"aka_id": [],
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"pdf_sha256": "44651321fc24685dd08c9bb34fe5afc151199f3c7d96303f9450273dcd9dc406",
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"pages": 3,
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"versions": {
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"spiegel_-_media-35546": {
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"pdf_sha256": "a857e0ae1ebcf66420f264de5c5b7b1a0bb83c1e779854fe9d9ffd8abfde976f",
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"changed_pages": [
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1,
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2,
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3
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]
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}
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}
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}
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