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data/spiegel_-_media-35532/metadata.json
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{
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"title": "BULLRUN",
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"type": "REPORTED",
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"description": "A GCHQ TOP SECRET STRAP1 briefing presentation on BULLRUN — summarising the programme's purpose, the network security technologies it targets, the sensitivities surrounding cryptanalytic capabilities, and the access control framework protecting both technical details and the \"fact of\" capability — notable for explicitly naming three ECIs protecting the technical underpinnings: PICARESQUE, PAWLEYS and AMBULANT.",
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"long_description": "This is a TOP SECRET STRAP1 GCHQ presentation on BULLRUN produced by PTD — Penetrating Target Defences — whose motto is stated on every slide as \"We penetrate targets' defences.\"\n\nThe presentation covers five topics. First, BULLRUN's scope: the ability to defeat encryption in specific network communications, covering SSL/TLS, SSH, encrypted chat, VPNs, encrypted VoIP and PPTP. Second, the context: a quote from a 2010 NSA briefing to GCHQ staff stating that NSA has led \"an aggressive, multi-pronged effort to break widely used Internet encryption technologies\" for the past decade, that cryptanalytic capabilities are \"coming on line,\" that \"vast amounts of encrypted Internet data which have up till now been discarded are now exploitable,\" and that major new processing systems, SIGDEV efforts and tasking must be put in place to capitalise on this. Third, the sensitivities: cryptanalytic capabilities are extremely difficult and costly to acquire, require long lead times, depend on sensitive sources, are very fragile, and if lost may never be regained — critically, even knowledge of the \"fact of\" a capability is sensitive because an adversary who knows what can or cannot be broken can evade collection without needing to know technical details.\n\nOne of the most significant slide is the one on protecting BULLRUN capabilities, which establishes a two-tier protection structure. Technical and operational details are protected by established ECIs and need be known only by cryptanalysts and those enabling cryptanalysis. Three ECIs are explicitly named: PICARESQUE, PAWLEYS and AMBULANT — followed by an ellipsis indicating there are more. Other published Snowden documents reveal that the full set of BULLRUN-related ECIs includes at least nine: APERIODIC, AMBULANT, AUNTIE, PAINTEDEAGLE, PAWLEYS, PITCHFORD, PENDLETON, PICARESQUE and PIEDMONT. Each covers a distinct method of attacking encryption. PICARESQUE, known from VALIANTSURF and TURMOIL documents, covers NSA's passive cryptanalytic capabilities against VPN and SSL/TLS traffic on bulk collection systems. PAWLEYS (PAW) protects clandestine HUMINT and CNE operations specifically intended to obtain cryptographic material — in practice, operations where NSA hacks into a target's systems or runs human sources specifically to steal encryption keys or break cryptographic systems, with CIA as the primary partner. AMBULANT (AMB) protects sensitive SIGINT Enabling relationships — the covert arrangements with technology companies to insert backdoors or weaken commercial encryption products — sitting under the broader ABEYANT umbrella programme alongside APERIODIC, AUNTIE and FIRSTDOWN. The three ECIs named on this slide therefore represent three fundamentally different methods of attacking encryption: passive mathematical cryptanalysis at scale (PICARESQUE), active covert operations to steal keys (PAWLEYS), and industry collaboration to weaken products before they reach targets (AMBULANT). The \"fact of\" information — which needs to be known widely within the SIGINT production chain — is protected separately by the BULLRUN Secure Community of Interest rather than by individual ECIs.\n\nThe implementation slide confirms BULLRUN was implemented at NSA and CSEC at the time of writing, with DSD and GCSB to follow, and explicitly states it is \"not to be shared with UK Partners / customers\" — a notable constraint given GCHQ's extensive domestic partnerships. The examples slide maps the three-tier classification structure to specific protection levels using abbreviated STRAP notation: SECRET STRAP1 for unspecified capabilities against named technology classes, TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT for capabilities against encryption used in specific technology classes, and TOP SECRET STRAP2 BULLRUN for capabilities against specific applications.",
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"tags": [
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"PTD",
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"ECI",
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"COI",
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"Secure Community of Interest",
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"CSEC",
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"DSD",
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"GCSB",
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"SSL",
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"TLS",
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"SSH",
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"HTTP",
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"VPNs",
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"IPSec",
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"PPTP",
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"encrypted chat",
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"encrypted VoIP",
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"cryptanalysis",
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"SIGINT enabling",
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"industry backdoor",
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"key theft",
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"Computer Network Exploitation",
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"clandestine HUMINT",
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"fact of capability",
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"indoctrination",
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"access control",
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"classification guide",
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"VPN decryption",
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"VPN exploitation"
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],
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"document": {
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"creator": "GCHQ",
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"date_created": "",
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"classification": [
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"TOP SECRET",
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"STRAP 1"
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],
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"dissemination": [],
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"banner": "TOP SECRET STRAP1",
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"genre": "slides",
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"programs": [
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"BULLRUN",
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"PICARESQUE",
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"PAWLEYS",
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"AMBULANT"
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],
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"countries": [],
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"people": []
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},
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"publication": [
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{
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"publisher": "Der Spiegel",
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"date_published": "2014-12-28",
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"title": "Prying Eyes: Inside the NSA's War on Internet Security",
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"link": "https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/inside-the-nsa-s-war-on-internet-security-a-1010361.html",
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"reporters": [
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"Appelbaum, Jacob",
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"Gibson, Aaron",
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"Grothoff, Christian",
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"Müller-Maguhn, Andy",
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"Poitras, Laura",
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"Sontheimer, Michael",
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"Stöcker, Christian"
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],
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"contributors": [],
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"doc_url": "https://cdn.prod.www.spiegel.de/media/f94a2e13-0001-0014-0000-000000035532/media-35532.pdf"
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}
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],
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"pdf_sha256": "02a7d15051d59497ef28c51ab7dfc32affcf680277e4933f934cd88650ad568b",
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"pages": 10
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}
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data/spiegel_-_media-35532/spiegel_-_media-35532.md
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TOP SECRET STRAP1
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# BULLRUN
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[REDACTED]
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PTD Lead for Special Operations and Policy
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PTD "We penetrate targets' defences."
