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data/spiegel_-_media-35521/spiegel_-_media-35521.md
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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NETWORK EXPLOITATION
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|
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# PROFILING SSL AND ATTRIBUTING PRIVATE NETWORKS
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## An introduction to FLYING PIG and HUSH PUPPY
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|
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[REDACTED]
|
||||
|
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ICTR - Network Exploitation
|
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GCHQ
|
||||
|
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
TR
|
||||
|
||||
THIS INFORMATION IS EXEMPT UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 (FOIA) AND MAY BE EXEMPT UNDER OTHER UK INFORMATION LEGISLATION. REFER ANY FOIA QUERIES TO GCHQ ON [REDACTED]
|
||||
CONTAINS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNED AND/OR MANAGED BY GCHQ. THE MATERIAL MAY BE DISSEMINATED THROUGHOUT THE RECIPIENT ORGANISATION, BUT GCHQ PERMISSION MUST BE OBTAINED FOR DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE THE ORGANISATION.
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|
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GCHQ
|
||||
|
||||
---
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|
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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|
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## Outline
|
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|
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- Two separate prototypes – FLYING PIG and HUSH PUPPY
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- Both are cloud analytics which work on bulk unselected data
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- FLYING PIG is a knowledge base for investigating TLS/SSL traffic
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- HUSH PUPPY is a tool for attributing private network traffic
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|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
THIS INFORMATION IS EXEMPT UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 (FOIA) AND MAY BE EXEMPT UNDER OTHER UK INFORMATION LEGISLATION. REFER ANY FOIA QUERIES TO GCHQ ON [REDACTED]
|
||||
CONTAINS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNED AND/OR MANAGED BY GCHQ. THE MATERIAL MAY BE DISSEMINATED THROUGHOUT THE RECIPIENT ORGANISATION, BUT GCHQ PERMISSION MUST BE OBTAINED FOR DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE THE ORGANISATION.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## FLYING PIG - TLS/SSL Background
|
||||
|
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- TLS/SSL (Transport Layer Security / Secure Sockets Layer) provides encrypted communication over the internet
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- Simple TLS/SSL handshake:
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|
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```
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Client Server
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------ Client hello ---------->
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<----- Server hello -----------
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<----- Certificate ------------
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<----- Server hello done ----->
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------ Client key exchange --->
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------ Change cipher spec ---->
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||||
------ Handshake finished ---->
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<----- Change cipher spec -----
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<----- Handshake finished -----
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<----- Application data ------>
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```
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
THIS INFORMATION IS EXEMPT UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 (FOIA) AND MAY BE EXEMPT UNDER OTHER UK INFORMATION LEGISLATION. REFER ANY FOIA QUERIES TO GCHQ ON [REDACTED]
|
||||
CONTAINS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNED AND/OR MANAGED BY GCHQ. THE MATERIAL MAY BE DISSEMINATED THROUGHOUT THE RECIPIENT ORGANISATION, BUT GCHQ PERMISSION MUST BE OBTAINED FOR DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE THE ORGANISATION.
|
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|
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---
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|
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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|
||||
## Motivations for FLYING PIG
|
||||
|
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- More and more services used by GCHQ targets are moving to TLS/SSL to increase user confidence, e.g. Hotmail, Yahoo, Gmail, etc.
|
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- Terrorists and cyber criminals are common users of TLS/SSL to hide their comms (not necessarily using the big providers).
|
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- A TLS/SSL knowledge base could provide a means to extract as much information from the unencrypted traffic as possible.
|
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|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
THIS INFORMATION IS EXEMPT UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 (FOIA) AND MAY BE EXEMPT UNDER OTHER UK INFORMATION LEGISLATION. REFER ANY FOIA QUERIES TO GCHQ ON [REDACTED]
|
||||
CONTAINS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNED AND/OR MANAGED BY GCHQ. THE MATERIAL MAY BE DISSEMINATED THROUGHOUT THE RECIPIENT ORGANISATION, BUT GCHQ PERMISSION MUST BE OBTAINED FOR DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE THE ORGANISATION.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## FLYING PIG implementation
|
||||
|
||||
* Federated QFD approach
|
||||
- Multiple separate cloud analytics, each of which produce a QFD (Query Focussed Dataset).
|
||||
- Analytics are run once a week, on approximately 20 billion events.
|
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- A single query in the web interface results in calls to multiple QFDs, which are returned to the user in separate panels.
|
||||
- Results in:
|
||||
(a) fast queries,
|
||||
(b) easy-to-maintain modular code, and importantly
|
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(c) easy to add future TLS/SSL QFDs.
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
THIS INFORMATION IS EXEMPT UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 (FOIA) AND MAY BE EXEMPT UNDER OTHER UK INFORMATION LEGISLATION. REFER ANY FOIA QUERIES TO GCHQ ON [REDACTED]
|
||||
CONTAINS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNED AND/OR MANAGED BY GCHQ. THE MATERIAL MAY BE DISSEMINATED THROUGHOUT THE RECIPIENT ORGANISATION, BUT GCHQ PERMISSION MUST BE OBTAINED FOR DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE THE ORGANISATION.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## Query by certificate metadata
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
FLYING PIG
|
||||
TLS/SSL KNOWLEDGE BASE
|
||||
|
||||
HRA Justification | Query FLYING PIG - general SSL toolkit Query QUICK ANT - Tor events QFD
|
||||
Prototype owner: [REDACTED] ICTR-NE
|
||||
|
||||
Query FLYING PIG
|
||||
IP/network/certificate field: %mail.ru
|
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Query as:
|
||||
Client IP Server IP Both
|
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or: Network [e.g. 1.2.3.0/24]
|
||||
or: Server Certificate [e.g. %example.com (use % for wildcards)]
|
||||
|
||||
Server certificate fields to search within:
|
||||
Subject common name
|
||||
Subject organisation name
|
||||
Issuer common name
|
||||
Issuer organisation name
|
||||
RSA modulus
|
||||
|
||||
Run Query!
|
||||
|
||||
Certificate field search: %mail.ru
|
||||
All HTTP requests matching your query (?)
|
||||
|
||||
1-5 of 500 items
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
| Server IP | Host name | First seen | Last seen | Count w/e 25th Nov | Count all time |
|
||||
| :-------- | :---------------------------- | :-------------------- | :-------------------- | :----------------- | :------------- |
|
||||
| 184.105 | swa.mail.ru | 2011-10-13 16:05:53.0 | 2011-11-25 21:11:59.0 | 6085663 | 42640739 |
|
||||
| 184.104 | swa.mail.ru | 2011-10-13 17:29:18.0 | 2011-11-25 21:11:55.0 | 6073183 | 36825411 |
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||||
| 134.201 | fc.ef.d4.cf.bd.a1.top.mail.ru | 2011-10-13 21:43:10.0 | 2011-11-25 21:10:49.0 | 4049743 | 19360920 |
|
||||
| 135.13 | top5.mail.ru | 2011-10-14 20:00:00.0 | 2011-11-25 21:12:05.0 | 3006868 | 14168963 |
|
||||
| 135.12 | top3.mail.ru | 2011-10-14 20:00:00.0 | 2011-11-25 21:10:48.0 | 2480950 | 12386999 |
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
All certificates matching your query (?)
|
||||
Tip 1: Right click on a row to find all server IPs that serve that certificate!
|
||||
Tip 2: Click on the disk icon in the title bar to download data in CSV format!
|
||||
Tip 3: Double-click on a field to enable copy and paste!
|
||||
Tip 4: Change displayed columns ('Basic' is default; 'Advanced' adds RSA Modulus and cipher suite distribution columns): Basic columns Advanced columns
|
||||
|
||||
1-10 of 70 items 10 | 25 | 50 | 100 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
| Full Certificate | First seen | Last seen | Count w/e 25th Nov | Count all time | Valid from | Valid to | Subject common name | Subject country | Subject org name | Issuer common name | Issuer country | Issuer org name | Self signed |
|
||||
| :---------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------ | :----------------- | :------------- | :------------------ | :------------------ | :------------------ | :-------------- | :--------------- | :----------------------- | :------------- | :------------------- | :---------- |
|
||||
| 308203CD308212011-09-22 | 2011-09-22 13:17:32 | 2011-11-25 19:01:59 | 2952729 | 16638958 | 2011-01-31 00:00:00 | 2012-03-27 23:59:59 | \*.mail.ru | ru | llc mail.ru | thawte ssl ca | us | thawte, inc. | N |
|
||||
| 308203613082(2011-09-22 | 2011-09-22 14:05:50 | 2011-11-25 15:40:05 | 249926 | 1085232 | 2010-01-21 00:00:00 | 2011-02-20 23:59:59 | \*.mail.ru | ru | llc mail.ru | thawte premium server ca | za | thawte consulting cc | N |
|
||||
| 308203D33082(2011-10-07 | 2011-10-07 20:29:55 | 2011-11-25 18:53:40 | 10059 | 30520 | 2011-09-25 00:00:00 | 2013-11-23 23:59:59 | \*.money.mail.ru | ru | llc mail.ru | thawte ssl ca | us | thawte, inc. | N |
|
||||
| 308203513082(2011-09-23 | 2011-09-23 17:01:58 | 2011-11-25 15:42:05 | 976 | 8517 | 2010-01-25 18:12:59 | 2012-01-27 18:12:59 | mail.ru.is | is | mail.ru.is | equifax | us | equifax | N |
|
||||
| 308202083082(2011-08-22 | 2011-08-22 08:14:21 | 2011-09-06 06:15:36 | 0 | 1482 | 2011-03-04 06:42:12 | 2012-03-03 06:42:12 | mail.ru-sib.ru | us | mail.ru-sib.ru | | us | | Y |
|
||||
| 308204383082(2011-10-17 | 2011-10-17 14:09:52 | 2011-11-25 18:50:10 | 22 | 1236 | 2011-05-27 00:00:00 | 2012-07-25 23:59:59 | mail.ru-com.ru | | mail.ru-com.ru | thawte dv ssl ca | us | thawte, inc. | N |
|
||||
| 308203043082(2011-10-08 | 2011-10-08 00:05:24 | 2011-11-25 17:04:02 | 301 | 1150 | 2010-02-13 14:19:06 | 2012-11-08 14:19:06 | mx1.shogo-mail.ru | ru | shogo | shogo.ru | ru | shogo | N |
|
||||
| 308204153082(2011-11-01 | 2011-11-01 07:36:53 | 2011-11-25 14:26:29 | 246 | 693 | 2011-09-15 11:47:51 | 2012-09-14 11:47:51 | limgs.mail.ru | ru | isp.cegedim.fr | cegedim | fr | cegedim | N |
|
||||
| 308202E43082(2011-10-14 | 2011-10-14 08:07:34 | 2011-11-21 18:20:34 | 201 | 306 | 2011-10-05 08:07:34 | 2014-10-04 08:07:34 | moder.foto.mail.ru | ru | mail.ru | moder.foto.mail.ru | ru | mail.ru | Y |
|
||||
| 308204153082(2011-10-31 | 2011-10-31 15:45:50 | 2011-11-25 05:13:34 | 99 | 259 | 2011-09-15 11:47:51 | 2012-09-14 11:47:51 | auth.mail.ru | ru | isp.cegedim.fr | cegedim | fr | cegedim | N |
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Server IPs (?):
|
||||
Tip 1: Right click on a server IP to explore it further!
|
||||
|
||||
1-25 of 500 items
|
||||
|
||||
Explore this server IP further!
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
| Server IP | Cert count w/e 25th Nov | Cert count all time |
|
||||
| :-------- | :---------------------- | :------------------ |
|
||||
| 177.1 | 333592 | 1052618 |
|
||||
| 191.213 | 330212 | 1388617 |
|
||||
| 184.16 | 308599 | 2496916 |
|
||||
| 184.17 | 297282 | 2226133 |
|
||||
| 184.15 | 294437 | 2395012 |
|
||||
| 189.160 | 168414 | 659037 |
|
||||
| 184.77 | 120533 | 560336 |
|
||||
| 184.98 | 113555 | 515169 |
|
||||
| 184.74 | 113555 | 515169 |
|
||||
| 184.75 | 112574 | 538512 |
|
||||
| 184.76 | 110325 | 690098 |
|
||||
| 135.55 | 3779 | 6023 |
|
||||
| 135.56 | 3740 | 7358 |
|
||||
| 134.151 | 3564 | 8498 |
|
||||
| 63.121 | 2532 | 4887 |
|
||||
| 136.43 | 2523 | 9226 |
|
||||
| 134.98 | 2360 | 9165 |
|
||||
| 179.89 | 2227 | 7600 |
|
||||
| 179.90 | 2051 | 7320 |
|
||||
| 136.84 | 1981 | 8442 |
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
THIS INFORMATION IS EXEMPT UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 (FOIA) AND MAY BE EXEMPT UNDER OTHER UK INFORMATION LEGISLATION. REFER ANY FOIA QUERIES TO GCHQ ON [REDACTED]
|
||||
CONTAINS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNED AND/OR MANAGED BY GCHQ. THE MATERIAL MAY BE DISSEMINATED THROUGHOUT THE RECIPIENT ORGANISATION, BUT GCHQ PERMISSION MUST BE OBTAINED FOR DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE THE ORGANISATION.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## Query by server IP
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
FLYING PIG
|
||||
TLS/SSL KNOWLEDGE BASE
|
||||
|
||||
HRA Justification | Query FLYING PIG - general SSL toolkit | Query QUICK ANT - Tor events QFD
|
||||
|
||||
Prototype owner: [REDACTED] ICTR-NE
|
||||
|
||||
Query FLYING PIG
|
||||
IP/network/certificate field: [REDACTED]184.14
|
||||
Query as:
|
||||
Client IP Server IP Both
|
||||
or: Network [e.g. 1.2.3.0/24]
|
||||
or: Server Certificate [e.g. %example.com (use % for wildcards)]
|
||||
|
||||
General IP info:
|
||||
Top 10 SSL client geos
|
||||
Top 10 SSL server ports
|
||||
Top 10 SSL case notations
|
||||
SSL Traffic stats
|
||||
|
||||
Server IP-specific panels:
|
||||
SSL Server certificates seen on this IP
|
||||
SSL Pattern of life
|
||||
HTTP requests to this IP
|
||||
Top 100 SSL clients
|
||||
|
||||
Run Query!
|
||||
|
||||
Certificate field search: %mail.ru
|
||||
General IP info for server IP: [REDACTED]184.14
|
||||
|
||||
Geolocation (?):
|
||||
Country: RU (M)
|
||||
City: MOSCOW (L)
|
||||
WHOIS info (?):
|
||||
Network: [REDACTED]76.0/20. Network type: No results.
|
||||
Company: Mail.Ru. Domain: mail.ru.
|
||||
AS info (?):
|
||||
Advertised by AS: 47764. Found within network: [REDACTED]76.0/20.
|
||||
AS name: MAILRU-AS Limited liability company Mail.Ru.
|
||||
|
||||
DNS (?): No results
|
||||
Tor node (?): No matches
|
||||
|
||||
Top 10 SSL client geos (?)
|
||||
Top 10 SSL server ports (?)
|
||||
Top 10 SSL case notations (?)
|
||||
|
||||
SSL Traffic stats (?):
|
||||
For week ending 2011-12-23:
|
||||
No. unique clients = 104317.
|
||||
% client-server IPs with traffic seen in both directions = 14.7%.
|
||||
|
||||
- Unique clients with client-server traffic only
|
||||
- Unique clients with server-client traffic only
|
||||
- Unique clients with bidirectional traffic
|
||||
|
||||
SSL Certificates seen on this IP (?)
|
||||
Tip 1: Right click on a certificate to explore it further!
|
||||
1-3 of 3 items 10 | 25 | 50 | 100 1
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
| First seen on this IP | Last seen on this IP | Count w/e 25th Nov | Count all time | Valid from | Valid to | Subject common name | Issuer common name |
|
||||
| :-------------------- | :------------------- | :----------------- | :------------- | :------------------ | :------------------ | :------------------ | :-------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| 2011-09-22 13:31:06 | 2011-11-25 19:01:47 | 357643 | 2359179 | 2011-01-31 00:00:00 | 2012-03-27 23:59:59 | *.mail.ru | thawte ssl ca |
|
||||
| 2011-08-08 12:23:45 | 2011-11-25 07:50:07 | 1441 | 1447304 | 2011-01-31 00:00:00 | 2012-03-27 23:59:59 | *.mail.ru | thawte ssl ca |
|
||||
| 2011-11-16 14:13:03 | 2011-11-16 14:13:03 | 0 | 1 | 2011-08-05 18:34:19 | 2014-08-05 18:34:19 | *.vkontakte.ru | go daddy secure certification authority |
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Average pattern of life for a client (seeded around SSL events to this server IP) (?)
|
||||
Tip 1: Filter by min. % occurrences of event: 1% Apply filtering
|
||||
1 - 8 of 233 items 10 | 25 | 50 | 100 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
| Correlated event | Event IP | Event port | Percentage occurrences of event |
|
||||
| -------------------------------------- | ---------------- | ---------- | ------------------------------- |
|
||||
| GET request to top3.mail.ru | [REDACTED]35.12 | 80 | 28.1 |
|
||||
| GET request to top5.mail.ru | [REDACTED]35.13 | 80 | 15.1 |
|
||||
| GET request to d0.c1.bf.a1.top.mail.ru | [REDACTED]34.253 | 80 | 14.2 |
|
||||
| GET request to my.mail.ru | [REDACTED]84.40 | 80 | 13.2 |
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
HTTP requests to this IP (top 100) (?)
|
||||
Tip 1: Right click on a server IP to explore it as an SSL server!
|
||||
1-10 of 226 items 10 | 25 | 50 | 100 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
| Server IP | Host name requested | First seen | Last seen | Count last week | Count all time |
|
||||
| --------------- | ------------------- | ---------- | ---------- | --------------- | -------------- |
|
||||
| [REDACTED]84.14 | e.mail.ru | 2011-10-14 | 2011-11-25 | 1989215 | 13992636 |
|
||||
| [REDACTED]84.14 | m.mail.ru | 2011-10-14 | 2011-11-25 | 89268 | 664189 |
|
||||
| [REDACTED]84.14 | [REDACTED]184.14 | 2011-10-14 | 2011-11-25 | 17426 | 108536 |
|
||||
| [REDACTED]84.14 | auth.mail.ru | 2011-10-14 | 2011-11-25 | 11738 | 70020 |
|
||||
| [REDACTED]84.14 | tel.mail.ru | 2011-10-14 | 2011-11-25 | 8994 | 65540 |
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
THIS INFORMATION IS EXEMPT UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 (FOIA) AND MAY BE EXEMPT UNDER OTHER UK INFORMATION LEGISLATION. REFER ANY FOIA QUERIES TO GCHQ ON [REDACTED]
|
||||
CONTAINS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNED AND/OR MANAGED BY GCHQ. THE MATERIAL MAY BE DISSEMINATED THROUGHOUT THE RECIPIENT ORGANISATION, BUT GCHQ PERMISSION MUST BE OBTAINED FOR DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE THE ORGANISATION.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## Query by server IP
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
FLYING PIG
|
||||
TLS/SSL KNOWLEDGE BASE
|
||||
|
||||
HRA Justification | Query FLYING PIG - general SSL toolkit | Query QUICK ANT - Tor events QFD
|
||||
|
||||
Prototype owner: [REDACTED]ICTR-NE
|
||||
|
||||
Query FLYING PIG
|
||||
IP/network/certificate fiel: [REDACTED]84.14
|
||||
Query as:
|
||||
Client IP Server IP Both
|
||||
or: Network [e.g. 1.2.3.0/24]
|
||||
or: Server Certificate [e.g. %example.com (use % for wildcards)]
|
||||
|
||||
General IP info:
|
||||
Top 10 SSL client geos
|
||||
Top 10 SSL server ports
|
||||
Top 10 SSL case notations
|
||||
SSL Traffic stats
|
||||
|
||||
Server IP-specific panels:
|
||||
SSL Server certificates seen on this IP
|
||||
SSL Pattern of life
|
||||
HTTP requests to this IP
|
||||
Top 100 SSL clients
|
||||
|
||||
Run Query!
|
||||
|
||||
Certificate field search: %mail.ru
|
||||
Server: [REDACTED].184.14 (?)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
| | | | |
|
||||
| -------------------------------------- | ----------------- | --- | ---- |
|
||||
| GET request to top3.mail.ru | [REDACTED]135.12 | 80 | 28.1 |
|
||||
| GET request to top5.mail.ru | [REDACTED]135.13 | 80 | 15.1 |
|
||||
| GET request to d0.c1.bf.a1.top.mail.ru | [REDACTED]134.253 | 80 | 14.2 |
|
||||
| GET request to my.mail.ru | [REDACTED]184.40 | 80 | 13.2 |
|
||||
| GET request to my.mail.ru | [REDACTED]184.41 | 80 | 12.9 |
|
||||
| GET request to stat.my.mail.ru | [REDACTED]184.40 | 80 | 10.8 |
|
||||
| GET request to stat.my.mail.ru | [REDACTED]184.41 | 80 | 10.5 |
|
||||
| GET request to mrimraker1.mail.ru | [REDACTED]189.183 | 80 | 10.4 |
|
||||
|
||||
| | | | | | |
|
||||
| ---------------- | ------------- | ---------- | ---------- | ----- | ------ |
|
||||
| [REDACTED]184.14 | m.mail.ru | 2011-10-14 | 2011-11-25 | 89268 | 664189 |
|
||||
| [REDACTED]184.14 | 94.100.184.14 | 2011-10-14 | 2011-11-25 | 17426 | 108536 |
|
||||
| [REDACTED]184.14 | auth.mail.ru | 2011-10-14 | 2011-11-25 | 11738 | 70020 |
|
||||
| [REDACTED]184.14 | tel.mail.ru | 2011-10-14 | 2011-11-25 | 8994 | 65540 |
|
||||
| [REDACTED]184.14 | e. | 2011-10-15 | 2011-11-25 | 307 | 616 |
|
||||
| [REDACTED]184.14 | e.mai | 2011-10-14 | 2011-11-25 | 155 | 1101 |
|
||||
| [REDACTED]184.14 | e.mail. | 2011-10-14 | 2011-11-25 | 119 | 705 |
|
||||
| [REDACTED]184.14 | mail.ru | 2011-10-24 | 2011-11-23 | 110 | 367 |
|
||||
| [REDACTED]184.14 | e.m | 2011-10-15 | 2011-11-25 | 107 | 400 |
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Top 100 SSL clients of server: [REDACTED]84.14 (?)
|
||||
Tip 1: Filter by country of client IP (e.g. enter nothing to avoid filtering or PK,IR,IQ to filter by multiple countries): GB,US,CA,NZ,AU
|
||||
( ) Only show clients in these countries (o) Remove clients in these countries
|
||||
[x] Remove clients that also act as servers
|
||||
Number of results returned: 100
|
||||
Filter! RESET
|
||||
|
||||
Tip 2: Right click on a client or server IP to explore it further!
|
||||
1-20 of 100 items 10 | 25 | 50 | 100 1 2 3 4 5
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
| Client IP | Client country (conf) | Client company info (from GEOFUSION export) | First seen | Last seen | Count w/e 25th Nov | Count all time | Pairing status w/e 25th Nov | Pairing status all time |
|
||||
| :------------- | :-------------------- | :----------------------------------------------------- | :--------- | :--------- | :----------------- | :------------- | :-------------------------- | :---------------------- |
|
||||
| [REDACTED].212 | ES(V) | Telefonica_de_Espana_SAU; rima-tde.net | 2011-10-16 | 2011-11-19 | 1415 | 50136 | Server -> Client only | Both directions |
|
||||
| [REDACTED].139 | ES(H) | R_Cable_y_Telecomunicaciones_Galicia_S.A.; mundo-r.net | 2011-10-24 | 2011-11-25 | 424 | 726 | Client -> Server only | Client -> Server only |
|
||||
| [REDACTED].111 | DE(V) | Bertelsmann_ZI_GmbH; mediaways.net | 2011-11-23 | 2011-11-23 | 417 | 417 | Server -> Client only | Server -> Client only |
|
||||
| [REDACTED].56 | NO(V) | Telenor_Nextel_AS; telenor.net | 2011-11-21 | 2011-11-24 | 403 | 403 | Server -> Client only | Server -> Client only |
|
||||
| [REDACTED].38 | IE(V) | Vodafone_ISP; UNKNOWN | 2011-11-23 | 2011-11-23 | 330 | 330 | Both directions | Both directions |
|
||||
| [REDACTED].114 | DE(V) | Bertelsmann_ZI_GmbH; mediaways.net | 2011-11-23 | 2011-11-23 | 329 | 329 | Server -> Client only | Server -> Client only |
|
||||
| [REDACTED].127 | KR(M) | Korea_Telecor | 2011-09-04 | 2011-11-25 | 325 | 2266 | Both directions | Both directions |
|
||||
| [REDACTED].250 | (-)(-) | [REDACTED] | 2011-11-18 | 2011-11-18 | 296 | 296 | Both directions | Both directions |
|
||||
| [REDACTED].152 | EC(H) | Ecuadortelecom_S.A.; ecutel.net.ec | 2011-11-10 | 2011-11-25 | 290 | 291 | Both directions | Both directions |
|
||||
| [REDACTED].186 | IE(V) | Vodafone_ISP; UNKNOWN | 2011-11-20 | 2011-11-20 | 196 | 196 | Both directions | Both directions |
|
||||
| [REDACTED].9 | MY(H) | TMNET; holcim.net | 2011-09-03 | 2011-11-24 | 189 | 383 | Both directions | Both directions |
|
||||
| [REDACTED].153 | KR(M) | QRIXNET; UNKNOWN | 2011-10-20 | 2011-11-25 | 181 | 198 | Both directions | Both directions |
|
||||
| [REDACTED].53 | MY(H) | CORE_IP_DEVELOPMENT; dancom.com.my | 2011-11-19 | 2011-11-25 | 179 | 179 | Both directions | Both directions |
|
||||
| [REDACTED].121 | IR(V) | Static-Pool-TP3; pol.ir | 2011-11-21 | 2011-11-21 | 177 | 177 | Client -> Server only | Client -> Server only |
|
||||
| [REDACTED].41 | IE(V) | UTV_PLC; utvinternet.net | 2011-11-19 | 2011-11-20 | 167 | 167 | Both directions | Both directions |
|
||||
| [REDACTED].237 | KR(M) | KRNIC; ktcu.or.kr | 2011-09-03 | 2011-11-25 | 150 | 1007 | Both directions | Both directions |
|
||||
| [REDACTED].38 | BR(M) | Comite_Gestor_da_Internet_no_Brasil; ampernet.com | 2011-11-23 | 2011-11-25 | 145 | 145 | Server -> Client only | Server -> Client only |
|
||||
| [REDACTED].87 | KR(H) | Korea_Telecom; postman.co.kr | 2011-10-16 | 2011-11-25 | 143 | 161 | Both directions | Both directions |
|
||||
| [REDACTED].155 | KR(H) | Korea_Telecom; kornet.net | 2011-10-24 | 2011-11-24 | 138 | 583 | Both directions | Both directions |
|
||||
