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data/spiegel_-_media-35516/spiegel_-_media-35516.md
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20320108
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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This Briefing is Classified TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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# Analytic Challenges from Active-Passive Integration
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[REDACTED], S324
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This Briefing is Classified TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA,FVEY
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DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSS Manual 1-52, Dated: 20070108, Declassify On: 20320108
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Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
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Dated: 20070108
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Declassify On: 20320108
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20320108
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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Information Technology Directorate (ITD)
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## Define shaping, please?
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* Working definition: Active implant copies traffic and directs a copy past a passive collector
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* Issues arise when collector is also processing passive traffic simultaneously
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* Current: Implants on network infrastructure devices, not user endpoints
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* Two types:
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* Physical/link layer:
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* an implant copies and shapes an entire link (E1, STM1) without selection; passive midpoint does selection
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* Network layer:
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* an implant performs targeted copying based on IP or application parameters and exfils only the targeted traffic; passive collector may or may not do further selection.
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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----
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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Information Technology Directorate (ITD)
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## Examples
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* Link layer: BRAVENICKEL project (optical Muxes)
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* Copied link is not disguised, just routed on an unused layer 2 path that a passive collector can monitor
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* Selection happens in the passive collector
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* Network layer: APEX for HAMMERMILL (routers)
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* Router is tasked to select and exfil targeted traffic (perhaps all of a particular protocol)
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* Exfil is disguised ("munged", encrypted) to avoid detection
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* Passive collector looks for IP source/destination address in order to detect the traffic
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* If further selection/processing is to be done in collector, the exfil must be "unwrapped" (unmunged, decrypted)
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* Exfil can be directed to passive or to TAO by changing the destination address
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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Information Technology Directorate (ITD)
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## So Why does Jane the Analyst care?
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* TAO implants have collection parameters that are put on exfil received thru TAO backend
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* case notation, SIGAD, PDDG, classification/legal authority
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* The passive collector has another set of these:
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* Site has a SIGAD, collector has a PDDG, the link it sees the traffic on has a case notation, and the access has a classification floor/legal authority
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* Current backend repositories and presenters weren't designed to expect TWO of these!!!
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* Which gets put on the data??? And where?
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* And (drum roll) ... how do we solve this problem CONSISTENTLY across the enterprise?
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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Information Technology Directorate (ITD)
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## Example: APEX IPSEC VPN collection
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* IPSEC VPN:
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* First packets between the devices establish the parameters and encryption keys (IKE)
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* Following this setup, "content" packets are encrypted and transmitted packet by packet (ESP)
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* CES wants the IKE exchange and maybe the ESP (content)
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* TURMOIL passive capability:
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* Passive capability to detect IKE and ESP
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* Metadata record produced for every IKE exchange
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* IKE for targeted VPN forwarded directly to CES database
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* For targeted VPN, real-time decryption is performed IF CES can provide a key in time
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* Decrypted IP traffic is processed by TURMOIL apps for normal selection (VoIP, webmail, etc, etc)
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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Information Technology Directorate (ITD)
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## TURBULENCE Pre-APEX VPN Exploitation
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```
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TURMOIL intercepts link
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Key exchange
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Encrypted Data
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Turmoil
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Metadata Extractor
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ESP Decrypt
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TURMOIL apps
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IKE Full take Metadata
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App metadata
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App metadata & content to other repositories
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Send IKE - Ask for Keys
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Selected Decrypted Content
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CA Resources
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NSA Net
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Full take IKE metadata to TOYGRIPPE
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PRESSUREWAVE
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METROTUBE Analytic
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TOYGRIPPE
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```
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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Information Technology Directorate (ITD)
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## TURBULENCE Pre-APEX VPN Exploitation
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```
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TURMOIL intercepts link
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Key exchange
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Encrypted Data
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Turmoil
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Metadata Extractor
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ESP Decrypt
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TURMOIL apps
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IKE Full take Metadata
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App metadata
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App metadata & content to other repositories
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Send IKE - Ask for Keys
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Selected Decrypted Content
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CA Resources
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NSA Net
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Full take IKE metadata to TOYGRIPPE
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PRESSUREWAVE
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METROTUBE Analytic
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TOYGRIPPE
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```
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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Information Technology Directorate (ITD)
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## TURBULENCE APEX VPN Exploitation
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```
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HAMMERSTEIN
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Key exchange
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Encrypted Data
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Unwrapper
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Metadata Extractor
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Decrypt
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TURMOIL apps
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IKE Full take Metadata
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To other repositories
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TAO Wrapped Exfil with TAO metadata
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Ask for Keys
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Selected Decrypted Content
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NSA Net
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CA Resources
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PRESSUREWAVE
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METROTUBE Analytic
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TOYGRIPPE
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Full take IKE metadata to TOYGRIPPE
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```
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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Information Technology Directorate (ITD)
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## Sounds great, but...
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* Now app streams (VoIP, webmail, etc) extracted from the tunnel carry two case notations
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* Which gets put into metadata records?
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* Both can be carried to PWV – but what happens after that?
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* Not to mention...
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* Metadata records about VPN being stored in TOYGRIPPE
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* CES database storing IKE exchange
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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Information Technology Directorate (ITD)
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## Example: TOYGRIPPE metadata record
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* Current fields:
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* caseNotation - searchable field
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* sourceID – "The SIGAD of the site that provided the data"
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* APEX proposed extension: add
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* Agent CaseNotation
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* Agent ID (UUID)
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* Passive CaseNotation
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* Which caseNotation goes into searchable field?
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* Passive records won't have the APEX block
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* TAO-collected records (returned via TAO, not passive) won't have the APEX block
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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Information Technology Directorate (ITD)
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## APEX VOIP Exploitation
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```
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HAMMERCHANT
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Strong select
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VoIP Signaling
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VoIP Content
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Targeted VoIP Content
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Unwrapper
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Turmoil
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APEX Packet Bundler
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Exfilled content w. TAO metadata And TURMOIL metadata
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NSA Net
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FASCIA record
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FASCIA
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TAO Wrapped Exfil of targeted VoIP
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Voice Processing
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Voice Repository
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PRESSUREWAVE
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METROTUBE APEX VoIP Analytic
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Voice Processing
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CONVEYANCE
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Voice Repository
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NUCLEON
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```
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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Information Technology Directorate (ITD)
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## Shaping is happening now
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* Operational (or coming soon) shaping:
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* HAMMERSTONE - TCP traffic to FORNSAT, soon SSO
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* No TURMOIL involvement
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* BRAVENICKEL - one operational flow – past SSO site
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* APEX – VPN metadata by end of June
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* Independent decisions being made about how to stuff the double metadata into legacy databases
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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Information Technology Directorate (ITD)
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## So what is your job here?
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* How do you want to identify the source of your data?
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* Does CaseNotation still make sense in this new world?
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* You need to drive processes, systems, & databases toward a CONSISTENT answer
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* Transformed systems and tools (METAWAVE, Marina, etc.) need to be designed to do more than accommodate
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* do "the right thing" (whatever you the analysts think that is)
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* Let me guess – you want everything, don't you?
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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---
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Information Technology Directorate (ITD)
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## Questions?
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Information Technology Directorate (ITD)
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