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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Target Pursuit
# Intro to the VPN Exploitation Process
[REDACTED]
OTP VPN Exploitation Team
S31176
September 13, 2010
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Overview
* S31176 and the OTP VPN Exploitation Team
* How can we help you?
* VPN and Network Encryption Types
* Birth of the VPN Adventure
* Sustained Exploitation
* Exploitation Successes
* Conclusions
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## S31176
Branch Name:
Custom Thread Development for
Network Encryption
Team Name:
OTP VPN Exploitation Team
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Mission Statement
S31176 provides cryptanalytic support services for many network encryption protocols, including, but not limited to:
IPSec, SSL, PPTP, SSH and proprietary protocols. We are the front-door of CES for targeted vulnerability assessment
and custom interim end-to-end exploitation flows for these protocols. In conjunction with various agency SIGDEV
counterparts and target organizations, we engage in discovery to find TOPI targets of interest. By maintaining
contact with field sites, TAO, and NCSC, we endeavor to guide and direct development and access through both
active and passive means in order to make exploitation possible and enable full prosecution of the target...
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Purpose in a Nutshell
* Act as your one stop shop for all VPN and network encryption exploitation related issues!
* Act as a liaison for SIGDEVers and TOPIs to other areas of the VPN community
* Perform some SIGDEV and target discovery
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Where are we positioned?
SID, S
Data Acquisition, S3
Cryptanalytic Exploitation Services, S31
Office of Target Pursuit, S311
Cryptanalytic Exploitation & Discovery, S3117
Custom Thread Development for Network Encryption, S31176
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## S31176 Branch Members
* [REDACTED] - Collection
* [REDACTED] - CMP Intern
* [REDACTED] - Team Lead, IPSec, SSH
* [REDACTED] - IPSec
* [REDACTED] - Branch Chief
* [REDACTED] – Diversity Tour
* [REDACTED] - CADP Intern
* [REDACTED] - PPTP
* [REDACTED] – BLEAKINQUIRY, SSL
How to Contact us (May be changing soon):
[REDACTED]
go vpn-xft
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Branches within OTP
* S31171 – PRC, N Korea, SE Asia, Japan
* S31172 – Iran, Hamas, Iraq, Saudi Arabia
* S31173 – Africa, Levant, Latin America, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan
* S31174 – Russia, Counter-Intel, Europe, FTM
* S31175 – Cross-Target Support Branch
* S31176 – Custom Thread Development
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Exploitation in the OTP Branches
* Each branch has a VPN representative
* We inform them about attacks, they inform us about targets
* If you have a target-specific inquiry, they may be able to help
* S31171 (Eastern and Southeast Asia)
* [REDACTED], [REDACTED]
* S31172 (Iran, Iraq, Arabian Peninsula)
* [REDACTED]), [REDACTED]
* S31173 (Levant, Central Asia, Africa, Latin America)
* [REDACTED]
* S31174 (Russia, Europe, International Targets)
* [REDACTED]
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## How can we help you?
Provide Exploitation Support
* Provide VPN vulnerability analysis
* Engage Network Security Products, TAO, ESO, etc
* Convey meaningful feedback to customer
* Develop sustained exploitation threads when possible
* Suggest alternative approaches if passive exploitation is unrealistic
* DECRYPTS, DECRYPTS, DECRYPTS!!!!!!
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Additional Services
We can assist with the following:
* Collection problems
* Tasking
* Data flow
* Plaintext analysis
* Metadata interpretation
* Tip-off vulnerable VPN links
* VPN SIGDEV
* Target Discovery and Development
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## How can you help you?
Glad you asked!
* Familiarize yourself with appropriate search criteria
* [REDACTED]
* Get a BLEAKINQUIRY account
* If you find VPN-related data, let us know.