| [REDACTED].1 | IE(V) | Vodafone_ISP; UNKNOWN | 2011-11-18 | 2011-11-18 | 137 | 158 | Client -> Server only | Both directions |
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
THIS INFORMATION IS EXEMPT UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 (FOIA) AND MAY BE EXEMPT UNDER OTHER UK INFORMATION LEGISLATION. REFER ANY FOIA QUERIES TO GCHQ ON [REDACTED]
|
||||
CONTAINS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNED AND/OR MANAGED BY GCHQ. THE MATERIAL MAY BE DISSEMINATED THROUGHOUT THE RECIPIENT ORGANISATION, BUT GCHQ PERMISSION MUST BE OBTAINED FOR DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE THE ORGANISATION.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## Query by client IP
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
FLYING PIG
|
||||
TLS/SSL KNOWLEDGE BASE
|
||||
|
||||
HRA Justification | Query FLYING PIG - general SSL toolkit | Query QUICK ANT - Tor events QFD
|
||||
|
||||
Prototype owner: ICTR-NE
|
||||
|
||||
Query FLYING PIG
|
||||
IP/network/certificate field: [REDACTED].127
|
||||
Query as:
|
||||
Client IP Server IP Both
|
||||
or: Network [e.g. 1.2.3.0/24]
|
||||
or: Server Certificate [e.g. %example.com (use % for wildcards)]
|
||||
|
||||
Client IP-specific panels:
|
||||
General IP info
|
||||
SSL Servers visited
|
||||
|
||||
Run Query!
|
||||
|
||||
Certificate field search: %mail.ru
|
||||
Server IP: [REDACTED].184.14
|
||||
Client IP: [REDACTED].127
|
||||
|
||||
General IP info for client IP: [REDACTED].127
|
||||
Geolocation (?):
|
||||
Country: KR (M)
|
||||
City: SEOUL (L)
|
||||
WHOIS info (?):
|
||||
Network: [REDACTED].0/20. Network type: No results.
|
||||
Company: Korea Telecom. Domain: groupon.kr.
|
||||
AS info (?):
|
||||
Advertised by AS: 4766. Found within network: [REDACTED].0.0/13
|
||||
AS name: KIXS-AS-KR Korea Telecom.
|
||||
DNS (?): No results
|
||||
Tor node (?):
|
||||
|
||||
Top 100 SSL servers visited by [REDACTED].127 (?):
|
||||
Tip 1: Filter by country of server IP (e.g. enter PK to filter by Pakistan only or PK,IR,IQ to filter by multiple countries): Only show servers in these countries Remove servers in these countries RESET
|
||||
Tip 2: Right click on a client or server IP to explore it further!
|
||||
|
||||
1-8 of 8 items 10 | 25 | 50 | 100 1
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
| Client IP | Server IP | Server country (conf) | Server company info (from GEOFUSION export) | First seen | Last seen | Count w/e 25th Nov | Count all time | Pairing status w/e 25th Nov | Pairing status all time |
|
||||
| :------------- | :------------------ | :-------------------- | :------------------------------------------ | :---------------- | :---------------- | :----------------- | :------------- | :-------------------------- | :---------------------- |
|
||||
| [REDACTED].127 | [REDACTED]184.14 | RU(M) | Mail.Ru;mail.ru | 04-09-11 02:23:55 | 25-11-11 13:47:52 | 325 | 2266 | Both directions | Both directions |
|
||||
| [REDACTED].127 | [REDACTED]184.17 | RU(M) | Mail.Ru;mail.ru | 04-09-11 02:13:48 | 25-11-11 13:23:36 | 299 | 2207 | Both directions | Both directions |
|
||||
| [REDACTED].127 | [REDACTED]184.16 | RU(M) | Mail.Ru;mail.ru | 03-09-11 05:18:48 | 25-11-11 10:15:23 | 269 | 2240 | Both directions | Both directions |
|
||||
| [REDACTED].127 | [REDACTED]184.15 | RU(M) | Mail.Ru;mail.ru | 03-09-11 03:20:27 | 25-11-11 11:49:27 | 213 | 2354 | Both directions | Both directions |
|
||||
| [REDACTED].127 | [REDACTED]2.131.207 | DE(M) | BBBK91667, rapi | 14-11-11 02:39:15 | 14-11-11 02:39:15 | 0 | 1 | No traffic w/e 25th Nov | Client -> Server only |
|
||||
| [REDACTED].127 | [REDACTED]213.87 | NL(L) | Mozilla_Corporatio | 09-10-11 05:07:48 | 06-11-11 22:38:50 | 0 | 8 | No traffic w/e 25th Nov | Server -> Client only |
|
||||
| [REDACTED].127 | [REDACTED]181.127 | RU(M) | Mail.Ru;mail.ru | 16-10-11 19:05:16 | 13-11-11 21:31:31 | 0 | 13 | No traffic w/e 25th Nov | Client -> Server only |
|
||||
| [REDACTED].127 | [REDACTED]191.213 | RU(M) | Mail.Ru;mail.ru | 24-10-11 17:53:21 | 24-10-11 17:53:21 | 0 | 1 | No traffic w/e 25th Nov | Client -> Server only |
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
THIS INFORMATION IS EXEMPT UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 (FOIA) AND MAY BE EXEMPT UNDER OTHER UK INFORMATION LEGISLATION. REFER ANY FOIA QUERIES TO GCHQ ON [REDACTED]
|
||||
CONTAINS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNED AND/OR MANAGED BY GCHQ. THE MATERIAL MAY BE DISSEMINATED THROUGHOUT THE RECIPIENT ORGANISATION, BUT GCHQ PERMISSION MUST BE OBTAINED FOR DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE THE ORGANISATION.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## Query by network range
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
FLYING PIG
|
||||
TLS/SSL KNOWLEDGE BASE
|
||||
|
||||
HRA Justification | Query FLYING PIG - general SSL toolkit | Query QUICK ANT - Tor events QFD
|
||||
|
||||
Prototype owner: [REDACTED] ICTR-NE
|
||||
|
||||
Query FLYING PIG
|
||||
IP/network/certificate field: [REDACTED].0/24
|
||||
Query as:
|
||||
Client IP Server IP Both
|
||||
or: Network [e.g. 1.2.3.0/24]
|
||||
or: Server Certificate [e.g. %example.com (use % for wildcards)]
|
||||
|
||||
Network-specific panels:
|
||||
General network info
|
||||
SSL Clients present in network
|
||||
SSL Servers present in network
|
||||
HTTP requests to IPs in network
|
||||
|
||||
Run Query!
