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data/spiegel_-_media-35510/metadata.json
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data/spiegel_-_media-35510/metadata.json
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{
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"title": "TLS Trends: A roundtable discussion on current usage and future directions",
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"type": "REPORTED",
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"description": "A presentation by Canada's Communications Security Establishment describing their TLS trend analysis programme, which systematically tracked SSL/TLS encryption parameters across warranted collection and Special Source access to identify cryptanalytic opportunities, monitor target behaviour and collaborate with GCHQ on exploiting weaknesses in widely-used encryption implementations.",
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"long_description": "This is a May 2012 TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, USA presentation by Canada's Communications Security Establishment (CSEC), delivered as a roundtable discussion on TLS usage trends across Five Eyes collection. The document describes a systematic programme to analyse the SSL/TLS encryption parameters visible in both warranted collection and Special Source access — the latter processed through a system called OLYMPIA — generating weekly trend reports inspired by equivalent GCHQ reporting, and feeding cryptanalytic opportunities into attack programmes including PHOENIX.\n\nThe trend reporting infrastructure uses a Netezza database to store parsed TLS metadata and generate regular analysis covering cipher suite breakdowns by key exchange method, RSA and Diffie-Hellman modulus sizes and their evolution over time, SSL/TLS version usage, certificate common names, session ticket and elliptic curve usage, and the identification of new moduli appearing in intercepted traffic. The key size trend data shown covers May 2011 to April 2012 and documents the industry transition from 1024-bit to 2048-bit RSA keys — information with direct cryptanalytic value, as 1024-bit RSA was considered feasibly attackable by nation-state resources at the time. The DH modulus trends track the specific moduli used by nginx, current and older Apache versions, and Java — revealing which server software is generating which cryptographic parameters, enabling targeted attacks against known weak implementations. The public key exchange trend data shows RSA dominant at around 80-98% of connections, with an interesting spike in elliptic curve usage in January 2012 before declining.\n\nThe target-specific reporting section describes engaging analysts to identify unknown services their targets are using, track changes in TLS usage patterns and flag anomalies — framing the cryptographic trend analysis as both a tactical intelligence tool and a cryptanalytic attack surface identifier. The success stories section notes collaboration with GCHQ on identifying frequent Google moduli changes, and active testing of newly identified moduli against publicly known weaknesses through a programme called PHOENIX — suggesting an active effort to exploit weak or repeated Diffie-Hellman parameters of the type later publicly documented in the 2015 Logjam academic research.\n\nThe sample report uses a fictional target called \"Canuckistan\" to demonstrate the format, showing categorised TLS connections by service type and time of day, including the now-famous hockey talk observation — referenced in Der Spiegel's reporting as an example of the mundane surveillance caught up in bulk collection — noting increased chat activity on hockeytalk.com attributed to the beginning of playoff season.",
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"tags": [
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"TLS",
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"SSL",
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"cryptanalysis",
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"warrant",
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"Special Source",
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"RSA",
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"Diffie-Hellman",
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"elliptic curve",
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"key size trends",
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"moduli analysis",
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"certificate tracking",
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"internet encryption",
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"traffic analysis",
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"target analysis",
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"hockey talk",
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"cryptographic standards"
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],
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"document": {
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"creator": "CSE",
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"date_created": "2012-05",
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"classification": [
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"TOP SECRET",
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"SI"
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],
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"dissemination": [
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"REL TO CAN, GBR, NZL, USA"
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],
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"banner": "TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, USA",
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"genre": "slides",
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"programs": [
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"NETEZZA",
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"OLYMPIA",
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"PHOENIX"
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],
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"countries": [
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"Canada"
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],
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"people": []
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},
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"publication": [
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{
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"publisher": "Der Spiegel",
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"date_published": "2014-12-28",
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"title": "Prying Eyes: Inside the NSA's War on Internet Security",
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"link": "https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/inside-the-nsa-s-war-on-internet-security-a-1010361.html",
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"reporters": [
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"Appelbaum, Jacob",
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"Gibson, Aaron",
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"Grothoff, Christian",
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"Müller-Maguhn, Andy",
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"Poitras, Laura",
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"Sontheimer, Michael",
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"Stöcker, Christian"
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],
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"contributors": [],
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"doc_url": "https://cdn.prod.www.spiegel.de/media/25722dbd-0001-0014-0000-000000035510/media-35510.pdf"
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}
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],
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"pdf_sha256": "ab070a1e6f12ed7c440e01428fd963581e2e47a7976d5f0ce8a78a9e6734e87e",
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"pages": 15
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}
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410
data/spiegel_-_media-35510/spiegel_-_media-35510.md
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data/spiegel_-_media-35510/spiegel_-_media-35510.md
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, USA
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Communications Security Establishment Canada
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Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
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# TLS Trends: A roundtable discussion on current usage and future directions
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[REDACTED]
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Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC)
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Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
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Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
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Canada
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, USA
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1
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---
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, USA
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Communications Security Establishment Canada
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Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
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This presentation is up to
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TOP SECRET//SI
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//REL TO
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CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, USA
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Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
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Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
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Canada
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, USA
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2
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---
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, USA
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Communications Security Establishment Canada
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Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
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## Outline
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* Background
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* Implementation
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* Trend Report
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* Success Stories
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* Future Development
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* Questions
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Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
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Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
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Canada
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, USA
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3
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---
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, USA
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Communications Security Establishment Canada
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Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
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## Background
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* Objectives:
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* Identify capabilities in existing warranted SSL/TLS traffic
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* Generate regular trend reports and analysis
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* Identify abnormalities and technology changes
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* Be proactive!
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Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
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Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
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Canada
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, USA
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4
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---
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, USA
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Communications Security Establishment Canada
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Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
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## Implementation - Warranted Collection
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```
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sort & parse traffic
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Crypt SD
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push traffic
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DFM
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Crypt Dir
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Source
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YYYYMMDD
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* Parsed 1
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* Parsed 2
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Find
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metadata
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Netezza DB
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Query
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generate
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Trends
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Analyze
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Notify!
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Crypt SD
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Request
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```
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Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
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Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
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Canada
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, USA
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5
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---
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, USA
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Communications Security Establishment Canada
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Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
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## Implementation – Special Source
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```
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Identify TLS
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OLYMPIA
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push traffic
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DFM
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Parse traffic and prepare for insertion
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metadata
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Netezza DB
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Query
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generate
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Trends
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Analyze
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Notify!
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Crypt SD
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Request
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```
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Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
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Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
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Canada
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, USA
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6
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---
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, USA
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Communications Security Establishment Canada
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Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
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## Trend Report – Warranted Collection
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* Inspired by GCHQ weekly TLS Trend Reports
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* What we're tracking:
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* Amount of SSL/TLS traffic seen
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* Cipher Suite Breakdown (RSA vs EC vs DH)
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* SSL/TLS Version Breakdown
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* Top Certificates seen by Common Name
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* Top RSA Certificate Moduli seen
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* Top DH Moduli seen
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* Percentage of Resumed Session
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* Session Ticket Usage, Elliptic Curve Usage
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* RSA & DH Modulus Size Breakdown
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* New DH moduli
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* Top new RSA moduli
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Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
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Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
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Canada
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, USA
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7
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---
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, USA
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Communications Security Establishment Canada
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Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
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||||
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## RSA Key Size Trends (warranted only)
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```
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70%
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60%
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50%
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40%
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30%
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20%
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10%
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0%
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May-11 Jun-11 Jul-11 Aug-11 Sep-11 Oct-11 Nov-11 Dec-11 Jan-12 Feb-12 Mar-12 Apr-12
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1024-bit
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2048-bit
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4096-bit
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||||
```
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||||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
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Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
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Canada
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, USA
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8
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---
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, USA
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||||
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Communications Security Establishment Canada
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Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
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||||
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||||
## DH Modulus Trends (warranted only)
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||||
```
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80%
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70%
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60%
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50%
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40%
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30%
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20%
|
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10%
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||||
0%
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May-11 Jun-11 Jul-11 Aug-11 Sep-11 Oct-11 Nov-11 Dec-11 Jan-12 Feb-12 Mar-12 Apr-12
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nginx
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Apache - current
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||||
Apache - older versions
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||||
Java
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||||
```
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||||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
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Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
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Canada
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, USA
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9
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---
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, USA
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Communications Security Establishment Canada
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Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
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## Public Key Exchange Methods (warranted only)
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||||
```
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100%
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90%
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80%
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70%
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60%
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50%
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40%
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30%
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20%
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10%
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0%
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May-11 Jun-11 Jul-11 Aug-11 Sep-11 Oct-11 Nov-11 Dec-11 Jan-12 Feb-12 Mar-12 Apr-12
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||||
RSA
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||||
DH
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||||
ECC
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||||
```
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||||
|
||||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
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||||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
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Canada
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|
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, USA
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||||
10
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|
||||
---
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||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, USA
|
||||
|
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Communications Security Establishment Canada
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Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
|
||||
|
||||
## Target Specific reporting (warranted only)
|
||||
|
||||
* Intended to engage analysts in identifying traffic of interest
|
||||
* Show the known services their target is using
|
||||
* Ask them to help identify unknown services
|
||||
* Identify changes in their target's use of TLS
|
||||
|
||||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, USA
|
||||
11
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, USA
|
||||
|
||||
Communications Security Establishment Canada
|
||||
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
|
||||
|
||||
## Sample Report
|
||||
|
||||
Trends Report for Canuckistan in the month of April
|
||||
|
||||
Table 1. Types of TLS traffic in working hours (7am to 6pm) and out of hours
|
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||||
WHO | OUT_HOURS | IN_HOURS | TOTAL
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||||
--------------------------+---------- +----------+------
|
||||
Google | 1479 | 2782 | 4261
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||||
Hotmail/Live | 455 | 934 | 1389
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||||
Advertising | 401 | 139 | 540
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||||
Foreign government sites | 338 | 97 | 435
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||||
Canuckistan Social Media | 59 | 90 | 149
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||||
Facebook | 38 | 82 | 120
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||||
Apple | 12 | 2 | 14
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||||
Banking | 5 | 4 | 9
|
||||
Transportation sites | 3 | 0 | 3
|
||||
Microsoft | 1 | 0 | 1
|
||||
|
||||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, USA
|
||||
12
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||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, USA
|
||||
|
||||
Communications Security Establishment Canada
|
||||
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
|
||||
|
||||
## Sample Report (cont'd)
|
||||
|
||||
Table 2. Sites visited from the Canuckistan Social Media group
|
||||
|
||||
WHO | SITES | OUT_HOURS | IN_HOURS | TOTAL |
|
||||
-----------+---------------------+-----------+----------+-------+
|
||||
hockeytalk | login.hockeytalk.com| 3 | 10 | 13 |
|
||||
hockeytalk | chat.hockeytalk.com | 31 | 44 | 75 |
|
||||
hockeytalk | mail.hockeytalk.com | 25 | 36 | 61 |
|
||||
|
||||
Comments:
|
||||
We have noticed a large increase in chat activity on the hockeytalk sites. This is
|
||||
likely due to the beginning of playoff season.
|
||||
|
||||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, USA
|
||||
13
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, USA
|
||||
|
||||
Communications Security Establishment Canada
|
||||
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
|
||||
|
||||
## Success Stories
|
||||
|
||||
* Easily identified current capabilities in warranted traffic
|
||||
* Verified certificate being phased out and identified possible replacements
|
||||
* Corroborated with GCHQ on discovering frequent Google moduli changes
|
||||
* Currently pushing new moduli for testing against publicly known weaknesses (PHOENIX)
|
||||
* Identified use of Elliptic Curve Certificates
|
||||
|
||||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, USA
|
||||
14
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, USA
|
||||
|
||||
Communications Security Establishment Canada
|
||||
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
|
||||
|
||||
## Future Development
|
||||
|
||||
* Trends reports on Special Source collection
|
||||
* New types of metadata added to database
|
||||
* Collaboration with CSEC's Data Mining team
|
||||
* Improve efficiency, stability of solutions
|
||||
|
||||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, USA
|
||||
15
|
||||
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