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data/nsa-se-spies/metadata.json
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{
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"title": "NSA Intelligence Relationship with Sweden",
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"type": "REPORTED",
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"description": "A 2013 NSA information paper documenting the agency's long-standing intelligence partnership with Sweden's signals intelligence service FRA, covering joint collection on Russian targets, counterterrorism, cryptanalysis, and cyber defense — a relationship kept classified due to Sweden's official political neutrality.",
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"long_description": "This top secret NSA/CSS information paper, dated April 18, 2013, outlines the history and current state of the intelligence relationship between the NSA and Sweden's Försvarets Radioanstalt (FRA), the Swedish signals intelligence service. The partnership dates to 1954, originally established under the UKUSA agreement with GCHQ holding the lead for COMINT exchanges and NSA leading on ELINT. In 2004, following recognition that the 50-year-old arrangement was no longer workable, a trilateral agreement signed by NSA, GCHQ, and FRA's Director General dissolved this division of responsibilities, allowing NSA to engage the FRA directly on COMINT matters without pre-coordination with GCHQ — while requiring both agencies to keep each other informed and the FRA to avoid duplication when both are making similar requests. The document notes the relationship is classified at the Top Secret level specifically because of Sweden's official posture of political neutrality, making the depth of its intelligence cooperation with the United States a particularly sensitive secret.\n\nThe most operationally significant development described is the FRA's provision of access to its cable collection in 2011, which gave the NSA unique collection on high-priority Russian targets including leadership communications, internal politics, and energy sector intelligence. Sweden's geographic position makes FRA cable access exceptionally valuable for Russian-focused collection, and the document describes the FRA as \"extremely competent, technically innovative, and trusted.\" Beyond Russia, the FRA contributes unique intelligence on the Baltic region, the Middle East, and counterterrorism targets, as well as outstanding ELINT signals input and collaboration on cryptanalytic issues — one of the most sensitive areas of intelligence cooperation between any two agencies.\n\nThe paper also highlights the FRA's growing cyber focus, noting ongoing malware-related exchanges between FRA analysts and NSA's National Threat Operations Center (NTOC), and describing FRA's ambition to become Sweden's official cyber defense authority pending a government mandate. In exchange for these contributions, the NSA provides the FRA with technical support, collection and processing equipment, training, accommodation purchases, and membership in multinational intelligence forums — and crucially, accepts FRA-supplied selectors and tasks them against approved NSA collection sites, effectively integrating Swedish targeting requests into NSA's own collection architecture.\n\nThe paper also instructs U.S. officials to thank Sweden for its critical role as a leading partner against Russian targets.",
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"tags": [
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"FRA",
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"UKUSA",
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"Third Party Partners",
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"political neutrality",
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"Russian leadership",
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"Baltic region",
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"cable collection",
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"cryptanalysis",
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"cyber defense",
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"SÄPO",
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"counterterrorism",
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"NTOC",
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"malware",
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"selector tasking",
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"intelligence sharing",
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"bilateral relationship",
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"energy sector",
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"middle east",
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"equipment",
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"training",
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"multinational forums"
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],
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"document": {
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"creator": "NSA",
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"date_created": "2013-04-18",
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"classification": [
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"TOP SECRET",
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"COMINT"
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],
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"dissemination": [
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"NOFORN"
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],
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"banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN",
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"genre": "report",
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"programs": [],
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"countries": [
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"Sweden",
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"Russia"
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],
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"people": []
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},
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"publication": [
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{
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"publisher": "SVT Nyheter",
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"date_published": "2013-12-05",
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"title": "SVT avslöjar: USA hyllar FRA:s ryss-spionage",
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"link": "https://www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/fra-spionerar-pa-ryssland-at-usa",
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"reporters": [
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"Struwe, Filip",
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"Svensson, Anna H",
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"Gallagher, Ryan",
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"Greenwald, Glenn"
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],
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"contributors": []
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},
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{
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"publisher": "SVT Nyheter",
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"date_published": "2013-12-05",
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"title": "Snowden files reveal Swedish-American surveillance of Russia",
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"link": "https://www.svt.se/nyheter/granskning/ug/snowden-files-reveale-swedish-american-surveillance-of-russia",
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"reporters": [
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"Struwe, Filip",
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"Svensson, Anna H",
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"Greenwald, Glenn",
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"Gallagher, Ryan",
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"Bergman, Sven",
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"Dyfvermark, Joachim",
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"Laurin, Fredrik"
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],
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"contributors": [],
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"version": "EFF_-_20131205-svt-fra_russia"
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}
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],
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"aka_id": [
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{
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"id": "ACLU_-_2013-12-05_FRA_Russia"
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},
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{
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"id": "2013-12-05_FRA_Russia"
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},
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{
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"id": "nsa-se-fra-relationship"
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},
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{
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"id": "EFF_-_20131211-svt-nsa_internal_pm_on_fra"
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},
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{
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"id": "nsa-gchq-se-fra-comint"
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},
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{
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"id": "EFF_-_20131211-svt-sweden_neutral"
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}
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],
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"pdf_sha256": "99aedf01646258b3785c47f1d6d5bcc407c9b6116866e865eaee5fce2eca37d2",
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"pages": 3,
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"versions": {
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"EFF_-_20131205-svt-fra_russia": {
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"pdf_sha256": "6637e769c4853c76bd33dde249419217aaa1f051ecd985d899f084fc2a2d798e",
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"changed_pages": [
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3
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]
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}
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}
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}
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63
data/nsa-se-spies/nsa-se-spies.md
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data/nsa-se-spies/nsa-se-spies.md
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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National Security Agency/Central
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Security Service
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Information Paper
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18 April 2013
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(S//REL to USA, FVEY) Subject: NSA Intelligence Relationship with Sweden
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(U) Introduction
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(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) NSA's relationship with the Swedish SIGINT service, Forsvarets Radioanstalt (FRA), was established in 1954 under the UKUSA agreement. At that time it was agreed that GCHQ would take the lead for the exchange of COMINT information and that NSA would take the lead for the ELINT exchange. As of April 2004, NSA, GCHQ and the FRA agreed to dissolve this part of the UKUSA agreement and hold bilateral exchanges on both COMINT and ELINT.
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(TS//SI//NF) NSA's relationship with the FRA, an extremely competent, technically innovative, and trusted Third Party partner, continues to grow. The FRA provided NSA with access to its cable collection in 2011, providing unique collection on high-priority Russian targets such as leadership, internal politics, and energy.
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. FRA's efforts against counter-terrorism (CT) targets continue to expand, and new legislation enacted in January 2013 has improved its ability to work directly with the Swedish internal security service (SÄPO). NSA's Data Acquisition is actively engaged with the FRA, which has numerous collection sites and is proficient in collecting a wide variety of communications.
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(U) Key Issues
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(TS//SI//NF) The FRA continues to place more emphasis on cyber. NSA's National Threat Operations Center (NTOC) and FRA analysts have an ongoing exchange discussing malware topics. The FRA is positioning itself to become the cyber defense authority in Sweden and hopes to receive the Swedish government mandate in the near future.
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Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
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Dated: 20070108
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Declassify On: 20320108
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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(U) What NSA Provides to Partner
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(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Technical support, collection, processing equipment and training
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(S//NF) NSA accepts selectors from FRA and tasks them to approved NSA collection sites
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(U//FOUO) Accommodation purchases of equipment
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(U//FOUO) Membership in multinational forums
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(U) What Partner Provides to NSA
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(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Unique intelligence on Russia, the Baltic, Middle East, and CT
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(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Outstanding and unique input on ELINT signals
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(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Access for special collection initiatives
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(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Collaboration on cryptanalytic issues
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(U) Success Stories
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(U) Prepared by:
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Country Desk Officer
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443-
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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Sweden
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(TS//SI) Based on a 1954 agreement between NSA and GCHQ (later ratified in the 1956 UKUSA accords), GCHQ had the lead with Sweden for COMINT matters. NSA had the lead for ELINT and, as things evolved, technical SIGINT issues for both COMINT and ELINT. In 2004 we mutually agreed that our 50-year-old arrangement was no longer operable since we,
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(TS//SI) Therefore, we drafted a paper that was signed by NSA's Principal Director for Foreign Affairs, GCHQ's head of Foreign Relations, and the Director General of Sweden's SIGINT Service (FRA), allowing NSA to deal with the FRA on COMINT issues without pre-coordination with GCHQ. The paper also requires both of us to keep the other informed as to what we are doing with the FRA, and requires the FRA to dedupe if both GCHQ and we are separately asking for the same or similar exchanges. As a result of this change, our COMINT relationship with the FRA has burgeoned on both sides. The relationship with Sweden is protected at the TOP SECRET level because of that nation's political neutrality.
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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National Security Agency/Central
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Security Service
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Information Paper
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18 April 2013
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(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) SIGINT NSA Intelligence Relationship with Sweden
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(U) Introduction
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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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The FRA provided NSA (...) unique collection on
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high-priority Russian targets, such as leadership,
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internal politics
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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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(U) What NSA Provides to Partner
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(U) What Partner Provides to NSA
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"What Partner provides to NSA
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Unique intelligence on Russia"
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(U) Success Stories
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[REDACTED]
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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Cyber
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[REDACTED]
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Thank Sweden for its continued work on
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the Russian target.
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and underscore the primary role
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that FRA plays as a leading partner
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to work the Russian Target,
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including Russian leadership, (...)
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and (...) counterintelligence
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FRA's cable access has resulted in
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unique SIGINT reporting on all of these areas.
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[REDACTED]
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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