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data/nsa-saudi-arabia-intercept-14-0725/metadata.json
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{
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"title": "NSA Intelligence Relationship with Saudi Arabia",
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"type": "REPORTED",
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"description": "A 2013 NSA information paper outlining the agency's expanding surveillance partnership with Saudi Arabia's Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior, providing the Saudis with advanced signals intelligence technology, decryption services, and targeting support — including capabilities used to track individuals inside the kingdom.\n",
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"long_description": "This top secret NSA/CSS information paper, dated April 8, 2013, documents the history, structure, and current state of the NSA's intelligence relationship with Saudi Arabia across two distinct ministry-level partners: the Ministry of Defense Radio Reconnaissance Department (MOD RRD) and the newly formalized relationship with the Ministry of Interior's Technical Affairs Directorate (TAD). The NSA's relationship with the MOD RRD dates to the first Gulf War in 1991 but had stagnated for years before undergoing a \"period of rejuvenation\" focused on modernizing Saudi High Frequency Direction Finding (HFDF) capabilities to monitor Iranian military activity and provide threat warning related to Houthi conflicts along the Saudi-Yemen border. A new HFDF sensor system was installed near Riyadh in September 2012, replacing a long-inoperable legacy system.\n\nThe more significant development documented in the paper is the December 2012 authorization by the Director of National Intelligence to formally expand NSA's Third Party SIGINT relationship with Saudi Arabia to include the MOI's TAD — a body focused on internal security. The NSA had already been quietly collaborating with TAD since February 2011 under CIA cover, working on a \"sensitive access initiative\" targeting activity on the Arabian Peninsula. With formal DNI approval, the NSA now explicitly provides TAD with direct analytic and technical support, data exploitation advice, target development assistance, a sensitive source collection capability, and a decryption service against terrorist targets. In exchange, TAD provides the NSA with access to unique collection on AQAP targets otherwise inaccessible by other means, while MOD RRD contributes collection against Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps maritime targets in the Arabian Gulf.\n\nThe paper is candid about the tensions in the relationship: the Saudi MOD RRD wants to expand the relationship, but some of its requests must be denied. The document also notes that NSA has agreed to coordinate its collection operations inside Saudi Arabia with the CIA Chief of Station in Riyadh to protect unilateral HUMINT assets — an acknowledgment that multiple U.S. intelligence equities are operating simultaneously inside the kingdom and require deconfliction. Critically, one of the NSA's stated primary goals for the partnership is facilitating the Saudi government's ability to \"locate and track individuals of mutual interest within Saudi Arabia\" — language that, given the MOI's documented record of targeting political dissidents and human rights activists, raises serious concerns about the use of U.S. surveillance technology against the Saudi regime's domestic opponents.",
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"tags": [
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"MOD",
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"TAD",
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"Technical Affairs Directorate",
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"Mabahith",
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"AQAP",
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"Al-Qaeda",
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"Arabian Peninsula",
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"IRGC",
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"Houthi",
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"internal security",
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"dissidents",
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"human rights",
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"repression",
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"HFDF",
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"direction finding",
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"decryption",
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"third party relationships",
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"DNI authorization",
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"CIA",
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"HUMINT deconfliction",
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"target tracking",
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"bilateral relationship",
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"counterterrorism",
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"Gulf region",
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"regime continuity",
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"surveillance export",
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"intelligence cooperation"
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],
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"document": {
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"creator": "NSA",
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"date_created": "2013-04-08",
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"classification": [
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"TOP SECRET",
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"SI"
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],
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"dissemination": [
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"NOFORN"
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],
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"banner": "TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN",
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"genre": "report",
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"programs": [],
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"countries": [
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"Saudi Arabia",
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"Iran",
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"Yemen"
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],
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"people": []
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},
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"publication": [
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{
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"publisher": "The Intercept",
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"date_published": "2014-07-25",
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"title": "The NSA's New Partner in Spying: Saudi Arabia's Brutal State Police",
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"link": "https://theintercept.com/2014/07/25/nsas-new-partner-spying-saudi-arabias-brutal-state-police/",
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"reporters": [
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"Greenwald, Glenn",
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"Hussain, Murtaza"
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],
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"contributors": [],
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"doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2014/07/25/saudi-arabia-information-paper/",
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"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1236112/saudi-arabia-information-paper.pdf"
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}
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],
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"pdf_sha256": "6779809517ecc50b95821234e84720656d9b99f1210932be1298c19c57e92954",
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"pages": 4
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}
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TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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National Security
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Agency/Central Security
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Service
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Information Paper
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8 April 2013
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(S//SI//REL TO USA, SAU) Subject: NSA Intelligence Relationship with Saudi Arabia
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(U) Introduction
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(TS//SI//NF) Since the first Gulf War in 1991, NSA/CSS has had a very limited SIGINT relationship with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). The SIGINT relationship has been solely with the Ministry of Defense, Radio Reconnaissance Department (MOD RRD) which is the first of three ministry-level organizations that have a role in the defense and security of the Kingdom. The NSA/CSS SIGINT relationship with the MOD RRD is a complex and challenging one that, after several years of stagnation, is experiencing a period of rejuvenation. NSA/CSS is in the process of modernizing the MOD RRD High Frequency Direction Finding (HFDF) capability that assists in the monitoring of Iranian military threats to KSA. NSA/CSS' Middle East/Africa (MEA) and Counterterrorism (CT) Product Lines provide threat warning against terrorist targets and targets of interest to the KSA, specifically, intelligence related to Huthi conflicts along the Saudi/Yemen border.
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(TS//SI//REL TO USA, SAU) On 11 December 2012, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) approved expansion of NSA's Third Party SIGINT relationship with Saudi Arabia to include the Saudi Ministry of Interior's (MOI) Technical Affairs Directorate (TAD). Prior to receiving DNI's approval of the relationship and under the auspices of CIA's relationship with the MOI's Mabahith (General Directorate for Investigations, equivalent to FBI), NSA had been collaborating with TAD since February 2011 on a sensitive access initiative. This capability is focused on internal security and terrorist activity on the Arabian Peninsula. With the approval of the Third Party SIGINT relationship, NSA/CSS intends to provide direct analytic and technical support to TAD.
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(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Lastly, using the Foreign Release Process, NSA/CSS shares threat warning and terrorist lead information produced by the Counterterrorism Product Line with the CIA Station in Riyadh to pass to CIA's intelligence partner the KSA Ministry of Interior Directorate of Investigations, Mabahith.
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Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
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Dated: 20130408
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Declassify On: 20380408
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TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
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TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
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(U) Key Issues
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(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) MOD RRD is interested in expanding the relationship with NSA/CSS. The MOD RRD seeks signals analysis equipment upgrades, decryption capabilities and advanced training on a wide range of topics. While NSA/CSS is able to respond to many of their requests, some must be denied due to the fact that they place sensitive SIGINT equities at risk.
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(TS//SI//NF) NSA/CSS leadership anticipates a spring 2013 visit to Saudi Arabia to meet with TAD leadership to discuss current and future initiatives of mutual interest under the new relationship construct. NSA's primary goals for the partnership are:
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1) (S//SI//REL TO USA, SAU) to leverage Saudi Arabia's strategic location and unique access to communications - e.g. al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) terrorist activity currently not accessible by other means, and
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2) (TS//SI//REL TO USA, SAU) to facilitate the Saudi government's ability to utilize SIGINT to locate and track individuals of mutual interest within Saudi Arabia.
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(U) What NSA Provides to Partner
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(S//SI//REL TO USA, SAU) NSA/CSS provides technical advice on SIGINT topics such as data exploitation and target development to TAD as well as a sensitive source collection capability.
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(S//SI//REL TO USA, SAU) NSA/CSS provides a sensitive decryption service to the Ministry of Interior against terrorist targets of mutual interest.
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(U) What Partner Provides to NSA
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(S//SI//REL TO USA, SAU) NSA leverages MOD RRD access to remote geography in the Arabian Gulf but provides no finished SIGINT reporting to NSA/CSS, however; they have provided unencrypted collection against the IRGC QODS Maritime Force targets of mutual interest from their collection system [REDACTED].
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(S//SI//REL TO USA, SAU) TAD provides sensitive access to unique collection containing AQAP terrorist targets of mutual interest.
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Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
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Dated: 20130408
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Declassify On: 20380408
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TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
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TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
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(U) Success Stories
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(S//SI//REL TO USA, SAU) NSA's work with TAD on a sensitive access has shown early promise in producing SIGINT of value to the CT product line.
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(S//SI//REL TO USA, SAU) A modernized HFDF sensor and HFDF antenna system was installed in September 2012 at a MOD RRD location new Riyadh. This HFDF system replaces a legacy sensor that has been inoperable for an extended period of time and will significantly improve NSA's regional HFDF architecture.
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(S//SI//REL TO USA, SAU) MOD RRD supported a Quick Reaction Capability that deployed a [REDACTED] system [REDACTED] in the Arabian Gulf in response to a potential threat from IRGC QODS Maritime Force. A sustained collection platform is planned for deployment in May 2013.
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(U) Problems/Challenges with the Partner
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(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) The MOD RRD would like to move expeditiously in their modernization efforts, to include the acquisition of additional SIGINT capabilities. NSA/CSS is cautiously moving forward with this partner and is not necessarily ready to move forward with initiatives that expose sensitive NSA/CSS SIGINT equities. This difference in strategic direction will sometimes be problematic and cause tension within the partnership.
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(S//SI//NF) NSA/CSS has agreed to coordinate collection operations in Saudi Arabia with Chief of Station of Riyadh in an effort to protect unilateral HUMINT assets from scrutiny.
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(TS//SI//NF) NSA/CSS does not expect the new relationship with TAD to usurp or negatively impact NSA/CSS' existing relationship with the Ministry of Defense Radio Reconnaissance Department (MOD RRD), as MOD RRD does not have similar access to internal Saudi telecommunications.
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(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Prepared by: [REDACTED]
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Saudi Arabian Desk Officer
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Foreign Affairs Directorate, NSA/CSS
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NSTS [REDACTED]
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Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
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Dated: 20130408
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Declassify On: 20380408
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TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
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TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
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Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
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Dated: 20130408
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Declassify On: 20380408
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TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
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