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{
"title": "Template:POISONNUT Product",
"type": "REPORTED",
"description": "An NSA WikiInfo page describing the POISONNUT ESP attack scheduling component — the internal software element responsible for determining whether a VPN key recovery attack can proceed, submitting it to the cryptanalytic processing infrastructure, correlating responses, and marking each attack attempt as successful or failed.",
"long_description": "This is a TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY NSA WikiInfo template page for a POISONNUT product component, published by Der Spiegel under the German title \"Erklärung des POISONNUT Produktes, um Angriffe auf VPN durchzuführen\" (\"Explanation of the POISONNUT product for conducting attacks on VPN\"). The page describes the internal software design of the ESP attack scheduling element within POISONNUT — the VPN Attack Orchestrator that forms the core of NSA's IPSec VPN key recovery capability under the LONGHAUL programme.\n\nThe component is responsible for scheduling ESP attacks, receiving incoming attack requests on the incomingESPAttack channel and outputting successful results on the successfulESPAttack channel. The design flowchart reveals a six-stage processing pipeline. First, a \"Can Attack\" determination checks whether sufficient Phase 1 IKE data is available to proceed with the current attack plan — if not, the request is routed to a cannotAttack path without marking the strategy as failed, leaving that decision to the calling component. If attack data is sufficient, a \"Submit Attack\" stage creates the attack command and submits it to the VRI with the appropriate resource from the attack strategy. A \"Submission to Output Correlator\" stage then correlates the Phase 1 IKE data with its VRI output using a correlation ID, with a timeout mechanism for cases where no VRI output is received. If the attack times out or is cancelled, a \"Cancel Attack\" message is sent to the VRI. An \"Attack Output Processor\" handles whatever the VRI returns — including no output in timeout cases — and marks the attack strategy as successful or failed. Finally, a \"Was Attack Successful\" check evaluates the result, potentially reusing the Phase 1 key material content-based router with different channel configuration.\nThe channel guide reveals the messaging architecture: all channels use Spring Integration Direct channels, with IKE Phase 1 data as the primary payload type flowing through the attack determination stages, and VRISubmission and VRIResponse objects flowing through the correlation stages. The document notes the component is implemented in the poisonnut-phaseprocessing-phaseattack Maven project, confirming POISONNUT was developed using standard enterprise Java tooling.\n\nThe metrics and issues sections are unpopulated template placeholders, suggesting this page was a living development document rather than a completed reference.\n\nTaken together, this document provides a rare view inside the actual software engineering of NSA's VPN decryption capability — showing that the attack orchestration pipeline was built as a modular, message-driven Java application with explicit handling for attack failures, timeouts and resource constraints, designed to manage large volumes of concurrent VPN key recovery attempts against the cryptanalytic processing infrastructure.",
"tags": [
"VPN exploitation",
"VPN decryption",
"VPN Attack Orchestrator",
"ESP attack",
"IKE",
"surveillance architecture",
"attack orchestration",
"key recovery",
"IPSec"
],
"document": {
"creator": "NSA",
"date_created": "",
"classification": [
"TOP SECRET",
"SI"
],
"dissemination": [
"REL TO USA, FVEY"
],
"banner": "TOP SECRET//SI-GAMMA/TALENT KEYHOLE//ORCON/PROPIN/RELIDO/REL TO USA, FVEY",
"genre": "wiki",
"programs": [
"POISONNUT"
],
"countries": [],
"people": []
},
"publication": [
{
"publisher": "Der Spiegel",
"date_published": "2014-12-28",
"title": "Prying Eyes: Inside the NSA's War on Internet Security",
"link": "https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/inside-the-nsa-s-war-on-internet-security-a-1010361.html",
"reporters": [
"Appelbaum, Jacob",
"Gibson, Aaron",
"Grothoff, Christian",
"Müller-Maguhn, Andy",
"Poitras, Laura",
"Sontheimer, Michael",
"Stöcker, Christian"
],
"contributors": [],
"doc_url": "https://cdn.prod.www.spiegel.de/media/0932ba67-0001-0014-0000-000000035524/media-35524.pdf"
}
],
"pdf_sha256": "95b7476893926e464b3b8f48fee2af01066bef0179669eb838ab9101dccf1f86",
"pages": 2
}