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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, ISR
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(TS//SI//REL) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (MOU)
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BETWEEN THE
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE (NSA/CSS)
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AND
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THE ISRAELI SIGINT NATIONAL UNIT (ISNU)
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PERTAINING TO THE PROTECTION OF U.S. PERSONS
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I. (U) PURPOSE
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a. (TS//SI//REL) This agreement between NSA and The Israeli SIGINT National Unit (ISNU) prescribes
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procedures and responsibilities for ensuring that ISNU handling of materials provided by NSA – including, but
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not limited to, Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) technology and equipment and raw SIGINT data (i.e., signals
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intelligence information that has not been reviewed for foreign intelligence purposes or minimized) - is
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consistent with the requirements placed upon NSA by U.S. law and Executive Order to establish safeguards
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protecting the rights of U.S. persons under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
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b. (TS//SI//REL) This agreement will apply to any SIGINT raw traffic, technology, or enabling that NSA may
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provide to ISNU. This agreement applies only to materials provided by NSA and shall not be construed to
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apply to materials collected independently by ISNU.
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c. (TS//SI//REL) ISNU also recognizes that NSA has agreements with Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the
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United Kingdom that require it to protect information associated with U.K. persons, Australian persons,
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Canadian persons and New Zealand persons using procedures and safeguards similar to those applied for U.S.
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persons. For this reason, in all uses of raw material provided by NSA, ISNU agrees to apply the procedures
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outlined in this agreement to persons of these countries.
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d. (U) This agreement is not intended to create any legally enforceable rights and shall not be construed to be
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either an international agreement or a legally binding instrument according to international law.
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II. (U) DEFINITIONS
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a. (C//SI//REL) Raw SIGINT is any SIGINT acquired either as a result of search and development, or targeted
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collection operations against a particular foreign intelligence target before the information has been evaluated
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for foreign intelligence and minimized. Raw SIGINT includes, but is not limited to, unevaluated and
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unminimized transcripts, gists, facsimiles, telex, voice and Digital Network Intelligence (DNI) metadata and
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content.
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b. (U//FOUO) Minimization is the process used to determine whether U.S. person information encountered in
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raw SIGINT is essential to assess or understand the significance of the foreign intelligence. The NSA Special
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US Liaison Advisor Israel (SUSLAIS) should be consulted any time U.S. person information is found in raw
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SIGINT data supplied by NSA.
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c. (U) A U.S. Person is:
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1) (U) a citizen of the United States;
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2) (U) an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States (informally referred to as a
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"green card" holder);
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, ISR
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, ISR
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3) (U) an unincorporated group or association, a substantial number of the members of which constitute (1)
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or (2) above; or
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4) (U) a company incorporated within the United States, including U.S.-flagged non-governmental aircraft
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or vessels, but not including those entities which are openly acknowledged by a foreign government or
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governments to be directed and controlled by them.
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5) (U) Additionally, a person known to be currently in the United States will be treated as a "U.S. person"
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unless that person is reasonably identified as an alien who has not been admitted for permanent
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residence, or if the nature of the person's communications or other information in the contents or
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circumstances of such communications give rise to a reasonable belief that such person is not a U.S.
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person. Any person located outside the United States will be treated as a non-U.S. person unless there is
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a reasonable belief that such person is a U.S. person.
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III. (U) BACKGROUND
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a. (TS//SI//REL) NSA routinely sends ISNU minimized and unminimized raw collection associated with
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selectors from multiple Target Office Primary Interest (TOPI) offices in Analysis and Production, S2 as part of
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the SIGINT relationship between the two organizations. This mutually agreed upon exchange has been
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beneficial to both NSA's and ISNU's mission and intelligence requirements.
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b. (TS//SI//REL) NSA and ISNU have previously discussed the protection of U.S. Person information, in relation
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to tasking joint collection operations, and agreed in principle to not task communications of U.S. citizens. The
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proposal to share unminimized raw collection requires additional procedures to meet formal requirements.
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In March 2009. ISNU was given an overview briefing during the Raw Material conference and agreed, in
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principal to protect U.S. Person information. It was determined that more formalized training is needed. The
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date of this training is TBD.
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IV. (U) RESPONSIBILITIES
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a. (U) NSA shall:
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1) (TS//SI//REL) Provide an annual review and training of these procedures with ISNU.
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2) (TS//SI//REL) Regularly review a sample of files transferred to ISNU to validate the absence of U.S.
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Persons identities.
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b. (U) ISNU shall:
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1) (TS//SI//REL) Not use any technology or equipment that is furnished under the accommodation
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procurement process to (a) intentionally target communications to, from, or about U.S. Persons
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anywhere in the world or (b) intentionally target any person meeting the definition of a U.S. Person
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provided in Section II above.
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2) (TS//SI//REL) Not use any information provided by NSA, as raw material or otherwise, to intentionally
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intercept the communications to, from or about a U.S. person. "Intercept" means the use of words or
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phrases, such as a name, telex number or answerback, address, telephone number, email address or any
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, ISR
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, ISR
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combination of such terms, to acquire non-public communications. It applies to both electronic and
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manual acquisition, including follow-on queries of stored communications.