|
||||
|
||||
Certificate field search: %mail.ru
|
||||
Server IP: [REDACTED].181.14
|
||||
Client IP: [REDACTED].127
|
||||
Network: [REDACTED].0/24
|
||||
|
||||
General network info for: [REDACTED].0/24
|
||||
Geolocation (?):
|
||||
Country: KR (M)
|
||||
City: SEOUL (L)
|
||||
WHOIS info (?):
|
||||
Network: No results. Network type: No results.
|
||||
Company: No results. Domain: No results.
|
||||
AS info (?):
|
||||
Advertised by AS: No results. Found within network: No results.
|
||||
AS name: No results.
|
||||
DNS (?):
|
||||
|
||||
SSL clients in network: [REDACTED].0/24: (?):
|
||||
Tip 1: Right click on a client IP to explore it further!
|
||||
1-20 of 57 items 10 | 25 | 50 | 100 1 2 3
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
| Client IP | Client company info (from GEOFUSION export) | First seen | Last seen | Total SSL traffic w/e 25th Nov | Total SSL traffic all time | Num. unique servers contacted w/e 25th Nov | Num. unique servers contacted all time |
|
||||
| :------------- | :------------------------------------------ | :--------- | :--------- | :----------------------------- | :------------------------- | :----------------------------------------- | :------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| [REDACTED].9 | Korea_Telecom;mailplug.co.kr | 2011-09-04 | 2011-09-04 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
|
||||
| [REDACTED].23 | Korea_Telecom;mailplug.co.kr | 2011-10-26 | 2011-11-23 | 1 | 7 | 1 | 3 |
|
||||
| [REDACTED].29 | Korea_Telecom | 2011-10-22 | 2011-10-22 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
|
||||
| [REDACTED].32 | Korea_Telecom | 2011-11-16 | 2011-11-18 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 |
|
||||
| [REDACTED].36 | Korea_Telecom;mailplug.co.kr | 2011-11-19 | 2011-11-22 | 7 | 7 | 1 | 1 |
|
||||
| [REDACTED].38 | Korea_Telecom;mailplug.co.kr | 2011-10-14 | 2011-11-16 | 0 | 21 | 0 | 5 |
|
||||
| [REDACTED].41 | Korea_Telecom;mailplug.co.kr | 2011-10-24 | 2011-10-26 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 |
|
||||
| [REDACTED].42 | Korea_Telecom;mailplug.co.kr | 2011-10-21 | 2011-10-21 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
|
||||
| [REDACTED].57 | Korea_Telecom;mailplug.co.kr | 2011-11-09 | 2011-11-11 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 2 |
|
||||
| [REDACTED].62 | Korea_Telecom;mailplug.co.kr | 2011-09-09 | 2011-09-09 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
|
||||
| [REDACTED].64 | Korea_Telecom;mailplug.co.kr | 2011-10-12 | 2011-10-12 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
|
||||
| [REDACTED].70 | Korea_Telecom;mailplug.co.kr | 2011-10-08 | 2011-10-31 | 0 | 18 | 0 | 5 |
|
||||
| [REDACTED].76 | Korea_Telecom;mailplug.co.kr | 2011-10-14 | 2011-11-07 | 0 | 14 | 0 | 1 |
|
||||
| [REDACTED].82 | Korea_Telecom;mailplug.co.kr | 2011-11-15 | 2011-11-15 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 |
|
||||
| [REDACTED].86 | Korea_Telecom;mailplug.co.kr | 2011-11-18 | 2011-11-18 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
|
||||
| [REDACTED].87 | Korea_Telecom;mailplug.co.kr | 2011-11-12 | 2011-11-12 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
|
||||
| [REDACTED].93 | Korea_Telecom;mailplug.co.kr | 2011-11-04 | 2011-11-04 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 |
|
||||
| [REDACTED].99 | Korea_Telecom;mailplug.co.kr | 2011-10-25 | 2011-11-21 | 3 | 12 | 2 | 5 |
|
||||
| [REDACTED].103 | Korea_Telecom;mailplug.co.kr | 2011-09-05 | 2011-09-05 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
|
||||
| [REDACTED].105 | Korea_Telecom;mailplug.co.kr | 2011-11-03 | 2011-11-03 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
|
||||
|
||||
``
|
||||
All SSL servers in network: [REDACTED].0/24: (?)
|
||||
Tip 1: Right click on a server IP to explore it further!
|
||||
1-3 of 3 items 10 | 25 | 50 | 100 1
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
| Server IP | Server company info (from GEOFUSION export) | Last week seen: | % Paired clients that week | Num. unique clients that week | Num. unique clients all time |
|
||||
| :------------- | :------------------------------------------ | :-------------- | :------------------------- | :---------------------------- | :--------------------------- |
|
||||
| [REDACTED].18 | Korea_Telecom;mailplug.co.kr | 2011-11-11 | 0.0 | 1 | 1 |
|
||||
| [REDACTED].205 | test | 2011-12-09 | 0.0 | 1 | 1 |
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
HTTP requests to IPs in network: [REDACTED].0/24 (top 100) (?)
|
||||
Tip 1: Right click on a server IP to explore it as an SSL server!
|
||||
1-1 of 1 items 10 | 25 | 50 | 100 1
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
| Server IP | Host name requested | First seen | Last seen | Count last week | Count all time |
|
||||
| :------------ | :------------------ | :------------------ | :------------------ | :-------------- | :------------- |
|
||||
| [REDACTED].40 | [REDACTED].40 | 2011-10-30 20:00:00 | 2011-10-30 20:00:00 | 0 | 5 |
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
THIS INFORMATION IS EXEMPT UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 (FOIA) AND MAY BE EXEMPT UNDER OTHER UK INFORMATION LEGISLATION. REFER ANY FOIA QUERIES TO GCHQ ON [REDACTED]
|
||||
CONTAINS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNED AND/OR MANAGED BY GCHQ. THE MATERIAL MAY BE DISSEMINATED THROUGHOUT THE RECIPIENT ORGANISATION, BUT GCHQ PERMISSION MUST BE OBTAINED FOR DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE THE ORGANISATION.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## Cyber applications
|
||||
|
||||
* Diginotar certificate authority compromise :
|
||||
- Private keys of legitimate certificate authority, Diginotar, stolen by hacker.
|
||||
- FLYING PIG was used to identify a FIS using them to launch a MITM against their own citizens.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### How the attack was done:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
┌───────────────────┐
|
||||
│ │
|
||||
│ Legitimate Google │◄────────────────┐
|
||||
│ server │ │
|
||||
│ │ │
|
||||
└────────▲──────────┘ │
|
||||
│ │
|
||||
│ │
|
||||
│ │
|
||||
│ │
|
||||
│ │
|
||||
│ │
|
||||
│ │
|
||||
│ ┌───┴───┐
|
||||
│ │ │
|
||||
Non-target traffic │ MITM │
|
||||
│ │ │
|
||||
│ └───▲───┘
|
||||
│ │
|
||||
│ │
|
||||
│ │
|
||||
│ │
|
||||
│ │
|
||||
─────Google request────────────►┌───┴────┐ │
|
||||
│ │ │
|
||||
─────Google request────────────►│ Router ├─────────────────Target traffic
|
||||
│ │
|
||||
─────Google request────────────►└───▲────┘
|
||||
│
|
||||
│
|
||||
│
|
||||
[REDACTED].242
|
||||
Logs into router and adds static route for target traffic
|
||||
│
|
||||
│
|
||||
│
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
FLYING PIG screenshot showing fake certificate:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|
||||
| :-------------- | :------------------ | :------------------ | :-- | :--- | :------------------ | :------------------ | :------------ | :-- | :--------- | :------------------------ | :-- | :-------------- | :-- |
|
||||
| 308204303082039 | 2011-09-16 20:54:29 | 2011-10-20 17:14:05 | 0 | 3154 | 2011-09-05 06:05:49 | 2012-09-05 06:15:49 | *.google.com | us | google inc | zscaler | us | www.zscaler.com | Y |
|
||||
| 3082052A3082049 | 2011-10-11 16:56:45 | 2011-11-25 15:41:29 | 5 | 1214 | 2011-09-20 06:07:12 | 2012-09-20 06:17:12 | *.google.com | | | google internet authority | | | N |
|
||||
| 308204523082038 | 2011-11-11 02:30:27 | 2011-11-25 06:20:50 | 26 | 572 | 2011-11-02 21:08:36 | 2012-11-02 21:18:36 | *.google.com | us | google inc | zscaler | us | www.zscaler.com | Y |
|
||||
| 308202DA3082024 | 2011-11-01 01:23:06 | 2011-11-25 17:48:58 | 71 | 547 | 2010-09-02 07:56:28 | 2011-09-02 08:06:28 | *.google.com | us | google inc | sfibluecoat.sficorp.com | us | is | N |
|
||||
| 308204303082039 | 2011-08-25 13:03:12 | 2011-10-13 07:51:24 | 0 | 467 | 2011-08-12 03:49:02 | 2012-08-12 03:59:02 | *.google.com | us | google inc | zscaler | us | www.zscaler.com | Y |
|
||||
| 308205283082041 | 2011-08-19 21:04:42 | 2011-08-26 19:51:50 | 0 | 441 | 2011-07-10 19:06:30 | 2013-07-09 19:06:30 | google.com | us | google inc | diginotar public ca 2025 | nl | diginotar | N |
|
||||
| 308204AA3082039 | 2011-11-08 09:35:22 | 2011-11-25 15:00:37 | 173 | 440 | 2011-09-20 06:07:12 | 2012-09-20 06:17:12 | *.google.com | us | google inc | lorealinternetbrowsing | fr | loreal | N |
|
||||
| 30820464308203C | 2011-11-17 14:14:12 | 2011-11-25 05:13:34 | 436 | 438 | 2011-11-10 11:47:51 | 2012-11-10 11:47:51 | *.google.com | us | google inc | zscaler | us | www.zscaler.com | Y |
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
THIS INFORMATION IS EXEMPT UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 (FOIA) AND MAY BE EXEMPT UNDER OTHER UK INFORMATION LEGISLATION. REFER ANY FOIA QUERIES TO GCHQ ON [REDACTED]
|
||||
CONTAINS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNED AND/OR MANAGED BY GCHQ. THE MATERIAL MAY BE DISSEMINATED THROUGHOUT THE RECIPIENT ORGANISATION, BUT GCHQ PERMISSION MUST BE OBTAINED FOR DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE THE ORGANISATION.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## Cyber applications
|
||||
|
||||
* Other Cyber applications:
|
||||
- Multiple examples of FIS data exfiltration using SSL have been found using FLYING PIG.
|
||||
- In particular, certificates related to LEGION JADE, LEGION RUBY, and MAKERSMARK activity were found on FLYING PIG using known signatures
|
||||
- These were then used to find previously unknown servers involved in exfiltration from US companies.
|
||||
- FLYING PIG has also been used to identify events involving a mail server used by Russian Intelligence.
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
THIS INFORMATION IS EXEMPT UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 (FOIA) AND MAY BE EXEMPT UNDER OTHER UK INFORMATION LEGISLATION. REFER ANY FOIA QUERIES TO GCHQ ON [REDACTED]
|
||||
CONTAINS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNED AND/OR MANAGED BY GCHQ. THE MATERIAL MAY BE DISSEMINATED THROUGHOUT THE RECIPIENT ORGANISATION, BUT GCHQ PERMISSION MUST BE OBTAINED FOR DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE THE ORGANISATION.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## Identification of malicious TLS/SSL
|
||||
|
||||
- Can identify malicious TLS/SSL using signatures if known
|
||||
- However this approach generally does not allow discovery of new threats
|
||||
- Alternative is to use “behavioural” features to automatically identify potentially malicious traffic
|
||||
- Features currently being investigated include:
|
||||
- Certificates with same subject but different issuers – may be indicative of Diginotar-style attack
|
||||
- Beaconing in TLS/SSL (indicative of botnets/FIS implants)
|
||||
- Number of client cipher suites offered
|
||||
- Repeated identical random challenges
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
THIS INFORMATION IS EXEMPT UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 (FOIA) AND MAY BE EXEMPT UNDER OTHER UK INFORMATION LEGISLATION. REFER ANY FOIA QUERIES TO GCHQ ON [REDACTED]
|
||||
CONTAINS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNED AND/OR MANAGED BY GCHQ. THE MATERIAL MAY BE DISSEMINATED THROUGHOUT THE RECIPIENT ORGANISATION, BUT GCHQ PERMISSION MUST BE OBTAINED FOR DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE THE ORGANISATION.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## HUSH PUPPY – motivation
|
||||
|
||||
* Much private network traffic seen but previously discarded
|
||||
* If traffic could be attributed, potential high value – close access
|
||||
* HUSH PUPPY is a bulk private network identification Cloud analytic
|
||||
* Basic idea is to look for the same TDI being seen coming from a private address and then from a public address within a short time
|
||||
* The private traffic can then be attributed to the owner of the public address
|
||||
* Works for SSE & COMSAT
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
THIS INFORMATION IS EXEMPT UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 (FOIA) AND MAY BE EXEMPT UNDER OTHER UK INFORMATION LEGISLATION.
|
||||
REFER ANY FOIA QUERIES TO GCHQ ON [REDACTED]
|
||||
CONTAINS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNED AND/OR MANAGED BY GCHQ.
|
||||
THE MATERIAL MAY BE DISSEMINATED THROUGHOUT THE RECIPIENT ORGANISATION, BUT GCHQ PERMISSION MUST BE OBTAINED FOR DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE THE ORGANISATION.
|
||||
GCHQ
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## HUSH PUPPY – example
|
||||
|
||||
Yahoo
|
||||
Internet
|
||||
1.2.3.4
|
||||
Y cookie: fred@yahoo.com
|
||||
NAT or proxy
|
||||
request to Yahoo
|
||||
Private network
|
||||
Y cookie: fred@yahoo.com
|
||||
192.168.0.2
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
THIS INFORMATION IS EXEMPT UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 (FOIA) AND MAY BE EXEMPT UNDER OTHER UK INFORMATION LEGISLATION. REFER ANY FOIA QUERIES TO GCHQ ON [REDACTED]
|
||||
CONTAINS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNED AND/OR MANAGED BY GCHQ. THE MATERIAL MAY BE DISSEMINATED THROUGHOUT THE RECIPIENT ORGANISATION, BUT GCHQ PERMISSION MUST BE OBTAINED FOR DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE THE ORGANISATION.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## Other HUSH PUPPY datasets
|
||||
|
||||
* HUSH PUPPY also makes use of Yahoo T-cookies to do correlations
|
||||
* A T-cookie contains the IP address of the client as Yahoo sees it
|
||||
* Hence a T cookie coming from a private IP can give the public IP of the NAT or proxy
|
||||
* In addition, HUSH PUPPY uses the following data to help verify results
|
||||
* Kerberos & Lotus Notes: Domains, organisations, departments, countries, machine names, user names
|
||||
* HTTP: Heuristic detection of Intranet web servers
|
||||
* SSL: Issuers, subjects, countries
|
||||
* SMTP: From & to domains
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
THIS INFORMATION IS EXEMPT UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 (FOIA) AND MAY BE EXEMPT UNDER OTHER UK INFORMATION LEGISLATION. REFER ANY FOIA QUERIES TO GCHQ ON [REDACTED]
|
||||
CONTAINS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNED AND/OR MANAGED BY GCHQ. THE MATERIAL MAY BE DISSEMINATED THROUGHOUT THE RECIPIENT ORGANISATION, BUT GCHQ PERMISSION MUST BE OBTAINED FOR DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE THE ORGANISATION.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## Results – what do we find?
|
||||
|
||||
* Foreign government networks
|
||||
* Airlines
|
||||
* Energy companies
|
||||
* Financial organisations
|
||||
|
||||
* In cases of good collection, 50-80% of collected private network traffic has been attributed
|
||||
* Some false positives can arise if few events correlated, due to factors such as TDIs not being completely unique and public internet proxies giving misleading public IP results
|
||||
* Results can frequently be verified using Kerberos etc data
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
THIS INFORMATION IS EXEMPT UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 (FOIA) AND MAY BE EXEMPT UNDER OTHER UK INFORMATION LEGISLATION. REFER ANY FOIA QUERIES TO GCHQ ON [REDACTED]
|
||||
CONTAINS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNED AND/OR MANAGED BY GCHQ. THE MATERIAL MAY BE DISSEMINATED THROUGHOUT THE RECIPIENT ORGANISATION, BUT GCHQ PERMISSION MUST BE OBTAINED FOR DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE THE ORGANISATION.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## Examples of operational successes
|
||||
|
||||
* A large private network related to the Afghan government was identified, with ~800,000 events correlated.
|
||||
* Examination of the case notations suggested it belonged to the Afghan MOD
|
||||
- A Kerberos domain mod.local
|
||||
- HTTP servers *.mod.local & mail
|
||||
- SSL certificates with the subject "Ministry of Defense" and the geo "AF"
|
||||
* Results confirmed by analysis of content on XKEYSCORE
|
||||
* A VSAT private network belonging to a Ministry of Foreign Affairs was identified
|
||||
* NOSEY PARKER events were correlated with SSE
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
THIS INFORMATION IS EXEMPT UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 (FOIA) AND MAY BE EXEMPT UNDER OTHER UK INFORMATION LEGISLATION. REFER ANY FOIA QUERIES TO GCHQ ON [REDACTED]
|
||||
CONTAINS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNED AND/OR MANAGED BY GCHQ. THE MATERIAL MAY BE DISSEMINATED THROUGHOUT THE RECIPIENT ORGANISATION, BUT GCHQ PERMISSION MUST BE OBTAINED FOR DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE THE ORGANISATION.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
## Contacts
|
||||
|
||||
- FLYING PIG – [REDACTED]
|
||||
- HUSH PUPPY – [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
THIS INFORMATION IS EXEMPT UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 (FOIA) AND MAY BE EXEMPT UNDER OTHER UK INFORMATION LEGISLATION. REFER ANY FOIA QUERIES TO GCHQ ON [REDACTED]
|
||||
CONTAINS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNED AND/OR MANAGED BY GCHQ. THE MATERIAL MAY BE DISSEMINATED THROUGHOUT THE RECIPIENT ORGANISATION, BUT GCHQ PERMISSION MUST BE OBTAINED FOR DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE THE ORGANISATION.
|
||||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue