first commit
This commit is contained in:
commit
0d90363116
6510 changed files with 679146 additions and 0 deletions
67
data/nsa-targeting/metadata.json
Normal file
67
data/nsa-targeting/metadata.json
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "NSA target package",
|
||||
"type": "REPORTED",
|
||||
"description": "This 2011 target package focuses on Muhammad Tahir Shahzad (alias Abu Hamza), a Pakistan-based bomb builder and Al-Qaeda facilitator. The document was produced by the Counter IED Analysis Integration Cell (CAIC) at the NSA. Notably, the document credits the tracking of Shahzad’s 60+ digital selectors with the eventual capture of high-value targets, including himself and Bali bombing suspect Umar Patek. The accompanying Washington Post investigation uses this specific case to highlight the massive scale of \"incidental collection.\" While Shahzad was a valid foreign target under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act (FAA), the investigation revealed that for every legitimate target like him, the NSA intercepted nine \"non-targeted\" users—many of whom were Americans—capturing deeply personal photos, medical records, and private correspondence.",
|
||||
"long_description": "The January 22, 2011, target package on Muhammad Tahir Shahzad, alias Abu Hamza, serves as a bridge between the high-level classification guides for Exceptionally Controlled Information (ECI) and the lived reality of mass digital surveillance. Produced by the Counter IED Analysis Integration Cell (CAIC) at the NSA, this document details the tracking of a Pakistan-based bomb builder whose digital footprint encompassed more than 60 specific selectors, including emails and IP addresses. The intelligence gathered from this \"Top Secret//COMINT//UMBRA\" operation was deemed highly successful, leading directly to the capture of Shahzad and his associate Umar Patek. However, as the 2014 Washington Post investigation revealed, this success came at a significant cost to the privacy of innocent individuals.\n\nThe investigation into the Snowden cache found that for every valid foreign target like Shahzad, the NSA’s PRISM and Upstream programs intercepted communications from nine other non-targeted individuals. This \"9-to-1\" ratio of incidental collection means that the vast majority of people caught in the NSA’s net were not terrorists or spies but ordinary internet users, many of them Americans. The files contained deeply personal data that analysts marked as useless but nevertheless retained, including medical records, academic transcripts, and over 5,000 private photos. One particularly striking example involved 800 pages of intimate, often painful correspondence between a non-targeted Australian woman and a suitor who had sought to join the Taliban. Her entire private life was archived and parsed by the NSA simply because she was in digital contact with a person who had become a target of interest.\n\nThis massive accumulation of data is authorized under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act, which allows the NSA to target non-U.S. persons abroad with a much lower \"standard of proof\" than a traditional warrant. Instead of establishing probable cause before a judge, analysts only need a \"reasonable belief\" that a target is a foreigner located overseas. The Post found that this standard is often stretched to its breaking point; for instance, analysts have used the fact that an email was written in a foreign language—a trait shared by tens of millions of Americans—as a justification for foreignness. Furthermore, even when the NSA \"minimizes\" data by masking the identities of U.S. persons, thousands of unmasked references remain in the files, and the FBI is frequently permitted to perform \"backdoor searches\" of this incidentally collected data for domestic criminal investigations.\n\nThe tension between the intelligence mission and individual rights is most evident in the retention of this \"collateral damage.\" While the government argues that filtering out irrelevant data is technically difficult and that today’s \"noise\" might be tomorrow’s vital lead, critics point out that this creates a permanent, voyeuristic archive of the daily lives of innocent people. The Shahzad target package illustrates the undeniable effectiveness of these tools in thwarts terrorist networks, but it also provides the documented evidence of a system where the \"incidental\" surveillance of the many is the price paid for the \"targeted\" capture of the few.",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"Section 702",
|
||||
"FAA",
|
||||
"upstream collection",
|
||||
"incidental collection",
|
||||
"Al-Qaeda",
|
||||
"AFPAK",
|
||||
"IED",
|
||||
"terrorism",
|
||||
"counterterrorism",
|
||||
"metadata",
|
||||
"content interception",
|
||||
"minimization",
|
||||
"data retention",
|
||||
"selectors"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "NSA",
|
||||
"date_created": "2011-01-22",
|
||||
"classification": [
|
||||
"TOP SECRET",
|
||||
"COMINT",
|
||||
"UMBRA",
|
||||
"ORCON"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dissemination": [
|
||||
"REL USA, FVEY"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//UMBRA//ORCON//REL USA, FVEY",
|
||||
"genre": "slides",
|
||||
"programs": [],
|
||||
"countries": [
|
||||
"Afghanistan",
|
||||
"Pakistan",
|
||||
"Indonesia",
|
||||
"France"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"people": [
|
||||
"Shahzad, Muhammad Tahir",
|
||||
"Patek, Umar"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "The Washington Post",
|
||||
"date_published": "2014-07-05",
|
||||
"title": "In NSA-intercepted data, those not targeted far outnumber the foreigners who are",
|
||||
"link": "https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-nsa-intercepted-data-those-not-targeted-far-outnumber-the-foreigners-who-are/2014/07/05/8139adf8-045a-11e4-8572-4b1b969b6322_story.html",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Gellman, Barton",
|
||||
"Tate, Julie",
|
||||
"Soltani, Ashkan"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [
|
||||
"Jenkins, Jennifer",
|
||||
"Leonnig, Carol D."
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "779bf6b08e12ba0d06fa57fb440f191a1a3744625903f907a9143f11dff2910a",
|
||||
"pages": 3
|
||||
}
|
||||
79
data/nsa-targeting/nsa-targeting.md
Normal file
79
data/nsa-targeting/nsa-targeting.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
|
|||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//UMBRA//ORCON//REL USA, FVEY
|
||||
|
||||
Counter IED Analysis Integration Cell (CAIC)
|
||||
|
||||
Muhammad Tahir Shahzad AKA Abu Hamza
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
22 JANUARY 2011
|
||||
|
||||
OVERALL CLASSIFICATION OF DOCUMENT:
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) The following information has not been fully analyzed and may be incomplete and subject to change. This report contains technical observations, opinions, unconfirmed data, and evidence. This is a CAIC NSAW analytic assessment and does not constitute a finished intelligence product.
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) To the best of our knowledge, this report is not based on any COMINT-derived information which should have been purged from NSA collection.
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//UMBRA//ORCON//REL USA, FVEY
|
||||
|
||||
Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
|
||||
Dated: 20070108
|
||||
Declassify On: 20320108
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//UMBRA//ORCON//REL USA, FVEY
|
||||
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
|
||||
|
||||
Overview (U)
|
||||
|
||||
[REDACTED] REAL NAME: Muhammad Tahir Shahzad
|
||||
[REDACTED] ALIAS: Abu Hamza, Saif, "Hamza from Haribour"
|
||||
[REDACTED] TO USA, ISAF, NATO) Age: 25-28
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
[REDACTED] POSITION: AL-QA' IDA EXTERNAL OPERATIONS COORDINATOR, GLOBAL MUJAHIDIN MENTOR, AND PAKISTAN IED COMPONENT FACILITATOR
|
||||
(TS/SI///REL) GROUP ASSOCIATIONS: Al-Qa' ida (AQ), Laskhar e-Teyyiba (LeT), and Taliban
|
||||
[REDACTED] ADDRESS: Pakistan
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
[REDACTED] MAINTAINS OVER 60 DNI SELECTORS (attached at end)
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
[REDACTED] BACKGROUND:
|
||||
Muhammad Tahir Shahzad, aka Abu-Hamza, user of [REDACTED] is Pakistan-based extremist involved in terrorist and foreign fighter recruiting, AFPAK IED building, training, and planning, and external operations coordination.
|
||||
[REDACTED] Abu-Hamza acted as an intermediary between AQ and Indonesia-based extremist groups Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)/Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) members, and was responsible for facilitating the meeting between JI member [REDACTED] and AQSL figure [REDACTED]. Abu-Hamza and [REDACTED] associate [REDACTED] have been identified in their involvement with the Abdul Samad IED network in Chaman, PK [REDACTED] where Hamza is reported to play an active role in training commanders in explosives.
|
||||
[REDACTED] Recently, Abu-Hamza received fugitive Bali bombing suspect Umar Patek and mediated his travel to Waziristan to meet with senior leadership [REDACTED] and is coordinating the travel and training of two members of a France-based extremist cell to Pakistan.
|
||||
[REDACTED] Abu-Hamza's activities are currently being monitored [REDACTED] for his widespread contacts and concurrent activities with elements of AQ, Taliban, LeT, JI, JAT, and others.
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//UMBRA//ORCON//REL USA, FVEY
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS//20320108
|
||||
|
||||
*******************************
|
||||
THIS INFORMATION IS DERIVED FROM FAA COLLECTION UNDER FAA COUNTERTERRORISM CERT
|
||||
*******************************
|
||||
*******************************
|
||||
THIS INFORMATION IS PROVIDED FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES IN AN EFFORT TO DEVELOP POTENTIAL LEADS. IT CANNOT BE USED IN AFFIDAVITS, COURT PROCEEDINGS OR SUBPOENAS, OR FOR OTHER LEGAL OR JUDICIAL PURPOSES.
|
||||
*******************************
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS//20320108
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS//20320108
|
||||
|
||||
*******************************
|
||||
THIS INFORMATION IS DERIVED FROM FAA COLLECTION UNDER FAA COUNTERTERRORISM CERT
|
||||
*******************************
|
||||
*******************************
|
||||
THIS INFORMATION IS PROVIDED FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES IN AN EFFORT TO DEVELOP POTENTIAL LEADS. IT CANNOT BE USED IN AFFIDAVITS, COURT PROCEEDINGS OR SUBPOENAS, OR FOR OTHER LEGAL OR JUDICIAL PURPOSES.
|
||||
*******************************
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS//20320108
|
||||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue