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data/nsa-huawei/metadata.json
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data/nsa-huawei/metadata.json
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{
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"title": "Slides Describe Mission Involving Huawei",
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"type": "REPORTED",
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"description": "This document details an NSA-led strategic initiative to target Huawei due to its dominance in global telecommunications infrastructure. The operation (codenamed \"Shotgiant\") aims to exploit Huawei hardware to maintain access to target communications while investigating the company’s potential role in facilitating People’s Republic of China (PRC) signals intelligence and supply chain subversion.",
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"long_description": "The NSA’s interest in Huawei is driven by the fact that many high-priority intelligence targets—including those in Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kenya, and Cuba—utilize the company’s infrastructure. As noted in a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), the agency views the integration of foreign-produced hardware into the global supply chain as a significant risk for \"persistent, stealthy subversions.\" Consequently, the NSA seeks to determine if Huawei actively conducts SIGINT for the PRC or possesses the capability to launch Denial of Service (DoS) attacks against Western infrastructure.\n\nTo manage this complex target, the NSA organized its efforts into three pillars: the company’s corporate structure, its specific technology, and its global deployment. Success is defined by a 6-to-9-month timeline focused on obtaining actionable intelligence regarding the plans of Huawei and PRC leadership. Crucially, the mission intends to leverage Huawei’s widespread physical presence to gain entry into \"networks of interest\" through Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) tools, effectively turning the company’s infrastructure into a vantage point for Five Eyes surveillance.",
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"tags": [
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"Huawei",
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"PRC",
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"Computer Network Exploitation",
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"supply chain",
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"infrastructure exploitation",
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"telecommunications",
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"TOPI",
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"Target Office of Primary Interest",
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"Denial of Service",
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"DoS",
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"subversion",
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"supply chain attacks"
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],
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"document": {
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"creator": "NSA",
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"date_created": "2010-01-01",
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"classification": [
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"TOP SECRET",
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"COMINT"
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],
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"dissemination": [
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"REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL"
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],
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"banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL",
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"genre": "slides",
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"programs": [
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"SHOTGIANT",
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"FOLLOWTHEMONEY"
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],
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"countries": [
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"China",
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"Iran",
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"Afghanistan",
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"Pakistan",
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"Kenya",
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"Cuba"
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],
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"people": []
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},
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"publication": [
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{
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"publisher": "The New York Times",
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"date_published": "2014-03-22",
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"title": "N.S.A. Breached Chinese Servers Seen as Security Threat",
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"link": "http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/23/world/asia/nsa-breached-chinese-servers-seen-as-spy-peril.html",
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"reporters": [
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"Sanger, David E.",
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"Perlroth, Nicole"
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],
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"contributors": []
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},
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{
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"publisher": "Der Spiegel",
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"date_published": "2014-03-22",
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"title": "NSA Spied on Chinese Government and Networking Firm",
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"link": "https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nsa-spied-on-chinese-government-and-networking-firm-huawei-a-960199.html",
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"reporters": [],
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"contributors": [],
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"reporting_only": true
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}
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],
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"aka_id": [],
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"pdf_sha256": "c1dd77b53e60f8f6cfa1b85c70789aab93930309964baaa27d53d831505e63be",
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"pages": 2
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}
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data/nsa-huawei/nsa-huawei.md
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data/nsa-huawei/nsa-huawei.md
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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(U) Why We Care
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* (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) S2 – many of our targets communicate over Huawei produced products
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* (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) S3 – design, deployment & market expansion impact access to communications .
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* (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) From NIE, The Global Cyber Threat to the US Information Infrastructure: “We assess with high confidence that the increasing role of international companies and foreign individuals in US information technology supply chains and services will increase the potential for persistent, stealthy subversions.”
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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9
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I have kind of been hinting at this all along, but why do we care?
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Many of our targets communicate over Huawei produced products, we want to make sure that we know how to exploit these products - we also want to ensure that we retain access to these communication lines, etc. There is also concern that Huawei's widespread infrastructure will provide the PRC with SIGINT capabilities and enable them to perform denial of service type attacks. This was all stated in the National Intelligence Estimate that came out a few months ago: “the increasing role of international companies and foreign individuals in US information technology supply chains and services will increase the potential for persistent, stealthy subversions.”
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---
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[REDACTED]
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So to recap, this is what we are hoping to accomplish:
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TS//SI//REL) Determine if Huawei is doing SIGINT for PRC.
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(TS//SI//REL) Perform more analysis on Huawei Corp - define relationships, organization, plans, etc.
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(TS//SI//REL) Direct efforts against intelligence gaps - IRM decrypts, underwater fiber, R & D facilities, follow the money, supply chain, etc.
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(TS//SI//REL) Focus on high priority targets - Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kenya, Cuba.
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(TS//SI//REL) Leverage Huawei presence to gain access to networks of interest.
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(TS//SI//REL) Document processes to be used later for targeting other non-partnerable companies.
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TS//SI//REL) How is success defined? (timeline 6-9 months)
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* Obtaining actionable intelligence of Huawei's (and potentially PRC's) leadership plans and intentions
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* Enable SIGINT collection through CNE tools
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So what are we going to do about it? The first step was to form a TOPI, so that we can start to report some of our findings and continue tasking the communications. However, targeting Huawei is a big, messy task. In order to help us focus, we broke Huawei into three pillars: The Company, The Technology, The Deployment of the Technology.
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When we look at these three different aspects of Huawei we found that two topics showed up across the board - marketing and plans/intentions. So that is our main focus. If we can see how Huawei is marketing itself, and working to expand this will help us to understand the company's plans and intentions. If we can determine the company's plans and intentions, we hope that this will lead us back to plans and intentions of the PRC.
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We will consider ourselves a success if we
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* Obtaining actionable intelligence of Huawei's (and potentially PRC's) leadership plans and intentions
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* Enable SIGINT collection through CNE tools
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