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data/shape-weekly-report-01-jun-2011-r/metadata.json
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{
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"title": "June 2011 Nato Afghanistan Intelligence Report",
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"type": "REPORTED",
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"description": "A June 2011 SHAPE weekly report to NATO HQ assessing the state of ISAF operations in Afghanistan, covering Taliban command and control deterioration, insurgent supply shortages, the post-bin Laden strain on NATO's Pakistani logistics routes, and notable attacks across regional commands.",
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"long_description": "This NATO Secret weekly report, dated June 1, 2011 and addressed from Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) to NATO HQ's Situation Centre, provides a strategic-level assessment of ISAF operations across Afghanistan's regional commands. The report opens by noting that the end of the poppy harvest was producing the anticipated uptick in insurgent activity, citing three significant incidents: a failed Taliban attempt to overrun Do Ab District Centre in Nuristan, a Kandahar IED strike killing eight U.S. soldiers, and a remote-controlled IED attack on the Governor's Palace in Taloqan that killed RC(N) Regional Chief of Police Lieutenant General Daoud Daoud and wounded RC(N) commander Major General Kneip — the latest in a series of high-profile assassinations targeting senior GIRoA figures in the north dating back to October 2010.\n\nDespite these incidents, the report's overall assessment is cautiously optimistic about coalition pressure on the insurgency. The May 19 RC(SW) spike in Helmand is assessed as a failed three-day Taliban offensive that collapsed after one day, with the unusual direct involvement of Taliban senior leadership in tactical planning interpreted as evidence that lower-level commanders were unwilling or incapable of leading independently — reflecting a widening gap between strategic and tactical echelons. The report's insurgent command and control assessment is particularly detailed: Taliban senior leaders operating primarily from Pakistan were described as having limited situational awareness, degraded facilitation lines, shrinking Afghan sanctuaries, and strained resources, with weakening bonds between Pakistani-based leadership and local Afghan fighting networks threatening the coherence of any coordinated insurgent military strategy.\n\nOn logistics, the report addresses the post-bin Laden strain on NATO's Pakistani supply lines, noting the Pakistani parliament's resolution threatening to revoke NATO transit authority over continued UAV strikes, while assessing that economic dependencies make a prolonged border closure unlikely. The northern supply route through Central Asia is identified as underutilized due to Uzbekistan's refusal to permit reverse shipments or movement of armored vehicles, limiting NATO's ability to exploit the alternative logistics corridor agreed at the 2010 Lisbon Summit.",
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"tags": [
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"NATO",
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"SHAPE",
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"ISAF",
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"Taliban",
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"insurgency",
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"RC Southwest",
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"RC North",
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"RC East",
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"Helmand",
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"Nuristan",
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"Kandahar",
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"Takhar",
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"Taloqan",
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"Daoud Daoud",
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"IED",
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"assassination",
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"GIRoA",
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"ANSF",
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"UBL",
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"drone strikes",
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"NATO logistics",
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"lines of communication",
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"border crossing",
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"poppy harvest",
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"opium",
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"strategic assessment",
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"NATO HQ"
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],
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"document": {
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"creator": "NATO",
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"date_created": "2011-06-01",
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"classification": [
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"NATO SECRET"
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],
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"dissemination": [],
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"banner": "NATO SECRET",
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"genre": "report",
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"programs": [],
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"countries": [
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"Belgium",
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"Afghanistan",
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"Pakistan",
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"Portugal",
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"Uzbekistan",
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"Kazakhstan",
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"Russia"
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],
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"people": [
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"bin Laden, Osama",
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"Daud Daud, Mohammed",
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"Kneip, Markus"
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]
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},
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"publication": [
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{
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"publisher": "The Intercept",
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"date_published": "2015-05-18",
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"title": "What the Snowden Files Say About the Osama Bin Laden Raid",
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"link": "https://theintercept.com/2015/05/18/snowden-osama-bin-laden-raid/",
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"reporters": [
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"Currier, Cora",
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"Fishman, Andrew",
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"Williams, Margot"
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],
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"contributors": [],
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"doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2015/05/18/june-nato-afg-intel/",
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"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2082582/shape-weekly-report-01-jun-2011-r.pdf"
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}
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],
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"aka_id": [],
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"pdf_sha256": "1c2ddf8f25b5b81a2b65d50d8823aa8023b242d69893ced6cdc267a96751b272",
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"pages": 2
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}
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