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data/nsa-ppd-20/metadata.json
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data/nsa-ppd-20/metadata.json
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{
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"title": "Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-20",
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"type": "REPORTED",
|
||||
"description": "Eighteen-page presidential memo reveals how Barack Obama has ordered intelligence officials to draw up a list of potential overseas targets for US cyber attacks.",
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"long_description": "Presidential Policy Directive 20 (PPD-20), signed by President Obama in October 2012 and classified Top Secret/NOFORN, constitutes the foundational legal and operational framework governing all U.S. cyber operations. The document establishes a comprehensive taxonomy of cyber activities — distinguishing between Cyber Collection, Defensive Cyber Effects Operations (DCEO), Nonintrusive Defensive Countermeasures (NDCM), and Offensive Cyber Effects Operations (OCEO) — and defines the approval thresholds and interagency coordination requirements for each category. Its central architectural principle is that any cyber operation \"reasonably likely to result in significant consequences\" (defined as loss of life, major property damage, serious foreign policy blowback, or economic harm) requires explicit Presidential approval, superseding the earlier NSPD-38 framework from 2004.\n\nThe directive's most consequential section concerns OCEO, which it describes as offering \"unique and unconventional capabilities to advance U.S. national objectives around the world with little or no warning to the adversary.\" It directs the Secretary of Defense, the DNI, and the CIA Director to compile a formal plan identifying foreign \"systems, processes, and infrastructure\" against which the U.S. should develop and maintain standing offensive cyber capabilities — effectively a pre-approved target list. This section, marked TS/NF, makes explicit what had been previously deniable: that the U.S. was not merely reactive in cyberspace but was actively building persistent offensive access to foreign infrastructure in peacetime, well before any specific conflict or crisis.\n\nThe directive also carves out an \"Emergency Cyber Action\" authority, permitting the Secretary of Defense and other agency heads to conduct DCEO without prior Presidential approval when an imminent threat does not allow time for the normal chain of command. Crucially, this emergency authority can extend to operations producing cyber effects within the United States, provided specific pre-approved domestic criteria are met — a significant legal threshold that acknowledges the government's capacity and potential willingness to conduct cyber operations on home soil. The directive requires after-the-fact reporting to the President through the National Security Advisor in such cases.\n\nFinally, PPD-20 establishes the Cyber Operations Policy Working Group (COP-WG) under the National Security Staff as the primary interagency forum for DCEO and OCEO policy, and mandates a series of implementation deliverables across agencies — including classification guides, communications strategies, NDCM testing plans, and counterintelligence authority frameworks — with deadlines ranging from one to six months post-approval. The directive is revealing for the first time the full scope of U.S. offensive cyber doctrine and the existence of a presidentially-directed target development program.",
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"tags": [
|
||||
"PPD 20",
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||||
"Presidential Policy Directive",
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||||
"offensive cyber operations",
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||||
"OCEO",
|
||||
"DCEO",
|
||||
"cyber operations",
|
||||
"network defense",
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||||
"emergency cyber action",
|
||||
"NDCM",
|
||||
"cyberspace",
|
||||
"Obama administration",
|
||||
"NSA",
|
||||
"CIA",
|
||||
"DoD",
|
||||
"Cyber Command",
|
||||
"interagency coordination",
|
||||
"significant consequences",
|
||||
"cyber target list",
|
||||
"target list",
|
||||
"cyber warfare",
|
||||
"domestic cyber operations",
|
||||
"internet militarization",
|
||||
"Stuxnet",
|
||||
"NSPD-38",
|
||||
"COP-WG",
|
||||
"national security",
|
||||
"cyber effects",
|
||||
"critical infrastructure",
|
||||
"intelligence authorities",
|
||||
"covert operations",
|
||||
"international law",
|
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"sovereignty",
|
||||
"cyber norms"
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||||
],
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"document": {
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||||
"creator": "NSA",
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||||
"date_created": "2012-10-01",
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"classification": [
|
||||
"TOP SECRET"
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||||
],
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||||
"dissemination": [
|
||||
"NOFORN"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"banner": "TOP SECRET/NOFORN",
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||||
"genre": "report",
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||||
"programs": [],
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||||
"countries": [],
|
||||
"people": []
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||||
},
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||||
"publication": [
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||||
{
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"publisher": "The Guardian",
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"date_published": "2013-06-07",
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"title": "Obama orders US to draw up overseas target list for cyber-attacks",
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"link": "https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/07/obama-china-targets-cyber-overseas",
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"reporters": [
|
||||
"Greenwald, Glenn",
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"MacAskill, Ewen"
|
||||
],
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||||
"contributors": []
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
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"pdf_sha256": "acd13d9cc8d4d5c111d099ce0cfef5b170c7297f8257bb21b03ae39e9d130ed8",
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"pages": 18
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}
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data/nsa-ppd-20/nsa-ppd-20.md
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TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
PRESIDENTIAL POLICY DIRECTIVE/PPD-20
|
||||
|
||||
MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
|
||||
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
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THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
|
||||
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
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THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
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THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
|
||||
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
|
||||
THE SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY
|
||||
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CHIEF OF STAFF
|
||||
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
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||||
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
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||||
AFFAIRS
|
||||
DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
|
||||
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR HOMELAND SECURITY
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||||
AND COUNTERTERRORISM
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||||
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
|
||||
POLICY
|
||||
DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
|
||||
DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
|
||||
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
|
||||
DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
|
||||
|
||||
SUBJECT: U.S. Cyber Operations Policy (U)
|
||||
|
||||
This Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) supersedes National
|
||||
Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-38 of July 7, 2004. This
|
||||
directive complements, but does not affect, NSPD-54/Homeland
|
||||
Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-23 on “Cybersecurity
|
||||
Policy" of January 8, 2008; National Security Directive (NSD)-42
|
||||
on "National Policy for the Security of National Security
|
||||
Telecommunications and Information Systems" of July 5, 1990; and
|
||||
PPD-8 on "National Preparedness" of March 30, 2011. (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
I. Definitions (U)
|
||||
|
||||
The following terms are defined for the purposes of this
|
||||
directive and should be used when possible in interagency
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
Reason: 1.4(a) (c) (e) (g)
|
||||
Declassify on: 10/16/37
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
2
|
||||
documents and communications on this topic to ensure common
|
||||
understanding. (U)
|
||||
|
||||
Cyberspace: The interdependent network of information
|
||||
technology infrastructures that includes the Internet,
|
||||
telecommunications networks, computers, information or
|
||||
communications systems, networks, and embedded processors and
|
||||
controllers. (U)
|
||||
|
||||
Network Defense: Programs, activities, and the use of tools
|
||||
necessary to facilitate them (including those governed by
|
||||
NSPD-54/HSPD-23 and NSD-42) conducted on a computer, network,
|
||||
or information or communications system by the owner or with
|
||||
the consent of the owner and, as appropriate, the users for
|
||||
the primary purpose of protecting (1) that computer, network,
|
||||
or system; (2) data stored on, processed on, or transiting
|
||||
that computer, network, or system; or (3) physical and virtual
|
||||
infrastructure controlled by that computer, network, or
|
||||
system. Network defense does not involve or require accessing
|
||||
or conducting activities on computers, networks, or
|
||||
information or communications systems without authorization
|
||||
from the owners or exceeding access authorized by the owners.
