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SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
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NSA STAFF PROCESSING FORM
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TO
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SIGINT DIR
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EXREG CONTROL NUMBER
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2012-704
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KCC CONTROL NUMBER
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S353-113-11
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THRU
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ACTION
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[X] APPROVAL
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[ ] SIGNATURE
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[ ] INFORMATION
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EXREG SUSPENSE
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KCC SUSPENSE
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ELEMENT SUSPENSE
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SUBJECT
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(S//REL) SSO's Support to the FBI for Implementation of their Cyber FISA Orders
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DISTRIBUTION
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V2, V3, V07
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SUMMARY
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RECOMMENDATION: (U//FOUO) Approve the provision of the assistance to FBI, with the
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proviso that the FBI remains responsible for any additional expenses incurred.
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PURPOSE: (S//REL) To obtain the SIGINT Director's approval for the Office of Special Source
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Operations (SSO) to provide ongoing technical assistance to the Federal Bureau of Investigation
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(FBI) for the implementation of the various orders they have obtained, and will obtain, from the
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Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) in certain Cyber cases involving agents of foreign
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powers (e.g. - [REDACTED] soon, [REDACTED]). The preparation of this Staff Processing Form was a
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collaborative effort between SSO and the NSA Office of General Counsel (OGC).
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BACKGROUND: (S//REL) On December 20, 2011, NSA received a request for technical
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assistance from the FBI seeking access to infrastructure established by NSA for collection of foreign
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intelligence from U.S. telecommunications providers. The FISC has issued a number of orders at the
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request of the FBI authorizing electronic surveillance directed at communications related to computer
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intrusions being conducted by foreign powers. The orders include some that are limited to pen
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register/trap and trace (PRTT) information as well as others that authorize collection of content. The
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first of these for which NSA assistance has been requested is directed at communications related to
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intrusions conducted by the [REDACTED] (Docket Number 11-91), regarding what FBI refers
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to as STYGIAN FLOW.
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(S//REL) In mid-2011, prior to receipt of the request for technical assistance, SSO became aware of
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FBI's plans to seek these orders and has been in discussions with FBI throughout the latter half of the
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year, in the belief that use of NSA's collection/processing infrastructure would allow the FBI to
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Continued...
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COORDINATION/APPROVAL
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| OFFICE | NAME AND DATE | SECURE PHONE |
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| :----- | :----------------------- | :----------- |
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| OFFICE | [REDACTED]/email/30 Jan. | |
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| FIB | [REDACTED]/email/4 Feb. | |
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| SI | [REDACTED]/s/ | |
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| NTOC | [REDACTED]/s/ | |
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| T | [REDACTED]/s/6 Feb. | |
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| OFFICE | NAME AND DATE | SECURE PHONE |
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| :----- | :----------------------- | :----------- |
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| | | |
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| S3 | [REDACTED]/s/ 3-20-12 | |
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| S35 | [REDACTED] | |
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| SV | [REDACTED]/s/ 31 Jan. | |
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| POV | [REDACTED]/s/ | |
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| T | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
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ORIGINATOR
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[REDACTED]
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Digitally signed by [REDACTED]
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DN: c=UB S. Govemmant, ou, ou=NSA
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Date: 2011.12.21 07:42:01-0600
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ORG.
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S353
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PHONE (Secure) [REDACTED]
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DATE PREPARED 20111221
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FORM A6796DE REV NOV 2008(Supersedes A6796 FEB 05 which is obsolete)
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NSN: 7540-FM-001-5465
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Derived From: NSA/CSS Manual 1-52
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Dated: 8 January 2007
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Declassify On: 20320108
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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
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SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
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SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
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Page 2 of 4: CATS 2012-704 (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) SSO's Support to the FBI for Implementation of their
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Cyber FISA Orders
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maximize the value of the collection without incurring the expenses associated with duplication of that
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infrastructure. Although FBI conducts numerous electronic surveillances without NSA's assistance, the
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vast majority of them are directed against targets located inside the United States, and U.S. providers
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served with FISC orders are ordinarily able to identify and deliver to the FBI most, if not all, of the
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targets' communications that they carry. That is because such electronic surveillance is typically
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effected at a point or points in the provider's infrastructure in physical proximity to the target's location.
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In the case of computer intrusions being conducted by foreign powers, the providers may be carrying a
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target's communications, but it is much more difficult to identify and locate them, because the
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communications in question will enter and leave the United States via any convenient path, and their
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path may be obscured to avoid detection. In other words, in these cases, because the target's location is
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outside the United Statues and not well-characterized, effecting the surveillance via FBI's traditional
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means is not effective.
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(S//REL) However, in support of FAA and in anticipation of the need to conduct similar collection
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activities for computer network defense purposes, over the last decade, NSA has expended a significant
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amount of resources to create collection/processing capabilities at many of the chokepoints operated by
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U.S. providers through which international communications enter and leave the United States.
