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TOP SECRET/NOFORN
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PRESIDENTIAL POLICY DIRECTIVE/PPD-20
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
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THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
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THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
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THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
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THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
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THE SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY
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ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CHIEF OF STAFF
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DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
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ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
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AFFAIRS
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DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
|
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ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR HOMELAND SECURITY
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AND COUNTERTERRORISM
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DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
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POLICY
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DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
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DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
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SUBJECT: U.S. Cyber Operations Policy (U)
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This Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) supersedes National
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Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-38 of July 7, 2004. This
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directive complements, but does not affect, NSPD-54/Homeland
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||||
Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-23 on “Cybersecurity
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Policy" of January 8, 2008; National Security Directive (NSD)-42
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||||
on "National Policy for the Security of National Security
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||||
Telecommunications and Information Systems" of July 5, 1990; and
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||||
PPD-8 on "National Preparedness" of March 30, 2011. (C/NF)
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|
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I. Definitions (U)
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||||
The following terms are defined for the purposes of this
|
||||
directive and should be used when possible in interagency
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|
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TOP SECRET/NOFORN
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||||
Reason: 1.4(a) (c) (e) (g)
|
||||
Declassify on: 10/16/37
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|
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TOP SECRET/NOFORN
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||||
2
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documents and communications on this topic to ensure common
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||||
understanding. (U)
|
||||
|
||||
Cyberspace: The interdependent network of information
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technology infrastructures that includes the Internet,
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telecommunications networks, computers, information or
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communications systems, networks, and embedded processors and
|
||||
controllers. (U)
|
||||
|
||||
Network Defense: Programs, activities, and the use of tools
|
||||
necessary to facilitate them (including those governed by
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||||
NSPD-54/HSPD-23 and NSD-42) conducted on a computer, network,
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||||
or information or communications system by the owner or with
|
||||
the consent of the owner and, as appropriate, the users for
|
||||
the primary purpose of protecting (1) that computer, network,
|
||||
or system; (2) data stored on, processed on, or transiting
|
||||
that computer, network, or system; or (3) physical and virtual
|
||||
infrastructure controlled by that computer, network, or
|
||||
system. Network defense does not involve or require accessing
|
||||
or conducting activities on computers, networks, or
|
||||
information or communications systems without authorization
|
||||
from the owners or exceeding access authorized by the owners.
|
||||
(U)
|
||||
|
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Malicious Cyber Activity: Activities, other than those
|
||||
authorized by or in accordance with U.S. law, that seek to
|
||||
compromise or impair the confidentiality, integrity, or
|
||||
availability of computers, information or communications
|
||||
systems, networks, physical or virtual infrastructure
|
||||
controlled by computers or information systems, or information
|
||||
resident thereon. (U)
|
||||
|
||||
Cyber Effect: The manipulation, disruption, denial,
|
||||
degradation, or destruction of computers, information or
|
||||
communications systems, networks, physical or virtual
|
||||
infrastructure controlled by computers or information systems,
|
||||
or information resident thereon. (U)
|
||||
|
||||
Cyber Collection: Operations and related programs or
|
||||
activities conducted by or on behalf of the United States
|
||||
Government, in or through cyberspace, for the primary purpose
|
||||
of collecting intelligence - including information that can be
|
||||
used for future operations - from computers, information or
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||||
communications systems, or networks with the intent to remain
|
||||
undetected. Cyber collection entails accessing a computer,
|
||||
information system, or network without authorization from the
|
||||
owner or operator of that computer, information system, or
|
||||
network or from a party to a communication or by exceeding
|
||||
authorized access. Cyber collection includes those activities
|
||||
essential and inherent to enabling cyber collection, such as
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
3
|
||||
inhibiting detection or attribution, even if they create cyber
|
||||
effects. (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
Defensive Cyber Effects Operations (DCEO): Operations and
|
||||
related programs or activities other than network defense or
|
||||
cyber collection conducted by or on behalf of the
|
||||
United States Government, in or through cyberspace, that are
|
||||
intended to enable or produce cyber effects outside
|
||||
United States Government networks for the purpose of defending
|
||||
or protecting against imminent threats or ongoing attacks or
|
||||
malicious cyber activity against U.S. national interests from
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||||
inside or outside cyberspace. (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
Nonintrusive Defensive Countermeasures (NDCM): The subset of
|
||||
DCEO that does not require accessing computers, information or
|
||||
communications systems, or networks without authorization from
|
||||
the owners or operators of the targeted computers, information
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||||
or communications systems, or networks or exceeding authorized
|
||||
access and only creates the minimum cyber effects needed to
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||||
mitigate the threat activity. (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
Offensive Cyber Effects Operations (OCEO): Operations and
|
||||
related programs or activities - other than network defense,
|
||||
cyber collection, or DCEO - conducted by or on behalf of the
|
||||
United States Government, in or through cyberspace, that are
|
||||
intended to enable or produce cyber effects outside
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||||
United States Government networks. (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
Cyber Operations: Cyber collection, DCEO (including NDCM),
|
||||
and OCEO collectively. (U)
|
||||
|
||||
Significant Consequences: Loss of life, significant
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||||
responsive actions against the United States, significant
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||||
damage to property, serious adverse U.S. foreign policy
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||||
consequences, or serious economic impact on the United States.
|
||||
(U)
|
||||
|
||||
U.S. National Interests: Matters of vital interest to the
|
||||
United States to include national security, public safety,
|
||||
national economic security, the safe and reliable functioning
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||||
of "critical infrastructure," and the availability of "key
|
||||
resources."¹ (U)
|
||||
|
||||
Emergency Cyber Action: A cyber operation undertaken at the
|
||||
direction of the head of a department or agency with
|
||||
appropriate authorities who has determined that such action is
|
||||
necessary, pursuant to the requirements of this directive, to
|
||||
mitigate an imminent threat or ongoing attack against U.S.
|
||||
national interests from inside or outside cyberspace and under
|
||||
circumstances that at the time do not permit obtaining prior
|
||||
|
||||
¹ As these terms are used in HSPD-7 on "Critical Infrastructure,
|
||||
Identification, Prioritization, and Protection" from December 17, 2003. (U)
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
4
|
||||
Presidential approval to the extent that such approval would
|
||||
otherwise be required. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
II. Purpose and Scope (U)
|
||||
|
||||
The United States has an abiding interest in developing and
|
||||
maintaining use of cyberspace as an integral part of U.S.
|
||||
national capabilities to collect intelligence and to deter,
|
||||
deny, or defeat any adversary that seeks to harm U.S. national
|
||||
interests in peace, crisis, or war. Given the evolution in U.S.
|
||||
experience, policy, capabilities, and understanding of the cyber
|
||||
threat, and in information and communications technology, this
|
||||
directive establishes updated principles and processes as part
|
||||
of an overarching national cyber policy framework. (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The United States Government shall conduct all cyber
|
||||
operations consistent with the U.S. Constitution and other
|
||||
applicable laws and policies of the United States, including
|
||||
Presidential orders and directives. (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The United States Government shall conduct DCEO and OCEO under
|
||||
this directive consistent with its obligations under
|
||||
international law, including with regard to matters of
|
||||
sovereignty and neutrality, and, as applicable, the law of
|
||||
armed conflict. (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
This directive pertains to cyber operations, including those
|
||||
that support or enable kinetic, information, or other types of
|
||||
operations. Most of this directive is directed exclusively to
|
||||
DCEO and OCEO. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The United States Government has mature capabilities and
|
||||
effective processes for cyber collection. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
Therefore, this directive affirms and does not intend to alter
|
||||
existing procedures, guidelines, or authorities for cyber
|
||||
collection. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
This directive provides a procedure for cyber collection
|
||||
operations that are reasonably likely to result in
|
||||
“significant consequences."² (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The principles and requirements in this directive apply except
|
||||
as otherwise lawfully directed by the President. With the
|
||||
exception of the grant of authority to the Secretary of Defense
|
||||
to conduct Emergency Cyber Actions as provided below, nothing in
|
||||
this directive is intended to alter the existing authorities of,
|
||||
or grant new authorities to, any United States Government
|
||||
department or agency (including authorities to carry out
|
||||
|
||||
² NSPD-38 referred to operations with significant consequences as "sensitive
|
||||
offensive cyber operations." (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
5
|
||||
operational activities), or supersede any existing coordination
|
||||
and approval processes, other than those of NSPD-38. Nothing in
|
||||
this directive is intended to limit or impair military
|
||||
commanders from using DCEO or OCEO specified in a military
|
||||
action approved by the President and previously coordinated and
|
||||
deconflicted as required by existing processes and this
|
||||
directive. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
In addition, this directive does not pertain to or alter
|
||||
existing authorities related to the following categories of
|
||||
activities by or on behalf of the United States Government,
|
||||
regardless of whether they produce cyber effects:
|
||||
|
||||
Activities conducted under section 503 of the National
|
||||
Security Act of 1947 (as amended);
|
||||
|
||||
Activities conducted pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence
|
||||
Surveillance Act, the approval authority delegated to the
|
||||
Attorney General (AG) by section 2.5 of Executive Order 12333
|
||||
(as amended), or law enforcement authorities; however, cyber
|
||||
operations reasonably likely to result in significant
|
||||
consequences still require Presidential approval, and
|
||||
operations that reasonably can be expected to adversely affect
|
||||
other United States Government operations still require
|
||||
coordination under established processes;
|
||||
|
||||
Activities conducted by the United States Secret Service for
|
||||
the purpose of protecting the President, the Vice President,
|
||||
and others as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 3056; however, cyber
|
||||
operations reasonably likely to result in significant
|
||||
consequences still require Presidential approval, and
|
||||
operations that reasonably can be expected to adversely affect
|
||||
other United States Government operations still require
|
||||
coordination under established processes;
|
||||
|
||||
The use of online personas and other virtual operations³ -
|
||||
undertaken exclusively for counterintelligence, intelligence
|
||||
collection, or law enforcement purposes - that do not involve
|
||||
the use of DCEO or OCEO;
|
||||
|
||||
Activities conducted in cyberspace pursuant to
|
||||
counterintelligence authorities for the purpose of protecting
|
||||
specific intelligence sources, methods, and activities;
|
||||
|
||||
Signals intelligence collection other than cyber collection as
|
||||
defined in this directive;
|
||||
|
||||
Open-source intelligence collection;
|
||||
|
||||
Network defense;
|
||||
|
||||
³ Human intelligence operations undertaken via the Internet. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
6
|
||||
Traditional electronic warfare activities;
|
||||
|
||||
The development of content to support influence campaigns,
|
||||
military deception, or military information support
|
||||
operations; or
|
||||
|
||||
Simple transit of data or commands through networks that do
|
||||
not create cyber effects on those networks. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
III. Guiding Principles for DCEO and OCEO (U)
|
||||
|
||||
DCEO and OCEO may raise unique national security and foreign
|
||||
policy concerns that require additional coordination and policy
|
||||
considerations because cyberspace is globally connected. DCEO
|
||||
and OCEO, even for subtle or clandestine operations, may
|
||||
generate cyber effects in locations other than the intended
|
||||
target, with potential unintended or collateral consequences
|
||||
that may affect U.S. national interests in many locations.
|
||||
(S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The United States Government shall conduct DCEO and OCEO in a
|
||||
manner consistent with applicable values, principles, and norms
|
||||
for state behavior that the United States Government promotes
|
||||
domestically and internationally as described in the
|
||||
2011 “International Strategy for Cyberspace." (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
National-level strategic objectives and operational
|
||||
necessities shall dictate what the United States Government
|
||||
seeks to accomplish with DCEO and OCEO. (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The United States Government shall integrate DCEO and OCEO, as
|
||||
appropriate, with other diplomatic, informational, military,
|
||||
economic, financial, intelligence, counterintelligence, and
|
||||
law enforcement options, taking into account effectiveness,
|
||||
costs, risks, potential consequences, foreign policy, and
|
||||
other policy considerations. (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The United States Government shall reserve the right to act in
|
||||
accordance with the United States' inherent right of self
|
||||
defense as recognized in international law, including through
|
||||
the conduct of DCEO. (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The United States Government shall conduct neither DCEO nor
|
||||
OCEO that are intended or likely to produce cyber effects
|
||||
within the United States unless approved by the President. A
|
||||
department or agency, however, with appropriate authority may
|
||||
|
||||
⁴ As defined by the Joint Dictionary 1-02, "Department of Defense Dictionary
|
||||
of Military and Associated Terms" (as amended through February 15, 2012):
|
||||
military action involving the use of electromagnetic or directed energy to
|
||||
control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Electronic
|
||||
warfare consists of three divisions: electronic attack, electronic
|
||||
protection, and electronic warfare support. (U)
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
7
|
||||
conduct a particular case of DCEO that is intended or likely
|
||||
to produce cyber effects within the United States if it
|
||||
qualifies as an Emergency Cyber Action as set forth in this
|
||||
directive and otherwise complies with applicable laws and
|
||||
policies, including Presidential orders and directives.
|
||||
(C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The United States Government shall obtain consent from countries
|
||||
in which cyber effects are expected to occur or those countries
|
||||
hosting U.S. computers and systems used to conduct DCEO or OCEO
|
||||
unless:
|
||||
|
||||
Military actions approved by the President and ordered by the
|
||||
Secretary of Defense authorize nonconsensual DCEO or OCEO,
|
||||
with provisions made for using existing processes to conduct
|
||||
appropriate interagency coordination on targets, geographic
|
||||
areas, levels of effect, and degrees of risk for the
|
||||
operations;
|
||||
|
||||
DCEO is undertaken in accordance with the United States'
|
||||
inherent right of self defense as recognized in international
|
||||
law, and the United States Government provides notification
|
||||
afterwards in a manner consistent with the protection of
|
||||
U.S. military and intelligence capabilities and foreign policy
|
||||
considerations and in accordance with applicable law; or
|
||||
|
||||
The President - on the recommendation of the Deputies
|
||||
Committee and, as appropriate, the Principals Committee -
|
||||
determines that an exception to obtaining consent is
|
||||
necessary, takes into account overall U.S. national interests
|
||||
and equities, and meets a high threshold of need and effective
|
||||
outcomes relative to the risks created by such an exception.
|
||||
(S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The information revealed to other countries in the course of
|
||||
seeking consent shall be consistent with operational security
|
||||
requirements and the protection of intelligence sources,
|
||||
methods, and activities. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The United States Government, to ensure appropriate application
|
||||
of these principles, shall make all reasonable efforts, under
|
||||
circumstances prevailing at the time, to identify the adversary
|
||||
and the ownership and geographic location of the targets and
|
||||
related infrastructure where DCEO or OCEO will be conducted or
|
||||
cyber effects are expected to occur, and to identify the people
|
||||
and entities, including U.S. persons, that could be affected by
|
||||
proposed DCEO or OCEO. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
8
|
||||
Additional Considerations for DCEO (U)
|
||||
|
||||
The Nation requires flexible and agile capabilities that
|
||||
leverage the full resources of the United States Government to
|
||||
conduct necessary and proportionate DCEO. These operations
|
||||
shall conform to the following additional policy principles:
|
||||
|
||||
The United States Government shall reserve use of DCEO to
|
||||
protect U.S. national interests in circumstances when network
|
||||
defense or law enforcement measures are insufficient or cannot
|
||||
be put in place in time to mitigate a threat, and when other
|
||||
previously approved measures would not be more appropriate, or
|
||||
if a Deputies or Principals Committee review determines that
|
||||
proposed DCEO provides an advantageous degree of
|
||||
effectiveness, timeliness, or efficiency compared to other
|
||||
methods commensurate with the risks;
|
||||
|
||||
The United States Government shall conduct DCEO with the least
|
||||
intrusive methods feasible to mitigate a threat;
|
||||
|
||||
The United States Government shall seek partnerships with
|
||||
industry, other levels of government as appropriate, and other
|
||||
nations and organizations to promote cooperative defensive
|
||||
capabilities, including, as appropriate, through the use of
|
||||
DCEO as governed by the provisions in this directive; and
|
||||
|
||||
Partnerships with industry and other levels of government for
|
||||
the protection of critical infrastructure shall be coordinated
|
||||
with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), working with
|
||||
relevant sector-specific agencies and, as appropriate, the
|
||||
Department of Commerce (DOC). (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The United States recognizes that network defense, design, and
|
||||
management cannot mitigate all possible malicious cyber activity
|
||||
and reserves the right, consistent with applicable law, to
|
||||
protect itself from malicious cyber activity that threatens U.S.
|
||||
national interests. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The United States Government shall work with private industry
|
||||
through DHS, DOC, and relevant sector-specific agencies - to
|
||||
protect critical infrastructure in a manner that minimizes the
|
||||
need for DCEO against malicious cyber activity; however, the
|
||||
United States Government shall retain DCEO, including
|
||||
anticipatory action taken against imminent threats, as
|
||||
governed by the provisions in this directive, as an option to
|
||||
protect such infrastructure. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The United States Government shall - in coordination, as
|
||||
appropriate, with DHS, law enforcement, and other relevant
|
||||
departments and agencies, to include sector-specific agencies
|
||||
- obtain the consent of network or computer owners for
|
||||
United States Government use of DCEO to protect against
|
||||
malicious cyber activity on their behalf, unless the activity
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
9
|
||||
implicates the United States' inherent right of self-defense
|
||||
as recognized in international law or the policy review
|
||||
processes established in this directive and appropriate legal
|
||||
reviews determine that such consent is not required. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
Offensive Cyber Effects Operations (U)
|
||||
|
||||
OCEO can offer unique and unconventional capabilities to advance
|
||||
U.S. national objectives around the world with little or no
|
||||
warning to the adversary or target and with potential effects
|
||||
ranging from subtle to severely damaging. The development and
|
||||
sustainment of OCEO capabilities, however, may require
|
||||
considerable time and effort if access and tools for a specific
|
||||
target do not already exist. (TS/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The United States Government shall identify potential targets
|
||||
of national importance where OCEO can offer a favorable
|
||||
balance of effectiveness and risk as compared with other
|
||||
instruments of national power, establish and maintain OCEO
|
||||
capabilities integrated as appropriate with other U.S.
|
||||
offensive capabilities, and execute those capabilities in a
|
||||
manner consistent with the provisions of this directive.
|
||||
(TS/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
IV. Cyber Operations with Significant Consequences (U)
|
||||
|
||||
Specific Presidential approval is required for any cyber
|
||||
operations - including cyber collection, DCEO, and OCEO -
|
||||
determined by the head of a department or agency to conduct the
|
||||
operation to be reasonably likely to result in “significant
|
||||
consequences" as defined in this directive. This requirement
|
||||
applies to cyber operations generally, except for those already
|
||||
approved by the President, even if this directive otherwise does
|
||||
not pertain to such operations as provided in the "Purpose and
|
||||
Scope" section of this directive. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
V. Threat Response Operations (U)
|
||||
|
||||
Responses to Persistent Malicious Cyber Activity (U)
|
||||
|
||||
Departments and agencies with appropriate authorities -
|
||||
consistent with the provisions set forth in this directive and
|
||||
in coordination with the Departments of State, Defense (DOD),
|
||||
Justice (DOJ), and Homeland Security; the Federal Bureau of
|
||||
Investigation (FBI); the Office of the Director of National
|
||||
Intelligence (DNI); the National Security Agency (NSA); the
|
||||
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); the Departments of the
|
||||
Treasury and Energy (DOE); and other relevant members of the
|
||||
Intelligence Community (IC) and sector-specific agencies - shall
|
||||
establish criteria and procedures to be approved by the
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
10
|
||||
President for responding to persistent malicious cyber activity
|
||||
against U.S. national interests. Such criteria and procedures
|
||||
shall include the following requirements:
|
||||
|
||||
The United States Government shall reserve use of such
|
||||
responses to circumstances when network defense or law
|
||||
enforcement measures are insufficient or cannot be put in
|
||||
place in time to mitigate the malicious cyber activity; and
|
||||
|
||||
Departments and agencies shall conduct these responses in a
|
||||
manner not reasonably likely to result in significant
|
||||
consequences and use the minimum action required to mitigate
|
||||
the activity. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
Emergency Cyber Actions (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The Secretary of Defense is hereby authorized to conduct, or a
|
||||
department or agency head with appropriate authorities may
|
||||
conduct, under procedures approved by the President, Emergency
|
||||
Cyber Actions necessary to mitigate an imminent threat or
|
||||
ongoing attack using DCEO if circumstances at the time do not
|
||||
permit obtaining prior Presidential approval (to the extent that
|
||||
such approval would otherwise be required) and the department or
|
||||
agency head determines that:
|
||||
|
||||
An emergency action is necessary in accordance with the
|
||||
United States inherent right of self-defense as recognized in
|
||||
international law to prevent imminent loss of life or
|
||||
significant damage with enduring national impact on the
|
||||
Primary Mission Essential Functions of the United States
|
||||
Government, ⁵ U.S. critical infrastructure and key resources,
|
||||
or the mission of U.S. military forces;
|
||||
|
||||
Network defense or law enforcement would be insufficient or
|
||||
unavailable in the necessary timeframe, and other previously
|
||||
approved activities would not be more appropriate;
|
||||
|
||||
The Emergency Cyber Actions are reasonably likely not to
|
||||
result in significant consequences;
|
||||
|
||||
The Emergency Cyber Actions will be conducted in a manner
|
||||
intended to be nonlethal in purpose, action, and consequence;
|
||||
|
||||
The Emergency Cyber Actions will be limited in magnitude,
|
||||
scope, and duration to that level of activity necessary to
|
||||
mitigate the threat or attack;
|
||||
|
||||
The Emergency Cyber Actions, when practicable, have been
|
||||
coordinated with appropriate departments and agencies,
|
||||
including State, DOD, DHS, DOJ, the Office of the DNI, FBI,
|
||||
CIA, NSA, the Treasury, DOE, and other relevant members of the
|
||||
IC and sector-specific agencies; and
|
||||
|
||||
⁵ As defined in NSPD-51/HSPD-20 on "National Continuity Policy" of May 9,
|
||||
2007. (U)
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
11
|
||||
The Emergency Cyber Actions are consistent with the
|
||||
U.S. Constitution and other applicable laws and policies of
|
||||
the United States, including Presidential orders and
|
||||
directives. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
In addition, Emergency Cyber Actions that are intended or likely
|
||||
to produce cyber effects within the United States (or otherwise
|
||||
likely to adversely affect U.S. network defense activities or
|
||||
U.S. networks) must be conducted:
|
||||
|
||||
Under the procedures and, as appropriate, criteria for
|
||||
domestic operations previously approved by the President; and
|
||||
|
||||
Under circumstances that at the time of the Emergency Cyber
|
||||
Action preclude the use of network defense, law enforcement,
|
||||
or some form of DOD support to civil authorities that would
|
||||
prevent the threatened imminent loss of life or significant
|
||||
damage. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
Department and agency heads shall report Emergency Cyber Actions
|
||||
to the President through the National Security Advisor as soon
|
||||
as feasible. If the coordination specified above is not
|
||||
practicable in the available time, then notification shall occur
|
||||
after the fact as soon as possible to inform subsequent whole-
|
||||
of-government response and recovery activities. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
Until such time as any additional criteria for domestic
|
||||
operations are approved by the President, authorization by
|
||||
department and agency heads for Emergency Cyber Actions that are
|
||||
intended or likely to produce cyber effects within the United
|
||||
States (or otherwise likely to adversely affect U.S. network
|
||||
defense activities or U.S. networks) shall be granted only if
|
||||
the President has provided prior approval for such activity, or
|
||||
circumstances at the time do not permit obtaining prior approval
|
||||
from the President and such actions are conducted within the
|
||||
other constraints defined above. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
VI. Process (U)
|
||||
|
||||
The National Security Staff (NSS) shall formalize the functions
|
||||
of the Cyber Operations Policy Working Group (COP-WG) as the
|
||||
primary United States Government forum below the level of an
|
||||
Interagency Policy Committee (IPC) for integrating DCEO or OCEO
|
||||
policy, including consideration of exceptions or refinements to
|
||||
the principles of this directive. The COP-WG shall work with
|
||||
other elements of the policy community as appropriate to the
|
||||
geographic or functional context of the DCEO- or OCEO-related
|
||||
policy discussion at the earliest opportunity. The COP-WG is
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
12
|
||||
not an operational group, but will address policy issues related
|
||||
to the conduct of operations raised by departments and agencies
|
||||
or the NSS. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
Departments and agencies shall work through the COP-WG to raise
|
||||
unresolved or ambiguous policy questions in an integrated IPC
|
||||
meeting of all appropriate national and economic security
|
||||
stakeholders. The NSS shall use existing channels to elevate
|
||||
any unresolved policy conflicts to the Deputies and Principals
|
||||
Committees, as appropriate. (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
Departments and agencies shall continue to use existing
|
||||
operational processes for cyber operations, except as those
|
||||
processes are modified by or under this directive. Other types
|
||||
of operations that are supported or enabled by cyber operations
|
||||
shall use their existing operational processes. This continued
|
||||
use of existing operational processes applies, for example, to
|
||||
operations conducted under military orders that authorize DCEO
|
||||
or OCEO, including clandestine preparatory activities. (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
Departments and agencies, during planning for proposed cyber
|
||||
operations, shall use established processes to coordinate and
|
||||
deconflict with other organizations - including, as appropriate,
|
||||
State, DOD, DOJ, DHS, members of the IC, and relevant sector-
|
||||
specific agencies - and obtain any other approvals required
|
||||
under applicable policies, except as those processes are
|
||||
modified by or under this directive. Departments and agencies
|
||||
shall modify or enhance these processes as future circumstances
|
||||
dictate. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
Departments and agencies shall coordinate DCEO and OCEO with
|
||||
State and Chiefs of Station or their designees in countries
|
||||
where DCEO or OCEO are conducted or cyber effects are expected
|
||||
to occur. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
Coordination of DCEO and OCEO with network defense efforts shall
|
||||
be sufficient to enable a whole-of-government approach to the
|
||||
protection of U.S. national interests and shall identify
|
||||
potential implications of proposed DCEO and OCEO for U.S.
|
||||
networks, including potential adversary responses or unintended
|
||||
consequences of U.S. operations for which the United States
|
||||
Government or the private sector would need to prepare. This
|
||||
coordination shall occur in a manner consistent with operational
|
||||
|
||||
⁶ Including the May 9, 2007, "Trilateral Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) among
|
||||
the Department of Defense and the Department of Justice and the Intelligence
|
||||
Community Regarding Computer Network Attack and Computer Network Exploitation
|
||||
Activities," and other operational coordination processes that exist between
|
||||
departments and agencies. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
13
|
||||
security requirements and the protection of intelligence
|
||||
sources, methods, and activities. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
Toward this end of ensuring a unified whole-of-government
|
||||
approach, departments and agencies shall coordinate and
|
||||
deconflict DCEO and OCEO with network defense efforts of other
|
||||
departments and agencies as appropriate. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
In addition, DCEO and OCEO with potential implications for
|
||||
U.S. networks shall be deconflicted as appropriate and
|
||||
coordinated with DHS, appropriate law enforcement agencies,
|
||||
and relevant sector-specific agencies. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The United States Government shall make all reasonable efforts
|
||||
to identify and notify, as appropriate, private sector
|
||||
entities that could be affected by DCEO and OCEO. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
Policy Criteria (U)
|
||||
|
||||
Policy deliberations for DCEO and OCEO shall consider, but not
|
||||
be limited to, the following criteria:
|
||||
|
||||
Impact: The potential threat from adversary actions or the
|
||||
potential benefits, scope, and recommended prioritization of
|
||||
proposed U.S. operations as compared with other approaches -
|
||||
including, as appropriate, network defense by the
|
||||
United States Government or private sector network operators;
|
||||
|
||||
Risks: Assessments of intelligence gain or loss, the risk of
|
||||
retaliation or other impacts on U.S. networks or interests
|
||||
(including economic), impact on the security and stability of
|
||||
the Internet, and political gain or loss to include impact on
|
||||
foreign policies, bilateral and multilateral relationships
|
||||
(including Internet governance), and the establishment of
|
||||
unwelcome norms of international behavior;
|
||||
|
||||
Methods: The intrusiveness, timeliness, efficiency, capacity,
|
||||
and effectiveness of operational methods to be employed;
|
||||
|
||||
Geography and Identity: Geographic and identity aspects of
|
||||
the proposed activity, including the location of operations
|
||||
and the resulting effects, the identity of network owners and
|
||||
users that will be affected, and the identity or type - when
|
||||
known - of adversaries to be countered or affected by U.S.
|
||||
operations;
|
||||
|
||||
Transparency: The need for consent or notification of network
|
||||
or computer owners or host countries, the potential for impact
|
||||
on U.S. persons and U.S. private sector networks, and the need
|
||||
for any public or private communications strategies before or
|
||||
after an operation; and
|
||||
|
||||
Authorities and Civil Liberties: The available authorities
|
||||
and procedures and the potential for cyber effects inside the
|
||||
United States or against U.S. persons. (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
14
|
||||
Policy decisions shall be broad enough and include rationales in
|
||||
order to provide guidelines and direction for future proposals
|
||||
with the same operational and risk parameters. (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
Annex: Implementation (U)
|
||||
|
||||
Departments and agencies shall establish necessary capabilities
|
||||
and procedures for appropriate and timely implementation of DCEO
|
||||
and OCEO policies in the national interest. (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
Policy Process (U)
|
||||
|
||||
Departments and agencies shall, as appropriate, conduct DCEO
|
||||
and OCEO in accordance with the principles set forth in this
|
||||
directive and shall bring forward to the COP-WG situations
|
||||
that require policy discussion, including considerations of
|
||||
exceptions to those principles, using the policy criteria
|
||||
described in this directive. [Action: All; ongoing] (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The National Security Advisor, through the NSS, shall
|
||||
establish and operate the COP-WG to serve as the entry point
|
||||
for interagency deliberations of policy matters related to
|
||||
DCEO and OCEO. [Action: NSS; ongoing] (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The National Security Advisor, through the NSS, as needed,
|
||||
shall use the existing policy escalation process through an
|
||||
appropriate joint IPC-level group involving all stakeholders
|
||||
for a given situation, the Deputies Committee, and the
|
||||
Principals Committee. This process shall clarify the
|
||||
application of the principles set forth in this directive to
|
||||
specific operations, including consideration of exceptions or
|
||||
refinements to those principles. [Action: NSS; ongoing]
|
||||
(C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The NSS, as needed, shall lead reviews by appropriate
|
||||
departments and agencies of legal issues associated with DCEO
|
||||
and OCEO. The NSS shall refer legal questions to the chief
|
||||
legal officers of the appropriate departments or agencies or
|
||||
to DOJ for resolution of interagency disagreements or as
|
||||
otherwise appropriate. [Action: NSS; ongoing] (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The DNI shall continue to ensure, through appropriate policies
|
||||
and procedures, the deconfliction, coordination, and
|
||||
integration of all IC cyber operations and serve as the IC
|
||||
focal point for strategic planning and policy coordination
|
||||
related to cyber operations, both within the IC and with other
|
||||
departments and agencies in interagency coordination
|
||||
processes. [Action: DNI; ongoing] (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
15
|
||||
Policy Reviews and Preparation (U)
|
||||
|
||||
The Office of the DNI, in coordination with appropriate
|
||||
departments and agencies, shall prepare a classification guide
|
||||
for departments and agencies to use in the implementation of
|
||||
the policies in this directive. [Action: Office of the DNI;
|
||||
2 months after directive approval] (U)
|
||||
|
||||
The National Security Advisor, through the NSS, shall lead an
|
||||
interagency review of the United States Government's
|
||||
communications strategy, including public affairs guidance,
|
||||
regarding DCEO and OCEO. Pending approval of this strategy by
|
||||
the Deputies Committee, the United States Government's public
|
||||
posture on related matters shall be: "All United States
|
||||
Government activities in cyberspace are consistent with the
|
||||
principles stated in the May 2011 International Strategy for
|
||||
Cyberspace." [Action: NSS report to Deputies; 1 month after
|
||||
directive approval] (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The National Security Advisor, through the NSS, shall work
|
||||
with the Secretaries of Defense, State, and Homeland Security,
|
||||
the AG, the DNI, relevant IC and sector-specific agencies, and
|
||||
other heads of departments and agencies as appropriate to
|
||||
develop for the conduct of Emergency Cyber Actions, as set
|
||||
forth in this directive - in addition to the previously cited
|
||||
procedures and, as appropriate, domestic criteria to be
|
||||
approved by the President - detailed concepts of operation,
|
||||
supporting processes, communications capabilities, exercises,
|
||||
and training. In addition, the NSS - working with these same
|
||||
departments and agencies - shall, as necessary, develop for
|
||||
Presidential approval procedures and criteria for DCEO to be
|
||||
conducted in response to malicious cyber activity. [Action:
|
||||
NSS update on implementation to Deputies; 3 months after
|
||||
directive approval] (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The Secretary of Defense, the DNI, and the Director of the CIA
|
||||
- in coordination with the AG, the Secretaries of State and
|
||||
Homeland Security, and relevant IC and sector-specific
|
||||
agencies - shall prepare for approval by the President through
|
||||
the National Security Advisor a plan that identifies potential
|
||||
systems, processes, and infrastructure against which the
|
||||
United States should establish and maintain OCEO capabilities;
|
||||
proposes circumstances under which OCEO might be used; and
|
||||
proposes necessary resources and steps that would be needed
|
||||
for implementation, review, and updates as U.S. national
|
||||
security needs change. [Action: DOD, Office of the DNI, and
|
||||
CIA update to Deputies on scope of plans; 6 months after
|
||||
directive approval] (TS/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
16
|
||||
The Secretary of Defense and other department and agency heads
|
||||
as appropriate in coordination with the Secretary of
|
||||
Homeland Security, the AG, and the DNI shall develop and
|
||||
maintain a flexible, agile capability for the purpose of using
|
||||
DCEO to defend U.S. networks consistent with the provisions
|
||||
set forth in this directive. [Action: DOD and others;
|
||||
ongoing] (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The Secretary of Defense - in coordination with the
|
||||
Secretaries of Homeland Security, Commerce, and State, the AG,
|
||||
the DNI, and relevant IC and sector-specific agencies - shall
|
||||
develop a multi-phase plan to be approved by the Deputies
|
||||
Committee for testing, reviewing, and implementing NDCM. The
|
||||
plan shall be subjected to legal review and address
|
||||
authorities, technical feasibility, operational risks, and
|
||||
coordination procedures. [Action: DOD present first phase of
|
||||
plans to Deputies; 2 months after directive approval] (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The AG and the DNI - in collaboration with the Secretaries of
|
||||
Defense, State, Commerce, and Homeland Security, and relevant
|
||||
IC and sector-specific agencies - shall develop a multi-phase
|
||||
plan to be approved by the Deputies Committee for a test of
|
||||
the applicability and efficacy of counterintelligence
|
||||
authorities in the conduct of DCEO. The plan shall be
|
||||
subjected to legal review and address technical feasibility,
|
||||
operational risks, and coordination procedures. [Action: DOJ
|
||||
and Office of the DNI present first phase of plans to
|
||||
Deputies; 2 months after directive approval] (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security, the DNI, the
|
||||
AG, and the Director of the CIA - in collaboration as
|
||||
appropriate with the Secretaries of State and Commerce and the
|
||||
heads of relevant IC and sector-specific agencies - shall
|
||||
develop proposals to be approved by the President through the
|
||||
National Security Advisor to ensure that a necessary framework
|
||||
of proposed options, roles, and levels of delegation is in
|
||||
place for the use of all appropriate United States Government
|
||||
DCEO and OCEO capabilities to advance and defend U.S. national
|
||||
interests, including actions taken in response to indications
|
||||
of imminent threat or when the United States or the Internet
|
||||
is subjected to a debilitating attack. This framework shall
|
||||
consider how cyber operations capabilities will complement
|
||||
other United States Government cyber capabilities, including
|
||||
network defense and law enforcement. [Action: DOD, DHS, DOJ,
|
||||
Office of the DNI, and CIA update to Deputies; 6 months after
|
||||
directive approval] (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
Department and agency heads conducting DCEO or OCEO covered
|
||||
under this directive shall report annually on the use and
|
||||
effectiveness of operations of the previous year to the
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
17
|
||||
President through the National Security Advisor. [Action:
|
||||
relevant departments and agencies; ongoing until otherwise
|
||||
directed] (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
Foundation Building (U)
|
||||
|
||||
The DNI, working with appropriate departments and agencies,
|
||||
shall continue to lead interagency efforts to improve
|
||||
intelligence collection in support of DCEO and OCEO, including
|
||||
under conditions when Internet infrastructure is significantly
|
||||
degraded. These efforts shall include an enhanced process for
|
||||
sharing intelligence-based cyber threat information with the
|
||||
private sector and international partners in the interest of
|
||||
minimizing the need for DCEO. The DNI shall identify needed
|
||||
investments including in research and development, testing,
|
||||
and evaluation to help develop intelligence capabilities in
|
||||
support of DCEO and OCEO. [Action: Office of the DNI;
|
||||
ongoing] (S/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The Secretary of State - in coordination with the Secretaries
|
||||
of Defense and Homeland Security, the AG, the DNI, and others
|
||||
as appropriate shall continue to lead efforts to establish
|
||||
an international consensus around norms of behavior in
|
||||
cyberspace to reduce the likelihood of and deter actions by
|
||||
other nations that would require the United States Government
|
||||
to resort to DCEO. [Action: State; ongoing] (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The AG - through the FBI and in coordination as appropriate
|
||||
with DHS, appropriate elements of the IC, and other
|
||||
departments and agencies shall continue to identify,
|
||||
investigate, mitigate, and disrupt malicious cyber activity in
|
||||
the interest of minimizing the need for DCEO. The AG, through
|
||||
the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force, shall lead
|
||||
related interagency efforts by integrating, sharing,
|
||||
coordinating, and collaborating on counterintelligence,
|
||||
counterterrorism, intelligence, and law enforcement
|
||||
information from member organizations concerning
|
||||
investigations of malicious cyber activity in order to
|
||||
facilitate the use of all available authorities to address
|
||||
such threats. These activities shall be coordinated with
|
||||
other entities and the private sector as appropriate. [Action:
|
||||
DOJ; ongoing] (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The Secretaries of State, Defense, Homeland Security, and
|
||||
Commerce along with the AG, the DNI, and others as
|
||||
appropriate shall continue to advance interagency efforts
|
||||
with international partners to increase their cyber capacities
|
||||
for self protection and, where appropriate, to facilitate
|
||||
cooperative defense of cyberspace in the interest of
|
||||
minimizing the need for DCEO. The partnerships shall include
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
18
|
||||
application of not only improvements to network defenses, but
|
||||
also sharing - as appropriate and consistent with operational
|
||||
security requirements and the protection of intelligence
|
||||
sources, methods, and activities of DCEO-related
|
||||
information, tools, and methods consistent with the provisions
|
||||
set forth in this directive, the National Disclosure Policy,
|
||||
and with U.S. national interests. [Action: State, DOD, DHS,
|
||||
DOC, and Office of the DNI; ongoing] (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
The Secretary of Homeland Security - in coordination with the
|
||||
Secretaries of Defense and Commerce, the AG, the DNI, and the
|
||||
heads of relevant sector-specific agencies shall continue to
|
||||
lead interagency efforts to develop partnerships with other
|
||||
levels of government and the private sector to increase the
|
||||
nation's cyber capacities for self protection and, where
|
||||
appropriate, to facilitate cooperative efforts to secure
|
||||
cyberspace in the interest of minimizing the need for DCEO.
|
||||
[Action: DHS; ongoing] (C/NF)
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET/NOFORN
|
||||
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Add a link
Reference in a new issue