|
||||
(U)
|
||||
|
||||
Malicious Cyber Activity: Activities, other than those
|
||||
authorized by or in accordance with U.S. law, that seek to
|
||||
compromise or impair the confidentiality, integrity, or
|
||||
availability of computers, information or communications
|
||||
systems, networks, physical or virtual infrastructure
|
||||
controlled by computers or information systems, or information
|
||||
resident thereon. (U)
|
||||
|
||||
Cyber Effect: The manipulation, disruption, denial,
|
||||
degradation, or destruction of computers, information or
|
||||
communications systems, networks, physical or virtual
|
||||
infrastructure controlled by computers or information systems,
|
||||
or information resident thereon. (U)
|
||||
|
||||
Cyber Collection: Operations and related programs or
|
||||
activities conducted by or on behalf of the United States
|
||||
Government, in or through cyberspace, for the primary purpose
|
||||
of collecting intelligence - including information that can be
|
||||
used for future operations - from computers, information or
|
||||
communications systems, or networks with the intent to remain
|
||||
undetected. Cyber collection entails accessing a computer,
|
||||
information system, or network without authorization from the
|
||||
owner or operator of that computer, information system, or
|
||||
network or from a party to a communication or by exceeding
|
||||
authorized access. Cyber collection includes those activities
|
||||
essential and inherent to enabling cyber collection, such as
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
3
|
||||
inhibiting detection or attribution, even if they create cyber
|
||||
effects. (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
Defensive Cyber Effects Operations (DCEO): Operations and
|
||||
related programs or activities other than network defense or
|
||||
cyber collection conducted by or on behalf of the
|
||||
United States Government, in or through cyberspace, that are
|
||||
intended to enable or produce cyber effects outside
|
||||
United States Government networks for the purpose of defending
|
||||
or protecting against imminent threats or ongoing attacks or
|
||||
malicious cyber activity against U.S. national interests from
|
||||
inside or outside cyberspace. (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
Nonintrusive Defensive Countermeasures (NDCM): The subset of
|
||||
DCEO that does not require accessing computers, information or
|
||||
communications systems, or networks without authorization from
|
||||
the owners or operators of the targeted computers, information
|
||||
or communications systems, or networks or exceeding authorized
|
||||
access and only creates the minimum cyber effects needed to
|
||||
mitigate the threat activity. (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
Offensive Cyber Effects Operations (OCEO): Operations and
|
||||
related programs or activities - other than network defense,
|
||||
cyber collection, or DCEO - conducted by or on behalf of the
|
||||
United States Government, in or through cyberspace, that are
|
||||
intended to enable or produce cyber effects outside
|
||||
United States Government networks. (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
Cyber Operations: Cyber collection, DCEO (including NDCM),
|
||||
and OCEO collectively. (U)
|
||||
|
||||
Significant Consequences: Loss of life, significant
|
||||
responsive actions against the United States, significant
|
||||
damage to property, serious adverse U.S. foreign policy
|
||||
consequences, or serious economic impact on the United States.
|
||||
(U)
|
||||
|
||||
U.S. National Interests: Matters of vital interest to the
|
||||
United States to include national security, public safety,
|
||||
national economic security, the safe and reliable functioning
|
||||
of "critical infrastructure," and the availability of "key
|
||||
resources."¹ (U)
|
||||
|
||||
Emergency Cyber Action: A cyber operation undertaken at the
|
||||
direction of the head of a department or agency with
|
||||
appropriate authorities who has determined that such action is
|
||||
necessary, pursuant to the requirements of this directive, to
|
||||
mitigate an imminent threat or ongoing attack against U.S.
|
||||
national interests from inside or outside cyberspace and under
|
||||
circumstances that at the time do not permit obtaining prior
|
||||
|
||||
¹ As these terms are used in HSPD-7 on "Critical Infrastructure,
|
||||
Identification, Prioritization, and Protection" from December 17, 2003. (U)
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
4
|
||||
Presidential approval to the extent that such approval would
|
||||
otherwise be required. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
II. Purpose and Scope (U)
|
||||
|
||||
The United States has an abiding interest in developing and
|
||||
maintaining use of cyberspace as an integral part of U.S.
|
||||
national capabilities to collect intelligence and to deter,
|
||||
deny, or defeat any adversary that seeks to harm U.S. national
|
||||
interests in peace, crisis, or war. Given the evolution in U.S.
|
||||
experience, policy, capabilities, and understanding of the cyber
|
||||
threat, and in information and communications technology, this
|
||||
directive establishes updated principles and processes as part
|
||||
of an overarching national cyber policy framework. (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The United States Government shall conduct all cyber
|
||||
operations consistent with the U.S. Constitution and other
|
||||
applicable laws and policies of the United States, including
|
||||
Presidential orders and directives. (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The United States Government shall conduct DCEO and OCEO under
|
||||
this directive consistent with its obligations under
|
||||
international law, including with regard to matters of
|
||||
sovereignty and neutrality, and, as applicable, the law of
|
||||
armed conflict. (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
This directive pertains to cyber operations, including those
|
||||
that support or enable kinetic, information, or other types of
|
||||
operations. Most of this directive is directed exclusively to
|
||||
DCEO and OCEO. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The United States Government has mature capabilities and
|
||||
effective processes for cyber collection. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
Therefore, this directive affirms and does not intend to alter
|
||||
existing procedures, guidelines, or authorities for cyber
|
||||
collection. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
This directive provides a procedure for cyber collection
|
||||
operations that are reasonably likely to result in
|
||||
“significant consequences."² (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The principles and requirements in this directive apply except
|
||||
as otherwise lawfully directed by the President. With the
|
||||
exception of the grant of authority to the Secretary of Defense
|
||||
to conduct Emergency Cyber Actions as provided below, nothing in
|
||||
this directive is intended to alter the existing authorities of,
|
||||
or grant new authorities to, any United States Government
|
||||
department or agency (including authorities to carry out
|
||||
|
||||
² NSPD-38 referred to operations with significant consequences as "sensitive
|
||||
offensive cyber operations." (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
5
|
||||
operational activities), or supersede any existing coordination
|
||||
and approval processes, other than those of NSPD-38. Nothing in
|
||||
this directive is intended to limit or impair military
|
||||
commanders from using DCEO or OCEO specified in a military
|
||||
action approved by the President and previously coordinated and
|
||||
deconflicted as required by existing processes and this
|
||||
directive. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
In addition, this directive does not pertain to or alter
|
||||
existing authorities related to the following categories of
|
||||
activities by or on behalf of the United States Government,
|
||||
regardless of whether they produce cyber effects:
|
||||
|
||||
Activities conducted under section 503 of the National
|
||||
Security Act of 1947 (as amended);
|
||||
|
||||
Activities conducted pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence
|
||||
Surveillance Act, the approval authority delegated to the
|
||||
Attorney General (AG) by section 2.5 of Executive Order 12333
|
||||
(as amended), or law enforcement authorities; however, cyber
|
||||
operations reasonably likely to result in significant
|
||||
consequences still require Presidential approval, and
|
||||
operations that reasonably can be expected to adversely affect
|
||||
other United States Government operations still require
|
||||
coordination under established processes;
|
||||
|
||||
Activities conducted by the United States Secret Service for
|
||||
the purpose of protecting the President, the Vice President,
|
||||
and others as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 3056; however, cyber
|
||||
operations reasonably likely to result in significant
|
||||
consequences still require Presidential approval, and
|
||||
operations that reasonably can be expected to adversely affect
|
||||
other United States Government operations still require
|
||||
coordination under established processes;
|
||||
|
||||
The use of online personas and other virtual operations³ -
|
||||
undertaken exclusively for counterintelligence, intelligence
|
||||
collection, or law enforcement purposes - that do not involve
|
||||
the use of DCEO or OCEO;
|
||||
|
||||
Activities conducted in cyberspace pursuant to
|
||||
counterintelligence authorities for the purpose of protecting
|
||||
specific intelligence sources, methods, and activities;
|
||||
|
||||
Signals intelligence collection other than cyber collection as
|
||||
defined in this directive;
|
||||
|
||||
Open-source intelligence collection;
|
||||
|
||||
Network defense;
|
||||
|
||||
³ Human intelligence operations undertaken via the Internet. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
6
|
||||
Traditional electronic warfare activities;
|
||||
|
||||
The development of content to support influence campaigns,
|
||||
military deception, or military information support
|
||||
operations; or
|
||||
|
||||
Simple transit of data or commands through networks that do
|
||||
not create cyber effects on those networks. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
III. Guiding Principles for DCEO and OCEO (U)
|
||||
|
||||
DCEO and OCEO may raise unique national security and foreign
|
||||
policy concerns that require additional coordination and policy
|
||||
considerations because cyberspace is globally connected. DCEO
|
||||
and OCEO, even for subtle or clandestine operations, may
|
||||
generate cyber effects in locations other than the intended
|
||||
target, with potential unintended or collateral consequences
|
||||
that may affect U.S. national interests in many locations.
|
||||
(S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The United States Government shall conduct DCEO and OCEO in a
|
||||
manner consistent with applicable values, principles, and norms
|
||||
for state behavior that the United States Government promotes
|
||||
domestically and internationally as described in the
|
||||
2011 “International Strategy for Cyberspace." (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
National-level strategic objectives and operational
|
||||
necessities shall dictate what the United States Government
|
||||
seeks to accomplish with DCEO and OCEO. (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The United States Government shall integrate DCEO and OCEO, as
|
||||
appropriate, with other diplomatic, informational, military,
|
||||
economic, financial, intelligence, counterintelligence, and
|
||||
law enforcement options, taking into account effectiveness,
|
||||
costs, risks, potential consequences, foreign policy, and
|
||||
other policy considerations. (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The United States Government shall reserve the right to act in
|
||||
accordance with the United States' inherent right of self
|
||||
defense as recognized in international law, including through
|
||||
the conduct of DCEO. (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The United States Government shall conduct neither DCEO nor
|
||||
OCEO that are intended or likely to produce cyber effects
|
||||
within the United States unless approved by the President. A
|
||||
department or agency, however, with appropriate authority may
|
||||
|
||||
⁴ As defined by the Joint Dictionary 1-02, "Department of Defense Dictionary
|
||||
of Military and Associated Terms" (as amended through February 15, 2012):
|
||||
military action involving the use of electromagnetic or directed energy to
|
||||
control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Electronic
|
||||
warfare consists of three divisions: electronic attack, electronic
|
||||
protection, and electronic warfare support. (U)
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
7
|
||||
conduct a particular case of DCEO that is intended or likely
|
||||
to produce cyber effects within the United States if it
|
||||
qualifies as an Emergency Cyber Action as set forth in this
|
||||
directive and otherwise complies with applicable laws and
|
||||
policies, including Presidential orders and directives.
|
||||
(C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The United States Government shall obtain consent from countries
|
||||
in which cyber effects are expected to occur or those countries
|
||||
hosting U.S. computers and systems used to conduct DCEO or OCEO
|
||||
unless:
|
||||
|
||||
Military actions approved by the President and ordered by the
|
||||
Secretary of Defense authorize nonconsensual DCEO or OCEO,
|
||||
with provisions made for using existing processes to conduct
|
||||
appropriate interagency coordination on targets, geographic
|
||||
areas, levels of effect, and degrees of risk for the
|
||||
operations;
|
||||
|
||||
DCEO is undertaken in accordance with the United States'
|
||||
inherent right of self defense as recognized in international
|
||||
law, and the United States Government provides notification
|
||||
afterwards in a manner consistent with the protection of
|
||||
U.S. military and intelligence capabilities and foreign policy
|
||||
considerations and in accordance with applicable law; or
|
||||
|
||||
The President - on the recommendation of the Deputies
|
||||
Committee and, as appropriate, the Principals Committee -
|
||||
determines that an exception to obtaining consent is
|
||||
necessary, takes into account overall U.S. national interests
|
||||
and equities, and meets a high threshold of need and effective
|
||||
outcomes relative to the risks created by such an exception.
|
||||
(S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The information revealed to other countries in the course of
|
||||
seeking consent shall be consistent with operational security
|
||||
requirements and the protection of intelligence sources,
|
||||
methods, and activities. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The United States Government, to ensure appropriate application
|
||||
of these principles, shall make all reasonable efforts, under
|
||||
circumstances prevailing at the time, to identify the adversary
|
||||
and the ownership and geographic location of the targets and
|
||||
related infrastructure where DCEO or OCEO will be conducted or
|
||||
cyber effects are expected to occur, and to identify the people
|
||||
and entities, including U.S. persons, that could be affected by
|
||||
proposed DCEO or OCEO. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
8
|
||||
Additional Considerations for DCEO (U)
|
||||
|
||||
The Nation requires flexible and agile capabilities that
|
||||
leverage the full resources of the United States Government to
|
||||
conduct necessary and proportionate DCEO. These operations
|
||||
shall conform to the following additional policy principles:
|
||||
|
||||
The United States Government shall reserve use of DCEO to
|
||||
protect U.S. national interests in circumstances when network
|
||||
defense or law enforcement measures are insufficient or cannot
|
||||
be put in place in time to mitigate a threat, and when other
|
||||
previously approved measures would not be more appropriate, or
|
||||
if a Deputies or Principals Committee review determines that
|
||||
proposed DCEO provides an advantageous degree of
|
||||
effectiveness, timeliness, or efficiency compared to other
|
||||
methods commensurate with the risks;
|
||||
|
||||
The United States Government shall conduct DCEO with the least
|
||||
intrusive methods feasible to mitigate a threat;
|
||||
|
||||
The United States Government shall seek partnerships with
|
||||
industry, other levels of government as appropriate, and other
|
||||
nations and organizations to promote cooperative defensive
|
||||
capabilities, including, as appropriate, through the use of
|
||||
DCEO as governed by the provisions in this directive; and
|
||||
|
||||
Partnerships with industry and other levels of government for
|
||||
the protection of critical infrastructure shall be coordinated
|
||||
with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), working with
|
||||
relevant sector-specific agencies and, as appropriate, the
|
||||
Department of Commerce (DOC). (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The United States recognizes that network defense, design, and
|
||||
management cannot mitigate all possible malicious cyber activity
|
||||
and reserves the right, consistent with applicable law, to
|
||||
protect itself from malicious cyber activity that threatens U.S.
|
||||
national interests. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The United States Government shall work with private industry
|
||||
through DHS, DOC, and relevant sector-specific agencies - to
|
||||
protect critical infrastructure in a manner that minimizes the
|
||||
need for DCEO against malicious cyber activity; however, the
|
||||
United States Government shall retain DCEO, including
|
||||
anticipatory action taken against imminent threats, as
|
||||
governed by the provisions in this directive, as an option to
|
||||
protect such infrastructure. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The United States Government shall - in coordination, as
|
||||
appropriate, with DHS, law enforcement, and other relevant
|
||||
departments and agencies, to include sector-specific agencies
|
||||
- obtain the consent of network or computer owners for
|
||||
United States Government use of DCEO to protect against
|
||||
malicious cyber activity on their behalf, unless the activity
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
9
|
||||
implicates the United States' inherent right of self-defense
|
||||
as recognized in international law or the policy review
|
||||
processes established in this directive and appropriate legal
|
||||
reviews determine that such consent is not required. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
Offensive Cyber Effects Operations (U)
|
||||
|
||||
OCEO can offer unique and unconventional capabilities to advance
|
||||
U.S. national objectives around the world with little or no
|
||||
warning to the adversary or target and with potential effects
|
||||
ranging from subtle to severely damaging. The development and
|
||||
sustainment of OCEO capabilities, however, may require
|
||||
considerable time and effort if access and tools for a specific
|
||||
target do not already exist. (TS/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The United States Government shall identify potential targets
|
||||
of national importance where OCEO can offer a favorable
|
||||
balance of effectiveness and risk as compared with other
|
||||
instruments of national power, establish and maintain OCEO
|
||||
capabilities integrated as appropriate with other U.S.
|
||||
offensive capabilities, and execute those capabilities in a
|
||||
manner consistent with the provisions of this directive.
|
||||
(TS/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
IV. Cyber Operations with Significant Consequences (U)
|
||||
|
||||
Specific Presidential approval is required for any cyber
|
||||
operations - including cyber collection, DCEO, and OCEO -
|
||||
determined by the head of a department or agency to conduct the
|
||||
operation to be reasonably likely to result in “significant
|
||||
consequences" as defined in this directive. This requirement
|
||||
applies to cyber operations generally, except for those already
|
||||
approved by the President, even if this directive otherwise does
|
||||
not pertain to such operations as provided in the "Purpose and
|
||||
Scope" section of this directive. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
V. Threat Response Operations (U)
|
||||
|
||||
Responses to Persistent Malicious Cyber Activity (U)
|
||||
|
||||
Departments and agencies with appropriate authorities -
|
||||
consistent with the provisions set forth in this directive and
|
||||
in coordination with the Departments of State, Defense (DOD),
|
||||
Justice (DOJ), and Homeland Security; the Federal Bureau of
|
||||
Investigation (FBI); the Office of the Director of National
|
||||
Intelligence (DNI); the National Security Agency (NSA); the
|
||||
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); the Departments of the
|
||||
Treasury and Energy (DOE); and other relevant members of the
|
||||
Intelligence Community (IC) and sector-specific agencies - shall
|
||||
establish criteria and procedures to be approved by the
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
10
|
||||
President for responding to persistent malicious cyber activity
|
||||
against U.S. national interests. Such criteria and procedures
|
||||
shall include the following requirements:
|
||||
|
||||
The United States Government shall reserve use of such
|
||||
responses to circumstances when network defense or law
|
||||
enforcement measures are insufficient or cannot be put in
|
||||
place in time to mitigate the malicious cyber activity; and
|
||||
|
||||
Departments and agencies shall conduct these responses in a
|
||||
manner not reasonably likely to result in significant
|
||||
consequences and use the minimum action required to mitigate
|
||||
the activity. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
Emergency Cyber Actions (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The Secretary of Defense is hereby authorized to conduct, or a
|
||||
department or agency head with appropriate authorities may
|
||||
conduct, under procedures approved by the President, Emergency
|
||||
Cyber Actions necessary to mitigate an imminent threat or
|
||||
ongoing attack using DCEO if circumstances at the time do not
|
||||
permit obtaining prior Presidential approval (to the extent that
|
||||
such approval would otherwise be required) and the department or
|
||||
agency head determines that:
|
||||
|
||||
An emergency action is necessary in accordance with the
|
||||
United States inherent right of self-defense as recognized in
|
||||
international law to prevent imminent loss of life or
|
||||
significant damage with enduring national impact on the
|
||||
Primary Mission Essential Functions of the United States
|
||||
Government, ⁵ U.S. critical infrastructure and key resources,
|
||||
or the mission of U.S. military forces;
|
||||
|
||||
Network defense or law enforcement would be insufficient or
|
||||
unavailable in the necessary timeframe, and other previously
|
||||
approved activities would not be more appropriate;
|
||||
|
||||
The Emergency Cyber Actions are reasonably likely not to
|
||||
result in significant consequences;
|
||||
|
||||
The Emergency Cyber Actions will be conducted in a manner
|
||||
intended to be nonlethal in purpose, action, and consequence;
|
||||
|
||||
The Emergency Cyber Actions will be limited in magnitude,
|
||||
scope, and duration to that level of activity necessary to
|
||||
mitigate the threat or attack;
|
||||
|
||||
The Emergency Cyber Actions, when practicable, have been
|
||||
coordinated with appropriate departments and agencies,
|
||||
including State, DOD, DHS, DOJ, the Office of the DNI, FBI,
|
||||
CIA, NSA, the Treasury, DOE, and other relevant members of the
|
||||
IC and sector-specific agencies; and
|
||||
|
||||
⁵ As defined in NSPD-51/HSPD-20 on "National Continuity Policy" of May 9,
|
||||
2007. (U)
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
11
|
||||
The Emergency Cyber Actions are consistent with the
|
||||
U.S. Constitution and other applicable laws and policies of
|
||||
the United States, including Presidential orders and
|
||||
directives. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
In addition, Emergency Cyber Actions that are intended or likely
|
||||
to produce cyber effects within the United States (or otherwise
|
||||
likely to adversely affect U.S. network defense activities or
|
||||
U.S. networks) must be conducted:
|
||||
|
||||
Under the procedures and, as appropriate, criteria for
|
||||
domestic operations previously approved by the President; and
|
||||
|
||||
Under circumstances that at the time of the Emergency Cyber
|
||||
Action preclude the use of network defense, law enforcement,
|
||||
or some form of DOD support to civil authorities that would
|
||||
prevent the threatened imminent loss of life or significant
|
||||
damage. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
Department and agency heads shall report Emergency Cyber Actions
|
||||
to the President through the National Security Advisor as soon
|
||||
as feasible. If the coordination specified above is not
|
||||
practicable in the available time, then notification shall occur
|
||||
after the fact as soon as possible to inform subsequent whole-
|
||||
of-government response and recovery activities. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
Until such time as any additional criteria for domestic
|
||||
operations are approved by the President, authorization by
|
||||
department and agency heads for Emergency Cyber Actions that are
|
||||
intended or likely to produce cyber effects within the United
|
||||
States (or otherwise likely to adversely affect U.S. network
|
||||
defense activities or U.S. networks) shall be granted only if
|
||||
the President has provided prior approval for such activity, or
|
||||
circumstances at the time do not permit obtaining prior approval
|
||||
from the President and such actions are conducted within the
|
||||
other constraints defined above. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
VI. Process (U)
|
||||
|
||||
The National Security Staff (NSS) shall formalize the functions
|
||||
of the Cyber Operations Policy Working Group (COP-WG) as the
|
||||
primary United States Government forum below the level of an
|
||||
Interagency Policy Committee (IPC) for integrating DCEO or OCEO
|
||||
policy, including consideration of exceptions or refinements to
|
||||
the principles of this directive. The COP-WG shall work with
|
||||
other elements of the policy community as appropriate to the
|
||||
geographic or functional context of the DCEO- or OCEO-related
|
||||
policy discussion at the earliest opportunity. The COP-WG is
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
12
|
||||
not an operational group, but will address policy issues related
|
||||
to the conduct of operations raised by departments and agencies
|
||||
or the NSS. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
Departments and agencies shall work through the COP-WG to raise
|
||||
unresolved or ambiguous policy questions in an integrated IPC
|
||||
meeting of all appropriate national and economic security
|
||||
stakeholders. The NSS shall use existing channels to elevate
|
||||
any unresolved policy conflicts to the Deputies and Principals
|
||||
Committees, as appropriate. (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
Departments and agencies shall continue to use existing
|
||||
operational processes for cyber operations, except as those
|
||||
processes are modified by or under this directive. Other types
|
||||
of operations that are supported or enabled by cyber operations
|
||||
shall use their existing operational processes. This continued
|
||||
use of existing operational processes applies, for example, to
|
||||
operations conducted under military orders that authorize DCEO
|
||||
or OCEO, including clandestine preparatory activities. (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
Departments and agencies, during planning for proposed cyber
|
||||
operations, shall use established processes to coordinate and
|
||||
deconflict with other organizations - including, as appropriate,
|
||||
State, DOD, DOJ, DHS, members of the IC, and relevant sector-
|
||||
specific agencies - and obtain any other approvals required
|
||||
under applicable policies, except as those processes are
|
||||
modified by or under this directive. Departments and agencies
|
||||
shall modify or enhance these processes as future circumstances
|
||||
dictate. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
Departments and agencies shall coordinate DCEO and OCEO with
|
||||
State and Chiefs of Station or their designees in countries
|
||||
where DCEO or OCEO are conducted or cyber effects are expected
|
||||
to occur. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
Coordination of DCEO and OCEO with network defense efforts shall
|
||||
be sufficient to enable a whole-of-government approach to the
|
||||
protection of U.S. national interests and shall identify
|
||||
potential implications of proposed DCEO and OCEO for U.S.
|
||||
networks, including potential adversary responses or unintended
|
||||
consequences of U.S. operations for which the United States
|
||||
Government or the private sector would need to prepare. This
|
||||
coordination shall occur in a manner consistent with operational
|
||||
|
||||
⁶ Including the May 9, 2007, "Trilateral Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) among
|
||||
the Department of Defense and the Department of Justice and the Intelligence
|
||||
Community Regarding Computer Network Attack and Computer Network Exploitation
|
||||
Activities," and other operational coordination processes that exist between
|
||||
departments and agencies. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
13
|
||||
security requirements and the protection of intelligence
|
||||
sources, methods, and activities. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
Toward this end of ensuring a unified whole-of-government
|
||||
approach, departments and agencies shall coordinate and
|
||||
deconflict DCEO and OCEO with network defense efforts of other
|
||||
departments and agencies as appropriate. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
In addition, DCEO and OCEO with potential implications for
|
||||
U.S. networks shall be deconflicted as appropriate and
|
||||
coordinated with DHS, appropriate law enforcement agencies,
|
||||
and relevant sector-specific agencies. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The United States Government shall make all reasonable efforts
|
||||
to identify and notify, as appropriate, private sector
|
||||
entities that could be affected by DCEO and OCEO. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
Policy Criteria (U)
|
||||
|
||||
Policy deliberations for DCEO and OCEO shall consider, but not
|
||||
be limited to, the following criteria:
|
||||
|
||||
Impact: The potential threat from adversary actions or the
|
||||
potential benefits, scope, and recommended prioritization of
|
||||
proposed U.S. operations as compared with other approaches -
|
||||
including, as appropriate, network defense by the
|
||||
United States Government or private sector network operators;
|
||||
|
||||
Risks: Assessments of intelligence gain or loss, the risk of
|
||||
retaliation or other impacts on U.S. networks or interests
|
||||
(including economic), impact on the security and stability of
|
||||
the Internet, and political gain or loss to include impact on
|
||||
foreign policies, bilateral and multilateral relationships
|
||||
(including Internet governance), and the establishment of
|
||||
unwelcome norms of international behavior;
|
||||
|
||||
Methods: The intrusiveness, timeliness, efficiency, capacity,
|
||||
and effectiveness of operational methods to be employed;
|
||||
|
||||
Geography and Identity: Geographic and identity aspects of
|
||||
the proposed activity, including the location of operations
|
||||
and the resulting effects, the identity of network owners and
|
||||
users that will be affected, and the identity or type - when
|
||||
known - of adversaries to be countered or affected by U.S.
