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{
"title": "Analytic Challenges from Active-Passive Integration",
"type": "REPORTED",
"description": "This NSA briefing addresses the technical and administrative friction caused by \"shaping\" operations. Shaping occurs when an active malware implant, typically situated on network infrastructure like a router, copies specific data streams and redirects them past a passive surveillance sensor such as TURMOIL. While this ensures the capture of data that might otherwise be missed, it creates a \"double metadata\" conflict where a single piece of intelligence carries two competing sets of identifiers: one from the active Tailored Access Operations (TAO) implant and another from the passive collection site. The document tasks analysts with finding a way to reconcile these source notations to ensure the data remains searchable and legally compliant within legacy databases.",
"long_description": "The briefing defines \"shaping\" as a strategic maneuver where an active implant copies traffic and directs it past a passive collector, particularly when the collector is already processing other passive traffic. This is currently executed at the network infrastructure level rather than on individual user endpoints. The document distinguishes between two primary methods of shaping. Physical or link-layer shaping, exemplified by the BRAVENICKEL project, involves copying an entire optical link without initial selection, leaving the filtering to the passive midpoint. Conversely, network-layer shaping, such as APEX for HAMMERMILL, involves targeted copying based on specific IP or application parameters. In these cases, the exfiltrated data is often \"munged\" or encrypted to mask the surveillance activity from the network owner.\n\nA significant portion of the briefing focuses on the exploitation of encrypted communications, specifically IPsec VPNs. The process begins with the TURMOIL passive capability detecting the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) and the subsequent Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP). If the agency’s cryptanalytic resources can provide the necessary keys in a timely manner, the encrypted traffic is \"unwrapped\" and decrypted. The resulting cleartext is then fed back into the TURBULENCE pipeline for standard processing, such as scanning for webmail or VoIP content. Projects like HAMMERSTEIN and HAMMERCHANT facilitate this by performing \"strong selection\" at the router level and bundling the exfiltrated content with specialized metadata.\n\nThe integration of these active and passive streams creates an \"Analytic Challenge\" for users like \"Jane the Analyst.\" Every intercept in the NSA system must be tagged with a Case Notation, a Source ID (SIGAD), and a legal authority. Because the active and passive systems each generate their own distinct sets of these markers, legacy backend repositories like TOYGRIPPE and NUCLEON—which were designed for single-source data—often struggle to process both. The document proposes extending metadata fields to accommodate \"Agent CaseNotation\" and \"Passive CaseNotation,\" but warns that inconsistent implementation across the enterprise could lead to data loss or legal tracking errors.\n\nUltimately, the briefing serves as a call to action for the Information Technology Directorate (ITD) and the analyst community. It notes that shaping operations like HAMMERSTONE and BRAVENICKEL are already operational, and that independent, uncoordinated decisions regarding how to \"stuff\" double metadata into old databases are creating systemic risks. Analysts are urged to drive a consistent enterprise solution for identifying data sources, emphasizing that the transformation of tools like METAWAVE and MARINA must prioritize the needs of the analysts who require a unified, transparent view of the \"converged\" data.",
"tags": [
"traffic shaping",
"shaping",
"Tailored Access Operations",
"VPN exploitation",
"VPNs",
"IKE",
"ESP",
"VoIP exploitation",
"cryptanalysis",
"case notation",
"SIGAD",
"PDDG",
"Computer Network Exploitation",
"metadata tagging",
"implants",
"malware",
"data exfiltration",
"SSO",
"network infrastructure",
"router exploitation",
"routers",
"traffic redirection",
"deep packet inspection",
"packet unwrapping",
"target development",
"network attack",
"link layer attacks",
"optical multiplexer",
"metadata repositories",
"surveillance architecture"
],
"document": {
"creator": "NSA",
"date_created": "",
"classification": [
"TOP SECRET",
"COMINT"
],
"dissemination": [
"REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL"
],
"banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20320108",
"genre": "slides",
"programs": [
"BRAVENICKEL",
"HAMMERMILL",
"APEX",
"TURMOIL",
"HAMMERSTONE",
"PRESSUREWAVE",
"METROTUBE",
"TOYGRIPPE",
"TURBULENCE",
"METAWAVE",
"MARINA",
"SSO",
"CONVEYANCE",
"NUCLEON",
"FASCIA",
"HAMMERCHANT",
"TOYGRIPPE"
],
"countries": [],
"people": []
},
"publication": [
{
"publisher": "Der Spiegel",
"date_published": "2014-12-28",
"title": "Prying Eyes: Inside the NSA's War on Internet Security",
"link": "https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/inside-the-nsa-s-war-on-internet-security-a-1010361.html",
"reporters": [
"Appelbaum, Jacob",
"Gibson, Aaron",
"Grothoff, Christian",
"Müller-Maguhn, Andy",
"Poitras, Laura",
"Sontheimer, Michael",
"Stöcker, Christian"
],
"contributors": [],
"doc_url": "https://cdn.prod.www.spiegel.de/media/cc118888-0001-0014-0000-000000035516/media-35516.pdf"
}
],
"aka_id": [],
"archive_comment": "Der Spiegel published this presentation in near-identical form in January 2015; only a few slides differ.\nmedia_35672_Explanation_of_APEX_shaping_to_put_exfiltrating_network_traffic_into_patterns_that_allow_plausible_deniability",
"pdf_sha256": "bb46dc0b004707c4905d52940e4e3a8e9867a478df036c384cfbbc96b9809613"
}

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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20320108
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
This Briefing is Classified TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
# Analytic Challenges from Active-Passive Integration
[REDACTED], S324
This Briefing is Classified TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA,FVEY
DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSS Manual 1-52, Dated: 20070108, Declassify On: 20320108
Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
Dated: 20070108
Declassify On: 20320108
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20320108
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
Information Technology Directorate (ITD)
## Define shaping, please?
* Working definition: Active implant copies traffic and directs a copy past a passive collector
* Issues arise when collector is also processing passive traffic simultaneously
* Current: Implants on network infrastructure devices, not user endpoints
* Two types:
* Physical/link layer:
* an implant copies and shapes an entire link (E1, STM1) without selection; passive midpoint does selection
* Network layer:
* an implant performs targeted copying based on IP or application parameters and exfils only the targeted traffic; passive collector may or may not do further selection.
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
----
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
Information Technology Directorate (ITD)
## Examples
* Link layer: BRAVENICKEL project (optical Muxes)
* Copied link is not disguised, just routed on an unused layer 2 path that a passive collector can monitor
* Selection happens in the passive collector
* Network layer: APEX for HAMMERMILL (routers)
* Router is tasked to select and exfil targeted traffic (perhaps all of a particular protocol)
* Exfil is disguised ("munged", encrypted) to avoid detection
* Passive collector looks for IP source/destination address in order to detect the traffic
* If further selection/processing is to be done in collector, the exfil must be "unwrapped" (unmunged, decrypted)
* Exfil can be directed to passive or to TAO by changing the destination address
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
Information Technology Directorate (ITD)
## So Why does Jane the Analyst care?
* TAO implants have collection parameters that are put on exfil received thru TAO backend
* case notation, SIGAD, PDDG, classification/legal authority
* The passive collector has another set of these:
* Site has a SIGAD, collector has a PDDG, the link it sees the traffic on has a case notation, and the access has a classification floor/legal authority
* Current backend repositories and presenters weren't designed to expect TWO of these!!!
* Which gets put on the data??? And where?
* And (drum roll) ... how do we solve this problem CONSISTENTLY across the enterprise?
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
Information Technology Directorate (ITD)
## Example: APEX IPSEC VPN collection
* IPSEC VPN:
* First packets between the devices establish the parameters and encryption keys (IKE)
* Following this setup, "content" packets are encrypted and transmitted packet by packet (ESP)
* CES wants the IKE exchange and maybe the ESP (content)
* TURMOIL passive capability:
* Passive capability to detect IKE and ESP
* Metadata record produced for every IKE exchange
* IKE for targeted VPN forwarded directly to CES database
* For targeted VPN, real-time decryption is performed IF CES can provide a key in time
* Decrypted IP traffic is processed by TURMOIL apps for normal selection (VoIP, webmail, etc, etc)
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
Information Technology Directorate (ITD)
## TURBULENCE Pre-APEX VPN Exploitation
```
TURMOIL intercepts link
Key exchange
Encrypted Data
Turmoil
Metadata Extractor
ESP Decrypt
TURMOIL apps
IKE Full take Metadata
App metadata
App metadata & content to other repositories
Send IKE - Ask for Keys
Selected Decrypted Content
CA Resources
NSA Net
Full take IKE metadata to TOYGRIPPE
PRESSUREWAVE
METROTUBE Analytic
TOYGRIPPE
```
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
Information Technology Directorate (ITD)
## TURBULENCE Pre-APEX VPN Exploitation
```
TURMOIL intercepts link
Key exchange
Encrypted Data
Turmoil
Metadata Extractor
ESP Decrypt
TURMOIL apps
IKE Full take Metadata
App metadata
App metadata & content to other repositories
Send IKE - Ask for Keys
Selected Decrypted Content
CA Resources
NSA Net
Full take IKE metadata to TOYGRIPPE
PRESSUREWAVE
METROTUBE Analytic
TOYGRIPPE
```
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
Information Technology Directorate (ITD)
## TURBULENCE APEX VPN Exploitation
```
HAMMERSTEIN
Key exchange
Encrypted Data
Unwrapper
Metadata Extractor
Decrypt
TURMOIL apps
IKE Full take Metadata
To other repositories
TAO Wrapped Exfil with TAO metadata
Ask for Keys
Selected Decrypted Content
NSA Net
CA Resources
PRESSUREWAVE
METROTUBE Analytic
TOYGRIPPE
Full take IKE metadata to TOYGRIPPE
```
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
Information Technology Directorate (ITD)
## Sounds great, but...
* Now app streams (VoIP, webmail, etc) extracted from the tunnel carry two case notations
* Which gets put into metadata records?
* Both can be carried to PWV – but what happens after that?
* Not to mention...
* Metadata records about VPN being stored in TOYGRIPPE
* CES database storing IKE exchange
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
Information Technology Directorate (ITD)
## Example: TOYGRIPPE metadata record
* Current fields:
* caseNotation - searchable field
* sourceID – "The SIGAD of the site that provided the data"
* APEX proposed extension: add
* Agent CaseNotation
* Agent ID (UUID)
* Passive CaseNotation
* Which caseNotation goes into searchable field?
* Passive records won't have the APEX block
* TAO-collected records (returned via TAO, not passive) won't have the APEX block
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
Information Technology Directorate (ITD)
## APEX VOIP Exploitation
```
HAMMERCHANT
Strong select
VoIP Signaling
VoIP Content
Targeted VoIP Content
Unwrapper
Turmoil
APEX Packet Bundler
Exfilled content w. TAO metadata And TURMOIL metadata
NSA Net
FASCIA record
FASCIA
TAO Wrapped Exfil of targeted VoIP
Voice Processing
Voice Repository
PRESSUREWAVE
METROTUBE APEX VoIP Analytic
Voice Processing
CONVEYANCE
Voice Repository
NUCLEON
```
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
Information Technology Directorate (ITD)
## Shaping is happening now
* Operational (or coming soon) shaping:
* HAMMERSTONE - TCP traffic to FORNSAT, soon SSO
* No TURMOIL involvement
* BRAVENICKEL - one operational flow – past SSO site
* APEX – VPN metadata by end of June
* Independent decisions being made about how to stuff the double metadata into legacy databases
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
Information Technology Directorate (ITD)
## So what is your job here?
* How do you want to identify the source of your data?
* Does CaseNotation still make sense in this new world?
* You need to drive processes, systems, & databases toward a CONSISTENT answer
* Transformed systems and tools (METAWAVE, Marina, etc.) need to be designed to do more than accommodate
* do "the right thing" (whatever you the analysts think that is)
* Let me guess – you want everything, don't you?
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
---
Information Technology Directorate (ITD)
## Questions?
Information Technology Directorate (ITD)