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{
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"title": "Tor Stinks",
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"type": "REPORTED",
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"description": "A June 2012 joint NSA-GCHQ presentation titled \"Tor Stinks\" detailing the two agencies' attempts to de-anonymize Tor users through analytics, exploitation, and network disruption — candidly admitting they will never be able to identify all Tor users, but outlining a range of techniques including cookie leakage tracking, QUANTUM attacks, circuit reconstruction, timing analysis, and deliberate network degradation.",
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"long_description": "This top secret NSA presentation, produced by the CT SIGDEV unit in June 2012 and shared with Five Eyes partners, documents the state of joint NSA-GCHQ efforts to attack the Tor anonymity network as of that date. The document opens with a frank admission: the agencies will never be able to de-anonymize all Tor users all the time, and have had no success de-anonymizing users on demand in response to specific TOPI requests. The presentation emerged from REMATION II, a joint NSA-GCHQ counter-Tor workshop split between NSA's MHS facility (analytics focus) and GCHQ (exploitation focus), and organizes its findings across four categories: analytics, technical research, exploitation, and Tor node operations.\n\nThe analytics section covers six approaches. Circuit reconstruction attempts to identify all three nodes in a Tor circuit simultaneously — currently limited by the agencies' access to very few nodes, making success negligible. The \"Goes Inta Goes Outta\" low-latency correlation technique, for which GCHQ has a working version called QUICKANT, attempts to correlate traffic patterns entering and exiting the Tor network to identify users. Cookie leakage exploits the fact that some cookies survive Tor use, with proposals to seed cookies to specific targets and investigate Evercookie persistence — including observed cases of DoubleClick IDs appearing on both Tor and non-Tor IPs. The EPICFAIL/GCHQ QFD and NSA's proposed GREAT EXPECTATIONS variant identify users through hard selectors when they are not using Tor. Node lifespan tracking via RONIN and DNS behavior analysis round out the analytics work.\n\nThe exploitation section is the most operationally significant. QUANTUMCOOKIE forces Tor clients to reveal stored browser cookies — including Hotmail MUIDs and Yahoo cookies — by intercepting an exit node request and redirecting the client to major web services that then serve identifying cookies in the clear. The presentation also discusses using FOXACID (referred to as \"FA\") and SHORTSHEET CNE techniques against Tor Browser Bundle users, though noting that Torbutton and TBB currently prevent CNE success against protected configurations. Shaping operations aim to route users toward friendly exit nodes, stain their traffic, or instruct compromised computers to connect outside Tor and reveal their true IP. Web server enabling would modify compromised servers to execute timing attacks. The node flooding concept proposes deploying slow nodes advertised as high-bandwidth to degrade overall network stability. The document closes on a pragmatic note — acknowledging that scaring targets away from Tor could be counterproductive, since a critical mass of targets use it, and that the goal is increasing success rates for individual users rather than total de-anonymization.",
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"tags": [
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"Tor",
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"Tor nodes",
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"anonymity",
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"de-anonymization",
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"cookies",
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"Evercookie",
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"DoubleClick",
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"circuit reconstruction",
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"timing analysis",
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"traffic correlation",
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"node flooding",
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"Tor Browser",
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"Firefox exploit",
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"hidden services",
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"DNS",
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"Computer Network Exploitation",
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"traffic shaping",
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"network attack",
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"GCHQ",
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"joint operations",
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"Five Eyes",
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"online privacy",
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"dissidents",
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"browser fingerprinting",
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"Tor exit nodes",
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"low latency attack"
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],
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"document": {
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"creator": "NSA",
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"date_created": "2012-06",
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"classification": [
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"TOP SECRET",
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"COMINT"
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],
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"dissemination": [
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"REL FVEY"
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],
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"banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT// REL FVEY",
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"genre": "slides",
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"programs": [
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"REMATION",
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"EPICFAIL",
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"QUANTUM",
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"NEWTONSCRADLE",
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"QUICKANT",
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"GREATEXPECTATIONS",
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"RONIN",
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"ONIONBREATH",
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"QUANTUMCOOKIE",
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"SHORTSHEET",
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"FOXACID"
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],
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"countries": [],
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"people": []
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},
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"publication": [
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{
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"publisher": "The Guardian",
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"date_published": "2013-10-04",
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"title": "NSA and GCHQ target Tor network that protects anonymity of web users",
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"link": "https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/nsa-gchq-attack-tor-network-encryption",
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"reporters": [
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"Ball, James",
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"Schneier, Bruce",
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"Greenwald, Glenn"
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],
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"contributors": [],
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"doc_source": "https://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/oct/04/tor-stinks-nsa-presentation-document",
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"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/801434/doc2.pdf"
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}
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],
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"aka_id": [
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{
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"id": "EFF_-_20131004-guard-tor_stinks"
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},
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{
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"id": "ACLU_-_tor-stinks"
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}
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],
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"pdf_sha256": "c3c7f93100e0542a8e55d3ab347547e8f8f456ea8babcc7a6a4ff4339264f649",
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"pages": 23
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}
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