|
||||
operations;
|
||||
|
||||
Transparency: The need for consent or notification of network
|
||||
or computer owners or host countries, the potential for impact
|
||||
on U.S. persons and U.S. private sector networks, and the need
|
||||
for any public or private communications strategies before or
|
||||
after an operation; and
|
||||
|
||||
Authorities and Civil Liberties: The available authorities
|
||||
and procedures and the potential for cyber effects inside the
|
||||
United States or against U.S. persons. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
14
|
||||
Policy decisions shall be broad enough and include rationales in
|
||||
order to provide guidelines and direction for future proposals
|
||||
with the same operational and risk parameters. (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
Annex: Implementation (U)
|
||||
|
||||
Departments and agencies shall establish necessary capabilities
|
||||
and procedures for appropriate and timely implementation of DCEO
|
||||
and OCEO policies in the national interest. (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
Policy Process (U)
|
||||
|
||||
Departments and agencies shall, as appropriate, conduct DCEO
|
||||
and OCEO in accordance with the principles set forth in this
|
||||
directive and shall bring forward to the COP-WG situations
|
||||
that require policy discussion, including considerations of
|
||||
exceptions to those principles, using the policy criteria
|
||||
described in this directive. [Action: All; ongoing] (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The National Security Advisor, through the NSS, shall
|
||||
establish and operate the COP-WG to serve as the entry point
|
||||
for interagency deliberations of policy matters related to
|
||||
DCEO and OCEO. [Action: NSS; ongoing] (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The National Security Advisor, through the NSS, as needed,
|
||||
shall use the existing policy escalation process through an
|
||||
appropriate joint IPC-level group involving all stakeholders
|
||||
for a given situation, the Deputies Committee, and the
|
||||
Principals Committee. This process shall clarify the
|
||||
application of the principles set forth in this directive to
|
||||
specific operations, including consideration of exceptions or
|
||||
refinements to those principles. [Action: NSS; ongoing]
|
||||
(C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The NSS, as needed, shall lead reviews by appropriate
|
||||
departments and agencies of legal issues associated with DCEO
|
||||
and OCEO. The NSS shall refer legal questions to the chief
|
||||
legal officers of the appropriate departments or agencies or
|
||||
to DOJ for resolution of interagency disagreements or as
|
||||
otherwise appropriate. [Action: NSS; ongoing] (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The DNI shall continue to ensure, through appropriate policies
|
||||
and procedures, the deconfliction, coordination, and
|
||||
integration of all IC cyber operations and serve as the IC
|
||||
focal point for strategic planning and policy coordination
|
||||
related to cyber operations, both within the IC and with other
|
||||
departments and agencies in interagency coordination
|
||||
processes. [Action: DNI; ongoing] (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
15
|
||||
Policy Reviews and Preparation (U)
|
||||
|
||||
The Office of the DNI, in coordination with appropriate
|
||||
departments and agencies, shall prepare a classification guide
|
||||
for departments and agencies to use in the implementation of
|
||||
the policies in this directive. [Action: Office of the DNI;
|
||||
2 months after directive approval] (U)
|
||||
|
||||
The National Security Advisor, through the NSS, shall lead an
|
||||
interagency review of the United States Government's
|
||||
communications strategy, including public affairs guidance,
|
||||
regarding DCEO and OCEO. Pending approval of this strategy by
|
||||
the Deputies Committee, the United States Government's public
|
||||
posture on related matters shall be: "All United States
|
||||
Government activities in cyberspace are consistent with the
|
||||
principles stated in the May 2011 International Strategy for
|
||||
Cyberspace." [Action: NSS report to Deputies; 1 month after
|
||||
directive approval] (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The National Security Advisor, through the NSS, shall work
|
||||
with the Secretaries of Defense, State, and Homeland Security,
|
||||
the AG, the DNI, relevant IC and sector-specific agencies, and
|
||||
other heads of departments and agencies as appropriate to
|
||||
develop for the conduct of Emergency Cyber Actions, as set
|
||||
forth in this directive - in addition to the previously cited
|
||||
procedures and, as appropriate, domestic criteria to be
|
||||
approved by the President - detailed concepts of operation,
|
||||
supporting processes, communications capabilities, exercises,
|
||||
and training. In addition, the NSS - working with these same
|
||||
departments and agencies - shall, as necessary, develop for
|
||||
Presidential approval procedures and criteria for DCEO to be
|
||||
conducted in response to malicious cyber activity. [Action:
|
||||
NSS update on implementation to Deputies; 3 months after
|
||||
directive approval] (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The Secretary of Defense, the DNI, and the Director of the CIA
|
||||
- in coordination with the AG, the Secretaries of State and
|
||||
Homeland Security, and relevant IC and sector-specific
|
||||
agencies - shall prepare for approval by the President through
|
||||
the National Security Advisor a plan that identifies potential
|
||||
systems, processes, and infrastructure against which the
|
||||
United States should establish and maintain OCEO capabilities;
|
||||
proposes circumstances under which OCEO might be used; and
|
||||
proposes necessary resources and steps that would be needed
|
||||
for implementation, review, and updates as U.S. national
|
||||
security needs change. [Action: DOD, Office of the DNI, and
|
||||
CIA update to Deputies on scope of plans; 6 months after
|
||||
directive approval] (TS/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
16
|
||||
The Secretary of Defense and other department and agency heads
|
||||
as appropriate in coordination with the Secretary of
|
||||
Homeland Security, the AG, and the DNI shall develop and
|
||||
maintain a flexible, agile capability for the purpose of using
|
||||
DCEO to defend U.S. networks consistent with the provisions
|
||||
set forth in this directive. [Action: DOD and others;
|
||||
ongoing] (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The Secretary of Defense - in coordination with the
|
||||
Secretaries of Homeland Security, Commerce, and State, the AG,
|
||||
the DNI, and relevant IC and sector-specific agencies - shall
|
||||
develop a multi-phase plan to be approved by the Deputies
|
||||
Committee for testing, reviewing, and implementing NDCM. The
|
||||
plan shall be subjected to legal review and address
|
||||
authorities, technical feasibility, operational risks, and
|
||||
coordination procedures. [Action: DOD present first phase of
|
||||
plans to Deputies; 2 months after directive approval] (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The AG and the DNI - in collaboration with the Secretaries of
|
||||
Defense, State, Commerce, and Homeland Security, and relevant
|
||||
IC and sector-specific agencies - shall develop a multi-phase
|
||||
plan to be approved by the Deputies Committee for a test of
|
||||
the applicability and efficacy of counterintelligence
|
||||
authorities in the conduct of DCEO. The plan shall be
|
||||
subjected to legal review and address technical feasibility,
|
||||
operational risks, and coordination procedures. [Action: DOJ
|
||||
and Office of the DNI present first phase of plans to
|
||||
Deputies; 2 months after directive approval] (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security, the DNI, the
|
||||
AG, and the Director of the CIA - in collaboration as
|
||||
appropriate with the Secretaries of State and Commerce and the
|
||||
heads of relevant IC and sector-specific agencies - shall
|
||||
develop proposals to be approved by the President through the
|
||||
National Security Advisor to ensure that a necessary framework
|
||||
of proposed options, roles, and levels of delegation is in
|
||||
place for the use of all appropriate United States Government
|
||||
DCEO and OCEO capabilities to advance and defend U.S. national
|
||||
interests, including actions taken in response to indications
|
||||
of imminent threat or when the United States or the Internet
|
||||
is subjected to a debilitating attack. This framework shall
|
||||
consider how cyber operations capabilities will complement
|
||||
other United States Government cyber capabilities, including
|
||||
network defense and law enforcement. [Action: DOD, DHS, DOJ,
|
||||
Office of the DNI, and CIA update to Deputies; 6 months after
|
||||
directive approval] (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
Department and agency heads conducting DCEO or OCEO covered
|
||||
under this directive shall report annually on the use and
|
||||
effectiveness of operations of the previous year to the
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
17
|
||||
President through the National Security Advisor. [Action:
|
||||
relevant departments and agencies; ongoing until otherwise
|
||||
directed] (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
Foundation Building (U)
|
||||
|
||||
The DNI, working with appropriate departments and agencies,
|
||||
shall continue to lead interagency efforts to improve
|
||||
intelligence collection in support of DCEO and OCEO, including
|
||||
under conditions when Internet infrastructure is significantly
|
||||
degraded. These efforts shall include an enhanced process for
|
||||
sharing intelligence-based cyber threat information with the
|
||||
private sector and international partners in the interest of
|
||||
minimizing the need for DCEO. The DNI shall identify needed
|
||||
investments including in research and development, testing,
|
||||
and evaluation to help develop intelligence capabilities in
|
||||
support of DCEO and OCEO. [Action: Office of the DNI;
|
||||
ongoing] (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The Secretary of State - in coordination with the Secretaries
|
||||
of Defense and Homeland Security, the AG, the DNI, and others
|
||||
as appropriate shall continue to lead efforts to establish
|
||||
an international consensus around norms of behavior in
|
||||
cyberspace to reduce the likelihood of and deter actions by
|
||||
other nations that would require the United States Government
|
||||
to resort to DCEO. [Action: State; ongoing] (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The AG - through the FBI and in coordination as appropriate
|
||||
with DHS, appropriate elements of the IC, and other
|
||||
departments and agencies shall continue to identify,
|
||||
investigate, mitigate, and disrupt malicious cyber activity in
|
||||
the interest of minimizing the need for DCEO. The AG, through
|
||||
the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force, shall lead
|
||||
related interagency efforts by integrating, sharing,
|
||||
coordinating, and collaborating on counterintelligence,
|
||||
counterterrorism, intelligence, and law enforcement
|
||||
information from member organizations concerning
|
||||
investigations of malicious cyber activity in order to
|
||||
facilitate the use of all available authorities to address
|
||||
such threats. These activities shall be coordinated with
|
||||
other entities and the private sector as appropriate. [Action:
|
||||
DOJ; ongoing] (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The Secretaries of State, Defense, Homeland Security, and
|
||||
Commerce along with the AG, the DNI, and others as
|
||||
appropriate shall continue to advance interagency efforts
|
||||
with international partners to increase their cyber capacities
|
||||
for self protection and, where appropriate, to facilitate
|
||||
cooperative defense of cyberspace in the interest of
|
||||
minimizing the need for DCEO. The partnerships shall include
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
18
|
||||
application of not only improvements to network defenses, but
|
||||
also sharing - as appropriate and consistent with operational
|
||||
security requirements and the protection of intelligence
|
||||
sources, methods, and activities of DCEO-related
|
||||
information, tools, and methods consistent with the provisions
|
||||
set forth in this directive, the National Disclosure Policy,
|
||||
and with U.S. national interests. [Action: State, DOD, DHS,
|
||||
DOC, and Office of the DNI; ongoing] (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The Secretary of Homeland Security - in coordination with the
|
||||
Secretaries of Defense and Commerce, the AG, the DNI, and the
|
||||
heads of relevant sector-specific agencies shall continue to
|
||||
lead interagency efforts to develop partnerships with other
|
||||
levels of government and the private sector to increase the
|
||||
nation's cyber capacities for self protection and, where
|
||||
appropriate, to facilitate cooperative efforts to secure
|
||||
cyberspace in the interest of minimizing the need for DCEO.
|
||||
[Action: DHS; ongoing] (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue