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{
"title": "Analytic Challenges from Active-Passive Integration",
"type": "REPORTED",
"description": "This NSA briefing addresses the technical and administrative friction caused by \"shaping\" operations. Shaping occurs when an active malware implant, typically situated on network infrastructure like a router, copies specific data streams and redirects them past a passive surveillance sensor such as TURMOIL. While this ensures the capture of data that might otherwise be missed, it creates a \"double metadata\" conflict where a single piece of intelligence carries two competing sets of identifiers: one from the active Tailored Access Operations (TAO) implant and another from the passive collection site. The document tasks analysts with finding a way to reconcile these source notations to ensure the data remains searchable and legally compliant within legacy databases.",
"long_description": "The briefing defines \"shaping\" as a strategic maneuver where an active implant copies traffic and directs it past a passive collector, particularly when the collector is already processing other passive traffic. This is currently executed at the network infrastructure level rather than on individual user endpoints. The document distinguishes between two primary methods of shaping. Physical or link-layer shaping, exemplified by the BRAVENICKEL project, involves copying an entire optical link without initial selection, leaving the filtering to the passive midpoint. Conversely, network-layer shaping, such as APEX for HAMMERMILL, involves targeted copying based on specific IP or application parameters. In these cases, the exfiltrated data is often \"munged\" or encrypted to mask the surveillance activity from the network owner.\n\nA significant portion of the briefing focuses on the exploitation of encrypted communications, specifically IPsec VPNs. The process begins with the TURMOIL passive capability detecting the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) and the subsequent Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP). If the agency’s cryptanalytic resources can provide the necessary keys in a timely manner, the encrypted traffic is \"unwrapped\" and decrypted. The resulting cleartext is then fed back into the TURBULENCE pipeline for standard processing, such as scanning for webmail or VoIP content. Projects like HAMMERSTEIN and HAMMERCHANT facilitate this by performing \"strong selection\" at the router level and bundling the exfiltrated content with specialized metadata.\n\nThe integration of these active and passive streams creates an \"Analytic Challenge\" for users like \"Jane the Analyst.\" Every intercept in the NSA system must be tagged with a Case Notation, a Source ID (SIGAD), and a legal authority. Because the active and passive systems each generate their own distinct sets of these markers, legacy backend repositories like TOYGRIPPE and NUCLEON—which were designed for single-source data—often struggle to process both. The document proposes extending metadata fields to accommodate \"Agent CaseNotation\" and \"Passive CaseNotation,\" but warns that inconsistent implementation across the enterprise could lead to data loss or legal tracking errors.\n\nUltimately, the briefing serves as a call to action for the Information Technology Directorate (ITD) and the analyst community. It notes that shaping operations like HAMMERSTONE and BRAVENICKEL are already operational, and that independent, uncoordinated decisions regarding how to \"stuff\" double metadata into old databases are creating systemic risks. Analysts are urged to drive a consistent enterprise solution for identifying data sources, emphasizing that the transformation of tools like METAWAVE and MARINA must prioritize the needs of the analysts who require a unified, transparent view of the \"converged\" data.",
"tags": [
"traffic shaping",
"shaping",
"Tailored Access Operations",
"VPN exploitation",
"VPNs",
"IKE",
"ESP",
"VoIP exploitation",
"cryptanalysis",
"case notation",
"SIGAD",
"PDDG",
"Computer Network Exploitation",
"metadata tagging",
"implants",
"malware",
"data exfiltration",
"SSO",
"network infrastructure",
"router exploitation",
"routers",
"traffic redirection",
"deep packet inspection",
"packet unwrapping",
"target development",
"network attack",
"link layer attacks",
"optical multiplexer",
"metadata repositories",
"surveillance architecture"
],
"document": {
"creator": "NSA",
"date_created": "",
"classification": [
"TOP SECRET",
"COMINT"
],
"dissemination": [
"REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL"
],
"banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20320108",
"genre": "slides",
"programs": [
"BRAVENICKEL",
"HAMMERMILL",
"APEX",
"TURMOIL",
"HAMMERSTONE",
"PRESSUREWAVE",
"METROTUBE",
"TOYGRIPPE",
"TURBULENCE",
"METAWAVE",
"MARINA",
"SSO",
"CONVEYANCE",
"NUCLEON",
"FASCIA",
"HAMMERCHANT",
"TOYGRIPPE"
],
"countries": [],
"people": []
},
"publication": [
{
"publisher": "Der Spiegel",
"date_published": "2014-12-28",
"title": "Prying Eyes: Inside the NSA's War on Internet Security",
"link": "https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/inside-the-nsa-s-war-on-internet-security-a-1010361.html",
"reporters": [
"Appelbaum, Jacob",
"Gibson, Aaron",
"Grothoff, Christian",
"Müller-Maguhn, Andy",
"Poitras, Laura",
"Sontheimer, Michael",
"Stöcker, Christian"
],
"contributors": [],
"doc_url": "https://cdn.prod.www.spiegel.de/media/cc118888-0001-0014-0000-000000035516/media-35516.pdf"
}
],
"aka_id": [],
"archive_comment": "Der Spiegel published this presentation in near-identical form in January 2015; only a few slides differ.\nmedia_35672_Explanation_of_APEX_shaping_to_put_exfiltrating_network_traffic_into_patterns_that_allow_plausible_deniability",
"pdf_sha256": "bb46dc0b004707c4905d52940e4e3a8e9867a478df036c384cfbbc96b9809613"
}