* The existence of a VPN on a network of interest
* Configuration/setup information about the VPN
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## BLEAKINQUIRY
* Metadata database of potentially exploitable VPNs
* Data Sources
* TOYGRIPPE metadata testing
* XKEYSCORE fingerprints
* Daily VPN exploitation
* Let us stress..."P-O-T-E-N-T-I-A-L"
* Want an account?
* E-mail [REDACTED] or [REDACTED]
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## BLEAKINQUIRY
```
BLEAKINQUIRY - Mozilla Firefox
File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help
[REDACTED] Google
BLEAKINQUIRY
Turn off NKR links Go to CRS Hide Help
Simple Search | Advanced Search | Batch Search
Advanced Search
IP 1:
IP 2:
Sigad:
Case notation:
Country: CN
Five-Eyes Defeat (Y): Y
City:
Domain:
Company:
Modem 1:
Modem 2:
Modem comment:
Modem ID:
Target name:
Status (comma list):
VPN type (comma list):
Last seen on or after: 20100502
Last seen on or before:
Submit Query
```
| Class | Status | IP 1 | IP 1 City | IP 1 Company | IP 1 Domain | IP 2 | IP 2 | IP 2 City | IP 2 Company | IP 2 Domain
|-------|--------|------|-----------|--------------|-------------|------|------|-----------|--------------|----------- |
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| TS//REL | 5 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| TS//NF | 5 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| TS//REL | 5 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| TS//NF | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| TS//REL | 5 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| TS//NF | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| TS//NF | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| TS//NF | 5 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
```
Your search returned over 100 results. To see all results, please download them as CSV.
Done
Status Codes
BLEAKINQUIRY on WikiInfo
RT documentation is moving to BLEAKINQUIRY's WikiInfo
page so that it is easier to maintain. This panel will
continue to show status codes.
Status Codes
* 0: potentially exploitable, 1-sided
* 1: potentially exploitable, missing password
* 2: potentially exploitable, attack failed
* 3: potentially exploitable, active op required
* 4: potentially exploitable, no password required
* 5: confirmed exploitable, no payload
* 6: confirmed exploitable, payload successfully
decrypted
Country Digraphs
[REDACTED]
Five-Eyes Defeat
The Five Eyes Defeat option is only available via the
Advanced Search query. For defeating all Five-Eyes
results, place a 'Y' or 'y' in the 'Five Eyes Defeat'
box. Any other character(s) will not defeat Five-Eyes
results.
NKB-Links Toggle Button
The "Turn on/off NKB links" button toggles on and off
the NKB lookup capability for IDs. When you click on
this button, the last query will automatically be
re-run. Disabling the links makes it easier to
highlight and select (double click) an individual IP
for pasting in another document.
Dynamic Page -- highest possible classification
Done
DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007
DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108
```
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Local IPSec Processing
MAILORDER
attack script
CORALREEF
VULCAN-
DEATHGRIP
genericIPSec_wrapper.pl
PINWALE
SCISSORS
TURTLEPOWER
XKEYSCORE
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Type 1: IPSec
* IPSec: IP Security
* Complete paired IKE
* Common UDP ports: 500 and 4500
* Pre-Shared Key (PSK)
* Router configuration (good source for PSKs)
* Encrypted Payload (ESP or AH)
* Next Protocol 50 or 51
* XKEYSCORE Queries
* Full log DNI search
* AppID/Fingerprints: “vpn/*”, “vpn/esp”, “vpn/isakmp”, “vpn/ikev2”, "vpn/ikev2_content"
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Type 2: PPTP
* PPTP: Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol
* Paired collect
* Next Protocol 47 = PPTP payload
* TCP Port 1723 = PPTP tunnel set up, no payload
* One-sided collect, client side
* XKEYSCORE Queries
* Full log DNI search
* Enter your IPs/casn/etc of interest
* AppID/Fingerprint: “vpn/pptp_encr*”
* Share your results with [REDACTED]
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Type 3: SSL
* SSL – Secure Sockets Layer
* Renamed TLS (Transport Layer Security) but still often referred to as SSL
* Paired collect – Compare IP's and Ports
* Server Certificates
* Port Numbers: 443, 465, 989, 990, 992, 993, and 995
* XKEYSCORE Queries
* Full log DNI search or use SSL plugin
* AppID/Fingerprints: "encryption/ssl/*" or "network_encryption/ssl/*"
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Type 4: SSH
* SSH – Secure Shell
* Industry-standard networking protocol for securely logging into other machines via a network.
* Complete paired traffic
* Port number 22
* Potentially recover user names and passwords
* Useful to TAO to access boxes and gather cryptographic information
* XKEYSCORE Queries
* Full log DNI search
* AppID/Fingerprints: “terminal/ssh/*”
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Birth of the VPN Adventure
We receive VPN-related requests from across the Globe
* TOPIs
* SIGDEV Analysts
* OTP Analysts
* Cryptologic Centers
* Field Sites
* Second Parties
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## The Many Flavors of Requests
IPSec, PPTP, SSL, SSH
Router Information
IP Links & Ranges
VPN Metadata
BLEAKINQUIRY Accounts
XKEYSCORE Fingerprints
VPN EXPLOITATION TEAM
Domain Names
Network Protocols
Interesting Terms & Names
Vulnerability Evaluations
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## 1. Initial Steps
VPN Info Found/Question Arises
[REDACTED]
Task Assigned to Team Analyst
Gather Background Info About Request
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## 2. Consult Repositories
* BLEAKINQUIRY – Metadata database of potentially exploitable VPNs
* TOYGRIPPE – VPN metadata repository
* PINWALE - Long-term repository for tasked SIGINT collect
* XKEYSCORE - Processes and databases DNI collect from various field sites
* Full-take feed (tasked and untasked)
* VULCANDEATHGRIP - Repository for tasked, full-take VPN collection
* FOURSCORE – PPTP repository
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## 3. Scripts: IPSec Focus
* Format downloaded repository files
* Create intermediate processing files
* Check for potential vulnerabilities
* Search for PSKs in CORALREEF
* Run attacks to recover PSK
* Decrypt traffic
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## 4. Communicate Results
Can we decrypt the VPN traffic?
* If the answer is “No” then explain how to turn it into a “YES!”
* If the answer is "YES!” then...
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Happy Dance!!
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
26
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## YES! We Have Decrypt!
* Notify customer of success
* Send decrypt through post-processing and deliver to TOPI
* Have TOPI determine the priority level of the resulting plain text
* Get IPs on sustained collect
* Set up and transition sustained decryption process to OTP VPN Branch Rep
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Turn that Frown Upside Down! From "No" to "YES!"
* Depends on why we couldn't decrypt it
* Find Pre-Shared Key
* Locate complete paired collect
* Locate both IKE and ESP traffic
* Have collection sites do surveys for the IP's
* Find better quality collect with rich metadata
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Contact Our Friends for Help
* Network Security Products
* Develop decryption algorithms
* Tailored Access Operations
* Computer Network Exploitation to create access points
* Collection Sites
* Perform surveys for the IPs of interest
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## More Friends
* NSA/CSS Commercial Solutions Center
* Manage industrial relationships
* SIGDEV
* Develops tools and methods to help you find the traffic you desire
* OTP VPN Representatives
* Assist in locating traffic of interest
* TOPI
* Target knowledge
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Sustained Exploitation
* Develop sustained exploitation thread AFTER the TOPI confirms the decrypts are interesting
* TOPI must task IP in CADENCE
* Task Port and IP
* UTT does not have boolean logic
* Categories
* IPSec: 6640 (protocols) and 6648 (ports)
* PPTP: 6648 (ports)
* SSL: 6647 (ports)
* Get the crypt system title
* Work with the OTP VPN Regional Branch representative
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Establish the Data Flow
* Establish the correct corporate data flow
* CES data flow guru [REDACTED]
* Make sure the correct routing tags and categories are appended to the data
* Direct tasked traffic to correct data repository
* PINWALE
* VULCANDEATHGRIP – IPSec
* VULCANMINDMELD – SSL
* FOURSCORE - PPTP
* Try to avoid relying on XKS workflows due to legal and logistical issues
* XKEYSCORE – SSH using XKS workflows directed to a file directory
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