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GCHQ
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This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
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© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
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---
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TOP SECRET STRAP1
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## BULLRUN
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* Covers the ability to defeat encryption used in specific network communications
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* Includes multiple, extremely sensitive, sources and methods
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PTD "We penetrate targets' defences."
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GCHQ
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This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
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© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
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---
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TOP SECRET STRAP1
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## Network Security Technologies
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* Secure Sockets Layer/Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS) (webmail)
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* Secure Shell (SSH)
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* Encrypted chat
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* Virtual Private Networks (VPNs)
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* Encrypted VoIP
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PTD "We penetrate targets' defences."
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GCHQ
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This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
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© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
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---
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TOP SECRET STRAP1
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## Response to improving security
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* For the past decade, NSA has lead an aggressive, multi-pronged effort to break widely used Internet encryption technologies
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* Cryptanalytic capabilities are now coming on line
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* Vast amounts of encrypted Internet data which have up till now been discarded are now exploitable
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* Major new processing systems, SIGDEV efforts and tasking must be put in place to capitalize on this opportunity
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PTD "We penetrate targets' defences."
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GCHQ
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This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
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© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
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---
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TOP SECRET STRAP1
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## Sensitivities
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* Cryptanalytic capabilities
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* Are extremely difficult and costly to acquire
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* Require a long lead time
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* Depend on sensitive sources
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* Are very fragile
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* If lost, may never be regained
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* The mere “fact of” a capability is very sensitive:
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* An adversary who knows what we can/cannot break is able to elude our capabilities even without knowing the technical details of how the capabilities work
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PTD "We penetrate targets' defences.”
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GCHQ
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This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
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© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
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---
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TOP SECRET STRAP1
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## Protecting BULLRUN Capabilities
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* Technical and operational details
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* Need to be known only by cryptanalysts and those who enable cryptanalysis
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* Protected by established ECI's
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* PICARESQUE, PAWLEYS, AMBULANT, ...
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* "Fact of” information
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* Needs to be known very widely within the SIGINT production chain
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* Protect with new secure community of interest (COI)
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PTD "We penetrate targets' defences.”
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GCHQ
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This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
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© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
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---
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TOP SECRET STRAP1
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## Protecting the Info – Secure COI
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* Secure Community of Interest (COI) – protects "fact of” as well as volume and scope of the capability
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* BULLRUN indoctrination required for access to COI
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* BULLRUN-related material, data – decrypted content and decrypted metadata, and details must be protected within the COI
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PTD "We penetrate targets' defences.”
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GCHQ
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This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
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© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
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---
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TOP SECRET STRAP1
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## Protecting the information
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* BULLRUN is for internal (Sigint) use only
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* Implemented at NSA &CSEC; DSD & GCSB to follow
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* Not to be shared with UK Partners / customers
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* EP not to reveal sources & methods; further guidance to be developed
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* BULLRUN brief on Gcwiki for reference
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PTD "We penetrate targets' defences."
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GCHQ
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This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
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© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
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---
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TOP SECRET STRAP1
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## Examples
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* (S S1) Unspecified capabilities against [VPNs, IPSEC, TLS/SSL, HTTPS, SSH, PPTP, eChat, eVoIP]
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* (TS S1 COMINT) Capabilities against the encryption used in [VPNs, IPSEC, TLS/SSL, HTTPS, SSH, PPTP, eChat, eVoIP]
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* (TS S2 BULLRUN) Capability against specific applications
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PTD "We penetrate targets' defences."
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GCHQ
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This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
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© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
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---
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TOP SECRET STRAP1
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## BULLRUN Bottom Line
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* Groundbreaking capabilities
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* Extremely fragile
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* Do not ask about or speculate on sources or methods underpinning BULLRUN successes
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* Indoctrination required for access to secure COI
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PTD "We penetrate targets' defences."
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GCHQ
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This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
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© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
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