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Collection at such chokepoints is much better suited to electronic surveillance directed at targets
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located outside the United States than FBI's traditional means of collection. In theory, FBI could rely
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on the orders it has obtained to direct U.S. providers to conduct surveillance at these chokepoints
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without relying on NSA capabilities, but it would take a considerable amount of time to do so, and FBI
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would have to reimburse the providers to recreate (i.e., duplicate) what NSA has already put in place.
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The cost alone would be prohibitive, and the time lost in doing so would necessarily result in a loss of
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foreign intelligence.
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(S//REL) The assistance being sought by the FBI is limited in nature. The U.S. providers served with
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Secondary Orders in this matter will assume full responsibility for the provisioning of PR/TT and
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content collection to the FBI. Since all of the authorized "facilities" (typically known as "targeted
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selectors" in NSA parlance) to date are Internet Protocol (IP) addresses used by the targets, there is no
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question as to the providers' abilities to employ devices under their control (e.g., routers) to provision
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fully-compliant, authorized intercept.
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(S//REL) Neither the providers nor the FBI will require NSA's Government off the Shelf (GOTS)
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Digital Network Intelligence (DNI) collection and processing solutions (e.g., TURMOIL,
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XKEYSCORE). Instead, metadata and full content derived from the authorized intercept will be
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produced using Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) processing solutions. If these COTS processing
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solutions involve components developed at NSA's expense and used, primarily, for NSA's Cyber
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survey purposes, the SSO will make careful and informed decisions prior to authorizing use of these
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components.
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SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
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SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
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Page 3 of 4: CATS 2012-704 (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) SSO's Support to the FBI for Implementation of their
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Cyber FISA Orders
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(S//REL) Prior to authorizing use of the extensive secure Wide Area Networks established at the two
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primary providers (cover terms, LITHIUM and ARTIFICE, respectively) as the end-to-end data
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delivery infrastructure to connect intercept and processing locations with the FBI's designated
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Cyber data repository at the Engineering Research Facility, Quantico, VA, SSO will make careful and
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informed decisions to ensure this capability is undertaken on a 100% non-interference basis with NSA's
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current and future data backhaul needs on these same networks.
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(S//REL) All data (metadata and/or content) collected under the auspices of these FISC orders will be
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forwarded securely and directly to the designated FBI repository. The FISC orders do contain a
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provision, as follows: "NCIJTF personnel participating in this joint investigation may have access to
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raw data prior to minimization." However, access to raw data by NTOC members of the NCIJTF will
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be facilitated under the purview of the FBI and not through any actions that SSO might take as the
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collected data passes through NSA's secure Wide Area Networks. Should the FBI's cyber orders from
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the FISC be modified in the future to authorize raw data retention by NSA, SSO will coordinate with
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all cognizant NSA offices (e.g., Data Governance, OGC, SV) to ensure the proper data delivery
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mechanism is put in place.
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(S//REL) Should the FBI require a sustained and high-level of dedicated analytical resources (i.e.,
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cleared, technical manpower) at the providers in order to optimize the collection effectiveness of their
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PR/TT and content orders, they will contract for those services directly with the providers. If, on the
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other hand, the FBI's requirement for provider analytical support is more ad hoc and aperiodic in nature
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during the period of time these orders remain in effect, SSO will make careful and informed decisions
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prior to authorizing labor charges against the relevant SSO contracts with the providers for these
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services on behalf of the FBI. Any charges that cannot be justified as necessary for NSA purposes will
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not be made unless/until FBI agrees to reimburse NSA.
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DISCUSSION: (S//REL) If SID decides to approve the requested assistance, SSO will assist the FBI
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in effecting any cyber orders submitted to it after the NSA/OGC has verified that each of them contains
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language permitting NSA's involvement. As stated in Attachment 1, NSA will have the opportunity to
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review and respond to any proposed use of FISA-derived information from these collections prior to
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the Attorney General authorizing the use of such information in any criminal proceedings.
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(S//REL) The assistance SSO is being asked to provide to the FBI will not preclude NSA's SIGINT
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targeting of these same fully-qualified, overseas IP addresses under the auspices of the FISA
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Continued...
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SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
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SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
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Page 4 of 4: CATS 2012-704 (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) SSO's Support to the FBI for Implementation of their
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Cyber FISA Orders
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(S//REL) The assistance SSO is being asked to provide to the FBI will not preclude NSA's SIGINT
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targeting of these same fully-qualified, overseas IP addresses under the auspices of the FISA
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Amendments Act (FAA) of 2008. To the contrary, the relatively recent discovery of these FBI Cyber
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FISA orders and the countless pages of SIGINT-derived evidence that was cited in the respective
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Applications to the FISC have already formed the basis for a dialog between NSA's OGC and the
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Department of Justice's National Security Division.
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(C) DIRECTOR, SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE DECISION:
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CONCUR: Teresa H. Shea DATE: 3-27-12
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NON-CONCUR: DATE:
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SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
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