32
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Data Flow Integrity
* Evaluate data integrity, quality, & quantity
* Different collectors produce different metadata formats
* Need rich metadata
* Need all the pieces (IKE and ESP for IPSec)
* Ensure that the data is not garbled and headers attached appropriately
* Check that the data volume is what is expected
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
33
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Collection Sites
* Contact Collection Sites if there are data issues
* Malformed headers
* Missing metadata
* Missing payload
* Garbled data
* Low volume
* Single-sided traffic
* Collection sites sometimes only collect one-side of the VPN traffic
* Need to collaborate with both sites
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Decrypt Processing
* Decrypt the VPN traffic
* Create SRI files for decrypts
* Send the decrypt and SRI files to TURTLEPOWER (IPSec, PPTP) or CAPRI OS (SSL, SSH) for post-processing
* Decryption of payload
* Decompression
* Unrar files
* Route to appropriate data repository according to the crypt system title and type of decrypt (text, voice, etc)
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
35
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Decrypt Repositories
* PINWALE
* Tasked IPSec, PPTP, and SSL
* Must be placed in the correct partition according to classification (REL FVEY, NOFORN, FISA)
* XKEYSCORE
* SSH - often have router configurations and user credentials which are easier to view in XKS than PINWALE
* Still developing the process
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
36
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## TOPI Evaluation
* Analyst locates the decrypts in PINWALE and/or XKEYSCORE
* Viewing the decrypts
* PINWALE,
* XKEYSCORE
* AGILITY
* DNI PRESENTER
* Contact TURTLEPOWER or CAPRI OS if there are file rendering issues
* Also try the Unidentified Protocols team in s S31122 for help identifying unknown protocols
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Thread Monitoring
* Responsibility for monitoring these exploitation threads are transferred to the OTP VPN Regional Branch representative
* After the thread is established and stabilized
* Trouble shoots decryption and collection issues
* Set up a cron job to run the decryptor every day
* Hopefully the TOPI continues to identify and report mission-critical intelligence from these decrypts
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Success 1: IPSec
### Follow-the-Money and TAO Targets
* TOPI (S2C22) has had a close relationship with TAO for quite some time
* FTM Target 1
* Not susceptible to any of NSP's implants
* TAO got the configuration files which provided us the PSKs to enable passive exploitation
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Success 1: IPSec
* FTM Target 2
* TAO got on the router through which banking traffic of interest flows
* NSP had an implant which allows passive exploitation with just ESP
* Successful exploitation for the past two years
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Success 2: PPTP
* Airlines
* Iran Air, IRTAA
* Royal Jordanian Air, JOTAA
* Transaero Airlines, RUCAC
* Telecommunications
* Mir Telematiki (pending system title)
* Afghani Wimax (pending system title)
* Government
* Mexican Diplomatic, MXDBB
* Pakistani General Intelligence, PKRAQ
* Turkish Diplomatic, TUDAT
* Afghanistan Government, AFYAD
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Success 2: PPTP
* Banking and Financial
* Zaad Financial
* Ewallet transactions of a principal financial node for Somali terrorist activity
* Follow-the-Money customer
* Kabul Bank
* BNI Banking, Indonesia
* Formed and owned by the Indonesian government
* Banking transactions over "Flexy,” Telkom Indonesia's fixed wireless network
* Other
* IRGC cyber attacker
* Nigerian power company's internal network
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Reminders
* If it's not exploitable now, that doesn't mean it won't be later
* We collaborate and communicate with our friends to produce decrypts
* Traffic must be both good quality and the correct type
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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