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data/project-camberdada/metadata.json
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{
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"title": "Project CAMBERDADA",
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"type": "REPORTED",
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"description": "NSA presentation on Project CAMBERDADA, a programme that intercepts emails sent to antivirus companies reporting new malware, uses SIGINT collection to monitor antivirus vendor communications, and identifies opportunities to repurpose malware before vendors detect it — listing 23 antivirus companies from around the world as targets, with Kaspersky as the primary focus.",
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"long_description": "This NSA presentation jointly authored by analysts from IAD (Information Assurance Directorate, unit I412) and NTOC (National Threat Operations Center, unit V252), describing Project CAMBERDADA — a programme to intercept communications flowing into antivirus companies and exploit the resulting intelligence for offensive and defensive cyber operations.\n\nThe document reveals that NSA was systematically monitoring emails sent by security researchers and members of the public to antivirus vendors reporting new malware samples. The example shown is a genuine email from François Picard of Montreal-based NewRoma.net, sent in May 2012, reporting a phishing file targeting BMO Financial Group customers — intercepted without Picard's knowledge. NSA analysts use these intercepts to triage approximately 10 potentially malicious files per day, with over 500 collected since 2009. Roughly 50 CAMBERDADA signatures had been deployed to NIPRnet for alerting, and 9 domains had been placed under DNS interdiction — where a Cloudshield device intercepts DNS requests and redirects them to a Department of Defense listening post while logging the responses.\n\nThe document connects CAMBERDADA to multiple collection streams: SSO (Special Source Operations cable tapping), overhead (satellite), SCS (Special Collection Service), and FORNSAT (foreign satellite collection), along with CADENCE selectors, daily PINWALE queries, EXIT4 models, and MAILORDER. The listed applications of the programme include repurposing captured malware through TAO, checking whether Kaspersky continues to detect intercepted virus files, monitoring the individuals who submitted the malware for further intelligence value, and establishing automated reporting.\n\nThe BRICKTOP (2009) slide lists Russian entities under surveillance including Kaspersky, Rosoboronexport, ComCor and Famatech. The \"More Targets!\" section lists 23 additional antivirus companies across Europe, Asia and the Middle East as targets for the same SIGINT-based monitoring, including F-Secure (Finland), AVG (Czech), Norman (Norway), DrWeb (Russia), Avira (Germany), ESET (Slovakia), Avast (Czech), Check Point (Israel) and Ahnlab (South Korea) — notably excluding American vendors McAfee and Symantec and British vendor Sophos.",
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"tags": [
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"antivirus",
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"PSP",
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"Kaspersky",
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"NTOC",
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"IAD",
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"Tailored Access Operations",
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"malware interception",
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"DNS interdiction",
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"NIPRnet",
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"SSO",
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"FORNSAT",
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"Special Collection Service",
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"email interception",
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"security research",
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"malware analysis",
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"SRE",
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"F-Secure",
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"AVG",
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"DrWeb",
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"ESET",
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"Avast",
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"Check Point",
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"Rosoboronexport",
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"cyber operations",
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"antivirus evasion",
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"zero-day exploits",
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"vulnerabilities",
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"vulnerability stockpiling",
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"malware",
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"BMO Financial Group",
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"OVERHEAD"
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],
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"document": {
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"creator": "NSA",
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"date_created": "",
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"classification": [
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"TOP SECRET",
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"COMINT"
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],
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"dissemination": [
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"REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL"
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],
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"banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL",
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"genre": "slides",
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"programs": [
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"CAMBERDADA",
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"BRICKTOP",
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"CLOUDSHIELD",
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"CADENCE",
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"PINWALE",
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"MAILORDER",
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"SSO"
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],
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"countries": [
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"Russia",
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"Iran",
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"India",
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"China",
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"Georgia",
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"Jordan",
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"Japan",
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"France",
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"Romania",
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"Italy",
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"Israel",
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"Norway",
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"Iceland",
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"Czech Republic",
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"Finland",
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"India",
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"Austria",
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"Germany",
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"Poland",
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"Slovakia",
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"South Korea",
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"Austria"
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],
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"people": [
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"Picard, François"
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]
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},
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"publication": [
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{
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"publisher": "The Intercept",
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"date_published": "2015-06-22",
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"title": "Popular Security Software Came Under Relentless NSA and GCHQ Attacks",
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"link": "https://theintercept.com/2015/06/22/nsa-gchq-targeted-kaspersky/",
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"reporters": [
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"Fishman, Andrew",
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"Marquis-Boire, Morgan"
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],
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"contributors": [],
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"doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2015/06/22/project-camberdada-nsa/",
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"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2106783/project-camberdada.pdf"
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}
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],
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"pdf_sha256": "02822ae2dc779287d023f331b8baa157cd718858f095ed16b8b09e5363c7d056",
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"pages": 13
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}
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data/project-camberdada/project-camberdada.md
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data/project-camberdada/project-camberdada.md
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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# An Easy Win: Using SIGINT to Learn about New Viruses
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Project CAMBERDADA
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By [REDACTED], I412 (IAD)
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& [REDACTED], V252
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(NTOC)
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Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
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Dated: 20070108
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Declassify On: 20370301
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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## Overall classification
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TOPSECRET//COMINT//
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REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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## BRICKTOP (2009)
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* Tascom
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* RusComNet
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* Kaspersky
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* Rosoboron export
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* nstitute of Information & Analytical Technology (IIAT)
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* Moscow Telecommunication Corporation (ComCor)
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* Famatech
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* Comstar
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* Komet
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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IR
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IN
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Антивирус
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Касперского
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JP
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JO
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PRC
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GE
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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## Sample Email Received by an AV Vendor
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PWZA20120510218350000197506
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Good day,
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A phishing scam file is attached for your analysis.
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Zip file password = virus
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The file tricks the user into giving her/his bank account
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credentials. This can be verified by clicking on the Sign In
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button.
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FYI: https://www.virustotal.com/file/8fb6447fdc9cfe204cde...
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Regards,
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Francois Picard
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www.NewRoma.net
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Attachment: BMOFinancialGroup.zip
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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Duh
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Duh
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Duh
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Duh
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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## Work Flow
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IR
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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---
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## Analytic value
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* SIGINT brings in ~10 potentially malicious files per day for malware triage
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* Over 500 potentially malicious files collected since 2009
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* ~ 50 CAMBERDADA signatures deployed to NIPRnet for alerting
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* 9 domains mitigated
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---
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## DNS Interdiction
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* 9 domains under DNS Interdiction
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* Cloudshield intercepts the DNS request
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* Returns the address of a DoD listening post
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* Munged version of the request is sent out
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* DNS response is sent to a log
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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## Current status
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* CRN
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* SSO
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* Overhead
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* SCS
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* FORNSAT
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* IN L-C-2010-147 - Multi-Country: Computer Network Ops
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* Dozens of CADENCE selectors
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* PINWALE daily queries; EXIT4 models
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* MAILORDER
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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---
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## What else can we do?
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* TAO can repurpose the malware
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* Check Kaspersky AV to see if they continue to let any of these virus files through their Anti-Virus product
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* Monitor the folks who provide the malware to see if they're into more nefarious activity
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* Establish automated reporting
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---
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## More Targets!
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* fsb-antivirus (France)
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* Bit-Defender (Romania)
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* Viritpro (Italy)
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* eAladdin (Israel)
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* F-secure (Finland)
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* AVG (Czech)
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* F-prot (Iceland)
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* Norman (Norway)
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* DrWeb (Russia)
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* k7computing (India)
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* Ikarus (Austria)
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* Hauri (Korea)
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* Arcabit (Poland)
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* Antiy (Chinese)
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* Avira (Germany)
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* Spy-Emergency (Slovakia)
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* Nod32 (Slovakia)
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* Ahnlab (S Korea)
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* Novirusthanks (Italy)
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* Emsisoft (Austria)
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* Eset (Slovakia)
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* Avast (Czech)
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* Checkpoint (Israel)
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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## THANK YOU!
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[REDACTED]
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I4121
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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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V252
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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED](s)
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[REDACTED](s)
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Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
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Dated: 20070108
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Declassify On: 20370301
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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