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3) (TS//SI//REL) Strictly limit access to storage systems containing raw SIGINT provided by NSA
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exclusively to properly cleared ISNU personnel and to properly cleared members of Israeli Intelligence
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services who ISNU has determined have a strict need to know. Access will be limited to those
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individuals who have been trained in the aforementioned procedures.
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4) (TS//SI//REL) Disseminate foreign intelligence information concerning U.S. persons derived from raw
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SIGINT provided by NSA - to include any release outside ISNU in the form of reports, transcripts,
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gists, memoranda, or any other form of written or oral document or transmission -- only in a manner
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that does not identify the U.S. person. ISNU agrees that it will shield the identities of U.S. persons both
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by name and by context, i.e. its disseminations shall be in such a way that a reasonably well-informed
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person cannot identify the U.S. person from the other contents of the dissemination.
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5) (U//FOUO) Ensure that any files containing the identities of U.S. persons withheld from dissemination
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are retained for no more than one year.
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6) (TS//SI//REL) Ensure that any requests from outside parties, including all ISNU customers, for release
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of such identities are referred to NSA, and that same is not released without written permission from
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NSA.
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7) (U//FOUO) Destroy upon recognition any communication contained in raw SIGINT provided by NSA
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that is either to or from an official of the U.S. Government. "U.S. Government officials" include
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officials of the Executive Branch (including the White House, Cabinet Departments, and independent
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agencies); the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate (members and staff); and the U.S. Federal
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Court system (including, but not limited to, the Supreme Court). "Officials" include civilian and
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military members and employees performing the official business of these branches of government, and
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is independent of seniority or position.
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8) (U//FOUO) Process only for purposes unrelated to intelligence against the U.S any communications
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contained in raw SIGINT provided by NSA that include references to activities, policies, and views of
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U.S. officials.
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V. (U) PROCEDURES
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a. (TS//SI//REL) ISNU must inform NSA immediately upon detection, via the SUSLAIS, when the identity of a
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U.S. person is found in the raw SIGINT provided to ISNU. Additionally, ISNU must provide a written report,
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via the SUSLAIS and CHIPPEWA on a quarterly basis, detailing the circumstances of those instances.
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b. (TS//SI//REL) ISNU must inform NSA immediately upon discovery, via the SUSLAIS, of inadvertent
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intercept of U.S. person communications where a selector that is believed to belong to a valid foreign target is
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subsequently found to belong to a U.S. person. ISNU further agrees to detask any and all such selectors, and to
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destroy any intercept collected as a result of such selectors, whether processed or not.
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VI. (U) OVERSIGHT
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a. (TS//SI//REL) ISNU agrees to put in place appropriate management controls to ensure adherence to the above
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policies, and to provide NSA with an annual report describing these controls and enumerating any and all
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, ISR
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, ISR
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violations of the above policies regarding access, collection, and dissemination. This report will be filed with
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the SUSLAIS, who will send it to NSA HQS Office of Inspector General and ISNU Oversight and
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Compliance.
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b. (TS//SI//REL) NSA agrees to assist ISNU with the implementation of appropriate management controls. NSA
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will also provide an annual review and training of these procedures to ISNU.
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VII. (U) REVIEW AND AMENDMENTS
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a. (U) This MOU is effective immediately upon execution and shall remain valid until modified or rescinded by
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mutual agreement. It may be terminated unilaterally upon written notice by either party to the other.
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b. (U) The terms and conditions of this MOU shall be reviewed at least every two years or upon request by any of
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the parties.
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c. (TS//SI//REL) Amendments to this MOU will be in writing, mutually agreed to by both Parties, and executed
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by authorized delegates for the Israeli and U.S. Government. A copy of all amendments will be appended to
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each copy of this document, dated, and consecutively numbered.
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d. (U) Any disputes or disagreements with regard to the interpretation of this MOU will be resolved through
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discussion by all parties. The parties agree that they will not attempt to enforce the terms of the MOU in any
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domestic, third party, or international court or tribunal.
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VIII. (U) LANGUAGE
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(U//FOUO) This agreement is executed in the English language.
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IX. (U) FUNDING
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a. (U) Except as provided herein, this agreement does not sanction the transfer or exchange of appropriated funds
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or authorized manpower between the parties.
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b. (U) No appropriated funds are obligated by this agreement. Funding is subject to availability of appropriated
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funds, and must comply with the Anti-Deficiency Act, 21 U.S.C. § 1341 and § 1517.
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X. (U) POINTS OF CONTACT
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a. (TS//SI//REL) The NSA HQS point of contact for this MOU is the Country Desk Officer (CDO) for Israel,
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Foreign Affairs Directorate.
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b. (TS//SI//REL) The NSA representative to Israel is the Special U.S. Special Liaison Advisor Israel (SUSLAIS).
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c. (U//FOUO) The ISNU point of contact is the Head of ISNU Foreign Relations.
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XI. (U) SIGNATURES
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For the Israeli SIGINT National Unit (ISNU)
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, ISR
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, ISR
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Signature: [REDACTED]
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Title: Commander, Israeli SIGINT National Unit
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Date of Signature:
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For the Government of the United States of America
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National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS)
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Signature:
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Title: Director, National Security Agency
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Date of Signature:
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, ISR
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