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(U) Penetrate Hostile Foreign Intelligence Services
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(S//NF) The ability to detect and engage foreign intelligence services and non state actors that target U.S.
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interests is critical to our success and security. Adversaries can disrupt intelligence capabilities, sabotage
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infrastructure, steal secrets, acquire advanced technology, and adversely impact national defense and economic
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44
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TOP SECRET//SI/TK//NOFORN
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---
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TOP SECRET//SI/TK//NOFORN
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well being. IC CI operations using both human and technical means are strategically focused against priority
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targets of China, Russia, Iran, Cuba and Israel and the regions surrounding Pakistan and North Korea.
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---
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* (TS//SI//NF) Provide insight to US Policymakers on Israeli activities to influence anti-regime elements in
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Iran through propaganda and other active measures.
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---
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(S//NF) Intensify counterespionage targeting efforts against priority threat countries. CIA will continue to
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conduct offensive CI operations in collaboration with DoD to gather knowledge about technical tradecraft
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and capabilities employed by foreign intelligence security services (FISS) in double agent operations. CIA
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will employ new investigative approaches to counter espionage threats involving emerging technologies.
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For example, CIA will strengthen analytic support and focus production requirements on CI operations
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in Russia, China, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, and Cuba to gain greater insight into adversary technical and
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HUMINT tradecraft.
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---
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Israel also targets us. On the one hand, the Israelis are extraordinarily good SIGINT
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partners for us, but on the other, they target us to learn our positions on Middle East problems. A NIE [National
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Intelligence Estimate] ranked them as the third most aggressive intelligence service against the US.
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---
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(TS//SI//NF) As close as the ISNU relationship has become, it has not been without
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tension. The Jonathan Pollard incident is one example that had a negative, albeit
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temporary, impact to the SIGINT relationship. Balancing the SIGINT exchange equally
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between US and Israeli needs has been a constant challenge. In the last decade, it
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arguably tilted heavily in favor of Israeli security concerns. 9/11 came, and went, with
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NSA's only true Third Party CT relationship being driven almost totally by the needs of
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the partner. Nevertheless, the survival of the state of Israel is a paramount goal of US
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Middle East policy. There is no doubt that the NSA-ISNU SIGINT relationship is built
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upon a solid foundation of trust and common purpose.
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