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{
"title": "JFK Assassination Records Classification/Declassification Guide Number: 385-00",
"type": "REPORTED",
"description": "A 2000 NSA guide setting what may be released from records responsive to the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, keeping intercept details classified at SECRET//SI or TOP SECRET//SI while declassifying the fact of Cuban and Soviet collection.",
"long_description": "Published on 23 June 2000 by NSA office DC322 over the signature of a redacted Director of Policy, this guide governs what may be released from NSA records responsive to P.L. 102-526, the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992. It is a 25-item table assigning each category of information a classification, a reason, an exemption date and remarks. The guide itself is marked TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL and carries a declassification date of 23 November 2029 — nearly three decades after publication, and most item-level exemptions run to 23 June 2025.\n\nItems 1 to 9 cover the internal apparatus of an intercept record and are withheld almost without exception at SECRET//SI//REL or above: the Intelligence Source Indicator, time of intercept, case notations, communications lane, message and telex numbers assigned by the foreign target, and cryptosystem designators, for which the guide gives the live examples CUIB1 and BLPY. Individuals' names rise to TOP SECRET//SI//REL where release would reveal intercept of diplomatic or leadership communications. Work sheet numbers are the only unclassified field in this block.\n \nItems 10 to 15 are the declassifying core and are uniformly UNCLASSIFIED: the fact of SIGINT targeting of Cuban naval, air and ground military communications, of Soviet forces in Cuba, of Soviet Forces Cuba (SFC), and of Soviet merchant shipping, all for 1 January 1959 through 31 December 1963, together with Czechoslovakian communications and Czechoslovakian air and air defence communications for 1 January 1960 through 31 December 1962. The remarks identify these as the time frames established for the Cuban Missile Crisis declassification effort and note that the Czechoslovak entries are not limited to Cuban Missile Crisis activity. Everything outside that frame reverts to SECRET//SI//REL under item 16, and Cuban diplomatic and agent communications, along with the covernames of Cuban agents, remain TOP SECRET//SI//REL — the guide nonetheless prints one such covername, SERAFIN, as an example.\n \nThe remaining items govern attribution and infrastructure. NSA employees' names are UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO under the statutory exemption of P.L. 86-36, except where a prior cover assignment keeps them classified; the fact that intercepted communications were encrypted stays SECRET//SI//REL; U.S. collection sources are unclassified while UK SIGADs are not. Item 25 releases sixteen SIGADs of closed or deactivated sites by designator — USA-36, -55, -66, -68, -70, -71, -73, -751, USM-4, -47, -48, -49, -84, -613, USN-27 and USN-851 — while holding their locations. Two closing notes record that material not responsive to the JFK Act is deleted and marked \"Not Believed Responsive (NBR)\", and that a NOFORN supplement to the guide exists only in hard copy.\n\nThe Intercept published this guide alongside the Cuban Missile Crisis classification guide in October 2017, during the mandated release of the Kennedy assassination files, as evidence of how long NSA continued to withhold the mechanics of its Cold War collection against Cuba and the USSR.",
"tags": [
"classification guide",
"declassification",
"SIGAD",
"COMINT",
"ELINT",
"FISINT",
"Cuban Missile Crisis",
"Cold War",
"historical SIGINT",
"records management",
"cryptosystems"
],
"document": {
"creator": "NSA",
"date_created": "2000-06-23",
"classification": [
"TOP SECRET",
"COMINT"
],
"dissemination": [
"REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL"
],
"banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20291123",
"genre": "guide",
"programs": [
"SERAFIN"
],
"countries": [
"Cuba",
"United Kingdom",
"United States",
"Russia",
"Czech Republic"
],
"people": [
"Kennedy, John F."
]
},
"publication": [
{
"publisher": "The Intercept",
"date_published": "2017-10-25",
"title": "NSA Concealed Records on JFK Assassination for Decades",
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2017/10/25/jfk-assassination-files-nsa-cuba/",
"reporters": [
"Pensack, Miriam"
],
"contributors": [],
"doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2017/10/25/nsa-jfk-assassination-records-classificationdeclassification-guide/",
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/4116927/JFK-Declassguide-Redacted.pdf"
}
],
"aka_id": [],
"pdf_sha256": "41103303a128a842b7f001363713d5f6d6881869b65c44dbebc0d62ede6772a1",
"pages": 4
}

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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20291123
(U) JFK ASSASSINATION RECORDS CLASSIFICATION/ DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE NUMBER: 385-00
(U) PUBLICATION DATE: 23 JUNE 2000
(U) PROJECT/ACTIVITY NAME: JFK (President John F. Kennedy) Assassination Records
(U) OFFICE OF ORIGIN: DC322
(U) PHONE: [REDACTED]
(U) CLASSIFICATION/ DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY: [REDACTED] Director of Policy
(U) CLASSIFICATION/DECLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE: Kennedy, (President John F.) Assassination Records
| Description of Information | Classification/ Markings | Reason | Exemption | Remarks |
| :------------------------- | :----------------------- | :----- | :-------- | :------ |
| (U) Records in response to P.L. 102-526 ("President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992") | - | - | - | - |
| 1. (U) Intelligence Source Indicator (ISI) | SECRET//SI//REL<br>(at a minimum) | 1.4(c), (d) | 20250623 | (U) ISI (often contained in SIGINT product report/ translation serial number) |
| 2. (U) Time of intercept | SECRET//SI//REL | 1.4(c) | 20250623 | - |
| 3. (U) Case notations | SECRET//SI//REL<br>(at a minimum) | 1.4(c), (d) | 20250623 | - |
| 4. (TS//SI//REL) Individuals' names or titles when release would reveal intercept of Diplomatic or Leadership communications | TOP SECRET//<br>SI//REL | 1.4(c) (d) | 20250623 | (U) For example, Prime Minister |
| 5. (U) Individuals' names when release would reveal the intercept of specific source of communications | SECRET//SI//REL<br>(at a minimum) | 1.4(c), (d) | 20250623 | - |
| 6. (U) Work Sheet numbers | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | (U) generally appears at top of report/ translation (for example WS 6511) |
| 7. (U) Cryptosystem designators | SECRET//SI//REL | 1.4(c), (d) | 20250623 | (S//SI//REL) For |
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20291123
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20291123
| | | | | |
| :-- | :-- | :-- | :-- | :-- |
| | (at a minimum) | | | example, CUIB1 or BLPY |
| 8. (U) Communications lane (foreign FROM/TO entities) | SECRET//SI//REL<br>(at a minimum) | 1.4(c), (d) | 20250623 | - |
| 9. (C//SI) Message/Telex numbers assigned by foreign target | SECRET//SI//REL<br>(at a minimum) | 1.4(c), (d) | 20250623 | - |
| 10. (U) SIGINT (COMINT/ELINT/FISINT) targeting/intercept of Cuban Naval, Air, and Ground Military communications/ signals related to the Cuban Missile Crisis **from 1 January 1959 through 31 December 1963** | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | (U) This is the time frame established for Cuban Missile Crisis declassification effort. |
| 11. (U) SIGINT (COMINT/ELINT/FISINT) targeting/intercept of communications/ signals of Soviet forces in Cuba (Army, Navy, & Air Force) related to the Cuban Missile Crisis **from 1 January 1959 through 31 December 1963** | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | (U) This is the time frame established for Cuban Missile Crisis declassification effort. |
| 12. (U) SIGINT (COMINT/ELINT/ FISINT) targeting/intercept of Soviet Forces Cuba (SFC) communications/ signals related to the Cuban Missile Crisis **from 1 January 1959 through 31 December 1963** | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | (U) This is the time frame established for Cuban Missile Crisis declassification effort. |
| 13. (U) SIGINT (COMINT/ELINT) targeting/intercept of Soviet Merchant Shipping communications/signals related to the Cuban Missile Crisis **from 1 January 1959 through 31 December 1963** | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | (U) This is the time frame established for Cuban Missile Crisis declassification effort. |
| 14. (U) Fact of SIGINT (COMINT/ ELINT/FISINT) targeting/intercept of Czechoslovakian communications/signals **from 1 January 1960 through 31 December 1962** | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | (U) This is the time frame established for Cuban Missile Crisis declassification effort. This "fact of" is not limited to Cuban Missile Crisis activity. |
| 15. (U) SIGINT (COMINT/ELINT/ FISINT) targeting/intercept of | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | (U) This is the time frame established for |
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20291123
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20291123
| | | | | |
| :-- | :-- | :-- | :-- | :-- |
| Czechoslovakian Air/Air Defense communications/signals **from 1 January 1960 through 31 December 1962** | | | | Cuban Missile Crisis declassification effort. This targeting/intercept is not limited to Cuban Missile Crisis activity. |
| 16. (U) Source of communications other than those in items 10, 11, 12, 13, 14,and 15 above | SECRET//SI//REL | 1.4(c), (d) | 20250623 | - |
| 17. (TS//SI//REL) Fact of COMINT targeting/intercept of Cuban Diplomatic and Agent communications | TOP SECRET//SI//<br>REL | 1.4(c), (d) | 20250623 | - |
| 18. (TS//SI//REL) Covernames of Cuban Agents | TOP SECRET//<br>SI//REL | 1.4(c), (d) | 20250623 | (TS//SI//REL) For example, SERAFIN |
| 19. (S//SI//REL) COMINT targeting/ intercept of international trade communications (ILC) | SECRET//SI//REL | 1.4(c), (d) | 20250623 | - |
| 20. (U) NSA employees' names unless already publicly known as an NSA employee | UNCLASSIFIED//<br>FOUO | N/A | P.L. 86-36 | (C//REL) In some instances names are classified because of prior cover assignments. |
| 21. (U) NSA/SCE reporters' notes indicating missing text | CONFIDENTIAL<br>//REL | 1.4(g) | 20250623 | (C//REL) For example: [5M/G] |
| 22. (U) Fact that intercepted communications were encrypted | SECRET//SI//REL | 1.4(c) | 20250623 | - |
| 23. (U) U.S. Collection Source | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | (U) generally found at bottom left of product report (for example: MS 974) |
| 24. (S//SI//REL) UK SIGAD | SECRET//SI//REL | 1.4 (c), (d) | 20250623 | (S//SI//REL) generally found at bottom left of product report (for example: UKM-262) |
| 25. (U) SIGADs of closed/deactivated sites: USA-36, USA-55, USA-66, USA-68, USA-70, USA-71, USA-73, USA-751,USM-4, USM-47, USM-48, USM-49, USM-84, USM-613, USN-27 & USN-851 **from 1 January 1959 through 31** | UNCLASSIFIED | - | - | (U) These SIGADS (assigned to closed sites) may be declassified even though associated with specific SIGINT. |
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20291123
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20291123
| | | | | |
| :-- | :-- | :-- | :-- | :-- |
| **December 1963** | | | | Location corresponding with these SIGADS remain classified. This is the time frame established for Cuban Missile Crisis declassification effort. |
NOTE 1: (U) Under provision of the JFK Act, information not responsive to the Act is deleted and marked "Not Believed Responsive (NBR)".
NOTE 2: (U) A NOFORN supplement to this guide is available in hard copy form. Contact the Office of Information Security Policy to obtain a copy.
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20291123