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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
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|
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
|
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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|
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Target Pursuit
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|
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# Intro to the VPN Exploitation Process
|
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|
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[REDACTED]
|
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|
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OTP VPN Exploitation Team
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S31176
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September 13, 2010
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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1
|
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|
||||
---
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|
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## Overview
|
||||
|
||||
* S31176 and the OTP VPN Exploitation Team
|
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* How can we help you?
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* VPN and Network Encryption Types
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* Birth of the VPN Adventure
|
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* Sustained Exploitation
|
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* Exploitation Successes
|
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* Conclusions
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|
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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2
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|
||||
---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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## S31176
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Branch Name:
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||||
Custom Thread Development for
|
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Network Encryption
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||||
Team Name:
|
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OTP VPN Exploitation Team
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
3
|
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|
||||
---
|
||||
|
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## Mission Statement
|
||||
|
||||
S31176 provides cryptanalytic support services for many network encryption protocols, including, but not limited to:
|
||||
IPSec, SSL, PPTP, SSH and proprietary protocols. We are the front-door of CES for targeted vulnerability assessment
|
||||
and custom interim end-to-end exploitation flows for these protocols. In conjunction with various agency SIGDEV
|
||||
counterparts and target organizations, we engage in discovery to find TOPI targets of interest. By maintaining
|
||||
contact with field sites, TAO, and NCSC, we endeavor to guide and direct development and access through both
|
||||
active and passive means in order to make exploitation possible and enable full prosecution of the target...
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
4
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## Purpose in a Nutshell
|
||||
|
||||
* Act as your one stop shop for all VPN and network encryption exploitation related issues!
|
||||
|
||||
* Act as a liaison for SIGDEVers and TOPIs to other areas of the VPN community
|
||||
|
||||
* Perform some SIGDEV and target discovery
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
5
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## Where are we positioned?
|
||||
|
||||
SID, S
|
||||
Data Acquisition, S3
|
||||
Cryptanalytic Exploitation Services, S31
|
||||
Office of Target Pursuit, S311
|
||||
Cryptanalytic Exploitation & Discovery, S3117
|
||||
Custom Thread Development for Network Encryption, S31176
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
6
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## S31176 Branch Members
|
||||
|
||||
* [REDACTED] - Collection
|
||||
* [REDACTED] - CMP Intern
|
||||
* [REDACTED] - Team Lead, IPSec, SSH
|
||||
* [REDACTED] - IPSec
|
||||
* [REDACTED] - Branch Chief
|
||||
* [REDACTED] – Diversity Tour
|
||||
* [REDACTED] - CADP Intern
|
||||
* [REDACTED] - PPTP
|
||||
* [REDACTED] – BLEAKINQUIRY, SSL
|
||||
|
||||
How to Contact us (May be changing soon):
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
go vpn-xft
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
7
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## Branches within OTP
|
||||
|
||||
* S31171 – PRC, N Korea, SE Asia, Japan
|
||||
|
||||
* S31172 – Iran, Hamas, Iraq, Saudi Arabia
|
||||
|
||||
* S31173 – Africa, Levant, Latin America, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan
|
||||
|
||||
* S31174 – Russia, Counter-Intel, Europe, FTM
|
||||
|
||||
* S31175 – Cross-Target Support Branch
|
||||
|
||||
* S31176 – Custom Thread Development
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
8
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## Exploitation in the OTP Branches
|
||||
|
||||
* Each branch has a VPN representative
|
||||
* We inform them about attacks, they inform us about targets
|
||||
* If you have a target-specific inquiry, they may be able to help
|
||||
* S31171 (Eastern and Southeast Asia)
|
||||
* [REDACTED], [REDACTED]
|
||||
* S31172 (Iran, Iraq, Arabian Peninsula)
|
||||
* [REDACTED]), [REDACTED]
|
||||
* S31173 (Levant, Central Asia, Africa, Latin America)
|
||||
* [REDACTED]
|
||||
* S31174 (Russia, Europe, International Targets)
|
||||
* [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
9
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## How can we help you?
|
||||
|
||||
Provide Exploitation Support
|
||||
|
||||
* Provide VPN vulnerability analysis
|
||||
* Engage Network Security Products, TAO, ESO, etc
|
||||
* Convey meaningful feedback to customer
|
||||
* Develop sustained exploitation threads when possible
|
||||
* Suggest alternative approaches if passive exploitation is unrealistic
|
||||
* DECRYPTS, DECRYPTS, DECRYPTS!!!!!!
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
10
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## Additional Services
|
||||
|
||||
We can assist with the following:
|
||||
|
||||
* Collection problems
|
||||
* Tasking
|
||||
* Data flow
|
||||
* Plaintext analysis
|
||||
* Metadata interpretation
|
||||
* Tip-off vulnerable VPN links
|
||||
* VPN SIGDEV
|
||||
* Target Discovery and Development
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
11
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## How can you help you?
|
||||
|
||||
Glad you asked!
|
||||
|
||||
* Familiarize yourself with appropriate search criteria
|
||||
* [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
* Get a BLEAKINQUIRY account
|
||||
|
||||
* If you find VPN-related data, let us know.
|
||||
* The existence of a VPN on a network of interest
|
||||
* Configuration/setup information about the VPN
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
12
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## BLEAKINQUIRY
|
||||
|
||||
* Metadata database of potentially exploitable VPNs
|
||||
* Data Sources
|
||||
* TOYGRIPPE metadata testing
|
||||
* XKEYSCORE fingerprints
|
||||
* Daily VPN exploitation
|
||||
* Let us stress..."P-O-T-E-N-T-I-A-L"
|
||||
* Want an account?
|
||||
* E-mail [REDACTED] or [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
13
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## BLEAKINQUIRY
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
BLEAKINQUIRY - Mozilla Firefox
|
||||
File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help
|
||||
[REDACTED] Google
|
||||
BLEAKINQUIRY
|
||||
Turn off NKR links Go to CRS Hide Help
|
||||
|
||||
Simple Search | Advanced Search | Batch Search
|
||||
Advanced Search
|
||||
IP 1:
|
||||
IP 2:
|
||||
Sigad:
|
||||
Case notation:
|
||||
Country: CN
|
||||
Five-Eyes Defeat (Y): Y
|
||||
City:
|
||||
Domain:
|
||||
Company:
|
||||
Modem 1:
|
||||
Modem 2:
|
||||
Modem comment:
|
||||
Modem ID:
|
||||
Target name:
|
||||
Status (comma list):
|
||||
VPN type (comma list):
|
||||
Last seen on or after: 20100502
|
||||
Last seen on or before:
|
||||
|
||||
Submit Query
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
| Class | Status | IP 1 | IP 1 City | IP 1 Company | IP 1 Domain | IP 2 | IP 2 | IP 2 City | IP 2 Company | IP 2 Domain
|
||||
|-------|--------|------|-----------|--------------|-------------|------|------|-----------|--------------|----------- |
|
||||
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| TS//REL | 5 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| TS//NF | 5 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| TS//REL | 5 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| TS//NF | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| TS//REL | 5 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| TS//NF | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| TS//NF | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| TS//NF | 5 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Your search returned over 100 results. To see all results, please download them as CSV.
|
||||
|
||||
Done
|
||||
|
||||
Status Codes
|
||||
|
||||
BLEAKINQUIRY on WikiInfo
|
||||
RT documentation is moving to BLEAKINQUIRY's WikiInfo
|
||||
page so that it is easier to maintain. This panel will
|
||||
continue to show status codes.
|
||||
|
||||
Status Codes
|
||||
|
||||
* 0: potentially exploitable, 1-sided
|
||||
* 1: potentially exploitable, missing password
|
||||
* 2: potentially exploitable, attack failed
|
||||
* 3: potentially exploitable, active op required
|
||||
* 4: potentially exploitable, no password required
|
||||
* 5: confirmed exploitable, no payload
|
||||
* 6: confirmed exploitable, payload successfully
|
||||
decrypted
|
||||
|
||||
Country Digraphs
|
||||
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
Five-Eyes Defeat
|
||||
The Five Eyes Defeat option is only available via the
|
||||
Advanced Search query. For defeating all Five-Eyes
|
||||
results, place a 'Y' or 'y' in the 'Five Eyes Defeat'
|
||||
box. Any other character(s) will not defeat Five-Eyes
|
||||
results.
