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{
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"title": "TURBULENCE - Fielded Capability: End-to-End VPN, SPIN 9 Design Review",
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"type": "REPORTED",
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"description": "An NSA SPIN 9 design review presentation describing the transition of TURMOIL's VPN decryption capability from the legacy Red Architecture to the new Blue Architecture — covering the full end-to-end dataflow, component interfaces, test scenarios and detailed processing specifications for each system in the VPN decryption pipeline.",
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"long_description": "This is a TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY TURBULENCE design review presentation. The document covers the SPIN 9 objectives, capabilities, dataflows, interfaces, test scenarios and detailed component specifications for TURMOIL's VPN decryption capability.\n\nAt the time of writing, all deployed VPN capabilities were running as SPIN 6 Red Architecture software on Red Architecture hardware at TEC and MHS Live only — YRS, SSO, MHS Dev had no VPN capability at all. SPIN 9's primary objective was to transition the entire capability to the Blue Architecture while redesigning the decryption flow to reallocate functionality between TURMOIL, the VPN Attack Orchestrator (VAO) and the VPN Metrics service. A key constraint is noted: SPIN 9 VPN identification and decryption capability would not deploy to Third Party TURMOIL sites, though metadata capability would deploy to all sites.\n\nThe document contains several notable features. First, it captures a transitional moment in the architecture — multiple references to WEALTHYCLUSTER 2.0 are struck through, indicating that the bundled decrypt path to WC2.0 was deprecated during SPIN 9 in favour of the sessionized decrypt path to XKEYSCORE. The TRANSFORM+FORWARD tasking option that previously sent decrypted traffic to WC2.0 was eliminated. However the interface table (VPN14) still lists a \"Bundled Decrypt\" path from TML Home to \"TEC WC2.0\" via MAILORDER, suggesting the TEC retained WC2.0 connectivity even as it was being phased out elsewhere.\n\nSecond, this document provides the explicit expansion of TGIF as \"The Grand Input Format\" — the format in which IKE metadata is delivered to TOYGRIPPE. The TOYGRIPPE section confirms it accepts TGIF files sent by MAILORDER as bundled tar files, with TOYGRIPPE 3.2 storing PPTP and IPSec VPN metadata for analyst access via a web browser interface.\n\nThird, the component descriptions provide rare functional detail on each system in the pipeline. TUBE defragments sessions, examines BME tags to determine PWV routing, and wraps multiple objects into single MAILORDER files to reduce file count. EXOPUMP extracts metadata from SOTF records and converts them to PWV XML metadata objects. PRESSUREWAVE hosts a persistent standing query from the VPN Analytic — when new metadata arrives matching the query, the analytic is notified and pulls IKE packets for TGIF conversion. The VAO generates ESP Security Association cryptovariables from IKE packets, matches CV requests with generated CVs, and notes that it requests multiple ESP packets per session. XKEYSCORE receives sessionized decrypted traffic in SOTF format, archives content, databases metadata for analyst query, performs keyword scanning, optionally forwards selected data to PINWALE, and sends presence tips to TRAFFICTHIEF.\n\nThe full interface table lists 14 numbered VPN interfaces (VPN1 through VPN14) with source, destination, content type, format, schema reference and transport mechanism for each, providing the most complete published specification of how data flows between TURMOIL, KEYCARD, PIQ Blade, VAO, TUBE, EXOPUMP, PRESSUREWAVE, XKEYSCORE, TOYGRIPPE and WC2.0.\n\nThe VPN-specific BME tag table documents ten metadata tags used to track decrypted VPN sessions through the processing pipeline, including the vpnID UUID, protocol namespace, ESP SPI, IKE cookie, IKE payload and survey flag — the fields that allow analysts and downstream systems to identify, query and route VPN-derived intelligence.\n\nThe test scenario section documents both sunny day and failure scenarios including VAO timeout, key response after TDS hold time expiry, ESP collected without IKE, IKE collected without ESP, and concurrent VPN sessions — providing insight into the operational failure modes engineers had to design around.\n\nTaken together this is the most comprehensive single-document description of the TURMOIL VPN decryption pipeline published in the Snowden archive, covering architecture, interfaces, component behaviour, metadata schema and test requirements in a single presentation.",
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"tags": [
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"VPN exploitation",
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"VPN decryption",
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"contact chaining",
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"TLS",
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"SSL",
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"Blue Architecture",
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"Red Architecture",
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"IPSec",
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"IKE",
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"ISAKMP",
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"ESP",
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"VPN Attack Orchestrator",
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"SIGDEV",
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"strong selectors"
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],
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"document": {
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"creator": "NSA",
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"date_created": "",
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"classification": [
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"TOP SECRET",
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"COMINT"
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],
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"dissemination": [
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"REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL"
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],
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"banner": "TOPSECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR,NZL//20320108",
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"genre": "slides",
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"programs": [
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"TURBULENCE",
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"TURMOIL",
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"KEYCARD",
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"WEALTHYCLUSTER",
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"TUBE",
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"XKEYSCORE",
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"PRESSUREWAVE",
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"EXOPUMP",
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"PWV",
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"TOYGRIPPE",
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"PICARESQUE",
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"AGILITY",
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"MAILORDER",
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"ISLANDTRANSPORT",
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"PIQBLADE",
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"PINWALE",
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"TRAFFICTHIEF",
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"IBRIDGE",
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"PPF",
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"METROTUBE",
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"FIP",
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"SSO"
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],
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"countries": [],
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"people": []
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},
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"publication": [
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{
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"publisher": "Der Spiegel",
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"date_published": "2014-12-28",
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"title": "Prying Eyes: Inside the NSA's War on Internet Security",
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"link": "https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/inside-the-nsa-s-war-on-internet-security-a-1010361.html",
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"reporters": [
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"Appelbaum, Jacob",
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"Gibson, Aaron",
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"Grothoff, Christian",
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"Müller-Maguhn, Andy",
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"Poitras, Laura",
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"Sontheimer, Michael",
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"Stöcker, Christian"
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],
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"contributors": [],
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"doc_url": "https://cdn.prod.www.spiegel.de/media/7783c6da-0001-0014-0000-000000035529/media-35529.pdf"
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}
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],
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"pdf_sha256": "3b73f559d5bce1088c27633ff0b1cab3a3eb0f1abce8fd8bbaecad7978a24dae",
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"pages": 47
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}
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