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(U) Penetrate Hostile Foreign Intelligence Services
(S//NF) The ability to detect and engage foreign intelligence services and non state actors that target U.S.
interests is critical to our success and security. Adversaries can disrupt intelligence capabilities, sabotage
infrastructure, steal secrets, acquire advanced technology, and adversely impact national defense and economic
44
TOP SECRET//SI/TK//NOFORN
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TOP SECRET//SI/TK//NOFORN
well being. IC CI operations using both human and technical means are strategically focused against priority
targets of China, Russia, Iran, Cuba and Israel and the regions surrounding Pakistan and North Korea.
---
* (TS//SI//NF) Provide insight to US Policymakers on Israeli activities to influence anti-regime elements in
Iran through propaganda and other active measures.
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(S//NF) Intensify counterespionage targeting efforts against priority threat countries. CIA will continue to
conduct offensive CI operations in collaboration with DoD to gather knowledge about technical tradecraft
and capabilities employed by foreign intelligence security services (FISS) in double agent operations. CIA
will employ new investigative approaches to counter espionage threats involving emerging technologies.
For example, CIA will strengthen analytic support and focus production requirements on CI operations
in Russia, China, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, and Cuba to gain greater insight into adversary technical and
HUMINT tradecraft.
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Israel also targets us. On the one hand, the Israelis are extraordinarily good SIGINT
partners for us, but on the other, they target us to learn our positions on Middle East problems. A NIE [National
Intelligence Estimate] ranked them as the third most aggressive intelligence service against the US.
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(TS//SI//NF) As close as the ISNU relationship has become, it has not been without
tension. The Jonathan Pollard incident is one example that had a negative, albeit
temporary, impact to the SIGINT relationship. Balancing the SIGINT exchange equally
between US and Israeli needs has been a constant challenge. In the last decade, it
arguably tilted heavily in favor of Israeli security concerns. 9/11 came, and went, with
NSA's only true Third Party CT relationship being driven almost totally by the needs of
the partner. Nevertheless, the survival of the state of Israel is a paramount goal of US
Middle East policy. There is no doubt that the NSA-ISNU SIGINT relationship is built
upon a solid foundation of trust and common purpose.