|
||||
|
||||
NKB-Links Toggle Button
|
||||
The "Turn on/off NKB links" button toggles on and off
|
||||
the NKB lookup capability for IDs. When you click on
|
||||
this button, the last query will automatically be
|
||||
re-run. Disabling the links makes it easier to
|
||||
highlight and select (double click) an individual IP
|
||||
for pasting in another document.
|
||||
|
||||
Dynamic Page -- highest possible classification
|
||||
|
||||
Done
|
||||
DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007
|
||||
DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
14
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## Local IPSec Processing
|
||||
|
||||
MAILORDER
|
||||
|
||||
attack script
|
||||
|
||||
CORALREEF
|
||||
|
||||
VULCAN-
|
||||
DEATHGRIP
|
||||
|
||||
genericIPSec_wrapper.pl
|
||||
|
||||
PINWALE
|
||||
|
||||
SCISSORS
|
||||
|
||||
TURTLEPOWER
|
||||
|
||||
XKEYSCORE
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
15
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## Type 1: IPSec
|
||||
|
||||
* IPSec: IP Security
|
||||
* Complete paired IKE
|
||||
* Common UDP ports: 500 and 4500
|
||||
* Pre-Shared Key (PSK)
|
||||
* Router configuration (good source for PSKs)
|
||||
* Encrypted Payload (ESP or AH)
|
||||
* Next Protocol 50 or 51
|
||||
* XKEYSCORE Queries
|
||||
* Full log DNI search
|
||||
* AppID/Fingerprints: “vpn/*”, “vpn/esp”, “vpn/isakmp”, “vpn/ikev2”, "vpn/ikev2_content"
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
16
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## Type 2: PPTP
|
||||
|
||||
* PPTP: Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol
|
||||
|
||||
* Paired collect
|
||||
* Next Protocol 47 = PPTP payload
|
||||
* TCP Port 1723 = PPTP tunnel set up, no payload
|
||||
|
||||
* One-sided collect, client side
|
||||
|
||||
* XKEYSCORE Queries
|
||||
* Full log DNI search
|
||||
* Enter your IPs/casn/etc of interest
|
||||
* AppID/Fingerprint: “vpn/pptp_encr*”
|
||||
* Share your results with [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
17
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## Type 3: SSL
|
||||
|
||||
* SSL – Secure Sockets Layer
|
||||
* Renamed TLS (Transport Layer Security) but still often referred to as SSL
|
||||
* Paired collect – Compare IP's and Ports
|
||||
* Server Certificates
|
||||
* Port Numbers: 443, 465, 989, 990, 992, 993, and 995
|
||||
* XKEYSCORE Queries
|
||||
* Full log DNI search or use SSL plugin
|
||||
* AppID/Fingerprints: "encryption/ssl/*" or "network_encryption/ssl/*"
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
18
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## Type 4: SSH
|
||||
|
||||
* SSH – Secure Shell
|
||||
* Industry-standard networking protocol for securely logging into other machines via a network.
|
||||
* Complete paired traffic
|
||||
* Port number 22
|
||||
* Potentially recover user names and passwords
|
||||
* Useful to TAO to access boxes and gather cryptographic information
|
||||
* XKEYSCORE Queries
|
||||
* Full log DNI search
|
||||
* AppID/Fingerprints: “terminal/ssh/*”
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
19
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## Birth of the VPN Adventure
|
||||
|
||||
We receive VPN-related requests from across the Globe
|
||||
|
||||
* TOPIs
|
||||
|
||||
* SIGDEV Analysts
|
||||
|
||||
* OTP Analysts
|
||||
|
||||
* Cryptologic Centers
|
||||
|
||||
* Field Sites
|
||||
|
||||
* Second Parties
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
20
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## The Many Flavors of Requests
|
||||
|
||||
IPSec, PPTP, SSL, SSH
|
||||
Router Information
|
||||
IP Links & Ranges
|
||||
VPN Metadata
|
||||
BLEAKINQUIRY Accounts
|
||||
XKEYSCORE Fingerprints
|
||||
|
||||
VPN EXPLOITATION TEAM
|
||||
|
||||
Domain Names
|
||||
Network Protocols
|
||||
Interesting Terms & Names
|
||||
Vulnerability Evaluations
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
21
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## 1. Initial Steps
|
||||
|
||||
VPN Info Found/Question Arises
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
Task Assigned to Team Analyst
|
||||
Gather Background Info About Request
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
22
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## 2. Consult Repositories
|
||||
|
||||
* BLEAKINQUIRY – Metadata database of potentially exploitable VPNs
|
||||
* TOYGRIPPE – VPN metadata repository
|
||||
* PINWALE - Long-term repository for tasked SIGINT collect
|
||||
* XKEYSCORE - Processes and databases DNI collect from various field sites
|
||||
* Full-take feed (tasked and untasked)
|
||||
* VULCANDEATHGRIP - Repository for tasked, full-take VPN collection
|
||||
* FOURSCORE – PPTP repository
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
23
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## 3. Scripts: IPSec Focus
|
||||
|
||||
* Format downloaded repository files
|
||||
* Create intermediate processing files
|
||||
* Check for potential vulnerabilities
|
||||
* Search for PSKs in CORALREEF
|
||||
* Run attacks to recover PSK
|
||||
* Decrypt traffic
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
24
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## 4. Communicate Results
|
||||
|
||||
Can we decrypt the VPN traffic?
|
||||
* If the answer is “No” then explain how to turn it into a “YES!”
|
||||
* If the answer is "YES!” then...
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
25
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## Happy Dance!!
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
26
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## YES! We Have Decrypt!
|
||||
|
||||
* Notify customer of success
|
||||
* Send decrypt through post-processing and deliver to TOPI
|
||||
* Have TOPI determine the priority level of the resulting plain text
|
||||
* Get IPs on sustained collect
|
||||
* Set up and transition sustained decryption process to OTP VPN Branch Rep
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
27
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## Turn that Frown Upside Down! From "No" to "YES!"
|
||||
|
||||
* Depends on why we couldn't decrypt it
|
||||
* Find Pre-Shared Key
|
||||
* Locate complete paired collect
|
||||
* Locate both IKE and ESP traffic
|
||||
* Have collection sites do surveys for the IP's
|
||||
* Find better quality collect with rich metadata
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
28
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## Contact Our Friends for Help
|
||||
|
||||
* Network Security Products
|
||||
* Develop decryption algorithms
|
||||
* Tailored Access Operations
|
||||
* Computer Network Exploitation to create access points
|
||||
* Collection Sites
|
||||
* Perform surveys for the IPs of interest
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
29
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## More Friends
|
||||
|
||||
* NSA/CSS Commercial Solutions Center
|
||||
* Manage industrial relationships
|
||||
* SIGDEV
|
||||
* Develops tools and methods to help you find the traffic you desire
|
||||
* OTP VPN Representatives
|
||||
* Assist in locating traffic of interest
|
||||
* TOPI
|
||||
* Target knowledge
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
30
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## Sustained Exploitation
|
||||
|
||||
* Develop sustained exploitation thread AFTER the TOPI confirms the decrypts are interesting
|
||||
* TOPI must task IP in CADENCE
|
||||
* Task Port and IP
|
||||
* UTT does not have boolean logic
|
||||
* Categories
|
||||
* IPSec: 6640 (protocols) and 6648 (ports)
|
||||
* PPTP: 6648 (ports)
|
||||
* SSL: 6647 (ports)
|
||||
* Get the crypt system title
|
||||
* Work with the OTP VPN Regional Branch representative
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
31
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## Establish the Data Flow
|
||||
|
||||
* Establish the correct corporate data flow
|
||||
* CES data flow guru [REDACTED]
|
||||
* Make sure the correct routing tags and categories are appended to the data
|
||||
* Direct tasked traffic to correct data repository
|
||||
* PINWALE
|
||||
* VULCANDEATHGRIP – IPSec
|
||||
* VULCANMINDMELD – SSL
|
||||
* FOURSCORE - PPTP
|
||||
* Try to avoid relying on XKS workflows due to legal and logistical issues
|
||||
* XKEYSCORE – SSH using XKS workflows directed to a file directory
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
32
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## Data Flow Integrity
|
||||
|
||||
* Evaluate data integrity, quality, & quantity
|
||||
* Different collectors produce different metadata formats
|
||||
* Need rich metadata
|
||||
* Need all the pieces (IKE and ESP for IPSec)
|
||||
* Ensure that the data is not garbled and headers attached appropriately
|
||||
* Check that the data volume is what is expected
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
33
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## Collection Sites
|
||||
|
||||
* Contact Collection Sites if there are data issues
|
||||
* Malformed headers
|
||||
* Missing metadata
|
||||
* Missing payload
|
||||
* Garbled data
|
||||
* Low volume
|
||||
* Single-sided traffic
|
||||
* Collection sites sometimes only collect one-side of the VPN traffic
|
||||
* Need to collaborate with both sites
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
34
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## Decrypt Processing
|
||||
|
||||
* Decrypt the VPN traffic
|
||||
* Create SRI files for decrypts
|
||||
* Send the decrypt and SRI files to TURTLEPOWER (IPSec, PPTP) or CAPRI OS (SSL, SSH) for post-processing
|
||||
* Decryption of payload
|
||||
* Decompression
|
||||
* Unrar files
|
||||
* Route to appropriate data repository according to the crypt system title and type of decrypt (text, voice, etc)
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
35
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## Decrypt Repositories
|
||||
|
||||
* PINWALE
|
||||
* Tasked IPSec, PPTP, and SSL
|
||||
* Must be placed in the correct partition according to classification (REL FVEY, NOFORN, FISA)
|
||||
* XKEYSCORE
|
||||
* SSH - often have router configurations and user credentials which are easier to view in XKS than PINWALE
|
||||
* Still developing the process
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
36
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## TOPI Evaluation
|
||||
|
||||
* Analyst locates the decrypts in PINWALE and/or XKEYSCORE
|
||||
* Viewing the decrypts
|
||||
* PINWALE,
|
||||
* XKEYSCORE
|
||||
* AGILITY
|
||||
* DNI PRESENTER
|
||||
* Contact TURTLEPOWER or CAPRI OS if there are file rendering issues
|
||||
* Also try the Unidentified Protocols team in s S31122 for help identifying unknown protocols
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
37
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## Thread Monitoring
|
||||
|
||||
* Responsibility for monitoring these exploitation threads are transferred to the OTP VPN Regional Branch representative
|
||||
* After the thread is established and stabilized
|
||||
* Trouble shoots decryption and collection issues
|
||||
* Set up a cron job to run the decryptor every day
|
||||
* Hopefully the TOPI continues to identify and report mission-critical intelligence from these decrypts
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
38
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## Success 1: IPSec
|
||||
### Follow-the-Money and TAO Targets
|
||||
|
||||
* TOPI (S2C22) has had a close relationship with TAO for quite some time
|
||||
* FTM Target 1
|
||||
* Not susceptible to any of NSP's implants
|
||||
* TAO got the configuration files which provided us the PSKs to enable passive exploitation
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
39
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## Success 1: IPSec
|
||||
|
||||
* FTM Target 2
|
||||
* TAO got on the router through which banking traffic of interest flows
|
||||
* NSP had an implant which allows passive exploitation with just ESP
|
||||
* Successful exploitation for the past two years
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
40
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## Success 2: PPTP
|
||||
|
||||
* Airlines
|
||||
* Iran Air, IRTAA
|
||||
* Royal Jordanian Air, JOTAA
|
||||
* Transaero Airlines, RUCAC
|
||||
* Telecommunications
|
||||
* Mir Telematiki (pending system title)
|
||||
* Afghani Wimax (pending system title)
|
||||
* Government
|
||||
* Mexican Diplomatic, MXDBB
|
||||
* Pakistani General Intelligence, PKRAQ
|
||||
* Turkish Diplomatic, TUDAT
|
||||
* Afghanistan Government, AFYAD
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
41
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## Success 2: PPTP
|
||||
|
||||
* Banking and Financial
|
||||
* Zaad Financial
|
||||
* Ewallet transactions of a principal financial node for Somali terrorist activity
|
||||
* Follow-the-Money customer
|
||||
* Kabul Bank
|
||||
* BNI Banking, Indonesia
|
||||
* Formed and owned by the Indonesian government
|
||||
* Banking transactions over "Flexy,” Telkom Indonesia's fixed wireless network
|
||||
* Other
|
||||
* IRGC cyber attacker
|
||||
* Nigerian power company's internal network
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
42
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## Reminders
|
||||
|
||||
* If it's not exploitable now, that doesn't mean it won't be later
|
||||
* We collaborate and communicate with our friends to produce decrypts
|
||||
* Traffic must be both good quality and the correct type
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
43
|
||||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue